

SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL DYNAMICS
OF CIVIL RESISTANCE IN WAR
CONTEXTS

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Dissertation Summary

Civil wars and intrastate conflicts are characterized by the armed confrontation between the government of a sovereign nation state and at least one non-state group. Accordingly, conflict research has traditionally put an emphasis on analyzing the dynamics of violence between these actors. Recent findings yet suggest that civil war contexts are also increasingly characterized by another type of—mostly nonviolent—behavior: Non-combatants like social movement organizations and local communities, but also armed actors themselves occasionally rely on methods of civil resistance like street protests or general strikes. These behavioral patterns present a fundamental puzzle: Why do rebel groups that normally rely on armed tactics resort to these rather atypical forms of resistance? And how can we explain that civilians even in these highly threatening environments manage to organize collective action in order to articulate their demands?

This dissertation addresses the puzzle from a particular angle: Although a nascent strand of research has examined the occurrence of wartime protests, the influence of conflict-endogenous factors on these phenomena has hitherto been largely neglected. We know that wartime violence within individual conflicts usually shows enormous variation—both on a spatial and a temporal level. We also know that these dynamics in turn can yield a strong impact on the further development of conflicts. The aim of this dissertation is to examine the effect of conflict-endogenous factors on the spatial and temporal distribution of civil resistance. I thereby focus on the use of respective tactics both by armed rebel groups and by civilians actors.

I pursue this overarching research aim in the course of a cumulative dissertation consisting of four individual research papers. The first study deals with the question how the spatial and temporal variation of wartime violence can explain the local emergence of protests and strikes. The paper argues that increased local battle activity typically correlates on the one hand with situations in which neither conflict party enjoys full territorial control. This in turn can open *opportunities*

for civil resistance. On the other hand, battle-related experiences and impacts can lead to surging *grievances* among the local population, eventually motivating them to organize protests. With an analysis based on geo-referenced event data, the paper demonstrates a significant relationship between the spatial and temporal variation of battle activity on the one hand and the emergence of protests and strikes on the other hand.

The second research paper deals with civil resistance mobilization through armed non-state actors. The central argument of this chapter is that short-term battle-related losses on the part of rebels increase their likelihood to organize general strikes in order to signal continued authority and control. This conjectured relationship is tested with the example of the conflict between the Government of India and Maoist rebels. The results of statistical analyses on a spatially and temporally disaggregated level suggest that rebel casualties increase the likelihood for a rebel-initiated general strike in the upcoming week to occur. The assumed mechanism is examined with further qualitative evidence, the testing of alternative explanations, and an event study.

The third research paper widens the scope to the post-conflict period. The underlying assumption is that conflict dynamics not only affect protest occurrence *during* the war itself, but also echo to the tense and fragile situation in which societies often find themselves after the war has ended. This study focuses in particular on protests in the course of power-sharing agreements: These provisions constitute a frequently used component in peace agreements with the aim to contain societal conflicts institutionally and eventually prevent countries to relapse into war. However, power-sharing arrangements can also lead to new social conflicts. This study approaches the topic using geo-referenced data on protests for African post-conflict societies, which is matched with data on the geographic distribution of socially relevant groups (here defined in terms of ethnicity). The results suggest that concrete implementation steps of power-sharing arrangements in post-conflict societies correlate with an increased likelihood of protest occurrence. Moreover, the study finds that protest likelihood is particularly increased for groups that were represented by a rebel group during the preceding civil war.

The fourth and final research paper focuses on the post-conflict period as well and examines how wartime experiences affect individual protest behavior after the end of the war. The research interest is approached with survey data that has been collected shortly after the end of fighting between the *Lord's Resistance Army* and the government within Uganda. The study has two central implications: First, I find a significant relationship between the local intensity of wartime violence

and the likelihood of individuals to engage in protests. Second, further statistical analyses corroborate the assumption that this relationship can be traced to a reinforcement of group-based *grievances*.

To sum up, the results of the four studies show a strong relationship between spatial and temporal conflict dynamics on the one hand and the occurrence of civil resistance on the other hand. This evidence applies to both the use of civil resistance by armed non-state actors and by local populations. With the examination of the influence of conflict-endogenous processes, these results contribute to a thriving strand of literature in conflict research that puts an emphasis on the investigation of civil resistance in war contexts.

Zusammenfassung der Dissertation

Bürgerkriege und innerstaatliche Konflikte sind gekennzeichnet durch die bewaffnete Auseinandersetzung zwischen der Regierung eines souveränen Nationalstaats und mindestens einer nicht-staatlichen Gruppe. Dementsprechend bildete die Betrachtung von Gewaltdynamiken zwischen diesen Akteuren traditionell den Schwerpunkt in der klassischen Bürgerkriegsforschung. Neuere Erkenntnisse legen jedoch nahe, dass eine weitere Form zumeist gewaltfreier Verhaltensmuster verstärkt auch in Bürgerkriegskontexten anzutreffen ist: Akteure, die nicht aktiv am Kriegsgeschehen beteiligt sind wie Soziale Bewegungen oder lokale Gemeinschaften, aber auch bewaffnete Gruppen wenden vereinzelt Formen zivilen Widerstands wie Straßenproteste oder Generalstreiks an. Diese Verhaltensmuster stellen grundsätzlich ein Rätsel dar: Warum greifen Rebellengruppen, deren Taktiken normalerweise von bewaffneten Aktionen gekennzeichnet sind, auf diese für sie im Grunde untypische Form des Widerstands zurück? Und wie ist es auf der anderen Seite zu erklären, dass zivile Akteure es selbst unter diesen enorm bedrohlichen Bedingungen vermögen, Formen kollektiven Handelns zu organisieren um ihren Forderungen Nachdruck zu verleihen?

Die vorliegende Dissertation nähert sich diesem Rätsel unter einem spezifischen Gesichtspunkt an: Trotz einer aufkeimenden Forschung zum Auftreten von Protesten in Bürgerkriegen wurde der Einfluss konflikt-endogener Faktoren bislang wenig untersucht. So wissen wir, dass das Auftreten von Bürgerkriegsgewalt innerhalb einzelner Konflikte in der Regel stark variiert—sowohl in räumlicher, als auch in zeitlicher Hinsicht. Wir wissen ebenfalls, dass diese Dynamiken ihrerseits einen starken Einfluss auf den Fortgang des weiteren Konfliktgeschehens haben können.

Ziel dieser Dissertation ist es, den Effekt dieser konflikt-endogenen Faktoren auf die räumliche und zeitliche Verteilung zivilen Widerstands zu untersuchen. Dabei fokussiert diese Arbeit auf die Nutzung entsprechender Taktiken sowohl von Seiten bewaffneter Rebellengruppen, als auch durch zivile Akteure.

Das übergeordnete Forschungsvorhaben wird in der vorliegenden kumulativen Dissertation durch vier individuelle Studien (bzw. Forschungspapiere) adressiert. Die erste Studie widmet sich der Frage, inwieweit die räumliche und zeitliche Verteilung von Bürgerkriegsgewalt das lokale Auftreten von Protesten und Streiks erklären kann. Das Kernargument lautet, dass erhöhte Kampfhandlungen einerseits häufig mit Situationen unvollständiger lokaler Kontrolle für die Konfliktparteien einhergehen, wodurch sich wiederum die Möglichkeiten (*opportunities*) für zivilen Widerstand erhöhen können. Andererseits verstärken die Erfahrungen und Auswirkungen bewaffneter Auseinandersetzungen *grievances* auf Seiten der lokalen Bevölkerung, wodurch sich die Bereitschaft zu Protesten erhöht. Mithilfe einer auf geolokalisierte Ereignisdaten gestützten Analyse zeigt das Papier auf, dass zwischen der räumlichen und zeitlichen Verteilung von Kampfhandlungen und dem Aufkommen von Protesten und Streiks ein systematischer Zusammenhang besteht.

Das zweite Forschungspapier beschäftigt sich mit der Mobilisierung zu zivilem Widerstand durch bewaffnete nicht-staatliche Akteure. Ich argumentiere, dass eine kurzfristige Zunahme kriegsbedingter Verluste seitens der Rebellen die Wahrscheinlichkeit erhöht, dass diese lokale Generalstreiks organisieren, um ein Fortbestehen lokaler Autorität und Kontrolle zu signalisieren. Dieser angenommene Zusammenhang wird anhand des Konflikts zwischen der indischen Regierung und maoistischen Rebellen überprüft. Die Ergebnisse statistischer Analysen auf einer räumlich und zeitlich desaggregierten Ebene deuten darauf hin, dass Rebellenverluste die Wahrscheinlichkeit auf einen durch Rebellen initiierten Generalstreik in der Folgewoche erhöhen. Der vermutete Mechanismus wird mithilfe qualitativer Evidenz, dem Testen alternativer Erklärungen, sowie einer *Event Study* plausibilisiert.

Das dritte Forschungspapier erweitert den Blick auf die Nachkriegsperiode. Die zugrundeliegende Annahme ist, dass Gewaltdynamiken nicht bloß eine unmittelbare Auswirkung auf Protestgeschehen *innerhalb* des Konflikts haben, sondern auch in der besonders angespannten und fragilen Lage nach dem Ende des Krieges nachhallen. In dieser Untersuchung steht insbesondere die Auswirkung auf Proteste im Zuge von Machtteilungsabkommen im Mittelpunkt: Diese bilden ein häufig verwendetes Instrument in Friedensabkommen mit dem Ziel, gesellschaftliche Konfliktlinien institutionell einzuhegen, um letztlich ein Wiederauftreten des

Krieges zu verhindern. Allerdings können Machtteilungsabkommen ihrerseits neue gesellschaftliche Konflikte hervorrufen. Mit einer Studie, die geolokalisierte Protestdaten für afrikanische Nachkriegsgesellschaften mit Daten zur geografischen Verteilung gesellschaftlich relevanter Gruppen (hier: auf ethnischer Ebene) kombiniert nähert sich diese Studie dem Untersuchungsgegenstand an. Die Ergebnisse legen nahe, dass konkrete Implementierungsschritte von Machtteilungsabkommen in Nachkriegsgesellschaften mit einer erhöhten Wahrscheinlichkeit für das Auftreten von Protesten einhergehen. Ferner fördert die Untersuchung zu Tage, dass die Protestwahrscheinlichkeit insbesondere bei jenen Gruppen verstärkt auftritt, die während des Bürgerkriegs durch eine Rebellenorganisation vertreten wurden.

Das vierte und letzte Forschungspapier legt den Fokus ebenfalls auf die Nachkriegsperiode und untersucht, inwieweit Kriegserfahrungen individuelles Protestverhalten nach dem Ende des Konflikts beeinflussen. Mithilfe von Umfragedaten, die kurz nach dem Ende der Kampfhandlungen zwischen der *Lord's Resistance Army* und der Regierung innerhalb Ugandas erhoben wurden, wird sich diesem Forschungsinteresse angenähert. Die Studie enthält zwei zentrale Implikationen: Zum einen kann festgestellt werden, dass ein signifikanter Zusammenhang zwischen der lokalen Intensität von Bürgerkriegsgewalt und der Protestbereitschaft von Individuen nach dem Ende des Krieges besteht. Zum anderen kann diese Korrelation durch weitergehende statistische Verfahren auf eine Verstärkung gruppenbasierter *grievances* zurückgeführt werden.

Zusammenfassend legen die Ergebnisse der vier Studien nahe, dass ein starker Zusammenhang zwischen räumlichen und zeitlichen Konfliktodynamiken auf der einen Seite und dem Auftreten von Protesten und Streiks auf der anderen Seite besteht. Dieser Befund zeigt sich für die Nutzung von zivilem Widerstand sowohl seitens bewaffneter nichtstaatlicher Akteure, als auch von Seiten der lokalen Zivilbevölkerung. Durch die Untersuchung des Einflusses konflikt-endogener Prozesse tragen die Ergebnisse zu einem wachsenden Literaturstrang in der Bürgerkriegsforschung bei, der das Phänomen zivilen Widerstands in Kriegskontexten verstärkt in den Mittelpunkt der Betrachtung stellt.

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Abbreviations

ACD Armed Conflict Dataset.

ACD2EPR Armed Conflict Dataset-to-Ethnic Power Relations.

ACLED Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

CPI-Maoist Communist Party of India-Maoist.

EPR Ethnic Power Relations data set.

ETA Euskadi Ta Askatasuna / Basque Fatherland and Freedom.

FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia / Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.

FMLN Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional / Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front.

FSLN Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional / Sandinista National Liberation Front.

GADM Database of Global Administrative Areas.

GAM Gerakan Aceh Merdeka / Free Aceh Movement.

GED Georeferenced Event Data.

GeoEPR Georeferenced Ethnic Power Relations data set.

GROWup Geographical Research on War, Unified Platform.

IDP Internally Displaced Person.

LRA Lord's Resistance Army.

LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

PKK Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê / Kurdistan Workers' Party.

PSED Power-Sharing Event Dataset.

SCAD Social Conflict Analysis Database / Social Conflict in Africa Database.

SIDE Spatially Interpolated Data on Ethnicity.

SPLM/A Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army.

SRDP Strategies of Resistance Data Project.

UCDP Uppsala Conflict Data Program.

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Chapter 1

Introduction

Civil wars and intrastate armed conflicts remain a persistent challenge in global politics.¹ After a period of relative decline since the mid-1990s, violent confrontations between state governments and armed non-state groups have resurged after 2011, peaking at an unprecedented number of 53 active armed conflicts in 2019 (see solid line in Fig. 1.1). But not only did civil wars become more prevalent in recent years. A dramatic increase of battle-related casualties since 2011 also bears witness to a surge of conflict severity that has taken place alongside the proliferation of wars. Fig. 1.1 shows both the frequency and intensity of conflicts next to each other, demonstrating that the latter's increase is also substantial in relative terms. After having reached a total of over 104,500 battle-related deaths in 2014—the highest figure in the post-Cold War period—, conflict severity has waned on the aggregate level in the following years. Nonetheless, as of 2018, the total number of battle-related deaths has still remained on a level far higher than at any point between 1991 and 2011. At the same time, civilians have carried the major burden of war-related violence. Both civilian casualties in the course of government-rebel clashes and targeted assaults on civilians have constantly accompanied conflicts and civil wars in the past decades (Pettersson, Davies, et al. 2021).

At a first glance, these trends suggest at least two implications: First, the developments apparently corroborate the commonplace assumption that violence continues to dominate (and in fact define) the behavior of the relevant actors in conflicts. With the overall number of war-related casualties increasing, it is even plausible to conclude that the study of violent interactions between the belligerents

¹ I will use the terms 'civil wars' and 'intrastate armed conflicts' interchangeably throughout this dissertation unless stated otherwise. A definition and disambiguation of the terms is provided in the subsequent section.




Fig. 1.1. Annual number of intrastate armed conflicts, 1946-2020, and battle-related deaths, 1989-2018. *Source: Own illustration based on UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD) v.21.1 and the Battle-Related Deaths data set v.19.1.*

is more important than ever if we want to understand conflict dynamics. Second, the increased victimization of and threats posed to civilians through indirect (i.e., battle-related) or direct (i.e., targeted) violence might suggest that the space of action for civil society in war contexts is severely constrained. As a consequence, one might conclude that there is no room conceivable for civilians to play any discernible role as independent actors in war contexts—at least from an analytic perspective.

And yet, the before-mentioned conflict trajectories have also been accompanied by two noteworthy observations that at least qualify these inferences. On the one hand, recent findings in conflict research have increasingly pointed to actor behavior in civil wars that is *not* solely characterized by the use of violence. In particular, scholars have found rebel groups with some degree of territorial control to occasionally develop state-like governance structures, including the provision of public services to the civilian population (Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly 2015; Cunningham and Loyle 2020; Mampilly 2011). Some insurgents such as Nepal’s Maoists established own judicial systems (Loyle and Binningsbø 2016; Loyle 2020), while Uganda’s *National Resistance Army* (Kasfir 2005) held elections in their areas of influence. Other groups like the *Free Aceh Movement* (GAM) in Indone-

sia's Aceh province occasionally granted civilian self-administration (Breslawski 2020) and forged alliances with local civil society groups (Barter 2015). In some instances, we even observe otherwise militant actors to engage in tactics typically associated with social movement organizations—methods of civil resistance like demonstrations, blockades or strikes (Keller 2017). It needs to be emphasized here that not all armed groups show these behavioral patterns. And even for those that do, violent tactics involving the use of armed force typically remain central. However, the unlikely incidence with which militant groups additionally engage in nonviolent behavior during civil wars is surprising and suggests that a sole consideration of *violent* actions may be insufficient to fully grasp conflict dynamics in many cases.

A second observation concerns the role of civil society during wartime. Although we might assume civilian activism to be deterred under the conditions of extreme violence, experiences from different conflict contexts suggest otherwise. From revolutionary conflicts in Colombia (Masullo 2015; Kaplan 2017) and El Salvador (Wood 2003) over secessionist campaigns in Indonesia's Aceh province (Barter 2017) and Northern Ireland (Grubb 2019), to even extremely intense civil wars such as the ones in Syria (Pearlman 2019) and Afghanistan (Zürcher 2019), evidence abounds on communities and movement organizations that have actively confronted armed actors with methods of civil resistance. In some cases, civil society activism has even been instrumental in conflict resolution and peace processes (Paffenholz 2014; Nilsson 2012), as demonstrated by mediation efforts of religious leaders in Uganda (Esuruku 2019) or traditional conflict resolution approaches in Somalia (Menkhaus 2000).

These examples of wartime civilian activism are by no means isolated incidents. The dashed line in Fig. 1.2 plots the annual number of nonviolent protests, riots and strikes that were recorded *during* active conflict episodes (following the *Uppsala Conflict Data Program* (UCDP) criteria) for African countries in the *Social Conflict Analysis Database* (SCAD) from 1990 to 2017. These events encompass non-military forms of resistance revolving around a variety of subjects, some of them related to conflict processes, and some of them dealing with issues that are not immediately connected to war violence like elections, labor disputes, or price hikes of essential commodities. The relevant implication is here that civil society organizations and local communities are apparently not apathetic during wartime, but to the contrary frequently stage protests and strikes even in the midst of fighting. If we take the solid line for comparison, which shows the




Fig. 1.2. Conflict intensity and civil resistance in ongoing armed conflicts in Africa, 1990-2017. *Source: Own illustration based on UCDP Battle-Related Deaths data set v.19.1. and Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD) v.3.3.*

annual battle-related deaths for the same time period in Africa, we can easily see that higher conflict severity—at least on the aggregate—appears in fact not to correlate with lower protest activity.

Taken together, these insights point to two central assertions underpinning the motivation of this dissertation. First, wartime interactions are not *solely* confined to violent behavior, but rather encompass a larger set of relevant tactics including methods of civil resistance. Second, conflict dynamics are not restricted to dyadic interactions between the belligerents, but civilians can in fact play a crucial role as actors in their own right. Yet given the developments outlined at the beginning, these observations appear puzzling: How can we explain that armed groups apparently show an increased tactical variation that also includes nonviolent forms of contention, even though the aggregate figures suggest violent tactics to become even more dominant? And why do unarmed civilians become active during wartime, even though the general trend suggests conflict contexts to become increasingly hostile environments for civilian activism?

These questions reflect an empirical as much as a theoretical puzzle. In the past years, our understanding about non-military behavior during civil wars—be it from otherwise armed actors or civilians—has constantly grown. Yet we still

know little about how factors related to the conflict dynamics themselves inspire such tactical behavior by relevant actors—particularly when it comes to the use of methods of civil resistance. The developments outlined above already demonstrate that war intensity, for instance, constitutes a dynamically changing variable that is likely to affect other conflict-related processes as well. Also within individual conflicts, the use and intensity of violence typically show tremendous variation both over time (Shellman, Levey, and Young 2013) and across geographic regions (Buhaug and Rød 2006). It is reasonable to expect these changes and differences to also inform decisions of conflict actors and civilians alike to resort to protest actions and strikes. Taking factors into account that vary on both a spatial and temporal level *within* individual conflict contexts may indeed prove essential for grasping this type of actor behavior in civil wars more comprehensively. This thesis addresses this gap and explores how conflict-related, dynamic factors explain actors' use of civil resistance methods in civil war contexts. The research question underlying this dissertation is: **Under which conditions do different actors resort to civil resistance tactics in contexts of armed conflict?**

I will address this question in the course of four individual research papers. Each article investigates how conflict-related factors varying either on a spatial or temporal dimension affect the use of civil resistance methods by different actor groups. The first two articles focus on periods of active conflict, with chapter 2 showing that local war intensity increases the likelihood of civil resistance to occur. Chapter 3 zooms into the individual conflict context of India and explores how temporal changes of rebel casualties affect the *Communist Party of India-Maoist's* (CPI-Maoist) decision to employ civil resistance methods—in particular, general strikes. But the ramifications of conflict-related processes are not confined to the period in which hostilities take place. I therefore employ a wider scope for the subsequent two chapters and investigate the aftereffects of conflict dynamics on post-war civil resistance. Chapter 4 addresses the effect of individual, temporally disaggregated steps in the implementation of power-sharing arrangements on protest onset. Chapter 5, by contrast, deals with the reverberation of wartime violence and investigates how the spatial variation of war intensity affects individual protest participation in post-conflict settings. This chapter takes the example of Uganda and focuses on the period after the fighting between the government and the *Lord's Resistance Army* (LRA) came to an end within the country.

For the remainder of this introduction, I will first define the core concepts, review the current state of literature in the field, and outline the research gaps that I am going to address. The particular focus will be on research related to civilian agency and armed actor behavior in war contexts. The introduction closes with a brief synopsis of the empirical papers, which also highlights the methodological approaches used in this dissertation. Chapters 2 through 5 form the main body of this dissertation and contain the individual research papers. I close in chapter 6 with a summary of the main findings, limitations of the approach taken, policy implications, and an outlook on possible avenues for further research.

1.1 Definitions

Before reviewing the current state of research on the dissertation topic, I will first define the two main concepts underlying this dissertation: civil wars and civil resistance. A proper conceptual clarification of both terms is particularly relevant for two reasons: First, it delineates the scope of the arguments that are presented in this dissertation. It indicates to which extent the inferences are applicable to other contexts, and clarifies which phenomena are *not* included in my understanding of the respective terms. Second, it is imperative to thoroughly differentiate both concepts from *each other*. Specifically in the colloquial use of the term ‘conflict’, the concept might easily be conflated with forms of social unrest that actually include methods of civil resistance such as (violent) protests. Understood in this way, any analysis of civil resistance in conflict contexts would inevitably be tautological. I will therefore highlight the specific properties of civil resistance methods and show how they differ both conceptually and empirically from those methods of armed resistance that define civil wars. This distinction shall prepare the conceptual foundation for investigating the use of civil resistance *in the context* of armed conflicts later on.

Civil Wars and Intrastate Armed Conflicts

Peace and conflict research offers different definitions as to what constitutes either a civil war or an armed intrastate conflict. Stathis Kalyvas, for instance, defines a civil war as an “armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities” (2006, p. 5, emphasis removed from original). For James Fearon, by contrast, civil wars are “violent conflict[s] within a country fought by

organized groups that aim to take power at the center or in a region, or to change government policies” (2007, p. 4). Albeit differing on individual aspects (such as whether a goal orientation is essential or not), both notions share the focus on *armed* actor involvement and conflicts *within* sovereign nation states as common denominators—the latter of which sets civil wars apart from inter-state wars that take place *between* sovereign nation states.

In one of the first endeavors to systematically collect and quantify war-related data, Small and Singer (1982) have similarly considered the internal character of the conflict as a key criterion that distinguishes intra- from inter-state wars in the *Correlates of War*. In addition, civil wars have been characterized by a) the active participation of the national government, b) effective resistance by both sides, and c) a minimum of 1,000 battle deaths per conflict year. These criteria, which have since become essential points of departure for most other civil war definitions in the field (Sambanis 2004), demarcate civil wars from other forms of political violence. First, civil wars differ from ethnic riots, communal violence, or conflicts taking place solely between armed non-state groups without the active involvement of the state military (e.g. gang-related rivalries or violence between different militant groups). Second, the criterion of ‘active resistance’ excludes instances of so-called one-sided violence like the repression of nonviolent protests or targeted attacks on civilians by either the government or a non-state group. To be clear, both one-sided and non-state violence can and often do occur *in the course* of civil wars, with the genocides in Rwanda (1994) and Bosnia (1995) being two particularly severe examples (Eck and Hultman 2007). However, the terms are not as such synonymous.² The last criterion, a minimum number of 1,000 deaths, shall distinguish civil wars from forms of low-level conflict or sporadic incidents of violence.

The outlined requirements also form the basis of one of the most widely used conceptions of civil war, which is derived from the *Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s* (UCDP) definition of an armed conflict. According to the UCDP, an armed conflict is understood as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year” (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2021). It is

² For example, the repression of protests around the *Tian’anmen* square in the People’s Republic of China (1989) is considered an act of one-sided violence in the UCDP *One-sided Violence Dataset* (Eck and Hultman 2007), but it took place outside the context of an active civil war.

considered an *internal* armed conflict if one of the parties is the state, and the other one is a non-state armed actor. Civil wars are—by that definition—not a qualitatively different category but rather indicate particularly severe armed conflicts with more than 1,000 casualties.

Contrary to one-sided or non-state violence, the difference between armed conflicts (also ‘state-based conflicts’ in UCDP terminology) and civil wars is hence not one of type, but rather of degree. It therefore makes sense to treat both not as conceptually distinct phenomena, but rather as different empirical expressions of the same variable, which is also the principal approach I will follow in this dissertation. This means, I will draw from the UCDP definition and consider both minor internal armed conflicts and full-scale civil wars. As the distinction between both forms is not relevant for the scope of my argument, I will use the terms *civil war* and *internal* or *intrastate armed conflict* interchangeably, which does henceforth not signal different semantic meanings unless stated otherwise.³

The UCDP definition highlights two other noteworthy aspects: First, internal conflicts are characterized by a specific purpose. They are fought about territory (i.e., secessionist or autonomy conflicts), government (i.e., with the aim of changing the political system or replacing the incumbent government), or both. Second, the definition emphasizes the ‘use of armed force’. This seemingly self-evident aspect is crucial as it points to a key difference between civil resistance and what is commonly considered war-related *violence* in conflict research (e.g. battles, armed attacks, violence against civilians). As I will explain in more detail below, I consider a critical difference between both sets of methods to lie in the fact that the latter is characterized by the use of weaponry suitable to at least in principle withstand the opponent’s attacks and inflict significant casualties.⁴ This sets these methods—which are typically conducted by armed combatants in the narrower sense—apart from civil resistance tactics, which rely primarily on the mobilization of *unarmed* civilians.

³ It is important to note that I do not argue that the difference does not matter *per se*, but only for the expected applicability for my arguments. Against the backdrop that I consider civil wars a particularly severe manifestation of armed conflicts here, I will control for conflict intensity whenever I expect the difference between minor armed conflicts and civil wars to play a potentially confounding role for the respective conjectured relationship.

⁴ This aspect is also reflected in the *Correlates of War* definition of the criterion of “effective resistance”, which means here that “(a) both sides had to be initially *organized for violent conflict* and *prepared to resist the attacks of their opponents*, or (b) the weaker side, although initially unprepared, *is able to inflict upon the stronger opponents at least five percent of the number of fatalities it sustains* (Small and Singer 1982, 215, emphasis added).

Lastly, UCDP distinguishes regular intrastate armed conflicts or civil wars that only include domestic actors from ‘internationalized’ ones that are characterized by the active intervention of foreign states (Gleditsch et al. 2002). Current examples of the latter include the ongoing internal conflict in Eastern Ukraine with involvement by the Russian Federation on behalf of the rebels, or the various active conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo with Malawi, South Africa, and Tanzania actively supporting the government. By contrast, current non-internationalized internal conflicts include the insurgency in Thailand’s South and clashes between the Turkish government and the *Kurdistan Workers’ Party* (PKK). As my main interest lies with the study of conflict dynamics within individual countries, information about foreign involvement is not immediately relevant for answering my research question. Therefore, when I use the terms intrastate armed conflicts or civil wars, I refer implicitly to both the internationalized and non-internationalized variants.

Civil Resistance

The second term central to this dissertation is the one of civil resistance, which represents the main outcome variable in the empirical papers. As is the case with civil wars, most definitions converge on some bedrock assumptions but diverge on individual details. A useful tentative definition is provided by Schock, who conceives of civil resistance as “the sustained use of methods of nonviolent action by civilians engaged in asymmetric conflicts with opponents not averse to using violence to defend their interests” (Schock 2013, p. 278). This definition places the practice of nonviolent action at the center, which is here understood as “non-routine political acts that do not involve violence or the threat of violence” (Schock 2013, p. 278). Reflecting a dominant perspective in current empirical research on civil resistance, nonviolent action is here conceived of as a genuinely strategic method of resistance with distinct tactical edges over violent methods (Nepstad 2015). It is also important to bear in mind that the use of nonviolence as depicted here does only refer to the behavior of activists. This means that violent repression of protests by the opponent (typically the state) does not disqualify a certain event from being considered as either civil resistance or nonviolent action. On the contrary, the typically grave imbalances in the means of physical coercion between unarmed challengers and, for instance, armed security forces are key to understanding the dynamics that are eventually assumed to give civil resistance a strategic advantage (more on that effect in the next section).

It is important to stress that neither civil resistance nor nonviolent action include *every* form of nonviolent or peaceful behavior. It is not to be confused with passivity, and it excludes institutionalized or routine forms of nonviolent political behavior such as voting in elections. Civil resistance is moreover conceived of as a method of *waging* conflict to pursue certain ends—as opposed to nonviolent methods of conflict *resolution* like mediation or negotiation (Schock 2003). Schock furthermore emphasizes the “collective pursuit of social or political objectives” (Schock 2003, p. 705), and the mobilization for collective action (Schock 2013) as important benchmarks. He states that nonviolent action “refers to specific actions that involve risks and that invoke non-physical pressure or nonviolent coercion in contentious interactions between opposing groups” (Schock 2003, p. 705). This caveat discards essentially nonviolent practices that do not require mobilization for collective action in a stricter sense.⁵ When I refer to civil resistance or civilian activism, I will focus only on those contentious performances that consist of publicly visible collective action such as protest marches, rallies, assemblies, demonstrations, sit-ins, blockades, occupations, or labor and general strikes.

The practice of civil resistance is thus conceived here as a specific set of methods. But how can we differentiate these forms clearly from other war-related behavior like battles and attacks on civilians? The question is not trivial, as the apparently distinctive feature of ‘nonviolence’ can potentially be misleading. If we approach this aspect from a purely empirical perspective, we would classify events based on the degree of violence used by the challengers—and not based on the specific method used. This would mean, for example, to distinguish peaceful protests from ones that become violent, and to relegate violent protests or violent strikes to the same class of tactics as ‘traditional’ insurgent methods.

I believe that such an approach, which distinguishes tactics according to whether we see the use of violence or not, can prove problematic, as it is often difficult to unambiguously determine the nonviolent character of individual protest events to begin with. Some demonstrations start peacefully but escalate into violent confrontations (Ives and Lewis 2020), while in other cases radical splinter groups engage in violence although the main body of a demonstration retains nonviolent discipline. In addition, we might need to reflect on whether any type

⁵ This can also be understood as applying to the issuing of formal statements or protest notes. I acknowledge that there are good theoretical reasons to include these practices alongside petition writing, for instance, as a method of civil resistance. However, I do not consider them in this dissertation for rather practical reasons. It is difficult to meaningfully locate such performances spatially, which makes it hard to compare them with practices that require physical mobilization.

of violent behavior bars a demonstration from being classified as nonviolent. Is property damage an exclusion criterion, or do we only consider events as violent when people are threatened or injured by participants (Sharp 1973)? Eventually, we would need to set up an ultimately arbitrary threshold in order to determine which events are considered nonviolent and which are not.

It is particularly the question how to deal with these borderline cases that lead to practical problems when we want to determine whether an event is considered as either an instance of civil resistance or war-related violence. The very fact that the attribute of ‘nonviolence’ also carries a certain normative evaluation about the legitimacy of the event makes related actions prone to fierce frame contests between challengers (i.e., protesters) and targets (typically the state). It is what Hess and Martin call a public “legitimation battle”: State actors attempt to present repressive action as a justified response to violent behavior by social movement actors, whereas the latter group tries to frame the state reaction as a disproportionate response to mainly peaceful actions (Hess and Martin 2006, pp. 252; 263). If we acknowledge that any report on contentious interactions is ultimately subject to these dynamics, a classification of an event as either violent or nonviolent on objective grounds becomes extremely challenging.

Instead of distinguishing civil resistance from wartime military tactics primarily based on the degree of violence used, it can be helpful to reflect on other features that are mutually shared by protest rallies, demonstrations, or strikes that set them apart from tactics typically used by armed actors such as military attacks on security forces. Two of these criteria is the non-use of arms and the role of civilian action. This emphasis finds its clear expression in Stephan and Chenoweth’s characterization of civil resistance tactics as “civilian-based method[s]” (2008, p. 9) or in the titular ‘unarmed insurrections’ from both Schock’s (2005) and Zunes’ (1994) works. In a similar vein, Hallward, Masullo and Mouly describe civil resistance methods as the “use of *unarmed* extra-institutional means against an opponent whose power, understood in the traditional sense, is superior” (2017, 2, emphasis added).

These examples point to one crucial distinctive feature: Protest assemblies, demonstrations, and strikes all require the mobilization of *unarmed* civilians, which sets them apart from *armed* attacks that are typically carried out by combatants only. Note that ‘armed’ as it is understood here refers to military weaponry that allows insurgents to inflict significant physical damage on the opponent and

to withstand government force, so the occasional use of makeshift weapons or weaponized objects by individuals in the course of violent protests might not cause conceptual ambiguity here.⁶

The focus on the mobilization of unarmed civilians as the distinctive feature has two important implications: First, it means that I conceive of civil resistance tactics and what is later on described as wartime violence as essentially two different classes of methods. Even if a protest escalates into violence, and even if a general strike is enforced by its organizers, it is nonetheless considered a form of civil resistance given the central role of civilian participation (though not necessarily organization) in both cases. Second, it allows for the possibility that different actors can engage in civil resistance tactics—regardless of their otherwise preferred approach. Even rebel groups typically resorting to armed tactics can occasionally mobilize civilians for collective action. The key difference on the tactical level is that protests and strikes as opposed to armed tactics critically require the mobilization of unarmed civilians beyond the core of active fighters in order to work.

1.2 State of Current Research

This dissertation builds on two different strands of literature: research on civil resistance in war contexts on the one hand, and studies dealing with armed actor behavior and tactical choices on the other hand. In the following, I will review both fields of research and highlight the main contribution of my work to the identified shortcomings. More detailed reviews tailored to the individual empirical research papers are provided in the respective chapters later on.

Civil Resistance in War Contexts

It is beyond the scope of this review to provide an extensive overview on the rich literature on civil resistance more generally (for an excellent review on that field of study, see Nepstad 2015). I will thus focus on outlining key works that have championed a *strategic* perspective on the use of civil resistance, as this notion also forms the cornerstone for the subsequent discussion on civilian activism in conflict contexts.

⁶ For example, Zunes specifies that “unarmed” means in particular the “popular resistance to government authority which [...] eschews the use of *weapons of modern warfare*” (Zunes 1994, 403, emphasis added). This also corresponds to the ‘effective resistance’ criterion we have encountered in the *Correlates of War* definition of ‘civil wars’ before.

It was particularly Gene Sharp who pioneered an utilitarian understanding of civil resistance in his seminal work *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (1973). According to Sharp, activists opt for respective methods not primarily out of ideological motivations, but rather because nonviolent action is simply more effective than violence when it comes to achieving political goals. Central to this argument is the idea that movement organizations which remain nonviolent are typically better placed to deal with state repression and can benefit from an effect called “political jiu-jitsu” (Sharp 1973, 657f.). The logic is as follows: Repressive governments may find it easier to legitimate violence against armed insurgents as an appropriate ‘law and order’ response. Yet the same course of action against nonviolent, unarmed civilians is more likely to be perceived as a disproportionate act of violence, leading to declining support for the regime, defections, and—in some cases—even an overthrow of the repressive government. Contrary to the intended goal of deterring a dissident movement, the state’s use of violence against nonviolent protesters can easily backfire. It can even strengthen the challenging movement in the medium term by turning formerly passive bystanders to movement-sympathizers, and by alienating former regime supporters.

While the field of civil resistance research has steadily evolved ever since, supporting evidence on the effectiveness of nonviolent methods has largely been based on individual cases for some time. It was particularly the large-scale data collection effort by Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) that elevated the external validity of related inferences to a new level. The authors demonstrated that civil resistance movements were not restricted to particular political systems, world regions or time periods, but that they were in fact ubiquitous phenomena. Chenoweth and Stephan were able to substantiate earlier claims on the strategic advantage of nonviolent action and found that 52% of all civil resistance movements since 1900 were successful in either overthrowing an incumbent regime or achieving territorial secession—compared to only 26% successful violent campaigns (i.e., civil wars). In the wake of Chenoweth and Stephan’s landmark contribution, a field of empirical research on civil resistance blossomed that branched into more specific fields of study concerned with the outcome of civil resistance campaigns (Nepstad 2011; Pinckney 2020), the mechanism of ‘political jiu-jitsu’ (Sutton, Butcher, and Svensson 2014) or intra-movement dynamics (Chenoweth and Schock 2015; Dudouet 2013), to name just a few.

The accruing evidence on the strategic benefits and impact of civil resistance eventually also led to a reconsideration of the potential role of civilians in war contexts. In traditional conflict research, civilians were certainly not considered irrelevant, but their role was typically defined over their relation to one of the conflict parties, for instance as active providers of support, in terms of shared ethnic ties, or as victims of violence from either side (e.g. Fjelde and Hultman 2014; Kalyvas 2006; Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004; Metelits 2010; Wucherpennig, Metternich, et al. 2012). Yet with a growing recognition of the power inherent to civil resistance methods, a burgeoning strand of literature has begun to pay closer attention to the ways in which civilians and communities strive to pursue their own interests in the midst of violence (Kaplan 2017; Hallward, Masullo, and Mouly 2017).

This nascent research program has shifted the perspective on conflicts from a purely dyadic one focused on the belligerents to one that takes civilian agency seriously. Civilians have no longer been considered as passive actors or as mere recipients of violence, but as actors in their own right that sometimes resort to nonviolent tactics in order to pursue their own goals. In this context, the phenomenon of wartime civil resistance has become the subject of investigation for conflict settings in Southeast Asia (Barter 2017; Krause 2018; Rubin 2019), Africa (Chenoweth, Hendrix, and Hunter 2019), the Middle East (Pearlman 2019; Koefoed 2017), and—perhaps the most thoroughly researched context—in Latin America (Wood 2003; Arjona 2016; Kaplan 2017; Masullo 2015). Scholars even found evidence for civil resistance in historical war settings such as the Spanish civil war (Seidman 2002) or German-occupied Europe in World War II (Sémelin 1993; Sharp 1973).

The findings of related studies have provided us with various novel insights on the phenomenon of wartime civil resistance. On a descriptive level, they give us a detailed account on the specific strategies and behavioral patterns of civilians and address the fundamental question: Which course of action do civilians decide upon under the conditions of war? Communities sometimes take up arms themselves to defend against incursions by militants (Schubiger 2016), but most research classifies the typical civilian reactions to wartime violence (forced or voluntary) alongside three broader categories: Migration and flight, active support, or strategies aimed at maintaining independence from the conflict parties (Arjona 2017; Kaplan 2017; Barter 2014). Endeavors in this latter category consist of practices of everyday resistance (Barter 2014; Stanley 2017), direct engagement with the conflict parties through negotiations (Barter 2014; Suarez 2017), but also

methods of civil resistance like protests or forms noncooperation (Masullo 2015). Several works illustrate that locals' capacity to organize civil resistance can in fact provide them with credible bargaining power vis-à-vis armed actors (Arjona 2015; Van Baalen 2021; Rubin 2019). In some instances, civilian actors have even been successful to secure their independence from armed groups in territorial terms—for example through the establishment of 'Zones of Peace' (Allouche and Jackson 2019; Hancock and Mitchell 2007). In a similar vein, several authors demonstrate how local communities and movement organizations employ civil resistance methods to retain autonomy and build up resilience against communal or war violence (Kaplan 2017; Krause 2018; Masullo 2015).

Moving from descriptive to explanatory territory, a second major field of inquiry concerns the *consequences* of wartime civil resistance. Apart from the immediate effect of restraining violence of conflict actors (Kaplan 2017; Grubb 2019), several studies also illustrate in which way related methods sometimes help to establish communication channels with (Kaplan 2013b; Barter 2014) or even transmit norms to armed groups (Kaplan 2013a). Léon (2017), by contrast, shows that local civil resistance can also be perilous and can lead to an increase of violence—particularly when one of the conflict parties exerts control over the respective area. His findings furthermore suggest that the effectiveness of civil resistance depends on the target of protests.

Other studies analyze the effect on broader conflict dynamics, focusing in particular on the consequences for the belligerents' attempts to establish effective control. Rubin's (2019) analysis of the communist insurgency in the Philippines finds that communities' capacity to mobilize collective action affects rebel incentives to seek territorial control. In a similar vein, van Baalen (2021) shows for the case of Côte d'Ivoire that local capacities to stage civil resistance influence the degree to which rebels act upon civilian preferences in controlled areas. These findings partly speak to earlier results from Arjona (2016), who argues that civil resistance is a crucially inhibiting factor for the proliferation of rebel rule. Lastly, Leventoğlu and Metternich (2018) demonstrate how wartime protests can even impact war outcomes. In one of the few cross-country studies that do not explicitly focus on community-level resistance in immediate war zones, the authors show that wartime anti-government protests signal waning government support among the urban middle class, and increase the likelihood that governments enter peace negotiations with rebel groups.

The third set of findings relates to the determinants of civilian mobilization. Why do we see civil resistance in some war contexts, but not in others? Some authors point to factors on the level of individual movements or communities that are conducive for collective action such as the density of local networks, group cohesion (Kaplan 2017; Rubin 2019), previous experiences with collective action (Masullo 2015) or the strength of local institutions (Kaplan 2013b; Krause 2018; Arjona 2016). Dorff's (2017) findings from Mexico's drug war point in a similar direction, although the author investigates political participation in a broader sense. She finds that strong, kinship-based social ties explain civilian activism.

Several works moreover highlight the role of individual leaders (Krause 2018; Barter 2014) or political entrepreneurs (Masullo 2020) for organizing community responses to violence. Lastly, some studies underscore the role of community-level norms in the coordination of civil resistance. Barter's (2014, p. 198) findings show the instrumental role played by sociocultural traditions and normative convictions for the decision to engage in civilian activism. Masullo (2020) similarly argues that normative commitments and political ideas inform choices for specific methods of community-level engagement.

Apart from agentic factors, research on wartime civil resistance moreover assigns an important role to context variables. For example, Barter (2014) argues that civilians' strategic choices are also subject to external pressure—that is, whether communities are coerced into a certain behavior or can take a deliberate strategic decision. Arguing from a somewhat different angle, Arjona (2015, 2017) expects the likelihood of civil resistance in rebel-held areas to be a function of the extent to which armed groups attempt to regulate civilian life. The central role of combatant behavior is also highlighted by Masullo (2015, pp. 48-50), who shows for the case of a peasant community in Colombia how the decision to engage in civil resistance was essentially shaped by two developments: An intensification of violence and the perception that this violence is increasingly carried out in an indiscriminate manner.

This dissertation is located in the field of research dealing with the explanations for protest *onset* rather than the consequences of wartime civil resistance. As the literature review has shown, research in this area has made significant inroads, but most works have rather focused on community-level explanations. By contrast, the interplay of civil resistance and war dynamics has mostly been investigated with a focus on how protests, demonstrations or strikes affect reactions by the

conflict actors (León 2017) rather than vice versa. The first major contribution of this dissertation is to address this gap and to explore how temporally and spatially varying conflict-related factors impact the onset of civil resistance.

Research on Armed Group Behavior

The second area of research motivating this dissertation deals with the behavior of armed groups. Two major strands of literature are of particular interest here, each dealing with militants' tactical choices from different angles: The first subfield located in conflict research more broadly seeks to explain rebel behavior in civil wars. While predominantly focusing on variations of *violent* behavior, more recent approaches in the literature have also encompassed other, non-military tactics and strategies such as the establishment of governance structures. Research specifically dealing with shifts to civil resistance tactics, however, remains scant. Second, some studies in the field of contentious politics investigate both violent and nonviolent methods on the part of resistance groups—yet without explicitly focusing on war contexts. The following review summarizes the findings from both areas with an emphasis on the determinants of tactical choices, and outlines the second main contribution of this dissertation.

As organized armed force represents a defining trait of armed conflicts, the literature on rebel behavior has traditionally placed a strong emphasis on the conditions that explain variations of violence (Weinstein 2007; Kalyvas 2006). Some studies explicitly deal with the question why rebels prefer particular violent tactics such as terrorism, kidnapping, or armed attacks over others (Pape 2005; Polo and Gleditsch 2016; Horowitz, Perkoski, and Potter 2018; Page Fortna 2015). With civilian targeting becoming an increasingly common phenomenon in conflict contexts, many authors moreover seek to explain why and under which conditions some groups resort to violence against civilians—and why others, by contrast, refrain from doing so.⁷ Group-specific characteristics ranging from preexisting ties with the local population and organizational cohesion (Staniland

⁷ To be clear, one-sided violence is of course by no means a method employed only by non-state groups, and several studies have investigated the issue with either specific reference to state governments (e.g. Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004) or both the state and non-state armed actors (e.g. Fjelde and Hultman 2014). Given the focus of this dissertation, however, the present review will restrict the discussion to actor behavior on the part of non-state armed groups.

2012a; Humphreys and Weinstein 2006) over the reliance on foreign assistance (Hovil and Werker 2005) to natural resources (Weinstein 2007) have thereby been established as robust explanatory factors.

Rebel behavior does yet not only differ *across* different groups. It also often varies for individual groups over time, or shows distinct geographical patterns *within* individual conflicts. A series of studies thus seeks to investigate to which extent actor behavior is subject to dynamically changing conflict processes or spatially varying factors. For example, some authors find local political alignments (Balcells 2011) or the existence of shared ethnic ties (Fjelde and Hultman 2014) to determine regional differences in the use of violence by the conflict parties. Others have highlighted the role of geographically varying conflict dynamics like regional differences in the distribution of capabilities (Lockyer 2010), territorial control (Anders 2020; Kalyvas 2006), or casualties (Wood 2014) between the combatant parties.

Apart from spatial variation, the conflict literature also emphasizes the role of temporal dynamics for explaining rebels' tactical choices. Particularly changing developments in the battlefield are considered as crucial predictors, including shifts of territorial control (Raleigh and Choi 2017), a changing balance of power between the state and rebels (Wood 2010; Holtermann 2016), increases in state repression (Horowitz, Perkoski, and Potter 2018; Shellman, Levey, and Young 2013) and own losses (Hultman 2007; Wood 2014), or the emergence of other militant groups (Horowitz, Perkoski, and Potter 2018; Raleigh and Choi 2017).

While related findings make a strong case for studying conflict-endogenous factors in order to understand rebel groups' tactical choices, they are mostly concerned with explaining variation of *violent* behavior—typically with regard to the use of violence against civilians, but also with regard to choices between different violent tactics. By contrast, shifts to other forms of resistance beyond armed force have received far less attention in the civil war literature. Recent research has yet demonstrated that armed actors often *do* engage in more complex—and sometimes nonviolent—interactions with both the state and the civilian population. These interactions range from quasi-diplomatic relations and accommodation (Coggins 2015; Barter 2015; Staniland 2012b) to contractual relationships with civilians (Kaplan 2017) or even elaborated wartime-governance structures (Kasfir 2005; Metelits 2010; Mampilly 2011). As the literature review in the preceding subsection has demonstrated, research has also increasingly recognized the sometimes active role noncombatants play in war contexts. Related studies show that war-affected

communities adopt a variety of strategies to cope with violence and armed groups' attempts to establish authority, often including the use of nonviolent methods (Kaplan 2017; Arjona 2015).

While the latter works focus on civil resistance as acts of defiance *against* armed groups, there is also evidence that rebels themselves sometimes mobilize civilians for street protests or general strikes. Keller (2017) shows that insurgent groups across different geographical contexts sometimes complement their tactical repertoire with large-scale popular mobilization and nonviolent action. She argues that a strong influence on the part of an organization's political wing, outreach to urban centers, and functional differentiation are the key factors facilitating tactical variation.

With this notable exception, however, research investigating the use of civil resistance methods like strikes or street protests by armed actors is scarce. This is particularly surprising as the literature on social movements and contentious politics suggests the use of both armed and civil resistance tactics by the same actors to be far from uncommon. For instance, several studies examine the phenomenon of 'radical' or 'violent flanks', that is, the presence of violent and nonviolent organizations within the same movement (Chenoweth and Schock 2015; Ryckman 2019; Wasow 2020). Other works focus on explaining why some movements undergo rather permanent shifts from the use of violent to nonviolent strategies (Dudouet 2013) or vice versa (Demirel-Pegg 2014; Bakke 2010).

However, there is also evidence that individual groups themselves sometimes routinely employ both civil resistance and armed tactics (Cunningham, Dahl, and Frugé 2017; Asal, Legault, et al. 2013). Dudouet points out several prominent examples of armed groups that also used mass mobilization tactics such as the El Salvadoran *Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front* (FMLN) or the *Basque Fatherland and Freedom* (ETA) in Spain (Dudouet 2013). Seidman likewise observes with regard to the South African anti-Apartheid movement that "most activists over the years viewed violent and nonviolent strategies as more intertwined and complementary than contradictory" (Seidman 2000, p. 165). Evidence from data on the level of individual resistance organizations suggests the use of such 'mixed' strategies to be not exceptional. For example, the recently published *Strategies of Resistance Data Project* (SRDP), which compiles data on tactics of self-determination movement organizations, indicates that around 15% of all observed groups employ both violence and methods of civil resistance such as strikes, blockades and protests (Cunningham, Dahl, and Frugé 2020).

This leaves us with two observations: First, research on contentious politics in general provides ample evidence that a non-negligible number of resistance groups engages in the *simultaneous* use of armed and civil resistance tactics. Yet second, and in contrast to the breadth of research dealing with the impact of conflict dynamics (spatially and temporally) on variations of *violent* rebel behavior, we know very little about the consequences of conflict-endogenous processes on the use of *nonviolent* or civil resistance tactics by armed groups in particular.

Summary: Gap and Contribution

Despite the persistent dominance of research on the use of armed force, our understanding about other, parallel, and mostly nonviolent processes that take place within civil wars has also broadened markedly in the past decades. This concerns in particular our knowledge about the behavior of two classes of actors: Armed non-state groups and civilians. The traditionally strong focus on the violent military interactions among the belligerents has made way for a more nuanced study of the strategic repertoire of non-state armed actors, and also for a stronger consideration of civilian agency. In both cases, the use of civil resistance methods has been central to express this changing perspective. Yet the literature review has also shown for both actor groups that our knowledge is very limited as to how the use of strikes, protests or blockades is affected by dynamic, spatially and temporally varying factors endogenous to conflicts.

I argue that this gap is highly relevant. Civil resistance tactics are themselves discrete events, and their frequency and intensity varies both over time and regions within individual conflict contexts. It is therefore likely that the use of civil resistance tactics by both civilians and armed groups is subject to dynamically changing factors. With this dissertation, I aim at addressing this gap by investigating how conflict-endogenous factors affect the use of civil resistance methods.

1.3 Dissertation Outline

The review of the literature from the previous section has highlighted a central gap: We still need to better understand how the variability of conflict-endogenous factors drives variation in the use of civil resistance. This dissertation seeks to address this lacuna with four empirical studies, which will focus in particular on the spatial and temporal variation of conflict intensity (chapters 2 and 5),

battlefield losses (chapter 3), and policies (chapter 4). These chapters form the main body of this dissertation and consist of already published papers (Table 1.1 summarizes the constituent parts of the dissertation, alongside co-authorship and publications). I have adhered to the style and format of the respective original publications.⁸

In addressing the dissertation's research interest, the papers utilize a quantitative approach and draw from different data sources: Chapters 2 and 4 employ geographical analyses based on observational data for several African countries in order to allow for inferences across different nation states. Focusing more closely on the individual conflict context of India, chapter 3 draws from an original, self-compiled event data set based on the meticulous coding of newspaper articles on India's Maoist insurgency. Chapter 5, lastly, examines the conflict-context of Uganda and utilizes fine-grained geographical and individual-level survey data to allow for inferences on a more disaggregated level of analysis. This section briefly outlines the main arguments and key results from the individual papers, and places an emphasis on showing how the findings contribute to addressing the overarching research agenda (Table 1.1 summarizes the constituent parts of the dissertation, alongside co-authorship and publications).

The dissertation starts with a study that investigates the phenomenon of civil resistance on a cross-national level. In *Raise Your Voices! Civilian Protest in Civil Wars* (chapter 2 of this dissertation), my co-author Johannes Vüllers and I address the question under which conditions civil resistance emerges during ongoing armed conflicts. We draw from highly disaggregated data that allows us to precisely identify the location and timing of both protest and conflict events. Our main hypothesis is that the location of battles in civil wars correlates with protest incidence. We argue that this relationship is subject to the joint influence of two factors: On the one hand, the impact of wartime fighting on the civilian

⁸ This also means that the style and format is not identical across the individual chapters, sometimes due to diverging journal requirements. For instance, most of the dissertation is written in American English, whereas chapter 5 is in British English. The chapters also vary with regard to the notation of regression tables in the main text and with regard to the reference to models in the appendices (sometimes labeled "R1", in other instances "A1" etc.). Changes to the original format were restricted to an absolute minimum, that is, when I deemed the inconsistent format to impede the interpretation and readability. First, I rearranged connected images in some instances to ensure readability (e.g. 2.6) and separated extra-long tables so that they span over separate pages (e.g. 4.1). Second, I prefixed figure, table and hypotheses numbers with their respective chapter numbers. Third, "figures" and "tables" are now uniformly referred to as "Fig." and "Table", respectively. Fourth, all spelled-out names of organizations and data sets (not the abbreviations) were written in italics. And lastly, I have consistently formatted the appendices (which were themselves not subject to formatting rules of the respective articles)

Table 1.1. Empirical papers: Overview

Chapter	Chapter Information	
2	<i>Paper Title:</i>	Raise Your Voices! Civilian Protest in Civil Wars
	<i>Authorship:</i>	Co-authored with Johannes Vüllers
	<i>Publication:</i>	Political Geography (2020), 80, 102183, DOI: 10.1016/j.polgeo.2020.102183*
	<i>Focus on:</i>	Effect of spatial and temporal conflict dynamics
	<i>Data source:</i>	Geo-referenced event data
3	<i>Paper Title:</i>	The Tactical Use of Civil Resistance by Rebel Groups. Evidence from India's Maoist Insurgency
	<i>Authorship:</i>	Single-authored
	<i>Publication:</i>	Journal of Conflict Resolution (2021), 65(7), 1251-1277, DOI: 10.1177/0022002721995547.*
	<i>Focus on:</i>	Effect of temporal conflict dynamics
	<i>Data source:</i>	Original event data set (self-compiled)
4	<i>Paper Title:</i>	Unintended Consequences of Post-Conflict Power-Sharing. Explaining Civilian Activism
	<i>Authorship:</i>	Co-authored with Johannes Vüllers
	<i>Publication:</i>	Zeitschrift für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung (2019), 8(2), 239-260, DOI: 10.1007/s42597-019-00002-3.*
	<i>Focus on:</i>	Effect of spatial and temporal conflict dynamics
	<i>Data source:</i>	Geo-referenced event data
5	<i>Paper Title:</i>	Wartime Violence, Collective Grievances, and Post-Conflict Protests. Evidence from Uganda's LRA Insurgency
	<i>Authorship:</i>	Single-authored
	<i>Publication:</i>	INEF Report (2021), 115/2021, University of Duisburg-Essen: Duisburg, ISSN: 0941-4967, URL: https://www.uni-due.de/inef/inef_report.php .
	<i>Focus on:</i>	Effect of spatial conflict dynamics
	<i>Data source:</i>	Survey data and geo-referenced event data

* *Journal with peer-review process*

population—for example through the destruction of livelihoods or even loss of lives—is expected to increase *grievances* among the affected communities, which in turn increases the propensity to mobilize for protests. On the other hand, fierce clashes at a specific location typically reflect a situation of contestation and unclear territorial control between the belligerents. This, in turn, can mean that neither side engages in repressive action against civilian protests—either because of a lack of state (and hence repressive) capacity, or because both sides fear the consequences of civilian defection to the opponent and hence act with restraint (see also León 2017, for a related argument). We argue that either way, battles can present what social movement scholars call *opportunity structures* that are conducive for mobilization. In sum, we expect wartime battles to increase the likelihood for protest emergence through both a *grievances* and *opportunities* mechanism.

Results from logistic regression models with random intercepts provide broad support for our expectations of a spatial and temporal correlation: Wartime battles in a given area are associated with an increased likelihood for protests to occur in the same location and in the same month. We also test for a quadratic relationship, which reflects the expectation that battles only signal *opportunities* for civil resistance up to a certain point—but that protest likelihood diminishes once conflict becomes too intense. Our findings yet lend only weak empirical support for this intuition. We corroborate our results with several additional analyses, which includes further disentangling the issues of protest in order to test our assumed mechanisms. Moreover, we further disaggregate the temporal dimension in order to check for the possibility of reversed causality. To sum up, the results from chapter 2 provide first solid evidence on a cross-national base that (1) civil resistance methods are in fact a relatively frequent phenomenon even during wartime, and that (2) the location and timing of these phenomena are themselves subject to spatial and temporal conflict dynamics.

The second paper zooms into an individual war context and explores how conflict processes affect the choice of *rebel groups* to engage in civil resistance tactics. In *The Tactical Use of Civil Resistance by Rebel Groups. Evidence from India's Maoist Insurgency* (chapter 3 of this dissertation), I investigate the early period of the armed conflict between the Government of India and the CPI-Maoist. My main argument is that rebels' tactical choices are mainly a function of battlefield dynamics: Specifically for a rebel group that exerts control in a given area, increased casualties inflicted by the opponent can jeopardize its

authority over the local population. In these situations, the use of civil resistance tactics—particularly general strikes—can be a strategic choice to demonstrate mobilization capacity and sustained control.

In order to test this argument, I have collected data on civil resistance tactics used in the course of the Maoist conflict based on newspaper articles from the most widely circulating English-speaking dailies in India. The resulting event data set captures contentious activism more broadly conceived in the six federal states that are most affected by the conflict—Bihar, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, West Bengal, Odisha, and Andhra Pradesh—for the early years of the conflict (2006-2009). For the purpose of this study, I have particularly focused on general strikes conducted by the CPI-Maoist. Using linear probability and logit models with fixed effects, I find strong support for the argument that higher rebel casualties in one period correlate with a higher likelihood to see rebel-sponsored general strikes in the subsequent week for the same district. The results remain robust against a series of model specifications, and I also probe the plausibility of the argument against several alternative explanations. Moreover, I test the assumed causal sequence with an event-study design and substantiate my claims with qualitative evidence.

Chapters 2 and 3 together lend strong support to the assumption that spatial variation and temporal dynamics within conflicts have immediate consequences for the use of civil resistance—both from affected civilian communities, but also from the conflict actors themselves. The impact of war dynamics is yet certainly not confined to actor behavior in the midst of an ongoing war, but can also linger on to the immediate post-conflict phase as well. The use of armed force may (at least temporarily) stop with the end of conflict, but civil resistance represents a contentious performance that is still at the actors' disposal even in the aftermath of war. Chapters 4 and 5 investigate these ramifications more closely. They approach the dissertation's research topic with a particular emphasis on the consequences of wartime dynamics for the immediate phase after hostilities have ceased.

For conflicts ending with a peace agreement, one of the most pressing and contentious issue in the immediate post-conflict phase revolves around the institutional design. In many cases, negotiated settlements include provisions on the division of power between the former belligerents and their respective constituencies—for instance the ethnic or religious groups that a specific rebel group has claimed to represent. The hope underlying such arrangements is to alleviate the grievances that gave rise to the conflict in the first place. However, these provisions are often themselves contested, and are typically not automatically implemented at the time of the conclusion of the peace agreement, but rather

over time. In *Unintended Consequences of Post-Conflict Power-Sharing. Explaining Civilian Activism* (chapter 4), Johannes Vüllers and I investigate these highly contentious episodes with regard to their ramifications for protests. We examine how the implementation of related policies—so-called power-sharing *practices*—affect the incidence of civil resistance in post-conflict societies.

We argue that power-sharing practices increase the likelihood of protests in the subsequent month. Moreover, we hypothesize that this effect is particularly pronounced in settlement locations of ethnic groups that share ties to the former rebel organizations. We assume former rebels to retain mobilizing structures that can be utilized for engaging in collective action in order to press for further demands in the wake of concrete policy implementations. Therefore, the arguments presented in this research paper focus on the effect of dynamic factors on civil resistance in two ways: First, we look for specific, discrete implementation steps of power-sharing provisions. Second, we account for the spatial variation of rebel constituencies, here understood as the settlement patterns of ethnic groups linked to rebel organizations.

We test our arguments with disaggregated data on power-sharing practices, ethnic groups' settlement areas, and post-conflict civil resistance. Results from logistic regression models on a panel data set for post-conflict countries in Africa provide general support to our arguments: While the likelihood of civil resistance does not increase in the immediate aftermath of the conclusion of power-sharing agreements (power-sharing *promises*), it does increase in the aftermath of concrete implementation steps (power-sharing *practices*). We also see that the effect is strongest for political and territorial power-sharing practices, whereas the implementation of military and economic provisions does not significantly affect the onset of civil resistance. In accordance with our expectations, we see that the association between power-sharing practices and civil resistance is particularly strong for protests occurring in settlement areas of ethnic groups affiliated to the former rebel parties. By contrast, we see no significant effect for unaffiliated groups.

The last chapter again turns to an individual conflict context and investigates the legacies of wartime violence on individual protest propensity in the postwar period. In *Wartime Violence, Collective Grievances, and Post-Conflict Protests. Evidence from Uganda's LRA Insurgency*, I make use of survey data collected in the immediate aftermath of the violent conflict between the Government of Uganda and the LRA (chapter 5) in order to assess to which degree local differences in the intensity of violence have repercussions on individual

protest behavior after the war has ended. I start with the observation that the immediate post-conflict phase is typically characterized by political decisions subject to tremendous contention, e.g. elections, allocation of reconstruction aid, but also power-sharing practices as shown in chapter 4. My goal here is to investigate to which extent developments in the war preceding this period influence individual choices to participate in protests and demonstrations. I argue that wartime violence affects the propensity to engage in post-conflict protest through a reinforcement of collective grievances.

I test the argument with survey data from the *Afrobarometer*. Results from linear probability models suggest a correlation between the local intensity of violence and individuals' likelihood to report that they have participated in a protest in the post-conflict period. I further investigate the assumed mechanism of increased collective grievances in a two-step approach: With the use of fine-grained data on the ethnic geography in Uganda, I first assign violent events during the civil war to the locally dominant ethnic group, thereby approximating the degree to which individual groups have been affected by the conflict in a specific region. Further estimations lend evidence to the assumption that wartime violence affects the propensity to participate in post-conflict protests if the respondent's own ethnic group has been particularly affected in a given area. Second, I conduct a causal mediation analysis in order to test the mechanism leading from exposure to violence to collective grievances and finally to protest participation.

Taken together, the four empirical papers are framed by the common theme of investigating the effect of conflict-endogenous variables on civil resistance. The individual papers approach the dissertation's research topic relying on different data sources (geo-referenced data, self-collected event data, and survey data), geographical emphases (cross-national and individual country studies), actor types (civilians and rebel groups), and time frames (immediate effect during war and repercussions to the post-conflict phase). The following chapters will present the empirical analyses in detail.

Chapter 2

Raise Your Voices! Civilian Protest in Civil Wars

Abstract

Under what conditions do protests occur in civil wars? Evidence from case studies suggests that protests can indeed play an important role in contexts of civil wars, with civilians using respective tactics both against the state and rebels. We argue that localities experiencing armed clashes are likely to see protest events in the same month. Civilians conduct protests due to battle-related changes in the local opportunity structures and grievances related to losses experienced through collateral damage. Using spatially disaggregated data on protest and battle events in African civil wars, we find support for our hypothesis that battles trigger civilian protests. This effect is robust to the inclusion of a comprehensive list of confounding variables and alternative model specifications, including the use of different temporal and spatial units. Our findings highlight the role of the civilian population and the spatial relationship between war events and protests in civil wars.

“By 2012, the FSA, Nusra Front, and other groups had emerged. There were ugly incidents. A cease-fire was declared, but no one was respecting it, of course. My sister and I met with a few friends to figure out what we could do. We came up with the most wonderful idea. Four of us would wear bridal dresses.(...) Our message was to both sides. Enough! End the killing.” Kinda, a Syrian activist (Pearlman 2017, p. 169)

2.1 Introduction

Contrary to traditional notions on the role of non-combatants in civil wars, a burgeoning strand of literature has demonstrated that civilians sometimes actively intervene into the dynamics of conflict (Arjona 2015; Barter 2014; Kaplan 2017). Examples across different contexts corroborate the assumption that civilians may not only remain passive or merely victims of violence, but rather organize themselves in order to articulate their genuine demands and interests in a nonviolent way against both rebels and the government. During Colombia’s armed conflicts, for instance, local communities have organized *zones of peace* to protect their homes from violence (Idler, Garrido, and Mouly 2015). In the ongoing Syrian civil war, local residents have resorted to means of nonviolent resistance in order to force insurgents from *al Nusra* to withdraw from their towns and villages (Kaplan 2013a). In some instances, civil society organizations even decisively intervene into the dynamics of conflict, as is demonstrated by the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative’s mediation efforts in the Ugandan civil war (Dolan 2009).

The increasing interest in wartime civilian protests notwithstanding, a quantitative study investigating the phenomenon across different countries is still missing. This paper contributes to the field of research by analyzing where protests tend to emerge in armed conflicts, covering 30 countries in Africa between 1992 and 2013. Using spatially disaggregated data on armed conflicts and protest events, we aim to shed light on the conditions facilitating or hampering the local manifestation of civilian protest. Since the dynamics of conflict usually tend to show tremendous subnational variation, we expect that the emergence of protests is likewise determined by the local conditions of war. In particular, we argue that protests tend to occur precisely in those areas where battle intensity is high. Battles entail externalities for local residents in the form of personal losses due to killings, the destruction of property, or devastation of farmland, which can in turn incite grievances on parts of the civilian population. The ensuing grievances constitute the emotional motives for publicly protesting against a continuation of violence

as the introductory quote indicates (Kaplan 2017; Nepstad 2011; Pearlman 2013, 2017). We argue that these grievances manifest particularly in the aftermath of battles in the same locality because the latter can open opportunities for civilian collective action.

To test our theoretical argument empirically, we use data from the *Social Conflict in Africa Database* (SCAD) and UCDP's *Georeferenced Event Data* (GED), which allows us to estimate the effect of battles on a spatially disaggregated level (Croicu and Sundberg 2016; Salehyan, Hendrix, et al. 2012). The results of multilevel regression models support our expectation that local battles between the government and rebels increase the likelihood that civilians protest. However, we find only limited support for the assumption that the propensity for wartime protests is highest for intermediate levels of battle intensity.

Our study contributes in two ways to our understanding of civilian protests in intrastate conflicts. First, we highlight a role of civilians that goes beyond their traditional ascription of a victimized status, and thereby stress the necessity to overcome the still-dominant dyadic understanding of conflicts in empirical studies (e.g. Kalyvas 2006; Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009). Second, the contextual determinants for the occurrence of protest and civil wars are frequently depicted as being implicitly different. Most importantly, protests are often seen as a primarily urban phenomenon, with large population densities forming the prerequisite for the emergence of effective protest campaigns (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017). Insurgent operations, by contrast, are expected in more remote and inaccessible areas that allow for the efficient exploitation of geographic advantages by rebel groups (Buhaug and Rød 2006). While both assumptions may hold on an aggregate level, we show that there is indeed a spatial relationship between battle events and entailing protest on a local level.

2.2 Prior Research

Research has shown that periods of crisis or transition provide opportunities for civilian protests (Tilly and Tarrow 2015). The related literature has focused predominantly on contentious action during peacetime, for instance in the form of nonviolent uprisings against authoritarian regimes. Interestingly, though, studies have only recently explicitly taken into account civil wars—which represent major manifestations of domestic crises—as opportunities for increased civilian action (Barter 2014; Kaplan 2017; Leventoğlu and Metternich 2018). Protests under

these circumstances operate in contexts that differ from peacetime insofar as the sovereignty of the state is typically contested between various conflict parties (Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2019).

Studies have shown on the country level that civilians tend to see conventional politics as a less viable strategy when state institutions collapse as in the case of civil wars, while unconventional politics become more attractive (Chenoweth and Cunningham 2013, p. 295). Leventoğlu and Metternich (2018) demonstrate that the likelihood of state concessions increases when violent insurgencies are accompanied by civilian protests in urban centers. However, the authors' model does not take the spatial relationship between wartime violence and protests into consideration. Their argument of rebels expanding their core to include the urban middle class implicitly builds on the assumption that both phenomena are geographically disjoined. Most studies remain at the group- or country-level and do not take into account the local dynamics of the civil war (Hallward, Masullo, and Mouly 2017, p. 3).

A broad set of studies particularly dealing with individual cases yet shows that the local context matters. On a more disaggregated level, civilian actors might see the breakdown of local order in the course of intensified battles as a chance to voice their interests. Individual subnational studies demonstrate that civilians may choose from different strategies ranging from flight and active support for the conflict parties to open protest (Barter 2014). Deciding to stay, civilians safeguard their interests through organized resistance, everyday methods of resistance (Barter 2017) or even violence (Schubiger 2016).

In this line of argumentation, a strand of research has explicitly investigated the different ways in which civilians cope with wartime events. At the local level, some studies investigate institutionalized types of civilian activism in the form of resistance communities that directly communicate with the belligerents. With regard to the Colombian civil war, various authors demonstrate that war violence drives civilians to coordinate their efforts in nonviolent resistance organizations (e.g. Kaplan 2017; Masullo 2015). Krause (2018) emphasizes the role of individual leadership and collective agency to establish inclusive identities, social control, and procedures for conflict management in such communities in Nigeria and Indonesia.

Most works investigating individual conflicts consider violence and territorial control essential for civil activism. For instance, Masullo (2015) argues that not only the intensification of violence is important, but also whether the violence is

perceived as indiscriminate by the local population. Others highlight the role of violence committed by the conflict parties against civilians as crucial to understand local activism (León 2017; Stanton 2017; Wood 2010).

Focusing on territorial control in civil wars, Arjona (2015) argues that the degree of governance a rebel group enacts in a given area and the quality of prior institutions explain the intensity of civilian resistance against rebel groups. For the communist insurgency in the Philippines, Rubin (2019) finds that communities with strong social networks impact the combatants' pay-offs and thus the likelihood of territorial control. In his study on protests in the Colombian civil war, León (2017) demonstrates that the response by the combatants depends on territorial control, but also on the protest goals. Attacks against civilians decrease when civilians protest against both conflict parties in a contested zone, but increase in areas that are under one party's control. The social cohesion of communities is one important explanation for the effectiveness of civilian activism in times of civil war (Kaplan 2017; Krause 2018; Masullo 2015; Rubin 2019), which can also take the form of participation in formalized political groups (Dorff 2017).

Research shows that civilians do not routinely support or reject either conflict party *in toto*, but represent independent third parties in times of war (Barter 2014; Kaplan 2017). We add to this growing research field in the following ways: First, we focus with *protests* on a high-risk strategy for civilians in times of civil wars. This analytical focus on individual events departs from some of the previous studies that focus on more persistent forms of community-level civil resistance, e.g. in the form of the establishment of *zones of peace*, community autonomy or noncooperation (Kaplan 2017; Masullo 2015). While these manifestations of resistance typically depend on the longer term development of the relationship between the communities with the conflict parties, protests can also constitute rather sudden acts of resistance that can be examined against the backdrop of individual battle events. Moreover, individual protests require a comparatively lower endowment of organizational resources and are thus expected to occur more frequently in wartime contexts. Second, our study provides a first quantitative comparative analysis of the local occurrence of wartime civilian protest across countries.

2.3 Civilian Activism in Civil Wars

Civil wars usually tend to cluster geographically within individual countries. While domestic conflicts certainly have an impact on entire societies, the theaters of active fighting are mostly confined to specific locations with low state capacity, inaccessible terrain, large distance from the national capital and proximity to state borders (Buhaug and Rød 2006). Our basic assumption is that individual battles matter for the question *where* local protests emerge. We argue that the likelihood for civilian protest—with civilians understood here in terms of their negative definition as any individuals that do not belong to an armed organized group (Barter 2012)¹—increases in areas that are directly affected by the civil war.

This argument may be counterintuitive considering the fact that civilians expose themselves to severe danger in these zones. Alternative ways to cope with exposure to civil war violence such as flight are, however, often only a last resort. Prior research has shown that locals directly affected by violence usually tend to stay because of domestic and cultural ties, fear from losing all possessions, and flight-related dangers and costs (Adhikari 2013).

Overt protest against war-related violence or for a peaceful resolution of the conflict presents an alternative option for civilians to deal with wartime violence. Civilians may hope to directly affect their living conditions through protests as the quote from the Syrian activist at the beginning of the article shows (Pearlman 2017, p. 169). Moreover, protest can mean an alternative strategy to cope with the immediate impact of war, a symbolic form of activism intended to create awareness and support from the wider public (Lipsky 1968). The international public may be addressed by protests in the hope that international actors (states and NGOs) intervene or support the civilians directly. Based on this premise, we expect battles and the ensuing local impacts to correlate with civilian protest, as they generate specific motives and opportunities (Lichbach 1998).

First, battles affect the propensity for civilian protest because losses incurred in the course of wartime violence increase grievances among the local population. The literature on grievances and relative deprivation essentially conceives collective action as the outcome of motivational factors: Protest thereby results from

¹ This conservative interpretation reflects the Geneva Convention's understanding of a civilian as any person not belonging to "organized armed forces, groups or units" and thereby not legitimately taking part in hostilities (International Committee of the Red Cross 1977, Art.50(1), Art.43(1-2)).

emerging gaps between one's own desires and the capabilities to achieve them. If these gaps widen, they are expected to set in motion a frustration-aggression mechanism that can eventually lead to collective action (Gurr 1970).

Importantly, the impact of these widening gaps can be particularly salient when they occur in the course of sudden shocks. We thus expect grievances to pertain particularly in those areas that have been immediately affected by battle-related violence. In these situations, civilian casualties can trigger protests. Aside from direct atrocities committed against civilians, battles frequently entail substantial collateral damage in the form of property damage, devastation of farmland, or even civilians killed in the crossfire (Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015). When the losses cause emotional upheaval on parts of locals, a formerly reluctant attitude to protest may change drastically, leading civilians to raise their voices in an attempt to influence the conflict parties (Pearlman 2013).

Being exposed to wartime violence can trigger emotions such as anger, a constant feeling of being insecure or being at the mercy of an irresponsible conflict party. These emotions can be motives to protest as they affect actors' rational calculations and lead to a greater risk-taking attitude (Ost 2004; Pearlman 2013). As Shanin wrote in his book on the Russian revolution: "At the very centre of revolutions lies an emotional upheaval of moral indignation, revulsion and fury with the powers-that-be, such that one cannot demur or remain silent, whatever the cost" (Shanin 1986, cited in Nepstad 2011, pp. 5-6). Once these grievances surge to the extent that they demand action, civilians may protest even in the midst of a civil war (Barter 2014; Kaplan 2017).

Single-case evidence from different civil wars backs this assumption. In Uganda's Lira district, citizens staged protests against the government's incapacity to end the civil war in the immediate aftermath of a massacre committed by the *Lord's Resistance Army* in the region (Muleme 2004). In Nepal's civil war, mothers from a village in Dailekh district launched demonstrations against the Maoist rebels after an increasing number of local youths has fallen in armed clashes (Shah 2008). As these examples suggest, the type of protests we are expecting in reaction to battles are rather small-scale, localized and individual events.

An alternative explanation would expect the impact of wartime violence on the population to also change the local societal structure as such, thus affecting the capacity of the population to protest by increasing group cohesion (Rubin 2019). In the light of destruction and loss, increased interpersonal trust and pro-social behavior amongst affected members of communities can form an essential strategy to build resilience against further threats (Bellows and Miguel 2009;

Gilligan, Pasquale, and Samii 2014). In turn, the development of group cohesion can facilitate actual collective action and thus even translate into protests (Dorff 2017; Kaplan 2017; Rubin 2019). Contrary to our expectation outlined before, however, we would expect such an effect to follow longer term experiences of wartime violence rather than sudden shocks.

Second, we assume wartime battles to change the opportunities for local protest. Previous studies have shown that the chances to protest hinge on structural factors that enable or deter collective action in the first place, with the capacity of the state to repress potential protests being a significant element (Davenport 2007; Tarrow 2011; Tilly 1978). A high number of local battles typically means that the locality is contested between the combatant parties (Kalyvas 2006). It can be reflective of a situation in which the local power structure changes, and in which the capacity of the former incumbent (may it be rebels or the government) to enact coercive force against civilians decreases (Kalyvas 2006; León 2017)—a situation locals may interpret as favorable windows of opportunity to take power in their own hands (Kaplan 2017). While either belligerent may also use targeted violence against civilians in zones of incomplete control (Kalyvas 2006), we do not expect these forms of violence to likewise change the opportunities for civilian protest. Faced with fear of reprisal, targeted attacks against the civilian population rather increase the costs for protest as compared to indirect civilian casualties in the course of battles.²

To sum up, we expect battles in the context of civil wars to increase the probability for civilian protest mainly through the interrelation between motivational triggers (grievances) and opportunities (contestation of territory). Based on these considerations, our first hypothesis reads:

Hypothesis 2.1 (H2.1): *Battles increase the likelihood for local protests in the same area.*

Battle intensity both increases motives and leads to the emergence of opportunities for protest (Lichbach 1998). However, we may assume that this relationship is not strictly linear (Tilly and Tarrow 2015). It is plausible to assume that low battle intensity does not increase the probability of civilian protest. The

² For a similar reason, we expect the effect of battles on protests to be most pronounced if one of the conflict parties is the state. Research has shown that competition between non-state groups is frequently entailed by targeted violence against civilians, which means that the costs for protest are comparatively high in these regions (Wood and Kathman 2015).

opportunities are low because the locality is under one party's control. At the same time, comparatively low experiences of violence may not incite the motives to protest.

A comparable effect may be present if a very high level of fighting decreases the opportunities but increases the motives to protest. We know from the literature on contentious politics that very high levels of conflict intensity can yield a deterring effect on mobilization (Opp and Roehl 1990; Tilly and Tarrow 2015). Although grievances surge at this point, the increased risk to be caught in the crossfire provides a constraint hampering the conjectured mechanism from our first hypothesis. High levels of fighting activity are additionally likely to change residents' preference for flight instead of protest in order to cope with civil war violence (Barter 2012).

We thus expect intermediate levels of battle activity to be associated with a comparatively high likelihood of civilian protests. In this case, the motivational incentives for civilians to protest against the fighting are strong enough to lead to action. At the same time, the intensity of fighting will not be too high to prevent civilian protest altogether.

Hypothesis 2.2 (H2.2): *The effect of battles on protests is highest for intermediate levels of battle intensity.*

2.4 Research Design

In order to test our theoretical assumptions empirically, we use data on civilian protest and battle events on a geographically disaggregated level for the African continent. A problem typical to spatial analyses consists of the possibility that the results are dependent on the choice for a specific spatial unit. In order to address this challenge known as the modifiable areal unit problem (Openshaw 1984), we apply our analysis on two different geographical units of analysis. In a first step, we aggregated the data to monthly observations on the first administrative level, which corresponds to subnational states, regions and provinces. The data on our unit of analysis was taken from the GADM *Database of Global Administrative Areas* (Global Administrative Areas 2018). In a second step, we conducted the analysis using artificial, equally sized and constant grid cells corresponding to 50 km edge length at the equator (Tollefsen, Strand, and Buhaug 2012). The latter approach carries a distinctive advantage: The consistency of grid cells reduces concerns over endogeneity and allows for a uniformly disaggregated analysis of

the conjectured effects independent of the varying shapes and sizes of subnational political units. Existing boundaries, on the other hand, often already reflect salient demarcations between different shares of the population along geographic or political lines, which may more accurately reflect the spatial extension where the effect is to be expected. Moreover, a reliance on much smaller grid cells drastically inflates the number of observations. Testing our propositions on both levels of spatial aggregation mitigates concerns that our findings are mainly driven by the selection of either spatial unit.

Africa is the continent with most civil wars during the investigation period. The high number of conflict-affected countries makes it a most-likely scenario for testing our hypotheses and ensures that our statistical results will not be driven by only a small number of countries. We included years of active armed conflict for African states since the end of the Cold War as recorded by the *UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset* (ACD) in our sample (Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015) and used the admin1-and grid cell-month level, respectively. The use of the most recent administrative areas as recorded by GADM resulted in 515 geographical units, while the grid-cell analysis consists of 7,889 geographical units (see Fig. B.1 for a comparison).

Dependent and Explanatory Variables

Our dependent variable is a binary measure capturing the onset of protests in an administrative unit/grid cell for a given month. We relied on SCAD, which encompasses a broad scope of conflict phenomena including nonviolent and violent forms of contention (Salehyan, Hendrix, et al. 2012). We operationalized instances of protest occurrence with the onset of demonstrations (spontaneous and planned) and strikes (limited and general) according to their start month.³ Given the large amount of observations, the occurrence of protests appears as a generally rare phenomenon across both peace and conflict years, with only 1.23% of all observations showing the emergence of at least one event (0.1% in the grid-cell sample). Separating between war and peace years reveals that from a total of 3,128 observations on the admin1-level with at least one protest, a considerable share of 25.35% (793) are located in periods of active conflict (24.84% for the grid

³ The events' total duration did not exceed 31 days for 98% of all cases in the raw sample, and hence including the start month was equivalent to the consideration of the total amount of months in which a protest has taken place. Being interested in the effect of violence on the *emergence* of protests, we include only the start month for longer lasting protest events as well.




Fig. 2.1. Absolute number of protests in the admin-1 (upper left) and grid-cell samples (lower left), and relative number of protests in the admin-1 (upper right) and grid-cell samples (lower right).

cell-month dataset). As Fig. 2.1 demonstrates, the respective occurrence rates for protests surprisingly do not differ significantly when we differentiate between years without active conflict (1.33% and 0.11%) and years with active conflict (1.0% and 0.07%).

The descriptive statistics reveal two patterns that correspond to our theoretical baseline assumptions. First, protest events with an identifiable organization that is active beyond the local context rarely occur during wartime. By contrast, protests that are either spontaneous or organized on the local level represent the most common form of civilian unrest. While this pattern pertains to peacetime protests as well, it is notable that the relative frequency of organized protests in wartime is 41.7% lower than during peacetime, whereas the corresponding difference for locally organized protests is only 9.72% (for the grid cell sample, the drop of relative frequency is 50% and 20%, respectively, see left-hand side of Fig. 2.2).




Fig. 2.2. Number of protests by degree of organization (left) and actor groups (right, only wartime), administrative 1 unit (upper row) and grid cell unit (lower row)

Second, only a minority of the protest events can be assigned to either conflict party. We manually assigned each protest event in our sample data to specific groups.⁴ We were able to only assign 16 protest occurrences to rebel groups, whereas 151 observations showed the engagement of at least one political actor, which includes the government and supporting groups as well as nonviolent anti-government organizations and opposition parties (right-hand side of Fig. 2.2).

These observations suggest that protests in the course of violent conflict are rather spontaneous contentious action by independent civilians than sustained campaigns or protests by front organizations of either the government or rebels. Indeed, other protest data support this assumption. For example, 43% of all wartime demonstrations and strikes in the *Nonviolent Action in Violent Contexts* data set have been conducted by local groups. Together with a category of

⁴ See Table B.1 in the appendix for additional information on the identification of actor affiliation.

unspecified groups, the share mounts to 77.73%. By contrast, rebel groups (1.7%), government-affiliated groups (6.1%) and political parties (11%) account for a substantively smaller share (Chenoweth, Hendrix, and Hunter 2019, p. 301).

We exclusively focused our dependent variable on *nonviolent* forms of protest as outlined above, discarding any potentially ambiguous forms such as rioting and violent protests that may be on the fringe to organized collective violence. SCAD *a priori* excludes violent events that can be attributed to the conflict itself or instances that involve one of the conflict parties as an initiator.⁵ This allows to accurately identify protests as independent popular activities that are civilian-based and carried out through widespread civilian participation. In order to test our argument that specifically grievance-driven protests related to actual wartime violence occur in the course of battle events, we use protests against war violence as coded in SCAD as an alternative dependent variable throughout our models.

The main explanatory variable *Number of battles* reflects the number of organized, armed conflict events as recorded in GED (Sundberg and Melander 2013). We used both the absolute number of events per unit-month (H2.1) and the quadratic term to test Hypothesis 2.2. In the admin-1 sample, 6,638 observations during active conflict years showed at least one instance of rebel-government battle, which corresponds to 8.41%. For the grid cell sample, we analogously observe 8,584 observations, which sums up to 0.7%. Despite a considerably higher share than protest events, we thus see that even battles as the defining element of civil wars occur relatively rarely and are not evenly distributed. While the number of battles range up to 33 events per month, 99% of all fighting-affected observations contain 13 events or less (the corresponding 99th percentile is at 10 events for the grid cell sample).

The temporal and spatial accuracy of both used datasets, which compile individual geo-located events, allowed for a precise assignment of each protest and battle instance to individual observations. Fig. 2.3 highlights the spatial distribution of protest occurrence and conflict intensity during the time period of investigation on a cross-sectional base. It suggests that the co-occurrence of both phenomena in the same locality is far from unusual.

A problem inherent both to SCAD and GED stems from a source of bias specific to geo-referenced event data. As several studies have indicated, a high reliance on media-based reports in the coding procedure may easily lead to a

⁵ We have additionally discarded all events that were flagged by SCAD as potentially conflicting with UCDP.




Fig. 2.3. Protest Occurrence and Conflict Intensity, 1992-2013.

Note: The figure shows the spatial distribution of events on a cross-sectional base.

disproportional representation of urban-based events, which can have different reasons. On the one hand, events in remote and sparsely populated areas tend to be underreported because a systematic lack of sufficient infrastructure and eye witnesses prevent the diffusion of information on respective events (Weidmann 2016). Another possible explanation might be that large-scale protests are not the primary form of protest in rural areas. On the other hand, the difficulty to precisely pinpoint event sites in rural areas often leads to the situation in which the alleged event location is relegated to the nearest populated place, typically a town (Eck 2012). As a result, reports from both the SCAD and GED may artificially converge to urban centers which may lead to biased results.

While the first problem is arguably difficult to solve, we have attempted to address it by repeating our main analysis with different sample sizes. With regard to the second source of bias, we are confident that the chosen research design mitigates the concern appropriately. First, the selection of relatively large geographical units was deliberately chosen in order to account for smaller degrees of imprecision. Consistent with our argument, battles may trigger protests in a wider vicinity of the conflict location, but both phenomena do not necessarily have to match in the exact same location. Second, we discarded all events that

were geographically vague or occurred nationwide in order to account for higher order imprecision. Additionally, we discarded all battle events in GED that were not attributable to individual months.

Controls

The models include a set of variables that control for alternative explanations. Our primary interest is to estimate the association between battles and protests, but both phenomena may be influenced by targeted attacks against civilians that can take place in close sequence (Kalyvas 2006), or indirect damage incurred in the course of inter-group clashes. We therefore controlled for the number of events per unit-month that were recorded by the UCDP GED as one-sided violence and non-state violence. Next, we accounted for time-constant geographic factors consisting of the share of mountainous terrain, forest cover and urban cover obtained from the Globcover dataset (2009) in order to approximate differences of state capacity across administrative units.

Moreover, we considered demographic control variables measured at the annual level that could potentially confound the conjectured relationship between battles and protests in our models. First, we approximated the level of local economic development with the annual mean of nightlight emissions per administrative unit. Local poverty tends to increase the propensity for violent conflict, whereas protests conversely correlate with economically developed, urbanized regions (Buhaug, Gleditsch, et al. 2009; Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017). We used the ‘stable lights’ version for our purpose, which corrects the data for non-stable emissions such as forest fires or gas flares (National Geophysical Data Center 2014). Second, we controlled for the (logged) population density, which is obtained from the Gridded Population of the World (CIESIN and CIAT 2005). As the census-based data on grid cell population was only available for quinquennial intervals, we filled the missing inter-censal data by linear interpolation.

Apart from battles, long-standing sources of grievances may correlate with higher local propensities for collective action in the first place. In line with this intuition, studies have identified ethnic discrimination to facilitate the outbreak of violent conflict (Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011). Against this backdrop, we include a dummy variable indicating whether any group excluded from power settles in a specific administrative unit. The information is taken from the GeoEPR.

The inclusion of year dummies shall mitigate the effect of time trends. Moreover, the months passed since last protest occurrence alongside their squared and cubic polynomials as suggested by Carter and Signorino (2010) address temporal autocorrelation of the dependent variable. We control for spatial diffusion by including a spatial lag as a dummy variable indicating whether a protest event occurred in an adjacent administrative unit during the same month. Due to data availability, the inclusion of all variables restricts the eventual period of investigation in the estimated models to the years 1992 to 2013.

2.5 Empirical Analysis

We now turn to our statistical analysis on the impact of wartime battles on civilian protest, with Table 2.1 summarizing the results from the logistic regressions. We apply a three-level random intercept model as our main estimation strategy with monthly observations nested in individual sub-national units, which are in turn nested in countries. This multilevel structure includes fixed coefficients, but allows the intercept to vary both across sub-national units and countries (Gelman and Hill 2007). Models 1–4 are based on the admin1-units, while models 5–8 are based on the grid cell levels (Table 2.1).

The first three columns display the coefficients for the predictors using the first administrative unit as the geographical unit of analysis. In accordance with our theoretical expectation, wartime battles show a positive and significant correlation with the outcome of interest (M1). A similar picture emerges when we only consider protests against civil war violence itself (M2) instead of *any* protest activity. The association with battles remains significant and even increases in terms of magnitude, whereas one-sided violence shows no effect at conventional levels of significance.

In order to illustrate the substantive effect of battles on protest occurrence, Fig. 2.4 displays the predictive margins for M1 and M2 on different values of our main explanatory variable. As expected, the baseline probability for any protests to occur in the absence of any battles in the admin1-month is fairly low. Based on that premise, M1 predicts an increase to 1.18% if we move to one battle. When the number of monthly battle events further increases from 1 to 6 (corresponds to the 5th and 95th percentile of all observations with at least one battle), the predicted probability increases by 35.36%. For M2, the same leap in battle intensity corresponds to an increase by 75.54%. This speaks to

Table 2.1. Mixed effects logistic regression results for the association between wartime violence and protest occurrence

	Admin 1				Grid cells			
	(1) Protests All issues	(2) Protests War violence	(3) Protests All issues	(4) Protests War violence	(5) Protests All issues	(6) Protests War violence	(7) Protests All issues	(8) Protests War violence
Battles	0.0810* (0.0356)	0.1332** (0.0467)	0.2841*** (0.0798)	0.4218** (0.1327)	0.0946** (0.0304)	0.0924* (0.0375)	0.3183* (0.1384)	0.3531+ (0.1936)
Battles ²			-0.0244* (0.0105)	-0.0315* (0.0140)			-0.0239+ (0.0144)	-0.0259 (0.0198)
One-sided violence	0.0755* (0.0294)	0.0458 (0.0515)	0.0879** (0.0276)	0.0753** (0.0250)	0.0723 (0.0632)	0.0368 (0.0488)	0.0954* (0.0460)	0.0704 (0.0472)
Non-state violence	0.0335 (0.0848)	0.2517*** (0.0402)	0.0251 (0.0851)	0.2390*** (0.0410)	0.0157 (0.1129)	0.0589 (0.1027)	0.0145 (0.1014)	0.0553 (0.0959)
Mountainous terrain	-0.1616 (0.3487)	0.2173 (0.3958)	-0.1864 (0.3600)	0.1648 (0.4202)	-0.2909 (0.3141)	0.3549 (0.7079)	-0.3083 (0.3160)	0.3039 (0.7183)
Forest cover	-0.0122* (0.0048)	-0.0032 (0.0069)	-0.0123* (0.0048)	-0.0042 (0.0070)	-0.0093* (0.0041)	-0.0026 (0.0055)	-0.0094* (0.0041)	-0.0026 (0.0054)
Urban cover	0.0327 (0.0400)	0.0931** (0.0359)	0.0264 (0.0399)	0.0838* (0.0364)	0.2694* (0.1260)	0.1357+ (0.0786)	0.2615* (0.1247)	0.1251 (0.0785)
Total population (log)	0.3461* (0.1459)	0.1387 (0.1169)	0.3411* (0.1448)	0.1278 (0.1165)	0.8486*** (0.1360)	0.6574*** (0.1597)	0.8446*** (0.1358)	0.6505*** (0.1597)
Mean annual nighttime lights	0.0692*** (0.0159)	0.0363* (0.0158)	0.0713*** (0.0154)	0.0371* (0.0148)	0.0443 (0.0298)	-0.0283 (0.0357)	0.0490+ (0.0297)	-0.0228 (0.0350)
Groups excl. from power	-0.0233 (0.1150)	0.0069 (0.1647)	-0.0307 (0.1160)	0.0035 (0.1601)	-0.0604 (0.1395)	0.1186 (0.1743)	-0.0663 (0.1438)	0.1054 (0.1820)
Protest in adj. spatial unit	1.2166*** (0.2082)	0.7192* (0.2889)	1.2189*** (0.2102)	0.7079* (0.2912)	1.1317*** (0.2372)	0.8035+ (0.4711)	1.1419*** (0.2384)	0.8243+ (0.4738)
Constant	-10.2608*** (2.0526)	-7.5396*** (1.6040)	-10.2138*** (2.0169)	-7.4457*** (1.5723)	-17.2239*** (2.0352)	-13.9081*** (2.2156)	-17.2281*** (2.0233)	-13.8911*** (2.1995)
var(Country)	0.4643* (0.2289)	1.0814** (0.4029)	0.4703* (0.2274)	1.1025** (0.3944)	0.4797 (0.3127)	1.3198** (0.4633)	0.4867 (0.3153)	1.3264** (0.4645)
var(Admin 1)	2.3581** (0.8000)	0.8565** (0.3036)	2.3130** (0.7586)	0.8118** (0.2857)				
var(Grid cell)					2.7869* (1.3466)	0.6033* (0.2918)	2.8046* (1.3280)	0.6088* (0.2768)
year-dummies	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	66,804	64,620	66,804	64,620	794,436	769,020	794,436	769,020
AIC	5004.8734	1542.5771	4993.6769	1532.3675	5316.0039	1590.0837	5305.5668	1583.9412

Robust standard errors (in parantheses) clustered on the admin1-/grid-cell-level; Months since last protest (3rd degree polynomial) not shown.
 + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

our expectation that the likelihood for civilian protest during wartime principally increases with a higher intensity of battles. Taken together, the findings lend first evidence to Hypothesis 2.1, as they suggest protests against wartime violence to emerge particularly in reaction to indirect, but not necessarily to targeted violence against the civilian population.

Turning to our second hypothesis, we expected wartime battles to be associated with a higher likelihood of protest only for an intermediate range, whereas a high conflict intensity was assumed to curb further protest. In order to test this argument, M3 and M4 repeat the analysis using a squared term of battle intensity as the main predictor. The results suggest support to our hypothesis, as the probability for protest occurrence decreases at a statistically significant level for the squared term of our explanatory variable. As Fig. 2.5 suggests, this reduction effect is only relevant for values beyond the 95th percentile of all cases with at least one battle event (corresponding to 7 and 8 battles, respectively). The finding should thus be taken with caution.

The remaining models in Table 2.1 repeat the previous analyses using grid cells instead of administrative units as the geographical unit of analysis. Using artificial, uniform grid cells mitigates concerns that our results are affected by the non-random delineation of administrative units. Furthermore, the grid cells on average cover a smaller geographical extent and thereby ensure that we capture the relationship between our variables in relatively close spatial proximity. These advantages come against the drawback of a much higher number of individual observations. We start by assuming a linear relationship between the predictors and the outcome (M5 and M6), with two findings being of specific importance: First, the coefficients for battle events remain stable and significant. It is particularly noteworthy that the effect for all protests (M5) and protests against conflict-related violence (M6) converge in terms of their magnitude now. Second, the coefficients for both one-sided and non-state violence become insignificant on the grid cell level. The association between battles and protests is thus the only result that appears robust across both scaling and zoning schemes. M7 and M8, on the other hand, suggest an ambiguous correlation between battle events and protest if we assume a curvilinear relationship. With regard to the control variables, particularly the occurrence of protests in adjacent geographical areas show a consistent effect across all model specifications. To sum up, the findings from the regression analysis provide a robust linear relationship between battle intensity and protest onset. However, we find mixed support that the effect is highest for intermediate levels of battle events.




Fig. 2.4. Predictive margins with 95% confidence intervals across different values of battle intensity according to models 1 (upper panel) and 2 (lower panel).




Fig. 2.5. Predictive margins with 95% confidence intervals across different values of battle intensity according to models 3 (upper panel) and 4 (lower panel).

Robustness Checks

In order to validate our findings and address potential sources of endogeneity, we tested different specifications based on models M1 and M2 (Table 2.1). The detailed results can be obtained from Fig. B.2 and Tables B.2 through B.5 in the appendix.

A first concern is related to the proposed direction of causality from battles to protests. At a first glance, it is likewise plausible to expect conflict actors to select localities with higher protest activity for punitive actions. While this would be an alternative explanation for the correlation between one-sided violence and protests, however, we deem this causal path to be less plausible for battle events. The location of violent encounters between the state and rebels is often subject to tactical considerations that are less directly related to the location of protests as compared to targeted attacks against the civilian population (for a similar argument, see De Juan and Pierskalla 2016).

To further probe the conjectured direction, we scaled the temporal dimension down to the week level and used the sum of battles from previous periods (starting with one lag in R1 and R2 to the cumulative sum of battles from the previous four periods in R7 and R8). Given our assumption that protests constitute relatively spontaneous and short-term reactions to violence, lagging the independent variable in our month-level estimations would not have been theoretically reasonable. A further disaggregation yet provides the opportunity to clearly test whether battles and protests follow in the proposed causal sequence. For enhanced interpretation, we visualized the coefficients of the three types of violence in Fig. B.2. The results are mixed: Considering all protest issues as our dependent variable yields no significant associations between any of our variables and the outcome. Only accounting for protests against civil war violence shows that the coefficients for battle events remain positive and significant throughout the tested time periods.⁶ These considerations cannot rule out reverse causality, but we are confident that the results point to a comparatively higher plausibility of the suggested theoretical argument.

Second, we test alternative estimation strategies. We start with a conservative conditional logit model with unit- and year-fixed effects (R9 and R10). The estimation approach chosen here discards all time-invariant variation between

⁶ A disaggregation to the weekly level inflates the number of observations and entails the problem that most of the control variables remain highly aggregated—up to the yearly level. The conclusions drawn from these models thus can serve as auxiliary evidence on the previous model’s finding only, but shall not constitute the main part of our analysis.

units (that is, across subnational units) and thus mitigates omitted variable bias stemming from the influence of stable, unobserved traits that differ across administrative units. The effect of battle events on the outcome is inferred from variation within individual units only (Firebaugh, Warner, and Massoglia 2013). On the downside, the consideration of only within-unit variation practically discards all observations for which no protests have occurred throughout the period of investigation. We can thus only make meaningful statements about the temporal covariation of protest and battle events within positive-outcome cases, but cannot compare administrative units with localities that have not been subject to battles or where no protest emerged at all. Models R9 and R10 return different results: Albeit being positively correlated throughout both models, the association between battles and protests is only statistically significant when we specifically consider protests against civil war violence. In a next step, we replaced the dummy-coded outcome with a count variable measuring the *number* of protest events and applied a negative binomial model (R11). We applied this procedure as an alternative for our outcome in model 1, as protest events can scale up to 6 in our sample. The results remain stable.

Third, we attempt to mitigate the previously discussed suspicion that the results could be biased due to a systematic over-reporting of urban areas at the expense of rural, remote areas (Weidmann 2016). We therefore repeat the analysis using smaller sub-samples. If the results would be driven by the fact that urban areas tend to have both more *reported* battle and protest events as compared to rural events, we would expect the results to become insignificant once we only compare urbanized regions with other urbanized regions. However, the results remain stable even if we only consider administrative units with cities populated by more than 100,000 people (R12 and R13)—locations for which we can be fairly confident of a constant media presence.

Fourth, we check for influential cases by running separate analyses without Algeria (R14 and R15), Sudan (R16) and Côte d’Ivoire (R17). The first country contains the majority of observations in the sample with at least one battle event (30.37% of all observations), while most protests in the sample period occurred in Sudan (17.02%) and most war-related protests in Côte d’Ivoire (11.11%). Overall, the results support our main findings.

Fifth, we assessed to which degree our results react to alternative specifications of the independent variable. In a first step, we used a log-transformed version of our independent variable in order to account for the skewness of the data and test whether the results are driven by outliers (R18 and R19). In a second step,

we proxied battle intensity with the (log-transformed) number of casualties as an alternative to the mere number of events (R20 and R21). The results remain stable for the main explanatory variable.

The results have so far shown a robust relationship between battle intensity and wartime protests. Central to our argument has thereby been the conviction that battles create both opportunities and grievances that enable civilian protest. With regard to the former, we assumed locations with increased battle intensity to reflect disputed areas that, in turn, may open ‘windows of opportunity’ due to a local loss in state capacity. If this argument holds, we would specifically find evidence on the conjectured effect if battles end in parity rather than a clear victory by one side.

GED does not provide information on the victorious party of individual battles. However, we can approximate the aggregate outcome of all battles in a unit-month with one side’s share of the total battle-related casualties. We take the share of government losses and its quadratic term as an alternative independent variable, expecting that the propensity for protest is highest when losses are balanced (for a similar approach, see León 2017). Applying this model with the alternative independent variable yields the expected results (R22 and R23), namely both coefficients are significant. Even more, we see that the effect is highest for situations of parity (that is, when the value is 0.5), thus lending evidence to our assumptions.

We further argued that grievance formation in the course of wartime battles follows a relatively short-term process. This is, we expected particularly sudden shocks to enable collective action. Up to now, we have implicitly followed this assumption by looking on battle intensity in the same month rather than taking longer term trends into account. In order to test the alternative possibility, namely that grievances rather build up and manifest in protest activity once the *development* of violence in a region surge, we tested our baseline models taking different measures on prior conflict severity into account. First, we use the deviation of battle intensity from the mean of previous periods (1, 6 and 12 months prior) as a predictor (R24 to R26). If the results are driven by sudden increases in battle intensity, we would expect the effect to be comparable to our main models. Second, we interact our main predictor with a continuous variable measuring the duration of violence (R27). If our assumptions are correct, we would assume that the effect on protest onset decreases if battles are preceded by longer spells of ongoing violence. The tested models indeed lend evidence to

our assumed mechanism, although the coefficients of deviations from prior battle intensity tend to show lower levels of both magnitude and significance once we take longer time periods into account.

Discussing Alternative Explanations

The final step of our analysis shall validate our proposed mechanism from battle events to local protests. We display the results of these tests in Fig. 2.6 (all specifications are based on models 1 and 5). First, we expected battle events to increase protests of autonomous civilians rather than government-led or rebel-initiated protests. The descriptive evidence outlined before already pointed to a relatively marginal amount of protests by these actor groups. If we explicitly estimate the effect separately for rebel- and state-led protests on the one hand and a remainder category on the other hand, we only find a statistically significant effect for the latter category. Notably, SCAD's actor coding does not allow for a more fine-grained differentiation here. Yet we find at least some suggestive evidence for our assumption that the observed effect is *not* reflective of nonviolent tactics conducted by the conflict parties.

Second, our argument rested on the assumption that wartime civilian protest in the aftermath of battle events differs from large-scale social movement campaigns that usually constitute the focus of attention in the literature on contentious politics. These campaigns, defined as “a series of observable, continuous, purposive mass tactics or events in pursuit of a political objective” (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, p.14) require organizational foundations as a crucial part of their social movement base. Consequently, if wartime protests would mainly occur in the course of large-scale campaigns, we should find a significant relationship between battles and protests with a clearly identifiable organization behind it. We thus repeated our basic estimation in two alternative models, one considering only protests as the dependent variable for which an organization can be identified and one considering only protest events without clear information on potential organizations as initiators according to SCAD.⁷ The relationship between battles and protests only remains significant for the latter, locally organized type that lacks an identifiable organizational structure. This lends evidence for our previous expectation: Not only are unorganized forms of protest more frequent during wartime as compared to organized forms, they are also the only ones that tend to systematically occur as a reaction to battle events.

⁷ See Day, Pinckney, and Chenoweth (2015, p. 131) on a similar operationalization approach.




Fig. 2.6. Coefficient plots for battles using alternative dependent variables, admin-1 sample (upper panel) and grid-cell sample (lower panel).

One may issue the caveat that the significantly increased protest propensity in the aftermath of battles may rather reflect the phenomenon of a generally increased civilian activity. Violence could indeed simply entail *any* reaction, of which protests may only be one among many manifestations. For example, an argument could be made that violent civilian uprisings and riots likewise increase in the aftermath of battles. Fig. 2.1 indeed suggests that violent protests and riots do occur amid active conflicts, albeit at a lower rate when compared to nonviolent protests. We have thus repeated models 1 and 5 with an alternative dependent variable measuring only riots from SCAD as an alternative form of civilian action. The results, however, show no significant effect comparable to the occurrence of protest activities.

Our argument rested on the assumption that battles can generate opportunities for civilians, but that these opportunities only translate into actual protests because the impact of battle events at the same time generates grievances on behalf of the affected population. We have found some evidence for this conjecture, but we have not addressed the concern so far whether battles may *only* lead to an opening of favorable “windows of opportunity” that suddenly enable civilian actors to raise their most pressing demands in public. The local breakdown of state capacity in the aftermath of heavy battles may thereby tremendously facilitate the opportunity for claim-making amongst local organizations and enable any type of conflict, regardless of the issue type.

Several examples illustrate that protests of any type occasionally co-occur with battles. In August and October 1997, for instance, several political parties have staged rallies in Algiers amid heavy local fighting during the civil war in an attempt to protest alleged fraud in the legislative elections. Similarly, the use of work strikes in the immediate aftermath of intensive local battles may be related only indirectly to the fighting. For example, the entailing breakdown of the local economy and large-scale job losses can give rise to worker protests and demands for assistance, as was the case in Burundi’s capital Bujumbura in 1996, 1998 and 2000, respectively. Moreover, active war fighting may fuel ethnic tensions and lead to nonviolent or even violent battles in the aftermath. This has happened in Mali’s Kati town in February 2012, where civilians immediately affected by violence and enraged over the government’s poor handling of the Tuareg conflict attacked homes and businesses from families of Tuareg ethnic communities.

The outlined cases thus suggest that the effect of fighting on protest occurrence may not mainly be related to fighting-induced grievances on the local population, but rather indirectly connected to each other. In order to address this concern,

we have repeated the analysis using five different protest issue categories as coded in SCAD alongside the already used category of civil war violence/terrorism: Economic conditions, elections, identity-based issues, pro-government protests, and human rights and democratization. As Fig. B.3 (appendix) demonstrates, almost all topical areas are represented even in times of conflict. However, there appears to be no statistically significant association between the location and timing of battle events on the one side and protests concerned with issues on human rights or democratization, economic conditions, elections or identity-based issues on the other side. We therefore find little support for a sole “window of opportunity” mechanism. The failure to find any indication for a positive relationship between battles and pro-government protest further strengthens our confidence that the type of activism we observe is *not* initiated by the government itself, but rather by autonomous civilians.

When we test the effect on individual protest issues, the only significant correlations between battles and protests show up if the latter deal with civil war-related violence. This finding provides suggestive evidence for our conjectured mechanism, which is based on the assumption that battles affect the probability of protest onset not only through the opening of opportunities, but in conjunction with grievances.

2.6 Conclusion

Research on protest in civil wars is growing, but there is still a lack of cross-country comparisons examining their spatial determinants. In this paper, we contributed to the emerging field by investigating the local conditions of protests using spatially disaggregated data. We argued that civilian protest tends to emerge in areas with a high intensity of battles between the government and rebels, since battles generate both grievances on behalf of the affected population and the opportunities to protest.

We tested this argument empirically relying on data from the SCAD and GED for all civil war years in Africa from 1992 to 2013. The statistical analysis lent evidence to our hypothesis that battle locations and protest occurrence correlate. The findings suggested an empirically meaningful spatial association between the number of battles and the likelihood of protest. A series of robustness checks validated the results against alternative model specifications. Examples of wartime protests in contexts as diverse as Uganda (Dolan 2009), Nepal (Shah 2008) or

Syria (Kaplan 2013a) underline the phenomenon's relevance and demonstrate that civilian protest in the midst of civil wars is not idiosyncratic to African conflicts. While our findings show also a curvilinear effect as hypothesized, the low number of observations with a high battle intensity does not allow an empirically informed assessment. We thus did not find consistent and robust support for H2.2.

Although we have discussed the plausibility of our suggested mechanism, we cannot entirely discard concerns of endogeneity and are therefore cautious to make definite causal statements. Relying on alternative research designs, subsequent analyses may put a stronger focus on the identification of causal effects between battles and protests.

The investigated topic offers several potential avenues for future research: First, we primarily investigated the spatial relationship between battles and protests and put less emphasis on the question *when* protests emerge over the course of individual conflicts. Follow-up studies may examine how aggregate temporal dynamics such as shifts in the balance of power between the belligerents or different phases of the conflict affect the propensity of protest.

Second, while we set out to investigate the local conditions that enable protest in the first place, the analysis of potential consequences for the conflict dynamics constitute the next logical step. Being a high-risk strategy, civilian protest can for example represent a distinct signal for shifting local support for either conflict party. As a sign for severe discontent, the individual locations of civilian protest during wars can also guide international reconstruction efforts in the aftermath of conflicts with regard to the identification of communities being able and prone to either obstruct or support peace building processes.

Lastly, the scope of this study has explicitly been restricted to battles between the government and rebel groups as we expected these types of wartime events to be most likely to be associated with independent civilian protest. However, many conflicts also include battles between different non-state actors such as militias and rebels as well. A potential avenue for future research may lie in the more thorough investigation how the effect of these conflict events in areas with low state capacity differ empirically from state-based violence.

Chapter 3

The Tactical Use of Civil Resistance by Rebel Groups. Evidence from India's Maoist Insurgency

Abstract

Research on rebel behavior during conflicts has traditionally focused on the use of violent tactics. However, evidence from several intrastate wars suggests that armed groups also occasionally employ general strikes—a method of civil resistance that has typically been associated with nonviolent groups. But when do rebels resort to general strikes? I argue that these tactics have a particular function which can offset potential risks for rebels after they have suffered losses in previous battles: Through general strikes, rebels signal sustained authority to the local population. The argument is tested for districts in Eastern India using newly compiled, disaggregated data on contentious action during the Maoist conflict. The paper contributes to a burgeoning literature on wartime civilian activism in two ways: First, it shows that armed groups themselves rely situationally on civilian mobilization. Second, it investigates the effect of conditions endogenous to the conflict on these tactical choices.

3.1 Introduction

We typically conceive of intrastate armed conflicts as exceptional political situations in which nonstate actors challenge the authority of the government with organized violence. However, rebel groups sometimes employ tactics beyond the mere use of armed force, involving forms of popular mobilization that are usually characteristic of nonviolent movements: Groups across diverse ideological and geographical contexts ranging from Nepal's and India's Maoist rebellions (Swain 2010; Mishra 2017) over separatist conflicts in Aceh and Kashmir (Keller 2017) to ethnic and religious conflicts in Iraq (Kamber and Glanz 2008) have repeatedly enforced general strikes in the course of predominantly violent insurrections. In some instances, such as the Nepalese civil war and the First Congo War, rebel-sponsored general strikes even decisively marked the final episodes of the respective conflict, leading to either concessions or regime change (Keller 2017; McGreal 1997). Despite their sometimes massive impact, though, general strikes are a hitherto unexplained variation of rebel behavior that has received relatively little attention in the academic debate.

The use of general strikes or civil resistance methods more generally by armed actors represents a puzzle. After all, the mobilization of civilians for contentious performances in public spaces departs considerably from tactics of insurgent warfare, which are usually characterized by clandestine and small-scale operations. This paper aims to explore how conflict dynamics affect rebel groups' propensity to employ general strikes during an ongoing violent campaign. I assume that insurgents operate in a strategic context in which tactical decisions are made based on their costs and benefits in a given situation. The implementation of general strikes can draw attention to an area, requires the diversion of resources, and runs the risk of backfiring if insurgents fail to enforce compliance. I argue, however, that particularly in cases where rebels experience battlefield losses in a certain locality, general strikes can outweigh these drawbacks by signaling ongoing local control and operational capacity to the local population. I test this argument in a systematic, subnational study using novel data on the implementation of general strikes during India's ongoing Maoist insurgency. While this conflict has predominantly been portrayed against the backdrop of the surge in violence, the militant *Communist Party of India-Maoist* (CPI-Maoist) has relied heavily on popular mobilization as a contentious performance alongside the use of armed force since the very beginning of the insurgency.

In particular, the Maoist rebels frequently rely on *bandhs*, a form of civil disobedience in South Asian countries that falls into the broader category of general strikes and implies the complete shutdown of all public and economic life in a specific region (Sinha, Sinha, and Shekhar 2006; McHenry 2006). The results from linear probability and logistic regression models show that rebel casualties increase the probability of rebel-initiated general strikes. These findings remain robust across different model specifications, including the use of different estimation strategies, the omission of influential cases, and alternative operationalizations of the independent variable. Moreover, I assess the plausibility of the supposed causal direction from battlefield losses to general strikes and discuss alternative explanations, which both strengthen confidence in the theoretical argument.

The paper contributes to the existing research on rebels' tactical choices in three ways: First, by showing that armed groups strategically employ civil resistance alongside violent methods, it sheds light on a hitherto undertheorized variation of rebel behavior. The study thereby adds to a burgeoning strand of literature that moves beyond the strictly dichotomous understanding of groups relying on either armed force or civil resistance (e.g. Cunningham, Dahl, and Frugé 2017). Second, the finding that rebels increasingly resort to civil resistance methods in the wake of battlefield losses highlights the importance of factors endogenous to the conflict as crucial drivers of tactical variation. This also has practical implications: interpreting the absence of a clear relationship between prior losses and subsequent attacks as a sign of rebel inactivity may prove misleading, as armed groups may instead simply shift to unconventional tactics of civil resistance. Lastly, the observation that rebels use general strikes in particular allows for a more nuanced understanding of the functional differences across various forms of civil resistance. The article shows that general strikes' specific quality of signaling sustained presence and control to local civilians makes them a particularly useful tactical choice in reaction to battlefield losses as compared to other forms of civil resistance such as protests or demonstrations.

3.2 Previous Research on Rebel Tactics and Civil Resistance

Insurgent groups' tactical choices have been central to the study of rebel behavior. Existing research has particularly focused on explaining variations in the use of violent tactics, including violence against civilians (Weinstein 2007; Hovil

and Werker 2005; Staniland 2012a; Humphreys and Weinstein 2006). A thriving literature on rebel governance has yet demonstrated that rebel behavior often exceeds the mere use of violence, sometimes even resulting in the establishment of wartime institutions (Kasfir 2005; Metelits 2010; Mampilly 2011; Staniland 2012b). In addition, recent research in the field of contentious politics implies that even militant groups occasionally mobilize civilians for public protests—a tactic traditionally associated with nonviolent movements (Keller 2017; Asal, Legault, et al. 2013; Arves, Cunningham, and McCulloch 2019). Related studies highlight the need for a broader perspective on rebel tactics beyond violence, but focus mostly on explaining variation between individual rebel groups rather than tactical variation over time.

Only few studies have attempted to explicate the conditions under which individual groups employ violent and civil resistance tactics at different points in time. Cunningham, Dahl, and Frugé (2017) demonstrate that short-term objectives such as garnering popular support, increasing visibility within the movement, withstanding repression, or increasing leverage can lead individual resistance organizations to switch dynamically between tactics. This idea builds on earlier works that remain deliberately agnostic on the character of organizations and instead assume that groups strategically use either violent or nonviolent modes of contention depending on the state's prior actions (Moore 1998; Lichbach 1987).

Turning to civil war studies, however, we still know little about how specifically rebel groups change to civil resistance tactics under the conditions of armed conflict. Disaggregated studies on individual civil wars have focused on both spatial and temporal factors to explain rebels' tactical variation. With regard to spatial variation, some studies have found local constituency bases (Ottmann 2017; Fjelde and Hultman 2014), preexisting networks and support (Holtermann 2016; Balcells 2011), the level of local control (Kalyvas 2006), or the presence of competition with other armed groups (Metelits 2009) to be significant determinants for the use of violence against civilians. In terms of temporal variation, some authors have foregrounded explanations connected to the war dynamics themselves, specifically with regard to shifting balances of power (Holtermann 2016) or the degree of state repression (Shellman, Levey, and Young 2013; Asal, Phillips, et al. 2019). Horowitz, Perkoski, and Potter (2018) demonstrate that violent state response and intergroup competition enhance the tendency for tactical diversification among armed groups. Similarly, both Hultman (2007) and Wood (2014) show that armed groups increasingly target civilians after battlefield losses.

These studies highlight the importance of factors endogenous to the conflict for explaining tactical variation, but restrict their focus largely on variations of violence. By contrast, works in the field of contentious politics have highlighted the analytical value of broadening the perspective on groups' repertoires to include violent and nonviolent tactics alike. However, the specific strategic rationale behind armed groups' use of civil resistance methods in individual conflicts has remained underspecified. This study aims to address both shortcomings and to contribute to a better understanding of the factors determining why actors that primarily rely on the use of violence occasionally employ civil resistance methods.

3.3 Theoretical Framework

In the following, I address the relationship between conflict dynamics and insurgents' use of civil resistance with specific reference to general strikes. A general strike is understood here as a contentious performance in which all people in a specific area are called upon to withdraw from their daily activities and thereby bring the public and economic life to a standstill (Sharp 1973). As opposed to purely military tactics, general strikes as a method of civil resistance are characterized by the mobilization of unarmed civilians beyond the immediate core of armed fighters (Schock 2005). Although typically associated with nonviolent movements, examples of general strikes called by Islamist insurgents in Iraq (Parker 2004) over the left-leaning *Sandinista National Liberation Front* (FSLN) in Guatemala (Washington Post 1979) to the separatist Acehese rebels in Indonesia (Dutter 2003) suggest that also armed groups resort to this method—regardless of their political alignment, goal or the geographic context. But why do rebels use general strikes?

At the heart of my argument lies the assumption that general strikes possess a functional feature that can be advantageous for armed actors under certain conditions: General strikes signal continued authority over a given locality to the local population, which makes it a rational tactical choice in situations when this very authority is jeopardized.

Local Control and Rebel Behavior

Maintaining authority in a given geographical area represents a key strategic imperative for many rebel groups. Local control decreases civilians' incentives to defect and, in turn, increases incentives to collaborate with the insurgents

(Kalyvas 2006). This aspect gains particular salience in asymmetric conflicts, when rebels become highly dependent on civilian support in order to offset the military disadvantage vis-à-vis the state (Balcells and Kalyvas 2014).

Given its potential to diminish a particular group's authority, any threat to the current state of local control is thus likely to be taken seriously by that group. Particularly when control is incomplete or disputed, these threats stem most directly from changes in the balance of power between the combatants. Each battle-related casualty carries the potential to impact local perceptions about the further trajectory of war in the region. If the local population perceives the fortunes of war to turn against the rebel group and anticipates that the government will regain control in the area, the incentives for defection will increase and the very power base on which the insurgency is built can be undermined. Battlefield losses in a given locale are thus likely to prompt rebels to react in the very same location with the intent to signal the maintenance of authority there to the local population.

In order to signal sustained authority in the wake of battlefield losses, rebels sometimes react with punitive actions against the civilian population (Wood 2014). However, especially indiscriminate violence can easily backfire and alienate the civilian population (Kalyvas 2006), which may eventually contribute to a further loss of authority. Instead of using military coercion, rebels that already enjoy a certain degree of local control thus occasionally resort to nonviolent or political actions in order to demonstrate sustained authority. For example, some militant groups develop elaborate institutions or provide basic services, which can serve as a powerful testament for the groups' local dominance and the state institutions' lack of authority in a given area (Mampilly 2011). These specific endeavors certainly require a longer-term time horizon on the rebels' part and may be unsuitable as reactions to situational threats to local authority. However, rebel governance comprises a much broader set of attempts to engage with civilians for public purposes (Kasfir 2015, p. 21). These efforts often produce structures enabling rebels to mobilize civilians for individual public actions—typically with the aim of bolstering local control (Huang 2016; Cunningham and Loyle 2020). In some instances, rebels mobilize civilians for acts of civil resistance, including protest rallies and general strikes (Keller 2017). In the following, I will explain why specifically the latter are a political action used by rebels in reaction to battlefield losses and a perceived loss of control.

The Strategic Advantage of General Strikes in the Context of Ongoing Conflict

General strikes aim at the comprehensive popular mobilization of (nearly) all segments of society—including the employees of public institutions and infrastructural facilities (Sinha, Sinha, and Shekhar 2006; Spivak 2014; Crook 1934). They can inflict significant economic damage (Sharp 1973). However, arguably more important is the signal sent by a general strike: If a group manages to enforce a complete standstill in a given area (and occasionally determine exemptions of the strike), it displays its own authority and at the same time demonstrates the state's incapacity and powerlessness to the population (Schock 2005; Crook 1934). Lakier's report from a general strike by a Nepali movement organization illustrates this logic, as the strike demonstrated the organization's ability "to subvert the government's control over roads, markets, and offices and to establish in its place their own, albeit temporary, authority over those spaces" (Lakier 2014, p. 155).

This goal is not necessarily tantamount to the aim of achieving genuine popular support. Lakier notes that "rather than unpersuasive demonstrations of popular support, what bandhs and protests like them function to symbolically demonstrate is the power (rather than the popularity) of their organizers" (Lakier 2014, p. 11). It is here where general strikes can differ markedly from other forms of civil resistance such as demonstrations, which primarily aim at raising awareness on an issue and garner support from the public, but do not necessarily disrupt state control (Sharp 1973, p. 114). By contrast, the potential to bring all public life to a standstill makes general strikes particularly suitable to convey the image of state incapacity. In some instances, the aim of showing authority can even lead organizers to resort to coercion in order to enforce compliance, as examples from noncooperation campaigns in Lebanon, India, Myanmar, Malaysia and South Africa demonstrate (Horowitz 2001; Seidman 2000).

Given that general strikes are a powerful means to signal local state incapacity, they can be a rational choice for rebels especially in situations when their own authority is jeopardized. The successful mobilization of civilians to refrain from their everyday activities signals the local population's continued submission to the rebels' commands without necessarily risking the alienating effect of indiscriminate violence. Moreover, the rebels' power to suspend all public services such as schools or offices serves as a vivid demonstration of the government's inability to enforce control in a specific area—even if the state has managed to inflict military losses on the rebels.

Evidence from different conflict contexts corroborates the assumed rationale of general strikes as signals of local rebel authority. For instance, groups such as the *Free Aceh Movement* (GAM), the CPI-Maoist, and insurgents in Kashmir have repeatedly called for complete shutdowns within their strongholds on national holidays. These performances served as acts of open defiance to symbols and rituals associated with the state, often accompanied by symbolic shows of allegiance with the rebels through the hoisting of flags (Ahmad 2005; Japan Economic Newswire 2002). A *Fatah*-led call for a general strike in *Hamas*-controlled areas in 2007 has even been explicitly linked by the organizers to the aim of “undermin[ing] *Hamas*’s power and rally[ing] the support of the Palestinian street” (Abu Toameh 2007).

We also find evidence for the assumption that these strike calls are often responses to setbacks on the battlefield. In fact, rebels’ strike calls frequently legitimize protest actions with the prior killing of members in clashes with security forces (e.g. *Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam* (LTTE), Xinhua General News Service 2005) or opponents’ military advancements in own territory (e.g. *Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia* (FARC), Ferrer 2001). General strikes can be a preferred tactical choice for the aim of undermining state capacity particularly after major losses, as rebels can simultaneously signal strength and avoid further direct military confrontations with security forces. Chakrabarty et al. describe a situation during an insurgent-enforced general strike in India that illustrates this rationale:

... during the Naxal blockade, the police were completely on the back foot. Other than patrolling, there was nothing that the police could do, and even patrolling could not prevent the Naxals from going ahead with their agenda. Of course, the police may claim that there were no major casualties reported, but bloodshed was not on the Naxal agenda (2014a, p. 188).

Implicit to my argument is the assumption that rebel-sponsored general strikes are primarily the result of strategic action rather than spontaneous bottom-up mobilization by the local population. Locals’ participation may occasionally stem from genuine support for the strike call. However, based on the premise that the intended effect is a demonstration of local authority, compliance itself is likely to be more salient for rebels than the reasons why people comply.¹ Insurgents thus usually remain the driving force behind the enforcement of the strike—even up to the point of coercion.

¹ For a very closely related point concerning the question of voluntary support for rebel governance, see Huang (2016) and Kasfir (2015).

Rebel groups typically claim responsibility for the strike already a priori by announcing the date, location and sometimes exempted sectors. This includes in many cases explicit threats against those who intend to defy the strike call, like the FARC warning that strike resisters will “face the consequences” (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1998). The preparation of the strike is moreover often accompanied by coordinated actions, including the distribution of leaflets and the felling of trees in order to obstruct the movement of traffic. During the strike itself, rebel groups typically enforce the shutdown either through threats or personal presence, and by setting up road blocks and barricades. During a *Fatah*-led general strike in *Hamas*-controlled Gaza strip, for instance, militants interrupted school sessions sending teachers and children home (Bazak 2006), while armed strike enforcers from the *Basque Fatherland and Freedom* (ETA) and LTTE reportedly patrolled the streets enforcing the closure of still running shops or forcing people to remain indoors (Deutsche Presse-Agentur 2000; Xinhua General Overseas News 1990). In many instances, the mere threat of violence suffices to ensure widespread compliance with the general strike (see, for instance, Lakier 2014).

In sum, general strikes signal a group’s local authority to locals, while retaining the strategic advantage of avoiding direct confrontations with security forces and the potential backlash from indiscriminate violence. Given these strategic advantages, why do rebels yet only occasionally resort to this form of civil resistance?

The Strategic Costs of General Strikes in the Context of Ongoing Conflict

Despite the potential benefits, general strikes are also associated with costs that restrict their strategic advantage for rebel groups. First, the intended effect of demonstrating local authority can backfire if the local population defies the strike call. This may be the case when civilians perceive the personal damage inflicted through the strike to be higher than the costs of non-compliance. When the Maoist insurgents in Nepal called for a general strike at a time of crucial student exams, for example, public outcry led the rebels to concede and postpone the planned protest action (Krämer 2003). Particularly when the frequency of strike calls rises, the risk of widespread defiance increases, and the intended effect of showcasing local authority can be undermined. In a strong testament of this concern’s salience for rebels, the CPI-Maoist in an internal review reportedly

recognized the growing frustration among the local population, who “lost interest [to participate in protest actions] when we started calling bandhs every few days” (Bhattacharya 2016).

Second, the public exposure required for the implementation of civil resistance methods more generally makes insurgents an easy target for potential state actions. Especially rebels engaged in asymmetric conflicts typically attempt to compensate for their relative disadvantage in capabilities with a strategy that builds on swift surprise attacks and the avoidance of enemy encounters (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010). Both the mobilization for and implementation of civil resistance methods require a degree of public preparation and exposure that counteracts the assumed advantages of clandestine action (Keller 2017). General strikes do not necessarily require the concentrated assembly of people in confined places, which mitigates the problem of exposure. Nonetheless, the announcement of general strikes—including location and timing—inevitably draws attention to a specific location, which conflicts with traditional tactics of insurgent warfare.

Third, methods of civil resistance typically require resource investments that are comparatively costly for armed actors. Horowitz, Perkoski, and Potter (2018) argue that militant groups generally refrain from diversifying their tactical repertoires, as it usually entails the diversion of resources away from proven capacities. Deviations from well-established military procedures to forms of popular mobilization can, on the one hand, evoke intra-organizational resistance and increase the probability of splits (Keller 2017, p. 78). On the other hand, civil resistance methods require mobilization capacities that may simply not be at the disposal of a clandestine organization specialized in insurgent warfare. This is particularly true for noncooperation and protest tactics (Cunningham, Dahl, and Frugé 2017). Apart from costs stemming from potential intra-organizational disagreement about the diversion of resources, armed groups may thus simply lack the capacities necessary for conducting civil resistance methods.

Given these drawbacks, I expect rebel groups to only use general strikes under conditions that make their use particularly valuable from a tactical viewpoint—that is, to demonstrate sustained authority after losses in the battlefield. From these considerations follows the hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3.1 (H3.1): *The higher the number of prior rebel casualties, the higher the probability that rebels will carry out a general strike in the same area.*

3.4 Research Design

Scope Conditions and Case Selection

The scope of the argument encompasses conflicts that are characterized by three conditions: First, the rebel group seeks to establish or maintain local control. Through governance processes, insurgents are often capable to mobilize civilians for political actions—including general strikes (Huang 2016). However, especially when insurgents do not rely on civilians—for example because they draw from external assistance or income from natural resources—governance may be a subordinate strategic priority (Weinstein 2007; Kasfir 2015). Empirical evidence suggests that particularly these groups are less likely to resort to political actions (Huang 2016), but to the contrary are more likely to use violence against civilians than other groups (Wood 2014). My argument is thus likely to apply only to groups that attempt to establish control over civilians.

Second, the rebel group's strategic decisions are embedded in an environment of high external pressure from the state. While a certain degree of local control is necessary in order to mobilize civilians for general strikes, my argument stipulates that rebels will likely resort to these means when their acquired control is threatened or contested by an opponent. Third, the group has the organizational capacity to carry out both violent and civil resistance tactics. The previous section emphasized that rebels' use of civil resistance tactics is associated with risks related to the distribution of organizational resources. Therefore, I expect rebel groups to be particularly likely to use civil resistance tactics when their organizational structure already reflects the designation of some resources to the implementation of political actions, that is, when the group has a political wing (Keller 2017).

I use the case of India's Maoist insurgency to test my theoretical proposition. The study focuses on the most recent wave of the ongoing conflict, which started in September 2004 with the merger of two formerly independent militant groups and the CPI-Maoist (Chakrabarty 2014a). The organization's operational radius has increased rapidly ever since, with occasional attacks being reported in almost all parts of the country. However, the vast majority of both Maoist attacks and counterinsurgency operations have remained confined to six states: West Bengal, Bihar, Jharkhand, Odisha, Chhattisgarh, and Andhra Pradesh (Chakrabarty 2014b).

The conflict represents a typical case with regard to the outlined scope conditions: First, the CPI-Maoist has underscored its ambition to seek and maintain local authority through the development of governance structures, including “People’s Governments” and the provision of services (Kennedy 2014; Suykens 2015). Second, the military capabilities of the belligerents are highly asymmetrical, a condition favoring the diversification of rebel tactics. As a country with relatively stable political institutions that has witnessed strong economic development in the recent past (World Bank 2018), India possesses significant aggregate capacities to address domestic armed insurrections. At the same time, however, India exhibits an extraordinarily high number of individual conflicts in different parts of the country. Among these, the Maoist insurgency has been the largest, in terms of both geographical spread and the number of armed fighters (according to the *Non-State Actor Dataset* v.3.4). Accordingly, the central government has placed an emphasis on combating the insurgency, labelling it the country’s “single biggest internal security challenge” (Singh 2006). Alongside targeted development and capacity-building programs (Dasgupta, Gawande, and Kapur 2017), military operations and increased troop presence in Maoist-affected areas have remained a key pillar of the central and state governments’ counterinsurgency efforts (Shapiro et al. 2017; Chakrabarty 2014a). The conflict context thus exhibits a high degree of external state pressure on the rebel group, even in districts with strong rebel control. I expect this to be a prime condition driving tactical decisions to use general strikes.

Third, although the CPI-Maoist’s strategic approach explicitly builds on insurgent warfare (Ramana 2014), the group consists of a separate political wing alongside its military branch and has demonstrated its ability to carry out general strikes since the very beginning of the insurgency (South Asia Terrorism Portal 2017; Suykens 2010; Chakrabarty 2014a). A peculiarity of the case is that the analysis of India’s Maoist insurgency allows us to largely cancel out external factors other than the state. Most importantly, several authors have pointed to the importance of competition with other nonstate groups challenging the state as a driver of tactical diversification (Horowitz, Perkoski, and Potter 2018; Cunningham, Dahl, and Frugé 2017). Although the conflict has historically been connected to other armed groups within the broader Naxalite movement, no larger armed contender in the movement apart from the CPI-Maoist has exhibited relevant activities after 2004.²

² See the appendix for a more detailed elaboration on this statement.

Data and Variables

The unit of analysis is the district-week for the observation period 2006–2009. The start date marks the year in which the conflict intensified markedly following the breakdown of negotiations between the insurgent group and the Indian government (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2019). My theoretical argument is that battlefield losses yield the expected effect because they constitute a perceived threat to local control. I therefore restrict the analysis to those districts of the six most-affected states that actually exhibited a high degree of rebel control prior to the investigation period.

For this purpose, I rely on the Ministry of Home Affairs' (MHA) assessment of Maoist-affected districts, which is obtained from Mukherjee (2018). The data is particularly useful for capturing the phenomenon of interest as the exposure to prior violence is only one among five criteria for districts to be included, the other factors being organizational consolidation (i.e., the operation of parallel administrations through the establishment of “liberated areas” or “guerrilla zones”), the presence of armed squads as an indicator of the rebels' capacity to carry out violent acts, the presence of mass organizations providing logistical support, and the active engagement of the police or the administration in the district to win back control (Mukherjee 2018).

The restriction to such districts ensures four baseline conditions: First, all districts exhibit a sufficiently high degree of prior Maoist control, which means battlefield losses are not perceived as isolated events but rather as a threat to the Maoists' local presence. Second, the presence of armed squads opens up the possibility that general strikes are carried out not as a result of insufficient local capacity, but rather as an alternative to purely violent tactics. Third, the criterion of organizational consolidation increases the probability that the rebels are capable of mobilizing the civilian population for the purpose of carrying out general strikes in the first place. Lastly, the criterion of active engagement by local security forces safeguards against potential selection bias stemming from the possibility that districts with a stronger Maoist presence (and likewise mobilization capacity) are more likely to be targeted by the state. Fig. 3.1 shows the sixty-five districts included in the sample.³

³ I chose the districts based on their extent in 2006 in order to ensure comparability across the years of observation. A list of the districts included is provided in the appendix.




Fig. 3.1. Indian districts considered for the analysis (baseline 2006).

I use original event data on Maoist general strikes for measuring the outcome of interest. The data were obtained through the manual coding of newspaper articles from the *Times of India*, *The Hindu* and *Hindustan Times* via *Factiva*. These publications represent the major English-language dailies with the highest circulation in India, thus ensuring an appropriate coverage of events across states. Individual events were coded with regard to the tactics used, the actors involved, the issue at stake, the date and location, the local impact and—if applicable—the date of announcement.

Based on these information, I considered events meeting the following three criteria for the dependent variable: First, I have focused on *bandhs*, *shutdowns*, *general strikes*, *hartals*, and *economic blockades* as phenomena representing a set of contentious activities with largely congruent traits that capture the type of protest relevant to my argument. *Bandhs*, as well as the almost identical form of agitation called *hartal*, are usually subsumed under the broader category of general strikes (see, for instance Schöttli, Mitra, and Wolf 2006; Suykens 2010; Sharp 1973).⁴ It

⁴ While some authors draw a dividing line between both phenomena based on the use of coercion during *bandhs* and the voluntary nature of *hartals*, this distinction can hardly be upheld in empirical reality. Suyken's (2010, p. 68) investigation of *hartals* in Bangladesh explicitly stresses that these events might easily erupt into violence. In this light, I opt for a synonymous interpretation of both protest forms as suggested in Schöttli, Mitra, and Wolf (2006).

is important to note that these performances are not confined to militant groups. They represent frequent forms of protest used by social movement organizations and political parties across various ideological orientations throughout South Asia (Dhavan 2006; Chatterjee 2016; Lakier 2014).

Second, being interested in testing how battlefield losses affect rebels' propensity to *carry out* general strikes, I have decided to include only those event locations for which an actual impact has been reported. This usually takes the form of sabotage acts, road blockades, closed shops or institutions, or disrupted traffic. Third, I have only considered events for which the CPI-Maoist or its closely affiliated outfit, the *People's Committee against Police Atrocities*, has been clearly named as the actor, thus excluding actions by front organizations or Naxalite groups not engaged in violent conflict with the state, such as the *Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist)*. A clear identification of the actors was facilitated by the fact that the implementation of strikes has usually been preceded by an announcement.

From these data, I have constructed a dummy variable indicating whether the CPI-Maoist carried out a general strike in a district-week, which resulted in a total of 240 positive outcomes for the sample of districts used here. It should be noted that observations with general strikes are relatively rare due to the fine-grained level of aggregation. In total, the onset rate is 1.78 percent. Using a binary outcome has several advantages over using a count variable for the present case. First, it better reflects my ambition to explain the occurrence rather than the intensity of rebel-sponsored general strikes. Second, multiple strike events per district-week occur very rarely, with 91 percent of the positive outcome cases only containing a single event. Third, the fact that strikes sometimes span several days makes it hard to distinguish individual general strike events within a single district-week.

The independent variable measures the sum of rebel casualties in the same district from the previous week. The data is obtained from Hoelscher, Miklian, and Vadlamannati (2012), who compile timely and spatially disaggregated event data on Maoist-related violent events resulting in at least one fatality from the *South Asian Terrorism Portal* (South Asia Terrorism Portal 2016), the *Global Terrorism Database* (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2016), and the *Worldwide Incident Tracking System* (National Counter Terrorism Center 2010; Wigle 2010). In total, 252 observations (1.86 percent of all observations in the sample) show at least one Maoist casualty, with a maximum of twenty-four deaths.

Given the reliance on media-based data, a potentially substantive source of bias could result from specific reporting patterns. With regard to the independent variable, the triangulation of different sources in Hoelscher, Miklian, and Vadlamannati's (2012) data compilation at least mitigates this concern. The measurement of the dependent variable is potentially more problematic, as the reporting of strike locations could gravitate toward districts in which violence has previously been reported. However, most general strikes, including those in the targeted locations, have typically been publicly announced beforehand. As a result, and contrary to violent events, their reporting should be considerably less dependent on news outlets' prior awareness of specific regions or insufficient diffusion of information from heavily affected districts.

I use linear probability and logistic regression models with district fixed-effects as the main estimation approach. Fixed-effects models discard all time-invariant factors from the analysis. The effect of battlefield losses on the outcome is thereby inferred only from variation within individual districts, which reduces omitted variable bias stemming from stable, unobserved heterogeneity between individual districts (Firebaugh, Warner, and Massoglia 2013). This includes also relatively slowly changing, district-specific attributes that could potentially influence the conjectured relationship such as economic development or the share of marginalized ethnic communities. In addition, I control for longer time trends by including year-dummies in all models.

I furthermore add several time-varying covariates that could potentially affect the presumed relationship between the independent and dependent variables. The number of police or paramilitary casualties per district-week (taken from Hoelscher, Miklian, and Vadlamannati 2012) accounts for the possibility that the overall conflict severity in a district drives the presumed relationship. Dummies for election dates and public holidays in the same week control for periods of potentially heightened conflict and strike activity. In order to control for serial autocorrelation, I include a variable (plus its squared and cubic polynomial) indicating the time passed since the last strike event in the district (Carter and Signorino 2010). A spatial lag to account for spatial autocorrelation is included by constructing a dummy variable indicating whether a general strike occurred in the previous week in any adjacent district.

3.5 Empirical Analysis

Table 3.1 reports the findings from the linear probability (models 1 and 2) and logit models (models 3 and 4) with robust standard errors clustered at the district level. Models 1 and 3 only estimate the relationship between the independent and dependent variables with district- and year-dummies, while models 2 and 4 add the control variables. In all instances, the results point to a positive and significant effect of rebel casualties in the previous week on the probability of general strikes. In substantive terms, the predicted probability of experiencing a rebel-sponsored strike increases from 1.7 percent in the absence of any Maoist casualty to 9.4 percent for nine casualties and 16.3 percent for seventeen fatalities according to model 2 (upper panel of Fig. 3.2).⁵ Turning to the logit model (model 4), the predicted probability increases at a similar rate for relevant values of the independent variable, from a baseline of 2.3 percent for zero casualties to 10.9 percent for nine casualties (lower panel of Fig. 3.2).

In order to validate the results, I conduct a series of robustness checks that repeat the main findings from models 2 and 4 using alternative estimation strategies, sample sizes and independent variables. In a first step, I test whether the results still hold after using a more liberal approach that allows for variation across districts. I have opted for a multilevel model with district-week observations nested in federal states (models A1 and A2). A set of time-constant covariates are included here in order to control for potential omitted variable bias stemming from differences on the district-level. These include the districts' gross domestic product in 2006, total population (log-transformed) and the share of urban population based on data from 2001 (Planning Commission of the Government of India 2014), access to infrastructure, forested area and percentage of *Adivasis* (the potential Maoist support base) in the total population (obtained from Hoelscher, Miklian, and Vadlamannati (2012)). The independent variables' coefficients remain virtually identical when compared to the main analysis.

⁵ The thresholds mark the 95th and 99th percentiles of all observations with at least one reported Maoist casualty.

Table 3.1. Regression results for the association between prior rebel casualties and the implementation of general strikes

	(1) Linear Probability	(2) Linear Probability	(3) Logit	(4) Logit
Rebel casualties, $t-1$	0.0082*** (0.0025)	0.0086*** (0.0026)	0.1651*** (0.0390)	0.2010*** (0.0427)
Police / paramilitary casualties, $t-1$		-0.0016* (0.0006)		-0.1617 (0.1065)
Weeks since last general strike		-0.7229* (0.3239)		-9.8723 (15.2313)
Weeks since last general strike ²		0.0008* (0.0004)		-0.0059 (0.0245)
Weeks since last general strike ³		-0.0000* (0.0000)		0.0008 (0.0010)
Maoist general strike in adjacent districts (dummy), $t-1$		0.0151 (0.0097)		0.3067 (0.1945)
Election week		-0.0104 (0.0133)		-0.1284 (0.6693)
Public holiday		0.0204* (0.0074)		0.9276*** (0.1968)
Constant	0.0149*** (0.0027)	0.0196*** (0.0046)	-4.2259*** (0.1837)	-3.9319*** (0.2617)
Year-fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
District-fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	13,455	13,455	10,143	10,143
Log lik.			-984.8929	-970.0681
R^2	0.0386	0.0449		

Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered on the district-level.

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.005$, *** $p < 0.001$.




Fig. 3.2. Predicted probabilities of general strikes following Maoist casualties with 90% CIs (Table 3.1, models 2 and 4)

In order to test to which extent the results are driven by cases influencing either the independent or the dependent variable, I discard those districts with the highest number of events involving Maoist casualties (A3 and A4) and general strike events (A5 and A6), respectively.⁶ After discarding the districts with most casualty events, the effect remains significant for the logit model (A4), whereas the independent variable's significance drops slightly below conventional levels for the linear probability model (A3). It is important to note, however, that the excluded cases account for nearly half of all incidents in which Maoists suffered casualties. The results remain stable after excluding districts with frequent general strike events (A5 and A6).

In a final step, I aim to assess the degree to which the models are sensitive to changes in the independent variable. First, I use a log-transformed variant of the predictor (A7 and A8). Second, I use the UCDP *Georeferenced Event Data* (GED) (Sundberg and Melander 2013) as an alternative measure (A9 and A10). More specifically, I extract the number of Maoist casualties and the corresponding killings of security personnel to construct variables comparable to the previously used variables. For both alternatives, the coefficient for the number of rebel losses remains positive and significant. Lastly, I account for longer-term time trends in rebel casualties. It is possible that the salience of recent losses is dependent on the trajectories of civil war. Rebels may show a stronger tendency to carry out general strikes following isolated defeats as compared to high losses at the end of successive encounters with the government. In order to account for this possibility, models A11 through A18 use the change in the independent variable from the previous week as well as from the mean of the prior three, four and eight weeks as the predictor. The results remain stable even after longer-term trends on the battlefield are factored in.

Discussion of the Causal Sequence and Alternative Explanations

This section discusses the results with regard to the assumed causal sequence of the argument and tests alternative explanations for the observed relationship. The theoretical argument suggested that battlefield losses increase the probability that rebels will carry out general strikes. However, it is also plausible to surmise

⁶ I defined the 90th percentile as the threshold. For models A3 and A4, this meant the exclusion of Bastar, Dantewadda, Khammam, Palamu, Ranchi, and Warangal districts. For models A5 and A6, the Bankura, Malkangiri, West Midnapore, Purulia, and Visakhapatnam districts were excluded.

that security forces explicitly target districts where a general strike is anticipated. The fact that the CPI-Maoist often publicly announces general strikes beforehand lends particular weight to this caveat.

This possibility cannot be ruled out entirely, yet descriptive evidence from the individual general strike events provides at least suggestive support for the causal direction proposed in this study. As a first indication, a closer investigation of the events' issue types reveals that a substantial share of 71.74 percent of all rebel-sponsored general strike events actually refer to prior counterinsurgency measures by the government; 37.27 percent even specifically name losses in the course of preceding encounters as the reason for the strike call. This shows that general strikes indeed frequently occur in *reaction* to prior casualties.

The majority of these strikes only vaguely refers to recent encounters. However, some cases allow us to trace the cause of the strike back to a particular preceding battle event. On average, the instances refer to encounters that date back 9.41 days, which corresponds to the chosen time lag of the preceding week. It may nonetheless still be the case that general strikes only indirectly lead to higher Maoist casualties by attracting the attention of security forces. In order for this explanation to be plausible and result in the observed correlation, we would expect that the time period between the strike *announcement* and the actual *implementation* tends to be considerably large. If we only consider instances of strike *announcements* from the data, we see no evidence supporting the alternative causal sequence: on average, rebel-sponsored general strikes occur shortly after they are announced (2.21 days on average). It is therefore less plausible to assume that strike calls are—at least in the short run—a trigger for increased Maoist casualties rather than vice versa.

In order to probe the plausibility of the presumed causal sequence beyond descriptive evidence, I repeat the analysis with several lags and leads of the independent variable (for a similar approach, see Autor (2003) and De Juan (2020)). The rationale is as follows: If general strikes are primarily a reaction to rather than a consequence of battlefield losses, the probability of general strikes will only increase for the first lag variable (corresponding to losses in the previous week), but not for the lead-variables. A challenge confronting the application of such an event-study approach to the present study is the fact that the majority of districts in the sample contains multiple observations with at least one Maoist casualty. This means it is problematic in many cases to determine whether a general strike occurs after the last casualty-related event or prior to the next casualty-related event.

In order to address this problem, I exclude observations if more than 1 event resulting in Maoist casualties occurred 4 weeks around the observation (two weeks prior, two weeks afterward). On the downside, this eliminates 26.59 percent of all observations for which the independent variable shows a positive value, but it facilitates the estimation of the strike probability around a casualty event with reduced ambiguity. Fig. 3.3 displays the results of the linear probability (left-hand side, models 5 and 7) and logit models (right-hand side, models 6 and 8), including four lags and four leads of the main independent variable (corresponding regression tables in the appendix). The coefficient estimates are ordered according to their distance to the event—the number of Maoist fatalities at t_0 —with leads representing weeks *prior* to the event and lags corresponding to weeks *after* the event. The upper-row panels present the results from the baseline models, which shows that the likelihood of general strikes increases in the week immediately after Maoist casualty events occurred, but not before, thus corroborating the initial conjecture.

Apart from this observation, however, there appears to be a significant and positive correlation between general strike occurrence and Maoist casualties two weeks ago. As noted earlier, yet, there exists the possibility of consecutive violent events, so I repeated the analysis in the lower-row panels excluding all observations with at least one additional casualty event occurring two weeks prior or two weeks afterward. In this updated version, we see that only the coefficient for the week immediately *after* the casualty event remains significant. The results thus back the theoretical argument proposed here, while lending less evidence for the alternative causal sequence.




Fig. 3.3. Models 5-8: Estimates for the correlation between different lags and leads of Maoist casualties and general strike occurrence (90% CIs)

In the next step, I address several alternative explanations that could account for the identified relationship apart from battlefield losses (Table 3.2). Reported are only results from the linear probability models, while logit estimations can be found in the appendix. First, the findings could be driven by the intensity of fighting rather than by Maoist losses in particular. The observation of increased casualties could be a result from rebels stepping up their activities in a district. The fact that there is a fairly strong correlation ($r = .59$) between the number of battles in a district-week and the number of Maoist casualties lends further weight to this concern. Casualties may then not necessarily signal rebel weakness, but counter-intuitively reflect rebel strength. Against this backdrop, model 9 repeats the main models including the (lagged) number of battles as an additional control. Model 10 furthermore includes the deviation from the average number of battles in the past four weeks in order to account for short-term trajectories of Maoist activity. The results do not support the alternative explanation that general strikes increase merely in the course of prior battles. By contrast, the coefficient remains insignificant and—even more remarkable—the coefficient for prior battlefield losses even increases if we hold previous incidents constant in the model.⁷

These findings also decrease the plausibility of a second alternative mechanism, namely that general strikes are rather spontaneously emerging as a result of surging grievances among the civilian population. In this scenario, general strikes would not be directly affected by prior Maoist losses, but indirectly through civilian casualties accompanying violent incidents. The failure to find any evidence of a relationship between battle intensity and general strikes yet significantly decreases the likelihood of this alternative mechanism.

Qualitative evidence from individual strike instances further corroborates the assumption that rebel-initiated general strikes are rather deliberate tactical choices than spontaneous popular uprisings in support of the Maoists. As a first indication, the majority of reports on general strikes in the data indicate a previous announcement of the general strike by the rebels themselves—alongside date, location, and exemptions—for example, in the following form:

We appeal to the people to express their protest against this onslaught by closing down educational and commercial institutions, banks, railways, transport etc. (We are exempting the exams of the students and emergency services like health care from this Bandh) (Communist Party of India (Maoist) 2013).

⁷ The variable is not included in the main analysis due to concerns of multicollinearity.

Table 3.2. Alternative explanations

	Dependent variable:			
	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Linear	Linear	Linear	Linear
	Probability	Probability	Probability	Probability
Rebel casualties, t_{-1}	0.0092** (0.0030)	0.0099*** (0.0029)	0.0007 (0.0025)	-0.0002 (0.0009)
Police / paramilitary casualties, t_{-1}	-0.0014* (0.0007)	-0.0013* (0.0006)	0.0037 (0.0025)	0.0014 (0.0013)
Number of battles, t_{-1}	-0.0031 (0.0087)			
Deviation of previous battles from four-week average		-0.0084 (0.0072)		
Election week	-0.0105 (0.0132)	-0.0111 (0.0133)	-0.0101 (0.0146)	-0.0088* (0.0044)
Public holiday	0.0204* (0.0074)	0.0059 (0.0066)	-0.0057 (0.0099)	0.0126* (0.0058)
Constant	0.0196*** (0.0046)	0.0129* (0.0049)	0.0089 (0.0059)	0.0127 (0.0091)
Year-fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
District-fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	13,455	13,260	13,455	13,455
Log lik.				
R^2	0.0450	0.0460	0.1179	0.0520

Robust standard errors (in parantheses) clustered on the district-level; Weeks since last strike/attack/protest (+ 2nd and 3rd degree polynomial) and spatial lag not shown.

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.005$, *** $p < 0.001$

If the general strikes were rather spontaneous instances of civil resistance, we would see Maoists (likely exaggeratedly) claiming credit only *after* an event has happened, but not before. The fact that Maoists explicitly announce general strikes hints to a deliberate tactical choice. A vivid illustration of the degree of rebel organization in these situations is provided by journalist Snigdhendu Bhattacharya, who reports from a travel to Lalgarh, which was then controlled by the Maoist *People's Committee against Police Atrocities*. He describes entering the Maoist-controlled area, which was under a blockade for the fourth time in seven months:

The officer warned us against removing the blockades and reiterated that we must return whenever asked to do so by the Maoists and PCAPA members. We obeyed. Whenever we approached a blockade, we exited the car, showed the locals our identity cards and persuaded them to talk to Mahato [the PCAPA spokesperson]. The tree would then be removed, our car would pass and the obstruction would be put back in place. (Bhattacharya 2016)

As in this instance, Maoist reports on general strikes often mention accompanying actions by Maoists aimed at enforcing a strike, including the felling of trees or distribution of pamphlets.

In a last step, I test two alternative explanations by using different outcome variables. First, general strikes following losses may not necessarily reflect a deliberate choice to demonstrate sustained presence in a given region, but could rather result from a decreased capacity to launch further violent acts. In the latter case, we would expect a significantly decreased probability of violent attacks in the aftermath of rebel casualties alongside a higher propensity for general strikes. In order to probe this mechanism, I repeat the main model using a dummy indicating whether any Maoist attack occurred as the dependent variable (model 11). The results remain inconclusive, which weakens the plausibility of the decreased-capacity argument. Lastly, the observed correlation could simply mirror an increased propensity on the part of the rebels to diversify their tactical repertoire more generally, and not point to a specific choice for general strikes. To test this, model 12 takes Maoist protests beyond general strikes as the dependent variable. However, the coefficient remains insignificant.

3.6 Conclusion

The article investigated the conditions under which armed groups use tactics of civil resistance. Examining the case of India's Maoist insurgency, I have argued that rebels are more likely to use general strikes in the aftermath of own battlefield losses. I assumed rebels to perceive casualties as a challenge to local authority, with general strikes providing a rational tactical choice given their potential to undermine local state capacity and demonstrate local control. I have tested this proposition on a spatially and temporally disaggregated level using a newly compiled data set on Maoist activism. The results from the regression analysis lend evidence to the theoretical argument.

I have further attempted to probe the causal sequence relying on descriptive evidence and employing an event study. Although these findings should be treated with caution as they provide only suggestive evidence, they nonetheless lend stronger support to the proposed direction of causality from prior losses to general strikes than vice versa. Further analyses did not support the plausibility of possible alternative mechanisms such as popular grievances, decreased capacity, or increased overall activity.

The study contributes to an ongoing discussion in the literature on tactical variation and buttresses previous research that moves beyond a strictly dichotomous view of actors and the tactics they employ. In particular, the finding that rebel groups use methods of civil resistance in reaction to factors endogenous to the conflict carries important implications: First, it points to the possibility that armed groups draw from repertoires of contention that are primarily associated with nonviolent groups. Second, it shows that the use of these tactics by rebels can vary over time. Therefore, the increased reliance on civil resistance tactics may not necessarily signal that the group does not have the capacity to sustain the armed rebellion, nor does it indicate a general strategic shift from violence to nonviolence. The study has shown that tactical choices appear to be rather situation-dependent phenomena.

I want to close with a discussion about the generalizability of the findings. In principle, I expect the findings from India's Maoist insurgency to be transferable to other conflict contexts in which similar scope conditions apply—that is, high external pressure from the state, some degree of local control, and the presence of a political wing for carrying out respective actions. According to the *Reputation of Terror Groups Dataset*, around 18.74 percent of all militant organizations both engage in governance (operationalized here in its maximalist terms as public goods

provision) and have a political wing or affiliated party (Tokdemir and Akcinaroglu 2016), which gives an impression about the potential extent. Almost all rebel groups mentioned throughout the paper as examples of general strike-employing organizations fulfill both requirements in the data set, including the *Free Aceh Movement*, FSLN, *Al-Fatah*, *Hamas*, the Maoists in Nepal and India, FARC and LTTE. Others like the Kashmiri rebels and ETA fulfill at least one of the outlined scope conditions. Inferences drawn from the case of India's Maoist insurgency therefore show a potentially high applicability to other armed conflicts that meet these scope conditions and may offer useful insights on the phenomenon of general strikes more broadly. While this study has specifically focused on the effect of clashes between the state and rebels, future research may deal more thoroughly with the impact of conflict dynamics in contexts of multiparty conflict. For example, competition with rival armed groups or social movement organizations could similarly be a source of external pressure triggering the use of civil resistance.

Chapter 4

Unintended Consequences of Post-Conflict Power-Sharing. Explaining Civilian Activism

Abstract

Under what conditions do civilians mobilize after power-sharing agreements? Research on post-conflict power-sharing has neglected the possible consequences of power-sharing agreements on micro level dynamics, i.e. civilian activism. We argue that (i) power-sharing practices increase the probability of civilian activism, (ii) political and territorial power-sharing practices are especially relevant in this regard, and (iii) ethnic identity groups affiliated to the former rebels are more likely to respond to power-sharing practices compared to other ethnic groups. Using data on power-sharing agreements and civilian activism in African post-conflict countries (1989–2006), we find support for our expectations. The results suggest that the effect of power-sharing practices on protests and riots is particularly high for ethnic groups with linkages to the former rebel organizations.

4.1 Introduction

The signing of a peace agreement is perceived as a success with the hope that the country will enter calmer waters. However, civilians at the local level often become active in this phase protesting and rioting in their interests, which can become a challenge for the peace process. For example, several thousands mobilized against the peace agreement with the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (FARC) rebels in Colombia in September 2016, resulting in the rejection of the peace agreement in a non-binding referendum. Another example is the agitation of numerous ethnic groups in Nepal with the goal to lobby for a federal structure in the new constitution as promised in the peace agreement (Lawoti and Hangen 2013). As the two examples demonstrate, civilian activism at the local level can pose a challenge for the overall peace process. Yet the risk of conflict relapse after the signing of a peace agreement typically constitutes the primary object of research in the literature on post-conflict political processes (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Hegre and Nygård 2015). The focus on the conflict parties or the reconstruction process alone tends to neglect the influence civilians can exert on the peace process. Moreover, it remains unclear at which time of the peace process civilians become active. This paper therefore addresses the question under what conditions peace agreements increase the probability of civilian activism in the form of protests, riots and strikes.

Most civil wars end with a peace agreement that includes power-sharing provisions. The main goal of such arrangements is to create and maintain peace between the warring parties by integrating the rebels into the country's power structure (Walter 2002; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007). Although peace agreements are usually concluded between a limited set of actors consisting of rebel and government representatives (Mehler 2009; Nilsson 2012; Wallensteen and Svensson 2014), the consequences often have a far broader scope. The redistribution of power between the actors involved in a civil war can affect the power relations between the country's social identity groups as a whole.

We argue that power-sharing arrangements generally create incentives for civilians to raise their voices, resulting in increased activism in the form of protests, riots and strikes by those who perceive the implementation of the provisions not to change in the desired way. As the peace agreements' negotiated provisions are often rather complex and unspecified, we expect this effect not to occur in the immediate aftermath of the signature, but only when actual implementation steps—the power-sharing *practices*—take place. With peace

agreements usually encompassing a variety of issue areas (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008), we moreover believe that the impact on activism will be most significant for the implementation of political and territorial power-sharing provisions compared to economic and military provisions, because the former will receive ample public attention and directly affect the relative power status of the identity groups in the country. Finally, we account for the differential effects of power-sharing arrangements across social identity groups. Groups sharing ties with the former rebels usually increase their relative power position in the course of peace agreements with power-sharing provisions. However, the actual power-sharing practices' failure to deliver on the promised provisions or incentives to press for further implementation can incite grievances on behalf of the affected population that can manifest in civilian unrest. We thus expect civilians from rebel-affiliated ethnic groups to be particularly likely to engage in activism after power-sharing practices.

We test these assumptions in a panel regression framework using ethnic group-months as our unit of analysis. Ethnic groups are arguably one of the most salient collective identities during civil wars, as the conflict parties often mobilize support along these cleavages (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010). It is plausible to assume that the relevance of these identity delineations for approximating ties between rebel organizations on the one hand and different parts of the civilian population on the other hand persists at least for the immediate post-conflict phase in which the peace agreement's provisions are implemented (Simonsen 2005). In a first step, we therefore assign geo-referenced data on civilian activism to individual ethnic groups' settlement regions. In a second step, we match information on whether an individual ethnic group has linkages to a particular rebel organization that has been part of a power-sharing agreement.

Our results are in line with the theoretical assumptions. First, we find that power-sharing practices increase the likelihood for civilian activism, but find no such effect after the immediate signature of peace agreements. Second, only the implementation of political and territorial power-sharing provisions has a positive and statistically significant effect on the likelihood of civilian activism. Finally, foremost civilians from ethnic groups connected to the rebel organization are mobilized by the implementation of the peace agreement.

Our contribution to existing research is twofold: First, research on power-sharing has neglected the role of civilian activism in post-conflict societies. Most of the research analyzes the impact of power-sharing agreements on post-conflict

peace (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Binningsbø 2013). However, these studies neglect the unintended consequences of power-sharing on civilian activism at the micro-level.

Second, our study adds to research on micro-level dynamics by looking at civilian activism in the direct aftermath of civil wars. We shed light on the dynamics in the society that are related to the implementation of power-sharing agreements. Civilian activism demonstrates that civilians are active in the post-conflict period to raise their voices, but civilian activism can jeopardize the peace process (Stedman 1997). It can disturb the political and economic developments in post-conflict countries as the security situation becomes more fragile. In the end, civilian activism can develop into a new violent conflict.

4.2 Literature Review

The literature on power-sharing after civil wars focuses on the duration of peace. Following the influential contributions by Hartzell and Hoddie (2003, 2007), the research field has developed an own definition of power-sharing that is distinct from the classical approach to the topic (Lijphart 1969). Post-conflict power-sharing focuses on the provisions negotiated in the peace agreement regulating the future distribution of power (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003).

Overcoming the focus on only structural regulations of the political system (Lijphart 1969), the literature identifies post-conflict power-sharing in the political, the military, the economic, and the territorial dimension as relevant for peace after civil wars (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003). However, so far no consensus exists about the impact of power-sharing for post-conflict peace (Binningsbø 2013). The possible negative impact of power-sharing, on the one hand, is explained with the incentives for conflict parties to return to violence as they experience that they gain benefits out of violence (Rothchild and Roeder 2005; Tull and Mehler 2005). Thus, the settlement of the conflict already includes the incentives for the next violent conflict. On the other hand, other studies highlight the positive impact of power-sharing agreements leading to stable peace and even a democratic transition of the country (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, 2015; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008). The studies refer to the credible commitment that both conflict parties give due to the acceptance of power-sharing (Walter 2002; Ottmann and Vüllers 2015).

However, the studies do not agree on what types of power-sharing are the most relevant in this regard. Hartzell and Hoddie, for example, argue that the inclusion of as many power-sharing dimensions in the peace agreement as possible is especially useful. The inclusion of numerous power-sharing provisions helps to limit the negative influence if one particular provision is not implemented (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, 2007). Other authors disagree and argue that particular power-sharing dimensions are costly signals to the other conflict side and therefore increase the probability of post-conflict peace (Walter 2002). The literature, however, disagrees if this holds true for political power-sharing (Mukherjee 2006; Mattes and Savun 2009; Cammett and Malesky 2012), military power-sharing (Hoddie and Hartzell 2003; Glassmyer and Sambanis 2008; DeRouen Jr et al. 2010), or territorial power-sharing (Walter 2002; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008). A consensus only exists that economic power-sharing does not have a positive impact on durable peace (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Mattes and Savun 2009; Binningsbø and Rustad 2012).

Others look at the inclusion of various actor groups in the peace agreements and thus in the negotiation over the distribution of power (Tull and Mehler 2005; Nilsson 2012). Peace agreements in general include foremost the two conflict parties, government and rebels (Ottmann and Vüllers 2015). However, while the new power structure impacts all groups within the society, representatives of social groups not connected to the warring parties are often excluded from or have limited impact on the negotiation of peace agreements (Mehler 2009; Nilsson 2012).

Most of the quantitative literature measures power-sharing with the provisions agreed upon in the peace agreement (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007). This focus on the provision of power-sharing dimensions in peace agreements has resulted in a rather narrow perspective of this research field. Only few studies go beyond this focus taking into account the actual implementation of power-sharing in the post-conflict period (Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Joshi and Darby 2013; Ottmann and Vüllers 2015).

Only few studies investigate unintended effects of power-sharing agreements. For example, Tull and Mehler (2005) argue that the practice of power-sharing in Africa has resulted in negative side effects. The inclusion of rebels in the power structures of the countries with the goal to reach peace has a demonstration effect. Rebels and would-be rebels are thus motivated to use violence to get also a share

of the power (Tull and Mehler 2005). Another example of a negative effect is an increase in corruption linked to power-sharing in the post-conflict period (Haass and Ottmann 2017).

In sum, we do not know much about the consequences of power-sharing in post-conflict societies because the focus is on the duration of peace between the former conflict parties. We address this research gap by looking at the effect of power-sharing on the decision of civilians to become active after the signature of a peace agreement. Research on the effects of power-sharing on the local level argues that the local dynamics are linked to the dynamics at the national level. According to this, local peace is in danger if the agreement between the former conflict parties becomes fragile (Simons et al. 2013). We argue, in contrast, that the implementation of power-sharing has decisive consequences for the power structures of the society in general.

4.3 Civilian Activism and Power-Sharing Provisions

The literature on post-conflict violence has shown that episodes with increased contentious activity are closely linked to specific events, most notably elections or referendums (Flores and Nooruddin 2012). Apart from these rather rare incidents, the conclusion of power-sharing agreements and their implementation and abolition steps arguably constitute the most relevant occasions in the post-conflict period bearing the potential for increased civilian activism. In the following, we elaborate on our theoretical argument for the impact of these events.

Power-sharing plays an important role in most peace agreements after the end of the Cold War. In the focus of such agreements is the solution of credible commitment problems between governments and rebels (Walter 2002; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Ottmann and Vüllers 2015). Peace agreements therefore include provisions in the political (e.g. cabinet positions), military (e.g. integration into the national army), economic (e.g. wealth allocation) and territorial dimension (e. g. devolution of power). The basic idea is that rebels receive some power in these dimensions in order to appease them and to stop the violence (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003). With the signature of the peace agreement and by granting the rebels access to power, the government signals that the armed non-state actor is a legitimate political actor in the country.

Beyond the immediate provisions regulating the power relationship between the government and former rebels, however, these agreements yield effects on the civilian population more generally. Depending on the degree to which they are related to the former rebel organizations, civilians may benefit or lose from specific implementation and abolition steps in the aftermath of the peace agreements' signature. These differential effects on the population may consequently motivate aggrieved shares of the population to become active, specifically in the form of protests, riots and strikes, despite the armed conflict being settled.

Changes in the power structure in the course of peace agreements can encourage civilians to resort to means of contention in an attempt to defend their interests in the peace process—which sometimes even means attacking it (Stedman 1997). The use of protests, riots and strikes—which we subsume under the category of civilian activism—is the first step in articulating their dissatisfaction with the new developments unfolding in the aftermath of peace agreement conclusions (Gurr 2000). Contrary to organized armed non-state actors, the repertoire of contention of civilians is usually limited to these forms of mobilization.

The government and rebels publicly bind themselves to the peace process by signing the peace agreement. The hope is that the included power-sharing provisions help both conflict parties to overcome their distrust (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Walter 1999). The peace agreement is a strong signal to the supporters of both conflict parties that their leaders try to overcome the conflict. As Mehler (2009, p. 462) argues: “After all, peace is when people think they are at peace. The perceptions of the population are the best indicator of successful and failing peace settlements.” The promised power-sharing provisions included in the peace agreement therefore might be enough to establish peace as they appease the former conflict parties and affiliated civilians in the first place.

Moreover, the politically controversial provisions of changes in the country's power constellations in the different dimensions, as agreed upon in the peace agreement, might be seen as future challenges that do not require direct reaction by civilians. The promises are often not implemented in the immediate aftermath of the peace agreement signature but rather have a longer time horizon, which gives the civilian population the opportunity to take a wait-and-see attitude (Ottmann and Vüllers 2015). We therefore expect that power-sharing promises do not increase the likelihood that civilians become active.

However, changes in the power relations become real once the promises from the power-sharing agreement are implemented or abolished, i.e. the government transfers or withdraws real power to or from the rebels (Jarstad and Nilsson

2008; Ottmann and Vüllers 2015). In the process of implementing the power-sharing agreements, people will first realize what power they are gaining or may be deprived of. The power-sharing *practices* can therefore produce dissatisfaction on all sides. Issues regarding the pace of the process or the difference between expected and actual extent of the implementation may likewise cause the civilian population to become active in order to publicly signal their dissatisfaction with the implementation process.

Hypothesis 4.1 (H4.1): *Power-sharing practices increase the probability for civilian activism.*

Post-conflict power-sharing provisions are implemented in the political, territorial, military and economic dimensions (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008). This classical distinction is helpful in order to specify our argument: Civilians may not respond to power-sharing practices in the different dimensions to a similar extent. A precondition is that they must be aware of the changes in the particular dimension *and* they have to perceive this change as a challenge to the power of their ethnic identity group. While this is the case for both power-sharing practices in the political and territorial dimensions, it is less so related to power-sharing practices in the military and economic dimensions.

Political power-sharing provisions include the integration of former rebels into the cabinet and parliament (Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Ottmann and Vüllers 2015). The takeover of cabinet positions attracts public attention as the rebels become included into the political system's core executive. At the same time, representatives from other ethnic groups will have to give up their positions in the cabinet or remain excluded from the executive. As these are public events, changes in the cabinet and the parliament should increase the likelihood that civilians become active in response to the changes in the political power structures.

Aside from provisions regarding the national executive and legislative bodies, power-sharing agreements often include promises regarding territorial changes (Walter 2002; Quackenbush 2010). Establishing new administrative units (autonomy) or providing existing units with more resources and power (devolution) are all public events and receive respective attention. Moreover, civilians from ethnic groups who do not settle in these regions with greater freedom in self-determination might feel discriminated against, which may motivate them to become publicly active to reaffirm and intensify their demands (Gurr 2000).

Military and economic power-sharing are less visible for the general public and also do not affect the power of other ethnic groups in a country to a comparable degree like political and territorial power-sharing. According to the literature, military power-sharing is the decisive factor of the success or failure of power-sharing agreements (Walter 2002; Hoddie and Hartzell 2003). Military power-sharing, the reintegration of rebels in the national army, is a challenge mostly for the rebels as they have to give up their own army in order to reintegrate into the political system (Hoddie and Hartzell 2003; Glassmyer and Sambanis 2008). By contrast, it does not negatively affect the relative power of the other ethnic groups that are not connected to the rebels. Rather the opposite is the case as with the ethnic groups affiliated to the rebels a potential competitor over power loses military strength and thus are the capability to make credible threats (Walter 1999). Thus, it would not be rational for civilians from other ethnic groups to use means of civilian activism to hamper the implementation of military power-sharing provisions.

Another mechanism is at play regarding the implementation of economic power-sharing provisions, the takeover of positions in state-owned companies by rebels, because they could have a direct effect on the relative power distribution between the ethnic groups.¹ Rebel leaders can use these positions to support their own ethnic groups by misappropriating money from the firms to support members from their support base (Haass and Ottmann 2017). This provides civilians from ethnic group connected to the rebels an advantage over civilians from other ethnic groups. In contrast to political or territorial power-sharing, however, corruption is not a public event that can trigger mobilization of civilians from the other groups because it is rather a constant hidden exploitation of resources. We therefore do not expect that civilians in general will be mobilized due to the implementation of economic power-sharing provisions.

Hypothesis 4.2 (H4.2): *Power-sharing practices in the political and territorial dimensions increase the probability for civilian activism.*

The identities of the two conflict parties have implications for the social identities in the society at large because most of today's civil wars are fought along ethnic lines. Both conflict parties often use ethnic identities in order to

¹ As we use the data from the PSED for our measurement of the implementation of power-sharing provisions, the economic variable does not include wealth power-sharing because of the coding decision of the PSED to focus only on the government-rebel dyad as the relevant conflict parties (Ottmann and Vüllers 2015).

construct group boundaries along which they mobilize support in the population for their fight (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010). Ethnic identities thus become politicized and salient and remain so in the immediate aftermath of a civil war, i.e., the first years after the signature of a peace agreement (Simonsen 2005).

With rebels often being linked to specific ethnic groups, we assume that the effect of power-sharing arrangements on the civilian population depends on whether their social identity group is affiliated to the rebels or not. Theoretically, rebel-affiliated groups tend to benefit from the redistribution of power in the aftermath of peace agreements. However, the actual practices of power-sharing may fail to deliver on the promised provisions or civilians may see the implementation of promises as incentives to push for further implementation steps. In these instances, rebels and their civilian support base may perceive civilian mobilization as the preferred strategy for two reasons:

First, they can maintain the pressure in order to receive the promised benefits from the power-sharing agreement. Once the rebels are disarmed, they lose a strong bargaining chip as they are no longer a credible threat for the stability of the country (Hoddie and Hartzell 2003; Glassmyer and Sambanis 2008). The use of protests, riots or strikes signals to the government that civilians connected to the rebels are able to mobilize support even without the use of organized armed force. For example, supporters of the Maoist rebels in Nepal used strategies of civil unrest during the peace process. Through civilian mobilization, they signaled strong popular support and generated pressure for securing their influence during the implementation period (Adhikari 2014).

Second, civilians connected to rebels demonstrate that they are able and willing to accept the regulative boundaries of a democratic state by refraining from violence. Research on the effectiveness of tactics has shown that the pressure on the government increases if rebel supporters use nonviolent strategies in their struggle (Shaykhutdinov 2010; Huff and Kruszewska 2016). By conducting tactics without the use of excessive force, they provide a credible signal to the national and international audiences that they accept the basic rules of the political game in the country. Thus, it becomes harder for the government and international community to sideline the demands of civilians connected to the rebels in the peace process.

It is important to note that we do not assume the likelihood for post-conflict civilian activism to be less likely for non-affiliated ethnic groups. Those ethnic groups are included in the country's political system or they are excluded groups that have not been represented by a formerly warring party. Indeed, we would

expect particularly included groups to possess a much more favorable endowment of mobilization resources that results in an increased overall protest propensity. However, we expect that power-sharing practices as specific events in the post-conflict period present situations to which those ethnic groups that are rebel-affiliated are much more sensitive. We therefore assume that the effect of power-sharing practices on civilian activism increases particularly for those groups as compared to all other, unaffiliated groups. This leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4.3 (H4.3): *The probability that power-sharing practices result in civilian activism increases for civilians from ethnic groups who are connected to the rebels compared to ethnic groups not connected to the rebels.*

4.4 Research Design

At the core of our theoretical argument lies the expectation that, firstly, the probability for civilian activism in post-conflict settings increases in the aftermath of power-sharing practices, but that the magnitude of this impact is, secondly, dependent on the dimensions and, thirdly, whether the respective ethnic groups are affiliated with a rebel organization entering a power-sharing agreement.² While existing conflict data allows to connect individual fighting events to the involved rebel organizations, there is currently no data available that would analogously enable the attribution of civilian activism. Indeed, given that civilians are by definition non-combatants, the key challenge remains how we may reliably establish the connection between this actor group with the distinctive repertoires of contention at their disposal to non-state actors primarily relying on the use of organized armed force.

The reliance on ethnic groups as our basic approximation for relevant social groups helps to address this issue. It allows us in a first step to assign geo-referenced data on incidents of civilian activism to ethnic groups' settlement areas according to the geo-coded version of the *Ethnic Power Relations* (GeoEPR) data set (Wucherpfennig, Weidmann, et al. 2011; Vogt et al. 2015). We implicitly assume that any civilian activism that occurs in a location attributed to a specific group is likely to be related to this specific ethnic group. In a second step, we can

² All peace agreements in the considered time period contain power-sharing provisions or are otherwise included in our data set as follow-up agreements. We did not consider the rare instances in which one party manages to defeat the opponent entirely, as these cases do not allow to trace time-specific implementation steps in the peace process comparable to power-sharing practices.

attribute the respective ethnic group to one or more particular rebel organizations to which this ethnic group is affiliated. Relying on the ACD2EPR data set allows us to match rebel organizations identified as parties of a power-sharing agreement to individual ethnic groups. Following Wucherpfennig et al. (2012), we code rebel organizations as being affiliated to a specific ethnic group when the former recruit from the respective group *and* make claims on their behalf. The ethnic group thereby provides the crucial linkage between events of civilian activism on the one hand and the related rebel organization on the other hand.

Given our expectation that civilian activism sequentially follows after specific power-sharing practices, we construct a panel data set with the ethnic group-month as our unit of analysis. We include all active, geo-referenced groups in African countries that have experienced violent conflict terminated by the signing of a power-sharing agreement between 1989 and 2006, which eventually led to a total number of 88 ethnic groups distributed over 15 African countries.³

We restricted the time period of observation for each country to active post-conflict periods, starting with the date marking the end of violence and ending by default five years after the conclusion of the power-sharing agreement if violence in the specific conflict setting does not recur.⁴ If the peace agreement breaks down, the date of renewed violence defines the end of the post-conflict period. For all instances in which the post-conflict period for several peace agreements overlapped in an individual country, we took the first conclusion and the most recent end as our reference point (yet accounting for gaps in between). This led to a total of 8,282 ethnic group-month observations between 1989 and 2011 (the maximum end date for post-conflict periods of power-sharing agreements concluded in 2006).

Data and Variables

Our main dependent variable is a binary indicator on the occurrence of civilian activism in a specific month and is obtained from the *Social Conflict Analysis Database* (SCAD) (Salehyan, Hendrix, et al. 2012).⁵ Given our objective to extract post-war forms of contention that differ from the wartime use of organized armed force, we restricted our scope to demonstrations, strikes and riots, whereas

³ More detailed information on the sample is provided in the appendix.

⁴ The focus on the first five years after the conclusion of a peace agreement has proven to be a helpful and commonly used time span in previous research on post-conflict power-sharing (see, for instance Walter 1999; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008).

⁵ Given the structure of our data set, which is disaggregated to the month level, occurrences of multiple protest events during an individual observation is relatively rare and does not exceed 5 instances per month. We thus refrained from using a count-model.

government repression and violence perpetrated by militant wings or organizations have been discarded from the analysis. Furthermore, we omitted events flagged as possibly overlapping with incidents of armed violence from the *Armed Conflict Dataset* and events with vague geo-localization.⁶

Our eventual estimation goal required to assign each civilian activism event to an ethnic group's settlement region. We thus discarded all instances of civilian activism taking place in areas with co-habitation of two or more ethnic groups. This led to the complete omission of Burundi and Rwanda, for which the ethnic groups of Tutsi and Hutu were coded statewide each and thus are indiscernible based on their settlement region, and South Africa, where several groups overlapped. From the remaining countries, a total of 11.56% of all civilian activism events in the original SCAD were located in overlapping settlement regions and thus discarded. We thereby obtained a total number of 724 group-months with civilian activism. From these, 283 observations were located in active post-conflict phases, which corresponds to a protest onset rate of 3.41% in the eventual sample. It should be noted that the relatively low proportion of positive cases is due to the temporal disaggregation used for the analysis. If we take a cross-sectional perspective, around 49% of all ethnic groups experience some form of civilian activism during a post-conflict period, rising up to 82 events for individual groups.

The main independent variable on the country level shall capture different manifestations of power-sharing in post-conflict periods. All variables are binary indicators lagged by one period—meaning that we estimate the effect of power-sharing in the *previous* month on civilian activism in the current month—in order to mitigate potential endogeneity issues. Following Ottmann and Vüllers, we define power-sharing as “any arrangement between the government of a state and a rebel group that promises to establish institutions that mandate joint control of power at the national level of government” (2015, p. 332).

To test our first hypothesis, we distinguish between two separate instances: The variable *power-sharing promise* denotes all observations in which the power-sharing agreement with specific implementation promises has been signed in the previous month. We therefore test whether the probability of civilian activism increases in the immediate aftermath of the power-sharing agreement's conclusion.⁷

⁶ This concerned ‘nationwide’ events, which are by default relegated to the capital, and events with unclear geo-location.

⁷ The variable is thus not constant over the entire post-conflict time, but is instead only tied to the period following the peace agreement conclusion. If the conclusion itself rather than practices would yield an effect on civilian activism, it is reasonable to assume that it would manifest in the next month.

Although this often mirrors the first observation for each group, our focus on the entire period after the end of hostilities implies that there can also be a considerable time lapse in-between the cessation of violence and the actual conclusion of the agreement. In instances with multiple agreements, the conclusion of a second power-sharing agreement can also occur within the post-conflict period of the previous one. In total, we observe 228 events of *power-sharing promises* within the relevant time spans, which accounts for 2.75%.

Power-sharing practices indicate all months in which actual implementation or abolition steps of these promises have been conducted in the previous period. A total of 816 observations (9.85%) have experienced at least one power-sharing practice in the previous month. Both variables are obtained from the *Power-Sharing Event Dataset* (PSED) (Ottmann and Vüllers 2015). The comparison groups for observations with prior promises and practices, respectively, are all other post-conflict months in which *no* power-sharing promise or practice has occurred in the previous month.

Additionally to an aggregated variable reflecting whether any power-sharing practice has taken place during a particular month, we distinguish between four dimensions according to Hartzell and Hoddie (2007): *Political* power-sharing practices include the implementation of stipulated power-sharing promises referring to the assumption of guaranteed seats in the parliament or cabinet positions by rebel representatives. *Military* power-sharing practices similarly reflect the integration of rebel soldiers or commanders into the national army. *Economic* power-sharing occurs when rebel representatives take over state-owned companies or obtain positions in a commission regulating sectors of the national economy. *Territorial* power-sharing lastly takes place when laws or decrees are passed that introduce devolution or regional autonomy. Apart from these implementation steps, a violation of power-sharing promises (e.g. laws or decrees introducing devolution are abolished, rebel representatives lose guaranteed seats in the parliament, leave the national army command or lose control in state-owned companies) is also considered a concrete power-sharing practice. The data for all these variables is taken from PSED.

For hypothesis 4.3, we interact *power-sharing practices* with a dummy indicating whether the respective ethnic group has been affiliated to the rebel organization with which the power-sharing arrangement has been concluded according to the ACD2EPR data set (Wucherpfennig, Metternich, et al. 2012). The data set confirmed an affiliation to a rebel party participating in the power-sharing agreement for 24 groups in our sample (see Table D.2 in the appendix for a list of all ethnic




Fig. 4.1. Civilian activism in post-conflict periods, West Africa

groups and affiliated organizations). Our comparison group for these groups are all ethnic groups in the respective country that have not been linked to a relevant rebel organization. It should be noted that individual ethnic groups can be linked to several rebel organizations and vice versa (Wucherpfennig, Metternich, et al. 2012). Figs. 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate the distribution of events coded as civilian activism across ethnic settlement areas for West African countries (Fig. 4.1) and Sudan (Fig. 4.2). Although civilian activism indeed occurs in areas populated by both groups that are affiliated and unaffiliated to rebel organizations, this cross-sectional illustration already points to the stronger intensity of these events for the latter group. We can thus assume that rebel-affiliated groups are not *per se* more prone to become active in post-conflict phases.

We include several control variables in order to ensure that the conjectured relationship is not driven by other factors characteristic to the respective ethnic group. All of the following variables are obtained from EPR's group-level data set GROWup (Girardin et al. 2015). The literature particularly points to groups' mobilization capacity as a crucial determinant for collective action (Cunningham 2013). First, the group's demographic size as the pool of potential supporters from which it can draw is important here. We thus include a measure reflecting the group's relative share of the country's ethnically relevant total population. In line with earlier studies, we include both a linear and quadratic term in order




Fig. 4.2. Civilian activism in post-conflict periods, Sudan and Chad

to account for the possibility that the propensity for civilian unrest is largest for intermediate demographic power levels (Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011).

Moreover, ethnic groups clustered in urban or wealthier areas may find it easier to mobilize supporters. We approximate this factor by including the logged sum of annual nighttime lights (National Geophysical Data Center 2014). By contrast, groups that are excluded from power may lack the institutional resources to mobilize for protests in the wake of power-sharing practices, so we include a dummy indicating the political status of the respective group. Lastly, we control for the possibility that the propensity for civilians to become active after these events is driven by the years that have passed since the ethnic group has been involved in an armed violent confrontation with the state.

The expected effect may be subject to changes of contextual factors on the country-level, particularly with regard to shifting conditions of the political system. We first controlled for the countries' current level of democracy, which is obtained from the Polity-IV Annual Times Series (Marshall and Jaggers 2014). We include both a linear and quadratic term to account for the assumption that civilian activism is most likely in countries of transition, whereas strong autocracies and consolidated democracies at the ends of the scale are unlikely to experience these forms of contention. Moreover, factors related to the conflict preceding the conclusion of the peace agreement may affect the likelihood for power-sharing

practices. We therefore include two dummy variables indicating prior conflict severity (above 1,000 battle-related deaths or not) and the involvement of external actors in the conflict. Both factors are taken from the *Armed Conflict Dataset*.

Additionally to our actual measure of power-sharing promises, we include a variable indicating whether a peace agreement in the previous month left specific questions of political, military, economic or territorial power-sharing unresolved. Analogously, we control for the signing of follow-up agreements in the post-conflict period when we estimate the effect of concrete power-sharing practices instead of promises in the models. We furthermore include a measurement when a referendum or election has taken place in the previous month. PSED provides the data for these variables. Lastly, we control for serial autocorrelation of the dependent variable by including the months passed since the last civilian activism event alongside their squared and cubic polynomials (Carter and Signorino 2010).

4.5 Analysis

We estimate the effect of power-sharing promises and practices on the probability for civilian activism in a panel regression framework using logit models. All models include country- and year-fixed effects in order to control for cross-country and between-year heterogeneity. Table 4.1 presents the results of our analysis. The first two models address hypothesis 4.1 by estimating the effect of the mere conclusion of a peace agreement with promises of power-sharing (model 1) and the actual implementation practices of power-sharing (model 2). It can be seen that power-sharing promises fail to yield a significant effect on the probability of civilian activism, whereas the effect of concrete practices is significant. In substantive terms, the predicted probability for civilian activism to emerge increases by 1.0% after power-sharing practices.

Addressing hypothesis 4.2, model 3 further splits the practices of power-sharing into its different dimensions: Political, military, territorial and economic power-sharing. In line with our assumptions, the results suggest that the effect of power-sharing practices on civilian activism is largely driven by two dimensions. The first regards practices of political power-sharing, including the take-over or dismissal of rebel representatives into cabinet positions and the take-over or dismissal of rebel representatives from guaranteed seats in the national legislative assembly. Second, practices of territorial power-sharing such as the introduction or abolition of autonomy or devolution affect the probability for civilian activism.

By contrast, the integration of rebel forces into the government army or the inclusion of former rebel representatives into state-owned company structures yield no significant effect, with the latter not even showing a single instance of protests, riots or strikes in its immediate aftermath in the data set.

Contrary to the effect of aggregate practices, the effects of political and territorial power-sharing practices substantially increase the likelihood of civilian activism, with the first dimension increasing the predicted probability by 2.0%, and the second one increasing the predicted probability by 3.6%. In line with our theoretical expectations, these vastly different effects across power-sharing dimensions could be explained by their different levels of impact on the civilian population. The effect of power-sharing on civilian activism is thereby likely to be strongest for those practices that immediately affect societies as a whole—namely the representation in the national polity and changes in the country’s territorial structure. Contrary to these practices, reshuffles in the army command, rebel soldier integration, or the shared management of state-owned companies usually affect elites or smaller segments of the society and may thus fail to yield similar mobilization effects as compared to the first two mentioned power-sharing dimensions.

Finally, model 4 tests the conditional effect of the group’s affiliation on *power-sharing practices* as outlined in hypothesis 4.3. The interaction term between both factors appears significant at a .1 level, suggesting that the likelihood for civilian activism increases in regions of rebel-affiliated ethnic groups *only* after power-sharing practices. As Brambor et al. (2006) have pointed out, however, the mere interpretation of the interaction coefficient can be misleading.

Table 4.1. Regression Results—Main Analysis

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Power-sharing promise t_{-1}	-0.582 (0.663)			
Power-sharing practice t_{-1}		0.317* (0.122)		0.201 (0.164)
Power-sharing practice $t_{-1} \times$ Group affiliated with rebel-party				0.948 ⁺ (0.562)
Political power-sharing practice t_{-1}			0.571* (0.206)	
Military power-sharing practice t_{-1}			0.201 (0.210)	
Economic power-sharing practice t_{-1}			-0.539 (0.756)	
Territorial power-sharing practice t_{-1}			0.908*** (0.228)	
Group affiliated with rebel-party	-1.774*** (0.517)	-1.775*** (0.515)	-1.776*** (0.516)	-1.969*** (0.573)
Sum of group nighttime lights (log)	0.607*** (0.116)	0.608*** (0.116)	0.609*** (0.116)	0.609*** (0.116)
Group excluded from political power	-0.551 (0.410)	-0.549 (0.410)	-0.551 (0.412)	-0.544 (0.402)
Relative population size	4.608 (3.011)	4.626 (3.019)	4.645 (3.041)	4.554 (2.903)
Relative population size ²	-7.564 ⁺ (4.282)	-7.575 ⁺ (4.284)	-7.592 ⁺ (4.311)	-7.504 ⁺ (4.134)
Years passed since last conflict (group)	-0.0273** (0.00874)	-0.0274** (0.00863)	-0.0274** (0.00863)	-0.0272** (0.00851)
Polity score	0.125** (0.0390)	0.121** (0.0373)	0.119** (0.0377)	0.121** (0.0376)
Polity score ²	-0.0312 ⁺ (0.0166)	-0.0296 ⁺ (0.0162)	-0.0286 ⁺ (0.0159)	-0.0298 ⁺ (0.0162)
Unresolved power-sharing issues / post-conflict agreement t_{-1}	0.627 (0.526)	0.619 (0.550)	0.681 (0.554)	0.632 (0.552)

Table continues on next page

Table 4.1. (continued): Regression Results—Main Analysis

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Elections or referendum t_{-1}	0.381 (0.398)	0.346 (0.406)	0.295 (0.378)	0.337 (0.407)
Prior conflict intensity: Civil war	3.179** (1.000)	3.199** (0.983)	3.237** (0.996)	3.213** (0.993)
Prior conflict type: Internationalized	-0.980 ⁺ (0.589)	-1.043 ⁺ (0.572)	-1.109 ⁺ (0.568)	-1.050 ⁺ (0.579)
Constant	-13.50*** (2.275)	-13.66*** (2.291)	-13.69*** (2.291)	-13.73*** (2.304)
lnsig2u	-1.186* (0.452)	-1.179* (0.451)	-1.148* (0.449)	-1.205* (0.460)
Year-dummies	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country-dummies	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	6,816	6,816	6,816	6,816
<i>AIC</i>	1587.090	1586.507	1582.646	1584.259

Robust standard errors clustered at the country level. Months since last civilian activism not shown.

⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.005$, *** $p < 0.001$




Fig. 4.3. Average marginal effects of power-sharing practices t_{-1} with 95% CIs.

We therefore plotted the average marginal effect of *power-sharing practices*_{*t*-1} in Fig. 4.3 for two conditions: Ethnic groups not related to a peace agreement-relevant rebel organization (left-hand side, coded as 0) and rebel-affiliated ethnic groups (right-hand side, coded as 1). The figure demonstrates that the effect is significant for the latter group only. In particular, the predicted probability for civilian activism to emerge after power-sharing practices increases by 1.53%. Importantly, this does not suggest rebel-affiliated groups to have a higher general likelihood to protest as compared to non-affiliated groups. It tells us, however, that despite civilian activism being less likely in general for rebel-affiliated groups, the immediate aftermath of power-sharing practices appears to present a situation in which particularly these groups are conducive for protests, strikes or riots in line with hypothesis 4.3.

Robustness Checks and Discussion

We first attempted to validate our findings with several model specifications. The detailed results can be obtained from Tables D.3–D.5, and Figs. D.2–D.4 in the appendix. One may argue that the chosen control variables bear the potential for post-treatment bias, so we replicated the regression models from Table 4.1 without using any controls safe for the fixed effects. Models R1–R3 do not differ substantively from the main models. While the interaction effect is insignificant in model R4, we assume that this divergence from the main model (4) is largely due to the fact that variations across ethnic groups may have a huge impact in this group-sensitive model. If we only include the group-specific covariates, the interaction effect becomes significant again (R5).

Next, we addressed the objection that the results are driven by the selection and omission of particular cases. Model R6 displays the results from our base model excluding Sudan, which accounts for most power-sharing practices in the sample (27.45%) and most observations with rebel-affiliated groups (33.14%). Despite a loss of 23.27% of our observations, the effect of the independent variable is still significant, thereby supporting our theoretical argument.

The increased civilian activism propensity after power-sharing practices for affiliated ethnic groups may merely mirror a more generally increased activism by the rebel organization itself. In order to address this concern, we have repeated the models using forms of organized violent contention in the aftermath of armed conflicts as our dependent variable. These included violence against state-authorities or individuals by a group's militant wing or organization, and

violent intra-government struggles.⁸ If not only the civilian population, but rather the rebel organizations themselves would become active in the aftermath of power-sharing practices, we would expect a similar effect for organized violence as observed for civilian activism in the previous models. As models R7 and R8 demonstrate, however, the independent variable fails to achieve a positive and significant effect comparable to our main model (2). Likewise, we see no significant interaction effect between rebel-affiliation and power-sharing practices on organized violent behavior. This also mitigates the suspicion that a lower overall protest intensity for rebel-affiliated groups may only be due to the fact that these groups tend to resort to other means of contention.

Our binary indicator for power-sharing practices has not accounted for different intensity levels. Model R9 therefore tests whether our findings hold after changing the binary independent variable to the *number* of power-sharing practices per month, which can climb up to 17 for individual countries. The results are positive and highly significant, thus supporting hypothesis 4.1. As Fig. D.2 (in the appendix) furthermore illustrates, the predicted likelihood for the occurrence of civilian activism is 3.79% after 1 power-sharing practice event, which means a 6.3% increase from the baseline propensity (3.57%). Moving from 1 to 10 power-sharing practices per month (the 90th percentile) increases the probability for the occurrence of civilian unrest even by 67.47%.

Given our focus on ethnic groups, we were unable to account for all instances of civilian activism occurring in areas that are inhabited by more than one group simultaneously and thus had a considerable loss of potentially relevant observations. The five countries we had to omit entirely—South Africa, Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia and Comoros—accounted for nearly one third of all protest, strike and riot observations accounted in the raw sample. In order to check whether this omission significantly changes the main results, we repeated the analysis on the country-month level. We controlled for the total number of excluded groups in the country, the logged GDP per capita, the logged population size in 1990, and years passed since the country has experienced its last armed conflict (all obtained from EPR’s country-level data set) along with the country-level variables used in the previous models. On this level of analysis, we were able to obtain a more representative result for the main model from hypothesis 4.1, but were unable to account for between-group differences. In line with our findings from the main analysis, power-sharing promises in the previous month do not

⁸ The variable was created using SCAD’s “anti-government violence”, “extra-government violence”, and “intra-government violence” categories (Salehyan, Hendrix, et al. 2012).

increase the probability for civilian activism (R10), but the effect is significant for power-sharing practices (R11 and R12) as well as for the different dimensions of power-sharing practices (R13). With an increase of 7.01%, the effect is much higher than in our main models which is likely due to the higher proportion of positive observations in the aggregated sample.

The last two specifications test our conjectured mechanism from H4.3 more in-depth. First, we did so far not distinguish between implemented and broken promises when we investigated the conditioning effect of power-sharing practices. However, we would specifically expect civilian activism to increase in the aftermath of implemented promises, as group members may press for further implementation steps. We therefore repeated our interaction model only for implemented practices, the results of which can be seen in Fig. D.3 (in the appendix). It shows that the results of the interaction effect still hold, suggesting that the implementation rather than the abolition of power-sharing promises are indeed the main driver for increased civilian activism in territories with ethnic groups affiliated to a rebel party. Sudan provides an illustrative case for this mechanism: One month after the long-delayed integration of the former rebels into the national forces in November 2009, civilian supporters of the SPLM/A took to the streets to demand amendments granting free elections as the next step.

Second, our theoretical assumptions have so far made no predictions as to which extent the effect of different power-sharing dimensions are dependent on the respective ethnic group's affiliation. As was outlined earlier in H4.2, particularly political and territorial power-sharing practices are prone to increased civilian activism due to the immediate impact it yields on the civilian population. However, we may expect the effect of the latter dimension to be particularly strong for rebel-affiliated ethnic groups. As the strive for territorial autonomy or independence underlies most ethnic conflicts in the observed time period, it is reasonable to assume that civilian activism in areas inhabited by rebel-affiliated groups will be particularly likely when power-sharing practices address the territorial dimension. In order to test these assumptions, we have repeated our main model 2, but interacted each dimension with a dummy on rebel-affiliation of the respective ethnic group. The results are shown in Fig. D.4 (in the appendix). We see no interaction effect for military and economic power-sharing, but see that territorial power-sharing practices and rebel-affiliation yields a strong and significant effect as expected. While the effect of political power-sharing practices on civilian activism is insignificant for rebel-affiliated groups, the effect is positive and

significant for unaffiliated groups.⁹ Two possible explanations may account for this effect: First, groups that had been included in the national power structure lose relatively to groups that are connected to the rebels and benefit from concessions. Second, groups that had already been excluded but were not affiliated with one of the warring parties may develop grievances due to being not considered in the redistribution of power. As we cannot distinguish between both types of unaffiliated ethnic groups here, however, we must leave this question open for further research.

4.6 Conclusion

Under what conditions do power-sharing agreements increase the probability of civilian activism? So far, research has focused on the relationship between the former conflict parties or the general development of the post-conflict country. We took a different angle and investigated the unintended consequences of power-sharing agreements on civilian activism, linking developments at the national level (power-sharing agreements) to the dynamics at the micro level (civilian activism).

We argued that three different factors make it more likely that civilians conduct protests, riots or strikes. First, power-sharing practices can create dissatisfaction on all sides. Second, civilians are more likely to mobilize in reaction to political and territorial power-sharing practices. Finally, we expect the effect to be particularly pronounced for ethnic groups affiliated with the former rebel party.

To test the theoretical assumptions, we matched information from different data sets on post-conflict countries in Africa (1989–2006) at the ethnic group-month level. Our statistical models provide general support for our hypotheses: Power-sharing practices increase the likelihood of civilian activism, while power-sharing promises (i.e. provisions in the peace agreements) do not have a statistically significant effect. Only political and territorial power-sharing practices increase the probability of civilian activism. Moreover, the likelihood of civilian activism increases for civilians from ethnic groups affiliated to rebel organizations included in the power-sharing agreement.

⁹ In fact, there are no protest events after economic power-sharing practices for rebel-affiliated groups altogether, resulting in a failure to estimate an interaction coefficient for the lower left part of Fig. D.4.

Our study is a first step in a new research field highlighting the consequences of decisions at the national level on dynamics at the micro level. Research on post-conflict countries neglects the effects of power-sharing agreements on civilian activism due to its focus on peace duration (Walter 1999; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008). However, empirical evidence from various countries highlights that we need a better understanding of the civilian dynamics at the micro level. Civilian activism can create a challenge as it questions the recently reached conflict settlement and might hamper the economic development of the society plagued by civil war. While the activism by the civilians from minority ethnic groups (and the political parties) in Nepal slowed the implementation process of the peace agreement, a civilian campaign brought the whole peace process in Colombia at the brink of collapse after the signature of a first peace agreement.

Both examples of civilian activism after the peace agreement might be extreme cases, but they highlight the need to take the dynamics at the micro level in post-conflict countries seriously. Aside from the question of peace vs. conflict recurrence, civilian activism in post-conflict countries has the potential to impact other developments. Three fields of research might be especially promising: First, international and national actors aim to establish the state as the only legitimate actor in all country regions after the end of the war in order to secure stability and development. Civilian activism might be a signal for national and international actors in which regions of the country the population is still dissatisfied with its overall situation. Second, civilian activism has the potential to threaten the general peace process. Thus, we need more knowledge about the impact of civilian activism on a renegotiation of the already signed peace agreement as it occurred in Colombia. Third, we have limited knowledge about the relationships between the civilian activists and former conflict parties. Future research therefore might look at the consequences of independent civilian activism on the post-conflict bargaining space of the former conflict parties as well as the willingness of the conflict parties to use violence in order to control the civilians.

Chapter 5

Wartime Violence, Collective Grievances and Post-Conflict Protests. Evidence from Uganda's LRA Insurgency

Abstract

The immediate aftermath of civil wars is a period prone to heightened contention: Political decisions about the distribution of aid or power, for example, can deepen social fault lines and in some instances even result in violent unrest. Yet despite its relevance, our knowledge on the drivers for individual participation in post-conflict contentious activism remains limited. Previous research has found particularly wartime experiences to affect political and social behaviour of individuals in the post-conflict period. Based on these findings, I argue that exposure to civil war violence increases the likelihood for individuals to participate in post-war protests. Moreover, I conjecture that this effect can be explained with the reinforcement of group-based grievances. Using survey data from the *Afrobarometer* collected shortly after the end of the Ugandan civil war in 2008, I find support for the argument: Results from linear probability models show a consistent and robust relationship between county-level war violence and the likelihood to participate in protests. An additional analysis with a novel measure of group-level exposure and a causal mediation analysis furthermore corroborate the assumed mechanism.

5.1 Introduction

For war-torn countries, the transition to the post-conflict phase often entails new challenges to domestic stability. Especially the early period after hostilities have ceased—when state capacity tends to be low and different possible paths of political and economic development are still open—can be prone to increased contention. Political violence and protests erupting in the course of post-conflict elections (Salehyan and Linebarger 2015), in the context of broader peacebuilding and development activities (Lee and Park 2020; Lai 2016), or over the distribution of political power (Krtsch and Vüllers 2019) are far from uncommon and may in some instances even jeopardize the further trajectory of the peace process as a whole—up to the point of conflict relapse.

Yet despite its apparent relevance for post-conflict stability, protests in such settings have remained a largely understudied subject of investigation. In particular, we still know little about the conditions and mechanisms that explain individual participation in post-conflict protests. On the one hand, empirical studies have identified wartime experiences as crucial determinants for individuals' attitudes and behaviour in the aftermath of conflict. At the same time, however, findings remain unclear as to whether and how these legacies translate into collective action (Bauer, Blattman, et al. 2016). This paper contributes to the discussion by first shedding light on the factors that explain individuals' propensity to engage in protests during post-conflict periods, and second by testing the mechanism through which the conjectured relationship is assumed to operate.

I argue that experiences of wartime violence reinforce group-based perceptions of threat, vulnerability and eventually grievances. These shared perceptions of grievances can—in turn—decrease barriers to collective action and result in an increased propensity to join protests in the immediate aftermath of war. Taking the case of the *Lord's Resistance Army* (LRA) insurgency in Uganda, I draw from survey data collected shortly after the end of violence (Afrobarometer 2008) and geo-referenced conflict data (Raleigh, Linke, et al. 2010) to test the argument empirically. Results from linear probability models show that the local intensity of violence correlates significantly with individuals' reported protest participation in 2008.

In order to examine the mechanism, I secondly assess the conditional effect of group-level exposure to violence on the found relationship. I therefore match individual violent events with precise geo-located information about local ethnic settlement patterns (Müller-Crepon and Hunziker 2018). The results suggest

that conflict intensity increases protest propensity if the respondent's own group has been highly affected by the violence. A causal mediation analysis finally shows that specifically group-based grievances are a plausible explanation for the relationship between conflict intensity and protest.

The paper contributes to current debates in two major ways: First, by showing that exposure to conflict-related violence increases protest activities after hostilities have ended, the paper adds further evidence to a more cautious interpretation of post-conflict social capital formation. Protests certainly constitute an important means for marginalized communities to articulate their interests in the peace process. At the same time, however, the mechanism of collective grievance formation also suggests that post-conflict protests may be a symptom of increased alienation with the state. These implications corroborate earlier works that see eroding trust in political institutions (De Juan and Pierskalla 2016) and a stronger retreat to autonomous local self-governance (Grosjean 2014) as an outcome of wartime experiences.

Second, it expounds on the mechanism through which wartime legacies transition into post-conflict collective action. Previous studies have demonstrated that immediate or contextual conflict exposure—e.g. approximated by the local intensity of violence—can have ramifications for post-conflict attitudes and behaviour (Freitag, Kijewski, and Oppold 2017; Bellows and Miguel 2009). While principally lending support to these findings, the results presented here shed light on the question *how* this effect may come about. d

5.2 Previous Research on Wartime Exposure and Collective Action

Civil wars often place heavy burdens on societies even after hostilities have ceased. Particularly the early post-conflict period can be critical, with pivotal moments such as elections (Flores and Nooruddin 2012; Salehyan and Linebarger 2015), the implementation of power-sharing provisions (Krtsch and Vüllers 2019) or aid allocation decisions (De Juan 2020) being prone to social unrest. Fig. 5.1 provides a cursory overview about the phenomenon's extent and plots the change of average protest intensity for African countries with at least three years of armed conflict followed by at least three years of peace since 1997 (defined according to the *Uppsala Conflict Data Program* (UCDP) definition of at least 25 battle-related deaths per year). In almost all cases, nonviolent and violent protests increased




Fig. 5.1. Change in the average number of protests and riots from three years prior to three years after the end of armed conflict. Data based on ACLED (Raleigh et al. 2010)

markedly after the end of the conflict. For the two exceptions, Rwanda (2002) and Ivory Coast (2004), the decrease in protests results from peaks of social unrest in the respective conflict's final year. It is also noteworthy that this selection does not include countries that experienced short-lived peace periods precisely because of increased social unrest in the immediate aftermath of conflict termination (as in the case of Libya, for instance).

Given the relevance of protests in post-conflict settings, most studies have sought to address the phenomenon on an aggregate level, relying either on cross-country analyses or comparisons across subnational regions or groups (Davenport et al. 2019). However, we still know little about the central drivers for individual participation in post-conflict protests. In fact, despite the negative consequences on the aggregate level, some microlevel investigations show that the impact of wartime experiences on individual attitudes and behaviour can be quite different. Based on survey evidence from post-conflict contexts, a series of studies has found wartime experiences to significantly correlate with higher individual levels of interpersonal trust and pro-social behaviour (Koos 2018; Bellows and Miguel 2009; Blattman 2009; De Luca and Verpoorten 2015b; Gilligan, Pasquale, and Samii 2014; Voors and Bulte 2014; Voors, Nillesen, et al. 2012). Some investigations have even found these unintended consequences to enhance certain forms of political

and community participation, such as voting in elections (Bellows and Miguel 2009), joining political groups (Bellows and Miguel 2009) participating in local assemblies (Bellows and Miguel 2009; De Luca and Verpoorten 2015a) or engaging in community-based associations (Blattman 2009; Koos 2018; Grosjean 2014).

Other investigations, by contrast, have either found no or even a negative relationship between experiences of violence and pro-social behaviour (Kijewski and Freitag 2018; Hager, Krakowski, and Schaub 2019; Muller and Vothknecht 2011; Colletta and Cullen 2000). Some authors point to the differential impact of war on social ties: While mainly affecting solidarity, trust and identification with members of the same ethnic, religious or community group, exposure to wartime violence could thereby be detrimental for attitudes towards out-group members (Bauer, Cassar, et al. 2014; Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti 2013; Balcells 2012; Cassar, Grosjean, and Whitt 2013).

It is particularly this differential impact—the reinforcement of in-group solidarity and identification coupled with mistrust against out-group members—that can in turn have profound implications on individual behaviour after the end of the conflict. For Bosnia-Herzegovina, Hadzic et al. (2017) show that vote shares for ethnic parties are significantly higher in war-affected communities. The authors find suggestive evidence that these voting patterns are mediated via increased trust towards co-ethnics and decreased trust towards members of other ethnic groups. In a similar vein, Costalli and Ruggeri (2015) and Beber et al. (2014) find wartime experiences to affect individual political preferences through the reinforcement of ideological or ethnic identification.

Despite this salience of this mechanism, however, few studies have systematically analysed how the reinforcement of group identities in the course of conflict may affect specifically protests in the immediate aftermath of war. While Freitag et al. (2017) identify a positive and significant relationship between wartime victimization and protest participation in post-war Kosovo, their study rather focuses on longer term consequences (eleven years after conflict termination) and does not specifically test the conjectured mechanism.

To sum up, the literature on the effect of wartime exposure on collective action has yielded mixed results: While most studies agree that the development of social ties is instrumental in explaining the relationship, there is no consensus about which *type* of social ties are reinforced through wartime experiences—and by extension, which type of behaviour we expect to prevail as a result. Taking up studies that suggest a differential effect on individuals' in- and out-group attitudes,

I will next outline a theoretical argument that explains how wartime exposure leads to an increased likelihood of protest participation through a mechanism of group-based grievance formation.

5.3 Theoretical Argument. Exposure to Wartime Violence, Collective Grievances, and Protest Mobilization

Starting from the premise that exposure to violence increases social ties and identification with in-group members—defined in terms of either ethnicity, religion, or location—, we may expect a higher individual protest likelihood to ensue. Group identities provide a network of trust that can serve as the very foundation for collective action (Passy 2003). They enable collective action by facilitating the dissemination of ideas and information, connecting like-minded individuals, and providing channels through which individuals can be mobilized (Edwards and McCarthy 2004; Oberschall 1994; Snow, Zurcher Jr., and Ekland-Olson 1980). Yet the mere reinforcement of group identities alone may not suffice to explain the link between exposure of wartime violence and post-conflict protest participation. I argue that a central driver for the latter lies in a) the reinforcement of group-related grievances through experiences of violence and b) the activation of these collective grievances in periods of increased contention—which is often the case in the immediate post-conflict period.

The argument builds on the assumption that motivational triggers are essential in order to activate existing networks for collective action. This link is perhaps most prominently associated with grievances-based explanations, which argue that perceptions of relative deprivation create individual frustrations and eventually lead to mobilization (Runciman 1966; Gurr 1970). Relative deprivation is thereby understood as the widening gap between value expectations and the capabilities to achieve them—for instance in the course of losses incurred through sudden shocks. It is easy to see how specifically wartime experiences may lead to perceptions of relative deprivation. On the one hand, wars are often accompanied by extensive direct violence against civilians (Eck and Hultman 2007). On the other hand, clashes between the government and rebel forces frequently entail substantial impacts on the civilian population in the form of destruction of livelihoods or even

loss of life through indirect killings. When people either witness or personally suffer from violence during civil wars, it can reinforce perceptions of threat and vulnerability that eventually lead to grievances.

These experiences are particularly likely to translate into collective action if they reflect a shared perception of deprivation among members of a social group instead of isolated individual experiences. Group identities are instrumental in shaping individuals' perspectives of common injustice, standpoints on specific political issues and the entailing imperatives of action (Passy 2003). In the context of civil war violence, individual experiences can become embedded into a common narrative of group deprivation; a common understanding about the wartime exposure of the entire social group with which the individual identifies itself (Østby 2013). Against the backdrop that civilian targeting in conflicts, but also the location of battles, are indeed not random but often very explicitly based on group membership, it is plausible to expect that individual experiences easily translate into group-based interpretations of victimization in war contexts (Gurr 1993).

Perceptions of increased deprivation in turn lead to collective action by enhancing frustration—most commonly identified with feelings of injustice. As Pettigrew states, people “must not only perceive difference, but they must also regard these differences as unfair and resent them” (2002, p. 368). Survey-based empirical studies have specifically identified perceptions of group-based injustices to be a strong predictor for participation in and support for contentious activism, including political violence and protests (Bhavnani and Backer 2007; Kirwin and Cho 2009; Miodownik and Nir 2016; Detges 2017; Dyrstad and Hillesund 2020; Alcorta et al. 2020). Group identities socialize individuals into a specific, common interpretation of social reality, which includes an evaluation about the respective group's position within the broader society (Freeman 1973; McAdam 1982; Passy 2003). As a consequence, collectively shared perceptions of wartime victimization are likewise prone to correlate with feelings of being disadvantaged or even treated unfairly in comparison to other groups. These feelings can, in turn, develop into injustice frames that can constitute a powerful narrative to organize collection action (Benford and Snow 2000). These frames typically include a particular attribution of blame—often targeted at the government. For the context of wartime violence, this may apply regardless of the actual perpetrators of violence. Even if non-state groups are the main actors responsible, individuals may nonetheless hold the government accountable for failing to provide security (De Juan and Pierskalla 2016; Gates and Justesen 2020).

Central to my argument is that these grievances can—once developed—translate to the post-conflict period. Siroky et al. (2020) show that relative deprivation does not necessarily correspond to tangible inequalities (e.g. economic differences). Instead, grievances based on perceptions of relative deprivation are essentially psychological phenomena reflecting the feeling of being disadvantaged—which can include real, subjective but also feared inequalities and injustices. They emphasize “group frustration owing to a gap between what the group has relative to what it feels it deserves—not necessarily to what others *have*” (Siroky et al. 2020, p. 696). Consequently, perceptions of threat and vulnerability developed through wartime experiences are likely to outlive the war itself as a motivational foundation for mobilization that can constitute a fertile ground for protests during subsequent contentious episodes.

The immediate post-conflict period is a particularly conducive phase for these simmering grievances to erupt. It entails moments and decisions that critically determine the country’s further trajectory and that are likely to have differential impacts on individual social groups. Elections (Flores and Nooruddin 2012; Salehyan and Linebarger 2015), power-sharing practices (Krtsch and Vüllers 2019) and decisions on the allocation of aid (De Juan 2020), for example, bear the potential to reinforce inter-group power imbalances and are thus likely to be highly contested. In these situations, increased group-related grievances resulting from experiences of wartime violence can lead individuals to participate in protests. Based on these considerations, I develop the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 5.1 (H5.1): *Exposure to wartime violence increases the likelihood of protest participation in the post-war period.*

5.4 The LRA Insurgency in Northern Uganda

I test the argument for Uganda’s immediate post-conflict period following the civil war between the LRA and the Government of Uganda. The conflict’s beginning dates back to Yoweri Museveni’s takeover of power in 1986, when remnants of the former Acholi-dominated regime rebelled against the new central government. In the early 1990s, the LRA prevailed as the predominant militant organization in Uganda’s north with support from the Sudanese government (Van Acker 2004).

Initially, the LRA and its predecessors drew primarily from support by the local Acholi population—an ethnic group that found itself on the losing side of the regime change in 1986. Yet, with the increased reliance on external assistance from Sudan and the neighbouring country’s southern region serving as a supply base and sanctuary for retreat, the LRA’s dependency on local support waned over time. The group increasingly staged targeted attacks on civilians, many of whom consisted of ethnic Acholi that were accused of collaboration with the central government (Vinci 2007). Since the mid-1990s, the conflict was fought with increased brutality and saw mass atrocities against the civilian population from both the Ugandan government and rebel forces (Dolan 2009). Additionally, the LRA increasingly relied on the abduction of children in order to forcibly recruit them as soldiers or laborers (Dunn 2004). Thus, although the LRA still majorly comprised of ethnic Acholi, members of the ethnic group became at the same time the largest group of victims affected by the conflict.

Violence surged to unprecedented heights between 2002 and 2005. After the Ugandan military sought to destroy LRA-bases in southern Sudan in March 2002, the conflict spread to the hitherto relatively unaffected subregions of Lango and Teso—in addition to the still heavily affected Acholi subregion (Van Acker 2004). With 1,471 violent conflict incidents, roughly 78% of all events took place during this period (see Fig. 5.2 below), causing destruction and displacement on a massive scale. By 2006, LRA-related conflict intensity had decreased and remained largely contained to the Acholi subregion (apart from 9 instances according to ACLED). Both conflict parties started negotiations over a peace agreement which resulted in a ceasefire in August of that year. Although the conclusion of a peace agreement eventually failed and the conflict spread to neighbouring countries, fighting between the Ugandan military and the LRA *de facto* came to an end on Ugandan territory after August 2006, barring sporadic incidents. With the local security situation improving, the resettlement process of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their home communities started. Additionally, the government announced a comprehensive economic recovery program for the conflict-affected region (World Bank 2009).

The context of Uganda’s conflict makes for a particularly fitting case to test the outlined argument. First, it resembles a most-likely-case for observing the expected relationship due to the conflict’s sheer severity. With a total of 8,549 casualties, it is a particularly intensive conflict-dyad, ranking in the top 10% of all entries recorded in UCDP’s *Battle-Related Deaths data set* (based on Pettersson et al. (2019), see Appendix Fig. E.1). Second, the post-conflict phase

was characterized by events and developments that would lead us to expect a period of heightened contention—and by extension, that developed group-based grievances may manifest in protest actions. After two landmark events that were themselves accompanied by social unrest—the referendum in 2005 that lifted the ban on political parties and the subsequent election in early 2006 (Goodfellow 2014; Aljazeera 2005)—the Ugandan government launched a series of controversial reforms addressing sensitive issues related to land use, regional autonomy, or executive power that sparked sometimes violent protests (Goodfellow 2014). In fact, both nonviolent and violent protests have sharply increased after 2006, from a total number of 54 in the years 2001–2005 to 155 in the five subsequent years according to ACLED (Raleigh, Linke, et al. 2010).

Some of the post-war political conflicts had an explicitly ethnic dimension. For instance, several bills introduced after 2005 that were perceived as touching the autonomy and basic rights of the Baganda culminated in large-scale ethnic mobilization (Goodfellow 2014). Moreover, voting in the 2006 elections followed distinctive regional patterns, with the northern region having been the strongest support base for the opposition candidate (Gloppen et al. 2006). Overall, the northern and eastern ethnic groups that were most affected by the war—Langi, Acholi, and Iteso—continued to remain excluded from political power after 2006 (Girardin et al. 2015), which presented a potential source for new conflicts. Particularly policies related to the use and ownership of land became one of the major issues of contention in the northern region immediately after the end of conflict. Conflicts erupted in particular over disputed land ownership between IDPs returning to their home communities on the one side and private companies or government authorities on the other side (World Bank 2009; International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) 2012).

Third, the 4th *Afrobarometer* round taking place in 2008 makes it possible to specifically investigate the short-term effects of wartime experiences in the early post-conflict period. Uganda has been among the most frequently surveyed countries over the course of several *Afrobarometer* waves. For the purpose of this study, it is not only helpful that the time span between the end of the conflict and the survey is relatively short. It is also useful that the country has been surveyed as well in the first *Afrobarometer* round (2000), which happened to take place shortly before the escalation of violence (the time point of both surveys is marked by the vertical bars in Fig. 5.2). Following a similar approach as Rohner et al. (2013), this allows me to control for pre-treatment values of some of the relevant variables, and thus address potential endogeneity concerns.




Fig. 5.2. Number of monthly violent events in Uganda based on ACLED (Raleigh, Linke, et al. 2010). Vertical bars mark the start and end dates of the investigation period (note: the three districts from Karamoja subregion, which are not included in AB round 4, are not considered here).

5.5 Data and Operationalization

I test the hypothesis on the level of the individual respondent using survey data for Uganda from the *Afrobarometer*. I make use of the 4th round, which was implemented in August 2008, shortly after the LRA insurgency de facto came to an end on Ugandan soil and shifted its geographic focus to South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and later on to the Central African Republic. The survey, which is nationally representative and geographically stratified, covers 2,431 respondents across all Ugandan regions. It includes areas less affected by the insurgency in the central and western regions as well as those which were heavily affected in the north and east. The Karamoja-subregion to the east, which was affected by non-state violence, is not included in the 4th round.

The empirical analysis follows a three-step approach: First, I estimate the correlation between local-level intensity of violence and individual protest propensity. Second, I address the assumed causal mechanism. If exposure to violence affects post-war protest participation through an increase of collective grievances, I expect the relationship to be conditional on another factor: the degree to which the respondent's *own* ethnic group has been exposed to violence. I therefore interact the local-level intensity of violence with a group-specific measure of exposure. Lastly, I test the mechanism with a causal mediation analysis by exploiting specific questions in the *Afrobarometer* pointing to the presence of group-based grievances.

The approach to estimate the effect of exposure to violence on individual protest behaviour rather than on spatial protest occurrence has a distinctive advantage. Post-conflict protest events might not take place in the very same location where previous violence has occurred, but rather cluster in nearby cities. In contrast, individual respondents' locations are more likely to correspond to the location of the assumed cause—in this case, war violence. A possible concern may still arise with regard to the impact of conflict-induced migration. The civil war caused internal displacement on a massive scale mounting to 1.8 million individuals in 2005 (International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) 2013). However, as Rohner et al. (2013) emphasize, this point may not affect the results in the present case substantively. Most conflict-induced movement took place within individual counties, thus alleviating concerns about distortions stemming from cross-county migration (for a related argument, see De Luca and Verpoorten 2015b). Moreover, the return process to IDPs' home villages has been completed by the time of the survey for most conflict-affected regions. A notable exception are the counties from the Acholi-subregion, in which a total of 24% of the original

camp population have returned to their villages of origin and 42% were still residing in transit areas by July 2008 (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 2008). I will implicitly account for this possibility in a later robustness check by testing the model without Acholi-respondents.

Unless stated otherwise, all predictors are aggregated to the county-level (based on the extent of 2002 according to the census), which is the lowest administrative unit for which information is available in the *Afrobarometer* survey round 4. There is a total of 125 counties covered by this survey round (out of a total of 164). Information on some control variables was only available for the next higher administrative unit, the district level (57 districts in total, from which 51 were included in the survey round).

Dependent Variable, Mediators, and Primary Controls

The dependent variable is binary, indicating whether an individual has participated at least once in a protest or demonstration during the past year. In particular, I draw from the survey item “Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance: Attended a demonstration or protest march?” The variable *protest* takes the value 1 if the respondent reports to have attended a demonstration at least once in the last year and takes the value 0 otherwise. A total of 210 respondents answered positively, which accounts for 8.82%. Compared with other countries surveyed in the same wave, this figure is rather low (see Fig. E.1 in the appendix for a comparison). Protest propensity is slightly lower in counties without a conflict event in the observed time period (8.5%) as opposed to those that have experienced at least one conflict event (9%), but the difference is insignificant. It should be noted, though, that this distribution is merely a bivariate depiction and also does not account for conflict intensity, but for the fact of whether the county experienced violence at all or not.

I conjecture the relationship between conflict exposure and protest participation to be mediated by the generation of group-based grievances. I use the survey item “How often are [*respondent’s ethnic group*] treated unfairly by the government?” to capture this notion empirically. The answer choices are collapsed into a binary mediator variable, with 0 corresponding to the answer choices “Never” and “Sometimes”, while 1 corresponds to “Often” and “Always”.

A major problem in the effort to test the relationship between wartime exposure, grievances, and protest activity concerns endogeneity: grievances may develop in the course of wartime exposure, but it is likewise plausible that war-affected areas may have already shown fairly high levels of discontent before the outbreak of violence. It may even be the case that grievance- and by extent protest-intensive locations were intentionally attacked by the conflict parties, which would mean that the assumed causal direction would in fact be reversed. In order to address this issue, I apply a similar strategy as the one used in Rohner et al. (2013) and take a vector of variables from the *Afrobarometer* round 1 in 2000 as my primary controls. These variables consist of the district-mean values of respondents' answers to survey items that shall capture pre-violence levels of group-based grievances and ethnic identification (the survey questions in both rounds are not identical, the corresponding variables and their generation are discussed in the appendix). Unfortunately, there has been no question on protest participation in the 2000 round of the *Afrobarometer*. However, I will include a control variable on protest locations prior to the investigation period taken from the *Armed Conflict Location and Event Data* (ACLED Raleigh, Linke, et al. 2010) in one of the robustness checks in order to address this issue. Lacking information on pre-war attitudes and behaviour of the individual respondents from the 4th round, I am nonetheless confident that the approximation via the spatial pre-war prevalence of grievances, identity and—in the robustness check—pre-war locations of protests mitigates endogeneity concerns. After all, if protests and grievances determine attacks rather than vice versa, the *location* of the protest events and spatial grievances prevalence may be a more plausible predictor than individual attitudes and behaviour to begin with.

Explanatory and Interaction Variable

The main explanatory variable captures local exposure to violence during the most intense period of fighting between 2000-2008. The data is obtained from ACLED (Raleigh, Linke, et al. 2010), which compiles geo-referenced event data on various forms of political violence for the period of investigation. I include all events between June 2000 (end of *Afrobarometer* round 1, the date of measurement of the prime controls) and July 2008 (first recorded interview date of *Afrobarometer* round 4) that were classified as either *battles*, *violence against civilians* or *remote*




Fig. 5.3. Spatial distribution and local intensity of violent events, 2000-2008. Events clustered within a distance of .25 degrees (ca. 27.75 km.) Shaded counties are not included in the sample.

violence. I do not explicitly distinguish between LRA-related events and other forms of organized violence like clashes between communal or ethnic militias in the main models.¹

The events are aggregated to the county-level and matched with the reported location of respondents. Events with a geo-precision value of 3 are discarded (i.e., events that were attributed to a larger region). For the investigation period, at least one violent event has been reported for 57% of all counties. However, the distribution is highly skewed, with 64% of all violent events having occurred in one of the 9 counties in Acholi subregion alone (see Fig. 5.3 for an overview of the local intensity of conflict throughout Uganda for the observed time period). I take the natural logarithm of conflict events as I assume the marginal effect of each additional violent event to decrease for higher values.

¹ The decision follows Kalyvas' (2003) argumentation, who shows that it is often hard if not impossible to discern individual, local-level cleavages from the war's broader conflict process. As a result, I only restrict the inclusion criterion to forms of organized violence.

From the same data source, I construct an interaction variable that captures group-level exposure. One way to approximate group-level variation of violence would be to rely on the actor-information provided by ACLED itself (see, for instance Rohner et al. 2013). In most cases, however, this essentially only allows us to make inferences on the ethnic affiliation of the *perpetrators* of violence, whereas the victims' ethnic attributes are rarely, if ever, reported. It is yet precisely this information that needs to be obtained if one wants to assess the group-level exposure to violence. I have thus opted for an alternative approach and matched the individual locations of ACLED events to known settlement areas of ethnic groups. Implicitly underlying this approach is the following assumption: if a violent event occurs in a location that is dominated by a certain ethnic group, there is a high likelihood that this particular group has been affected either by direct or indirect violence.

This approach requires very precise data on the location of ethnic groups. I have therefore decided to match the locations of ACLED events to ethnic groups based on the *Spatially Interpolated Data on Ethnicity* (SIDE) data set (Müller-Crepon and Hunziker 2018). SIDE maps religion- and ethnicity-related information from geo-coded *Demographic and Health Surveys* for a range of low- and middle-income countries, including Uganda, and interpolates ethnic compositions in-between individual sampling points. The resulting advantage of SIDE is the possibility to obtain information for local settlement patterns of ethnic groups on an extremely fine-grained resolution of 0.0083 decimal degrees (which corresponds roughly to 1km at the equator). On the downside, the earliest available information is from 2010, which potentially introduces post-treatment bias. Given that ethnic settlement patterns tend to remain relatively stable, however, I am confident that the specific ethnic composition around conflict locations is unlikely to be the immediate consequence of conflict events.²

I chose the most recently available SIDE data from 2011 as it contains the maximum number of ethnic groups that can be assigned to group identities from the *Afrobarometer* round 4 (all but 4 groups were assigned, which sums up to a total drop-out of only 29 respondents as compared to the original analysis). Given the high resolution of the source data, I have created buffers of 0.0083 decimal degrees radius (ca. 1km) around each ACLED event and calculated the relative share of each ethnic group recorded in SIDE. The violent event was then coded as

² None of the ethnic groups' settlement patterns in Uganda have changed between 1990 and 2017 in the GeoEPR data (Wucherpfennig, Weidmann, et al. 2011). This can admittedly only provide suggestive evidence, but it lends principle support to my assumption.



Fig. 5.4. Buffers 1km (grey circles) and 10km (transparent circles) around conflict events. Shaded counties are not included in the sample.

affecting the dominant group located within the buffer area. I have decided to err on the side of caution and only considered a specific ethnic group to be affected by the respective ACLED event if the group's share is at least 50% of all groups in the buffer region. With this restriction in place, roughly 4.3% of all relevant conflict events in the sample dropped out as no single group had an absolute majority. For a later robustness check, I have repeated the procedure using a radius with 0.083 decimal degrees length (ca. 10 km) in order to test whether the arbitrary choice of the buffer radius and the consideration of potential imprecisions with regard to the conflict location impact the eventual results. However, the assignment to the respective majority groups is virtually identical (see Fig. 5.4 for an illustration of the buffer areas and Fig. 5.5 for the spatial distribution of the assigned ethnic groups).

After assigning the conflict events to individual ethnic groups, I used the LEDA r-package in order to link ethnic groups from SIDE with the response options for ethnic group identity in the *Afrobarometer* (Müller-Crepon, Pengl, and Bormann 2020). I calculated a variable that captures for each respondent the number of county-level violence affecting her own group divided by the county-




Fig. 5.5. Violent event locations, 2000-2008, with assigned ethnic groups from SIDE 2011b. Ethnic group names in singular form in accordance with answer categories in *Afrobarometer* round 4. Shaded counties are not included in the sample.

level violence affecting any other group (note here that the 4.3% of events that were not assigned to any group are not included here as well). Thus, the interaction variable used in the analysis captures the relative exposure of the respondent's own group in a county. The ratio variable is standardized at 1 for instances where no violence occurs. As with the main explanatory variable, I take the logarithm in order to account for extreme values, which means that for the final variable, 0 corresponds to "no violence".

The log-transformed variable can be interpreted as follows: Values smaller than 0 reflect situations in which the respondent is located in a conflict-affected county—but the majority of violence likely affected another ethnic group. Conversely, values higher than 0 indicate that most of the violence affected the respondent's own ethnic group. If exposure to violence leads to protest through a reinforcement of group-based perceptions of threat and grievances, I would expect the relationship between the explanatory and dependent variable to be particularly pronounced in the latter case. In 16% of all cases, a group other

than the respondent's one was majorly affected by county-level violence, while the respondent's own group was majorly affected in 41% and no violence occurred at all in 43% of all cases.

I include several control variables on the individual- and county-level that may confound the relationship between exposure to violence and protest mobilization. On the individual level, I include a vector of respondent-characteristics taken from the *Afrobarometer*, including dummies on urban location, ownership of television or radio, gender, employment status as well as continuous variables on education, and age. Moreover, I include an additive index capturing the availability of basic services—electricity, water, cell phone coverage, and a sewage system—at the respondent's location to approximate community-level development.

Beyond these personal attributes, location-specific characteristics are likely to have an impact on the conjectured relationship. I therefore include a set of county-level variables including ethnic and religious fragmentation, total population (log-transformed) and an additive index of water and electricity access.³ All county-level information is obtained from Uganda's 2002 population census (Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2006). Although the census's timing is after the starting point of the investigation, concerns over post-treatment bias are mitigated by the fact that the variables are still measured before the surge of violence that started in 2002. For later robustness checks, I have also calculated the mean additive index of water/electricity access, religious fragmentation and total population on the level of individual ethnic groups based on the census data. Lastly, I account for differences between broader geographical regions and group-specific factors by including region- and group-fixed effects in the main models.

5.6 Empirical Results

I use linear probability models with robust standard errors clustered at the county-level to estimate the effect of exposure to violence on post-conflict protest participation. Table 5.1 presents the results, with the first specification (model 1) estimating the model without explicitly considering regional heterogeneity between different parts of the country. We see already a positive and statistically significant relationship between the (log-transformed) number of violent events

³ The index shows a strong correlation with other indicators drawn from the census, including mean level of education or unemployment rate, and with other typical operationalizations of socio-economic development such as nighttime lights emissions. In order to avoid multicollinearity, I have only included the additive index of basic services here.

and protest participation. In substantive terms, moving from 0 to the median value of the independent variable (.7, which corresponds to 1 event) increases the probability of protest participation by 13.5%; moving from 0 to the 90th percentile (3.37, which corresponds to roughly 28 events) even increases the probability by 65.6%. To put it into perspective, this last category of heavily affected counties encompasses all nine counties in the Acholi subregion (the epicentre of the conflict prior to 2002), but also one county in Teso subregion (Amuria), one county in the West Nile subregion (East Moyo) and one county in Lango subregion (Lira Municipality). After including region-fixed effects, the coefficient increases both in magnitude and significance (model 2). Model 3 additionally includes ethnic group-fixed effects to the model. The effect for the main independent variable remains of similar magnitude, though at a lower level of significance.

Robustness Checks

Before turning to the further exploration of the mechanism, a series of robustness checks shall test whether the findings of the main models hold against various model specifications. The results can be obtained from the appendix (Tables E.2 and E.3). Unless otherwise specified, I use model 1 as the baseline for further specifications.

First, I repeat the analysis using a logit (Table E.2, model A1) instead of a linear probability model. The Table reports average marginal effects, which remain almost identical to the explanatory variable's coefficient in the main analysis. The second specification adds to the model a binary indicator on county-level protest mobilization before 2000 (obtained from ACLED), which could potentially account for post-conflict behaviour. Again, results from model A2 suggest no substantial impact on the main relationship. Third, after changing the explanatory variable's level of aggregation from the county- to the district-level (the first administrative unit), the coefficient becomes insignificant—but only if region-fixed effects are not included (model A3).

Model A4 tests whether the exclusion of Acholi-respondents impacts the overall results. A large share of violent events for the investigation period clusters in Acholi-dominated counties, which means that the results could be significantly driven by the outliers from this group (in fact, the mean number of violent events for Acholi respondents is 97.97, whereas the mean for all respondents lies at 13). Moreover, the Acholi subregion was the only area left for which a substantial amount of wartime IDPs have not returned to their home villages by 2008. If the

Table 5.1. Linear regression results for wartime exposure on protest participation

	(1) Protest	(2) Protest	(3) Protest
Violent events in county (log)	0.0135* (0.0054)	0.0191*** (0.0053)	0.0173+ (0.0097)
Individual controls:			
Urban location	-0.0022 (0.0218)	-0.0085 (0.0213)	-0.0048 (0.0217)
Female	-0.0353*** (0.0098)	-0.0349*** (0.0098)	-0.0364*** (0.0100)
Level of education	0.0103 (0.0139)	0.0100 (0.0137)	0.0110 (0.0141)
Respondent's age	-0.0013** (0.0004)	-0.0013** (0.0004)	-0.0013** (0.0005)
Public services (individual)	0.0145* (0.0066)	0.0148* (0.0067)	0.0161* (0.0064)
TV/Radio ownership	0.0316* (0.0132)	0.0341* (0.0134)	0.0337* (0.0133)
Employed	0.0014 (0.0125)	-0.0005 (0.0126)	-0.0048 (0.0125)
County-level controls:			
Total population (log)	-0.0245* (0.0117)	-0.0315** (0.0118)	-0.0336* (0.0162)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.0860* (0.0364)	0.0713* (0.0349)	0.0818* (0.0398)
Public services (county)	-0.0599 (0.0395)	-0.0639 (0.0410)	-0.0528 (0.0434)
Religious fractionalization	-0.0670 (0.0997)	-0.2503* (0.1045)	-0.3003* (0.1368)
Constant	0.4936* (0.1967)	0.7253*** (0.2036)	0.5794* (0.2386)
Ethnic group-dummies			✓
Region-dummies		✓	✓
Controls from AB round 1	✓	✓	✓
Observations	2,220	2,220	2,213
R^2	0.027	0.033	0.047

Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered on the county-level

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

results hold even after excluding Acholi-respondents from the analysis, it would thus hint also to a decreased salience of the pace of IDP return as an alternative mechanism for post-conflict grievance formation. The coefficient in model A4 yet remains significant (albeit only at a 10% level) and decreases only slightly even after excluding respondents from the analysis that identified themselves as Acholi. The results are significant at a 5% level if region-fixed effects are included.

In the fifth specification, I test how exposure to violence affects protest participation in the subsequent, 5th round of the *Afrobarometer* from 2012 (A5). The coefficient remains insignificant. Although this non-finding is arguably difficult to interpret, it may point to the previously outlined assumption that the effect of wartime experiences on protest likelihood is particularly prevalent in the immediate phase following the end of war.

The last set of robustness checks reported in table E.3 tests the impact of modifications to the explanatory variable on the outcome. Using the original count of violent events instead of the log-transformed variant (A6), battle-related fatalities instead of events (A7), specifically violence against civilians (A8), or only LRA-related violent events (A9) all yield results similar to the original model in terms of sign and significance. In a similar vein, substituting the measure of violent events by ACLED with an alternative data source on violent events—the UCDP *Georeferenced Event Data* (GED) v.20 (Sundberg and Melander 2013)—does not change the results substantively (A10).⁴

Model A11 concludes by using the maximum number of IDPs per year as the independent variable. As explained earlier, the majority of conflict-induced population movement is assumed to have occurred within individual counties, which means that IDP figures can be regarded a valid alternative proxy for local conflict intensity. Information on such a disaggregated level is yet sparse, so I have relied here on the *Humanitarian Update* reports from UNHCR (e.g., Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 2002). As compared to the proxy used in the main analysis, this measure is problematic insofar as it is inconsistent, on a higher level of aggregation (district-level) and only fully available until 2005—which yet covers the most conflict-intensive periods. Ultimately, these reservations render the measurement of an absolute number of IDPs in a location problematic, but it allows nonetheless to assess a stock figure of the (logged)

⁴ The operationalization procedure is outlined in the appendix.

maximum number of reported IDPs for each district in the time 2000 to 2005. As model A11 shows, this measure shows a positive and statistically significant effect, although the coefficient is considerably smaller as compared to the main analysis.

5.7 Exploring the Causal Mechanism

The final section addresses the causal mechanism. I argue that wartime violence tends to reinforce perceptions of group-based grievances—which in turn lead to a higher propensity to engage in collective action. From this expectation follow two observable implications: First, the effect of local-level violence on protest behaviour should be particularly strong if the respondent's own ethnic group has been affected by violence. Second, perceptions of relative deprivation should have a mediating effect on the relationship between wartime violence and protest participation.

Starting with the first conjecture, I have repeated models 1 through 3 with an interaction term. The effect of *Violent events in county (log)* on protest participation is estimated conditional on the ratio of the respondent's own group's exposure relative to the exposure of other groups (Models A12 through A14, table E.4). Fig. 5.6 visualizes the average marginal effects of wartime violence for different values of the interaction variable using again model 1 as the baseline.⁵ The plot shows that the effect is insignificant for most negative values (up to -.6). This means, an increase of violence is not systematically related to an increase of protest participation if the respondent does not belong to the majorly affected ethnic group. The effect becomes significant only when the ratio narrows down, and the effect increases with higher relative exposure of the respondent's own group. These results corroborate the idea that one pathway from experiences of wartime violence to protests is tied specifically to group-related exposure.

As a robustness check, I first apply a larger, 10 km radius for calculating the ethnic structure around the event location. The results do not change substantively yet (A15 through A17, table E.5). Second, I re-run the analysis with a nationwide measure of group-level exposure as the interaction variable. More specifically, I sum up all violent events assigned to the respondent's ethnic group. Models A18 and A19 (table E.6 and Fig. E.2 in the appendix) point to a similar direction as

⁵ All models additionally include census-based control variables measured on the level of the respondent's ethnic group in order to account for between-group differences. All models (A12 through A19) can be obtained from the regression Tables E.4 through E.6 in the appendix.




Fig. 5.6. Average marginal effects of “Violent events in county (log)” for different values of “Ratio of own group violent exposure / Other groups violent exposure in county (log)” with 95% CIs (based on model A12).

the previous analysis. We see that county-level violence has an effect on protest participation only when the respondent’s own group has been particularly affected by violence. More specifically, the average marginal effect of county-level violence becomes significant at a 5% level if the value for (log) national group-level violence is 3.8 or higher (applies to 7 ethnic groups). These findings lend support to the results from the main models that protest participation can be explained by a combination of local *and* group exposure to violence.

Causal Mediation Analysis

In a final step, I test the conjectured mechanism between exposure to war violence and protest participation with a causal mediation analysis. The goal is to assess to which extent the total effect can be explained by the conjectured mediator variable. Following Imai et al. (2011), this effort consists of first regressing the mediator (collective grievances) on the independent variable (war exposure) and any relevant covariates (the control variables are identical to the ones used in model 1), and second to regress the outcome (protest) on the mediator, the independent variable, and the controls. The user-written Stata package *medeff*

allows for the estimation of the average causal mediation effect (ACME), that is, the share of the total effect that can be explained by the assumed mediator variable.

As outlined in the data section, I expect the effect of exposure to violence on protest participation to be mediated through collective grievances. This is approximated here with the mediator variable on the respondent's perception that the own group is treated unfairly by the government. Moreover, I test to which degree identification with the respondent's own ethnic group mediates the conjectured relationship in two separate analyses. If the effect of violence exposure to protest participation is mediated through collective grievances, but not through ethnic identification alone, the initial assumption of the assumed causal mechanism would find support.

Table 5.2 shows the results for the causal mediation analysis with collective grievances as the mediator. Control variables and model specification remain unchanged from the main analysis, with model 1 constituting the baseline (linear probability model with standard errors clustered at the county-level). Model 4 presents the results, with column 1 showing the correlation between the independent variable and the mediator, and column 2 reporting the result for the relationship between the mediator and independent variable on the outcome (protests). Total, direct effects and the average causal mediation effects (ACME) are displayed in the table's footer.

The results show that the relationship with the mediator is positive and statistically significant for exposure to violence (column 1). Moreover, we find support for the second step in the causal chain, namely that the explanatory variable affects the outcome after controlling for the mediator (column 2). Lastly, we see that the ACME is positive and significant, with 8.8% of the total effect being explained by the mediator. At a first glance, this number may not appear to be a substantive amount. However, it is important to bear in mind that the direct effect (i.e., the remainder of the effect that is not explained through grievances) includes all other possible influences that cannot be considered here. Moreover, the approximation via perceived injustices is arguably a measure that cannot reflect the concept of collective grievances in its full extent.⁶ But the goal is

⁶ A similar argument is made in De Juan and Koos (2019), who find a comparatively small indirect effect (7%) in their mediation analysis. Their design also aims at disentangling the mechanism for individual behavior in a survey study.

Table 5.2. Causal mediation analysis

	(4)	Protest	(5)	Protest
	Perception: Group treated unfair		Stronger ethnic identity	
Violent events in county (log)	0.0370** (0.0134)	0.0135* (0.0055)	0.0118 (0.0112)	0.0140* (0.0056)
Perception: Group treated unfair		0.0361* (0.0154)		
Stronger ethnic identity				0.0135 (0.0158)
Constant	-0.4222 (0.2789)	0.4969* (0.2080)	0.1012 (0.2996)	0.4732* (0.1996)
Individual controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
County-level controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls from AB round 1	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	2,044	2,044	2,166	2166
R^2	0.034	0.032	0.016	0.028
ACME (ind. effect)		0.0013		0.0001
Direct effect		0.0134		0.0138
Total effect		0.0147		0.0140
Percent of total effect mediated		8.8147		1.0263

Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered on the county-level.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

not to confirm that the explanatory variable affects the outcome *solely* based on grievances, but rather to lend evidence whether a grievances mechanism has any explanatory power at all.

It is furthermore important to note that the effect remains rather sensitive to potentially unobserved confounders (see Fig. E.3 in the appendix). The evidence presented here shall therefore rather serve as supporting evidence for a group-based grievances mechanism as identified in the preceding analysis.

In order to corroborate this finding, I repeat the same analysis with an alternative mediator variable (model 5). I rely here on the question “Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a Ugandan and being a [*respondent’s ethnic group*]. Which of the following best expresses your feelings?” The variable *ethnic identification* takes a value of 1 if the respondent indicated that she identifies more or only with the ethnic group, and 0 if the respondent either feels more or only Ugandan, or if she identifies in equal parts as Ugandan and as a member

of her ethnic group. Turning to the results (model 5), we see that there is no significant correlation between the mediator and the outcome (protest), and the indirect effect accordingly remains insignificant.

Thus, increased ethnic identification alone may not suffice for explaining the correlation between exposure to violence and post-conflict protest participation. While wartime violence indeed appears to be somewhat related to a higher likelihood of ethnic identification as opposed to national identification, this phenomenon alone may be insufficient to account for higher protest likelihood. Instead, the causal mediation analysis suggests that the formation of collective, group-based grievances is related both to exposure to violence and to protest participation.

5.8 Conclusion

This paper addressed the question how exposure to wartime violence affects protest participation in the immediate aftermath of conflicts. I argued that exposure to violence fosters the development of group-based grievances, which in turn serve as the motivational foundation for later protest behaviour. Relying on survey data in the post-conflict context of Uganda and geo-located data on civil war violence, I showed that experiences of civil war violence increase individuals' propensity to participate in protests and demonstrations after the conflict has ended. The results remained robust against a series of model specifications, including different measurements of the independent variable and alternative samples. Further analyses supported the assumption that collective grievances are a plausible mechanism through which that relationship can be explained.

The findings presented here contribute to a better understanding of contentious politics in post-conflict settings and shed light on a hitherto understudied perspective. While previous studies have recognized the propensity for protests in the early stages of the peace process, the motivations driving individual participation have remained largely unaddressed. Several implications follow from the results presented here: First, they focus the attention on the immediate post-conflict phase. While some studies highlight the mid- to long-term effects of wartime experiences on either political attitudes (e.g. Cassar, Grosjean, and Whitt 2013) or protests (Freitag, Kijewski, and Oppold 2017), I show that the ramifications on contentious activism are already relevant in the early stages when

the risk for conflict relapse is comparatively high (Jarland et al. 2020). At least for the specific context analysed here, I found no comparable effect in a longer-term perspective.

Second, they raise the question whether increased protest participation could develop to more severe social conflicts that could jeopardize the peace process as a whole. On the one hand, the fact that individual decisions to join protests are associated with wartime experiences and reinforced group-based perceptions of deprivation and injustice suggests that social cleavages may stem from rather deep-seated causes—and are thus potentially more difficult to resolve. On the other hand, however, it is important to emphasize that my argument rested on the assumption that contentious political developments in the post-conflict period are a necessary condition for collective grievances to result in manifest protest actions. This means that policies aimed at ameliorating existing group-based grievances and perceptions of injustice—e.g. through programs addressing economic horizontal inequalities—could plausibly counteract the direct translation into protest activity.

I would like to close with a few remarks on the applicability to other contexts. Uganda has been selected here as a most-likely case given the severity of the conflict and the presence of contentious political developments in the post-conflict period. Considering the last point in particular, the study's findings are likely to apply in particular to situations in which armed conflict is followed by a period of negative peace—that is, the absence of organized armed violence. Conflicts that are not terminated but rather phase out into a stage of continued, lower scale activity may not see the outlined political and economic developments typical to the aftermath of ceasefires, victories or peace agreements. They may thus also not be subject to similar dynamics with regard to participation in protests. Given the prevalence of low activity as a conflict outcome—roughly half of all conflict episodes in UCDP's *Conflict Termination Dataset* (v. 2/2015) records after the end of the Cold War ended by dropping below the threshold of 25 battle-related deaths—the investigation of protest dynamics in these contexts constitutes a relevant avenue for future research.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

The conclusion summarizes the findings from all papers and locates them in the context of the overarching research gap outlined in the introduction. Afterwards, I will discuss some policy implications and elaborate on potential limitations of the approach taken here. The section closes with an outlook on avenues for further research.

6.1 Summary and Contributions

This dissertation examined the phenomenon of civil resistance in contexts of internal armed conflicts. While the four empirical papers approached the overarching topic from different perspectives, they all shared a common research focus: to investigate the impact of spatial and temporal conflict dynamics on civil resistance. In the following, I will summarize the main findings with an emphasis on this research interest.

Chapter 2 started with a cross-national, geographically disaggregated study that examined the impact of conflict intensity on civil resistance. More specifically, my co-author and I assessed to which degree local variations of battle intensity correlate with protest events in the same spatial unit and month. We therefore matched geo-located information on individual battles and protest events with different geographical areas—administrative units and artificial grid cells. The results pointed to a robust linear relationship, meaning that an increase of battle intensity was shown to co-vary with a higher likelihood to see civil resistance like protests or strikes. Although intuitively plausible, the expectation of a curvilinear relationship—that is, conflict intensity only increases protest likelihood up to a certain point, and deters mobilization for very high values—found only weak

empirical support in the analysis. Further model specifications corroborated the argument's validity. Albeit not being able to rule out reverse causality entirely, we found suggestive evidence strengthening the plausibility of our proposed argument that battles lead to subsequent protests rather than vice versa. Further robustness checks showed that the phenomenon of civil resistance we were observing here was likely to be driven by autonomous civilian communities rather than large-scale social movements or the conflict actors themselves. Lastly, we showed that a rising conflict intensity yields an effect specifically on protests against war violence. We interpreted this finding as support for our assumption that wartime civil resistance in reaction to battle intensity is in fact not only driven by *opportunities*, but also through a *grievances* mechanism.

In line with chapter 2's findings, chapter 3 lent further support to the argument that conflict-inherent processes account for variations of civil resistance. I focused here in particular on the use of civil resistance tactics by armed groups—an actor class typically rather associated with the use of *armed* violent tactics. Thus, in addition to the more general, cross-country findings from chapter 2 that placed an emphasis on civilian communities, I showed here that dynamic factors can also account for tactical changes by rebel groups. Contrary to chapter 2, though, the main focus is not on the impact of battle intensity, but specifically how the *outcome* of battle events (i.e., whether the rebels suffered combat-related casualties) affects a group's propensity to engage in civil resistance tactics.

Investigating the conflict context of India's Maoist insurgency, the results in chapter 3 did in fact lend evidence to this conjecture. I found a robust and significant relationship between rebel losses and an increased likelihood of rebel-sponsored general strikes in the subsequent week. Similar to the study in chapter 2, arguably one of the most pressing potential caveats concerned the direction of causality—so whether rebel losses affect the decision to implement general strikes as conjectured in the argument, or whether it is rather the other way round. In order to mitigate these concerns, I have sought to substantiate the plausibility of my argument through descriptive evidence from the event-level data (e.g. by tracking the issue and preceding event of individual strike events and by looking on the time lapsed between strike announcements and the respective implementation) and by employing an event-study design. I have furthermore addressed the plausibility of alternative mechanisms between battlefield losses and strike occurrences like the presence of popular grievances or a decreased capacity to launch armed attacks with qualitative evidence and by testing alternative regression models.

Chapters 4 and 5 turned to the immediate post-conflict period. Instead of investigating how conflict-related processes affect civil resistance *during* the conflict, the focus shifted to the consequences on protests after hostilities have ceased and the society is in a phase of transition. Chapters 4 and 5 looked on this broader theme from different perspectives. The first study (chapter 4) focused on the effect of two dynamic factors on civil resistance in the post-conflict phase: Spatial variation of affiliations between rebels and local ethnic groups during the conflict itself, and discrete implementation steps of power-sharing arrangements that were part of peace agreements. The analysis found that power-sharing practices (i.e., implementation and abolition steps) increase the likelihood of protests and strikes. Moreover, my co-author and I showed that this effect is particularly pronounced in settlement areas of ethnic groups that are considered constituencies of the former rebel organization.

Chapter 5 focused again on the spatial dimension of war dynamics and their implication for post-conflict societies. I explored survey data collected shortly after the end of hostilities in Uganda's civil war with the LRA to find out to which degree individual propensities to join protests and demonstrations are determined by the exposure to war-related violence. At the core of the argument was the expectation that higher local intensities of violence correlate with an increased protest propensity. I furthermore argued that this effect is driven by the development or reinforcement of group-based grievances. In order to test this mechanism, I first approximated the local exposure of violence for each ethnic group using GIS-applications. The results supported my expectation that war violence has a particularly strong effect on protest propensity if the respondent's own group was among the main affected ethnic groups in the respective county. Second, I exploited survey questions capturing perceptions of injustice in order to explore the underlying mechanism. Results from a causal mediation analysis suggested that the identified effect is at least partly driven by grievances.

Taken together, the findings from all four empirical papers underscore the importance of spatial and temporal factors for explaining civil resistance in war contexts. The dissertation thereby speaks to works in the field of conflict research that call for a proper consideration of micro-dynamics within conflicts.¹ As Verwimp et al. emphasize, “[a]t a fundamental level, conflict originates from individuals' behaviour and their repeated interactions with their surroundings,

¹ See, for instance, Kalyvas (2008), or more recently Balcells and Stanton (2021) for a review on the (in the latter case eventually rejected) distinction between micro- and macro-level approaches in conflict research.

in other words, from its micro-foundation.” As a result, “in order to understand conflict dynamics and its effects on society, we have to take seriously the incentives and constraints shaping the interaction between the civilian population and the armed actors” (Verwimp, Justino, and Brück 2009, p. 307). An essential part of this endeavor is the “disaggregation of actors, time and space” (Haer, Vüllers, and Weidmann 2019, p. 155). This dissertation contributed to this larger field of research by examining in particular how micro-dynamics of armed conflict affect the onset of *civil resistance*.

6.2 Policy Implications

I have thus far mainly highlighted the contributions from a research-centric perspective—that is, how the findings from this dissertation may help us to explain phenomena and associations that have hitherto been neglected in the literature. But how could they be relevant from the perspective of decision-makers when it comes to the implementation of policies? This section shall emphasize central implications to be drawn from the studies’ findings that are relevant when it comes to the formulation and implementation of policies. I structure the discussion alongside the two major actor groups analyzed throughout this dissertation: civilians and armed groups.

Starting with the group of civilians, the findings presented in this dissertation on a basic level echo two central assertions from earlier studies: First, civil resistance represents a powerful set of methods available to communities that strive to establish an independent position between the conflict parties. Second, the mobilization for protest actions, demonstrations or strikes in armed conflict contexts is in fact more common than we might expect at first glance.² As this dissertation demonstrates in particular, civil resistance occurs across different conflict contexts and can be an immediate reaction by local communities to wartime dynamics.

Given the non-negligible incidence of wartime civil resistance, a central question revolves around the potential ramifications for the period *after* the war has ended. Do local experiences of collective action have long-lasting impacts on behavior in the post-conflict phase? And if so, are these impacts conducive or detrimental for the further path of post-conflict development? These questions

² For example, Kaplan (2017) illustrates the phenomenon of civilian autonomy actions for several war contexts worldwide. In this dissertation, especially chapter 2 highlights the prevalence of wartime protests.

are all the more relevant from a policy perspective as it is particularly the early post-conflict phase in which crucial decisions about the further course of action are made.

As outlined in chapter 5, existing research suggests that the exposure to violence can reinforce social bonds among the affected population—and eventually lead to increased pro-social behavior and political participation (e.g. Bauer, Blattman, et al. 2016). It is not far-fetched to assume that mobilization for collective action (e.g. wartime protests) could play a catalyzing role in this causal chain: We already know from research on social movements that collective action can create networks and social capital that serve as the foundation for subsequent mobilization (Diani 1997). Wartime collective action by civilian groups or communities could likewise reinforce social bonds among participants, and likely form the resource base from which post-conflict civilian activism could draw.

If we assume that wartime civil resistance could also affect the propensity of civilian activism in the post-conflict period, what does this imply? One perspective might conclude that it entails at least a cautiously optimistic prospect for post-conflict societies on a local level: If wartime civil resistance increases social bonds in respective communities, and if these social bonds in turn lead to increased social and political participation in the aftermath of war, it would mean that these communities can draw from a potentially beneficial resource in the process of peace-building and post-conflict recovery. In other words: Increased civil society activism carrying over to the aftermath of war might potentially form an essential cornerstone in stabilization and democratization processes, especially on the local level.

However, this dissertation has also pointed to potential pitfalls in this line of argumentation. As we have seen, some parts of the literature on post-conflict social capital formation argue that wartime experiences in fact do increase social bonds—but mainly *within* communities, whereas attitudes and behavior towards *out-group* members might even be negatively affected (e.g. Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti 2013). If we assume that wartime civil resistance might form one nucleus for the reinforcement of social ties, this specific and differential impact is a plausible option. Chapters 4 and 5 moreover showed that post-conflict protests are particularly prevalent in times of increased contention—for instance, when power-sharing provisions are implemented or abolished, or in the aftermath of elections. So contrary to the rather optimistic perspective outlined before, it can

also be argued that increased civil society activism carrying over to the aftermath of war might be perilous for early, less stable post-conflict societies and lead to an entrenchment of social division lines.

To be clear, the results of this dissertation do not definitively suggest that any of these two positions is more plausible than the other. We can neither infer that post-conflict protests are a sign of an active and democratically-oriented civil society, nor do the findings allow us to conclude that these protests are emblematic for increased instability. It is also important to bear in mind that civil resistance can in fact be a necessary channel for groups to articulate their interests if they are sidelined in the peace process. The conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is rather as follows: The incidence of wartime protests and civilian activism suggests that civil society usually does not start from the scratch after war. On the contrary, it sometimes carries potentially powerful resources for mobilization over to a period that is by itself prone to increased contention. This means, on a basic level, that civilians need to be taken seriously as potentially impactful actors in the aftermath of conflicts. The path of peace processes certainly depends to a large extent on the behavior of former or newly emerging armed groups, but civil society can likewise play an instrumental role in either undermining or promoting post-conflict development. A central challenge in this period prone to contention is thus to channel local communities' and movement organizations' resources in a way that they can actually develop their potential to assist stabilization and democratization processes on a local level. This means, on the other hand, that policies seeking to mitigate existing cleavages and inequalities gain additional importance, so that civil society activism does not manifest in antagonistic mobilization patterns that threaten to undermine the peace process as a whole.

The second major actor group considered in this dissertation were armed non-state actors. Here, the observation that rebels strategically use methods of civilian mobilization merits particular attention from a counterinsurgency perspective. The results from chapter 3 reiterate earlier findings on rebel governance that have stressed the rather broad repertoire of performances from which rebel groups typically draw, including 'traditional' military but also non-military tactics. This insight is highly relevant, as it cautions to not mistakenly interpret periods in which armed groups scale back their attacks against security forces or civilians as signs of *permanent* rebel inactivity or dwindling strength. If we consider the

results from chapter 3, these periods could also reflect situations in which rebel groups simply temporarily shift to alternative tactics that are nevertheless capable of achieving certain strategic objectives.³

It is also here where the implications from this dissertation differ from previous studies that have focused on more permanent shifts to nonviolent action (e.g. Dudouet 2013). As the example of the use of general strikes by the CPI-Maoist demonstrates, the increased implementation of related tactics may not necessarily signal a general change in the strategic approach. It can also reflect a more immediate, situation-dependent and tactically motivated reaction to short-term battlefield dynamics. If this is the case, rebels may as quickly shift back to armed tactics as they moved to the mobilization of civilians before. With this possibility in mind, paying close attention to signs that point to either a far-reaching strategic transformation (for instance when tactical changes are flanked by developments of the organizations' internal structure) or rather short-term tactical adaptations gains further importance.

The findings from chapter 3 moreover highlight the local population's central role in the context of insurgent strategies, and thus also have ramifications for the assessment of rebel-civilian relations. Based on the recognition that local support is essential for many rebel groups in order to maintain armed insurrections, counterinsurgency approaches often include efforts aimed at swaying civilians to switch sides or deny rebels support or sanctuary (Kalyvas 2006; Berman, Shapiro, and Felner 2011). The observation that rebel groups sometimes engage in civilian mobilization might affect this strategic approach to 'win hearts and minds' in various ways:

On the one hand, the capacity of rebels to mobilize the civilian population for general strikes or protest actions can point to the existence of strong ties between civilians and rebels in a given area. These relationships might be characterized by coercion in some instances, but we cannot entirely discard the possibility that at least a share of protest participants feels a genuine connection to the rebels'

³ For a related argument, see Lawrence and Chenoweth (2010, p. 4) who state that the "absence of violence [...] may indicate a complete absence of conflict, or it may mean that actors in conflict are utilizing any of a number of non-violent strategies to attain their objectives" and hence urge against lumping methods of civil resistance and the absence of violence together.

cause. Either way, if we conceive of civilian mobilization as a governance practice, it is plausible to assume that its repeated use contributes to a reinforcement of hostile attitudes towards the government and solidarity with the armed groups.⁴

On the other hand, we need to consider the effect of civil resistance tactics on local perceptions about rebel authority. Kalyvas (2006, p. 128) stresses that local control is a precondition for ‘hearts and minds’ programs to succeed, whereas they are destined to fail under conditions of incomplete or no control. If armed non-state groups succeed in mobilizing civilians for general strikes, perceptions about rebel dominance are likely to reinforce among the local population—possibly in conjunction with an increased belief that the state is powerless in the region. If these perceptions prevail, any government efforts aimed at persuading the local population to refuse support for insurgents is likely to become more challenging.

6.3 Critical Discussion

The previous two sections have outlined the contributions from both an academic and a policy-relevant perspective. While all papers presented in this dissertation corroborated their respective results with additional tests and evidence, there inevitably remain limitations that need to be discussed. I will focus here on the broader, overarching challenges across the different empirical works without addressing specific caveats that have already been raised in the individual empirical chapters.

First, by virtue of the dissertation’s research interest, most arguments heavily draw from structural explanations (i.e., how spatial and temporal war dynamics affect tactical choices) and individual motivations (i.e., grievances). One may reasonably argue that this focus comes at the expense of other crucial factors. Most importantly, scholars of contentious politics have identified organization-specific determinants such as the presence of mobilization structures as potentially impactful drivers of variation of protest behavior (e.g. McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996). The salience of such factors—for instance pre-existing endowment with social capital, degree of leadership, or social cohesion—has also been established for wartime civil resistance, as the literature review has demonstrated.

⁴ This point speaks to a certain extent to the argument made by Huang (2016), who claims that rebel governance practices—particularly political mobilization—have a strong and long-lasting impact on civilians’ political behavior in the post-conflict period, for instance related to the demand of rights and expression of grievances.

While not denying the potentially important role of community- or organization-specific drivers, the possibility to account for them is yet constrained by a lack of sufficiently fine-grained data for the levels of analysis in chapters 2 and 4 (geographical units across different countries) as well as chapter 5 (individual level). As an alternative approach, my co-author and I have considered the availability of resources or networks from which local communities can potentially draw (e.g. urbanization, population, ethnic groups), but this approximation admittedly captures local variations in the endowment of resources that are critical for mobilization only imperfectly.

A second caveat relates to the chosen focus on quantitative analyses throughout all empirical parts of the dissertation. Eventually, the choice between quantitative and qualitative studies typically represents a trade-off between the endeavor to test the validity of theoretical propositions across different contexts on the one hand, and the goal to comprehensively understand the mechanism underlying a specific case on the other hand (with the aim to develop theoretical arguments applicable to a larger set of cases).

This dissertation was mainly guided by the first mentioned research approach. Yet bearing the limitations of quantitative approaches in mind, I have tried to mitigate them in various ways. First, despite the focus on statistical analyses, I have nonetheless employed a variety of approaches within this broader methodological school ranging from cross-national, geo-referenced observational data processed with GIS software, over the analysis of self-collected and -coded event data to the examination of survey data. Second, I have balanced studies that investigate individual conflict contexts (chapters 3 and 5) with more broad-based examinations across a larger set of cases (chapters 2 and 4). And, finally, I have provided additional qualitative evidence (chapter 3) or further statistical tests (chapter 5) in order to corroborate my assumptions about the underlying mechanisms. Still, the lack of evidence getting at the very bottom of the causal mechanisms is an entirely legitimate caveat pertaining to all papers. Quantitative studies by design examine the objects under investigation with indirect measurements, which can only approximate more complex phenomena such as actors' intrinsic motivations. This dissertation can thus only be a first step. A logical next step in future studies would consist of more thorough qualitative investigations of individual cases that carve out and explicate the entire causal process leading from wartime dynamics to the eventual occurrence of civil resistance.

The last set of limitations is related to endogeneity, which is almost by definition a problem inherent to studies that investigate dynamic conflict processes (Kalyvas 2008, p. 403). Perhaps the most pressing concern is the question of reverse causality. This pertains in particular to those papers that investigate relatively immediate responses to changes in the conflict dynamics (chapters 2 and 3). The question is: Can we be certain that battle intensity or casualties affect the decision to use civil resistance tactics, or could it also be the other way round? Moreover, we might be suspicious whether the results we see are driven by some hitherto unconsidered third variable (*omitted variable bias*) or systematic measurement errors (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). The empirical papers presented in this dissertation have approached these issues in various ways. With regard to *reverse causality*, chapters 2 and 3 further disaggregated the temporal level of analysis to test whether the assumed cause occurred prior to the expected outcome. I also used additional information from the underlying data and employed an event-study design to address this issue (chapter 3). In order to mitigate *omitted variable bias*, all regression models included a set of covariates to control for the effect of confounders. And lastly, I addressed problems related to *systematic measurement error* through various model specifications in the respective robustness section, including a test for the influence of systematic reporting patterns (chapter 2) or the use of alternative data sources (chapters 3 and 5).

Still, we must be cautious with any causal interpretation as long as we are dealing with data for which the selection into treatment and control is not random. The major contribution in this dissertation rests with the demonstration of a systematic relationship between wartime dynamics and civil resistance, and with the provision of additional evidence corroborating the plausibility of the conjectured argument. Solidifying causal inference is a logical next step for follow-up studies, either through in-depth qualitative *process tracing*, or through the application of specifically tailored quantitative approaches such as *instrumental-variables* designs (see, for instance, Dunning 2012).

6.4 Avenues for Future Research

I close with a discussion about some additional avenues for further research. The primary motivation of this dissertation was to investigate the effect of spatial and temporal war dynamics on the use of civil resistance. Beyond the overarching

contribution outlined before, however, the findings from the individual papers also pointed to further lacunae that are worthwhile to address more thoroughly in future studies.

When it comes to the exploration of a hitherto rather uncharted field of research, the findings drawn from chapter 3 are perhaps most promising. The observation that armed actors in war contexts sometimes rely on techniques of civil resistance adds weight to positions that reject a clear-cut distinction between violent and nonviolent movement organizations. We see that tactical variation more broadly understood is a phenomenon which is also relevant in conflict contexts.

And yet, the results presented for the individual conflict context of India's Maoist insurgency are certainly only a first step in this promising field of research. A plausible next move would consist of extending the data collection effort to a cross-national scale, which is imperative for investigating why some groups resort to civil resistance tactics and others not. This may also help to better understand why and under which conditions groups choose *specific* tactics like general strikes over other forms of contention like street protests.

Apart from the collection of new data, the research program on tactical variation of rebel groups may also benefit from a more thorough examination of interactions with other groups. For example, to which degree are tactical choices dependent on the actions of other groups within the same movement? Do we also see patterns of tactical diffusion or diversification in war contexts (Cunningham, Dahl, and Frugé 2017)? An important question arising specifically in conflict environments concerns the role of other armed actors: To which extent is tactical variation in multi-party conflicts affected by the actions of other rebel groups (Wood and Kathman 2015) or pro-government militias (Mitchell, Carey, and Butler 2014)? And lastly, what is the role of rebel 'front organizations' that organize mass mobilization in urban centers?

Turning to the research field of community activism in war contexts, we may identify two potential ways to move forward based on the presented results. One avenue for future research outlined in chapter 2 concerns the more thorough investigation of civilian activism in different stages of the conflict. Throughout the papers, a strong emphasis has been put to event-driven, short-term changes in the dynamics of conflict like battle intensity and changes in the local balance of power. But how do communities react in different *phases* of an armed conflict? It might be plausible to suggest, for instance, that periods of negotiation and mediation might have a restraining effect on the conflict parties' preparedness

to act repressively against civil resistance activism by local communities—which might in turn present the latter with opportunities to engage in protests. It is also conceivable that periods of mediation are perceived as signals of government weakness, which might eventually spur anti-government protests.

On the other hand, it might be worthwhile to more closely consider phases in which conflicts continue, but with an intensity that fails to meet the conventional criterion of an ‘armed conflict’. The practice of setting an—ultimately arbitrary—minimum threshold of battle-related deaths is certainly important. It addresses the necessity to demarcate phenomena of intensive conflict or even war from occasional skirmishes that yet might not have a significant impact on larger-scale political processes. This dissertation has also followed the conventional war and conflict definition. Yet it is likely that even small-scale armed groups that only occasionally engage in violent actions might have an impact on a local level. As outlined in the conclusion of chapter 5, nearly half of all conflict episodes have ‘ended’ not by a peace agreement, ceasefire or victory by one party, but because conflicts continued with a decreased intensity below the threshold of 25 battle-related deaths. Investigating how these simmering, low-scale conflicts affect local civilian activism might thus be an area of research that could be potentially crucial for understanding ‘post-conflict’ processes.

The second and last suggestion for proceeding further takes up the discussion from the policy implications outlined in the previous section. This dissertation has focused on war and post-war civil resistance, with both time periods having been investigated in the course of individual studies. Yet it is of course likely that wartime civil resistance itself translates to a higher propensity to see protests after the war has ended—for instance through the generation of social capital. Examining post-conflict mobilization as a potential aftereffect of wartime protests would meaningfully contribute to a larger research program that investigates the temporal interrelations of contentious activism (Davenport et al. 2019).

Appendix A

Declaration of Authorship

Single-Authored Parts

I hereby declare that the introduction (chapter 1), papers 2 (chapter 3) and 4 (chapter 5), as well as the conclusion (chapter 6) are entirely my own work. Chapters 2 and 4 represent a collaborative work with PD Dr. Johannes Vüllers. In the following, I will explicate my own contribution to both chapters.

Chapter 2

Research Idea and Conceptualization

Johannes Vüllers developed the initial research idea to investigate the association between wartime conflict events and protests based on readily available data sources that are frequently used in the literature—the UCDP GED and SCAD. We have together discussed the feasibility of the respective study, narrowed down the research focus, and outlined a plausible theoretical argument based on the literature. We also discussed possible methodological approaches that might be applicable in order to examine our idea empirically. Johannes Vüllers took the lead for the development of the theoretical argument, the framing of the paper, and the literature review, though we regularly discussed possible refinements and implemented changes only after we both agreed on them. **Share of contribution: 40%**

Data Collection and Empirical Analysis

I was responsible for processing the geo-referenced event data with the GIS application software *QGIS*, and also set up and cleaned the data set (which included merging the data with other data sets in order to obtain control variables). I was also responsible for conducting the empirical analysis (i.e. running the regression analyses) and for creating the tables, maps, and figures in the manuscript. Although I was mainly responsible for these parts, I regularly discussed the used methods and occurring challenges with Johannes Vüllers throughout the entire process, so that we eventually agreed upon an approach to address emerging problems with the data or methods. In a similar vein, I took the initiative when it came to the interpretation of the obtained findings, and I also suggested possible strategies to better flesh out the theoretical mechanism. However, I always discussed my ideas with my co-author and implemented his valuable input whenever feasible. **Share of contribution: 80%**

Manuscript Writing and Submission Process

The writing of the manuscript principally followed the division of tasks outlined above: Johannes Vüllers drafted the introduction, literature review, theory chapter and conclusion, whereas I wrote the sections on the research design, empirical analysis, and discussion.

After the first draft has been completed, we reviewed the entire manuscript and discussed necessary changes and adjustments for each others' parts. We thereafter implemented the suggested changes, reviewed the manuscript again and streamlined the arguments and empirical analysis before entering the actual submission process. Both Johannes Vüllers and me individually presented a draft version of the manuscript at different conferences, followed by a joint presentation in a Brown Bag-Meeting at the University of Konstanz. We implemented recommendations and suggestions from discussants and journal reviewers together. We also jointly drafted the revision memos after receiving feedback from a journal, and Johannes Vüllers eventually took over the communication with the journal editors. **Share of contribution: 50%**

Chapter 4

Research Idea and Conceptualization

This paper project started with Johannes Vüllers' idea to contribute an article on contentious activism to an upcoming special issue of the *Zeitschrift für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung*. We discussed several possible ideas and I conducted preliminary empirical analyses in order to test the feasibility of different approaches. We eventually decided together to investigate further the implications of power-sharing provisions for post-conflict protests. Similar to chapter 2, Johannes Vüllers was mainly responsible for outlining the paper's relevance, drafting the literature review, and developing the theoretical argument. However, we did again eventually discuss and agree on each individual point together. **Share of contribution: 40%**

Data Collection and Empirical Analysis

After having discussed the principal approach to address our research question, I took on the task to compile and clean the data for the later analysis. I was responsible for matching the geo-referenced event data on contentious activism (from the SCAD) with the settlement areas of ethnic groups according to GeoEPR using the GIS application software *QGIS*, for merging the resulting data with information on power-sharing events (PSED) and to link individual ethnic groups to affiliated rebel organizations with ACD2EPR. I also took the task of cleaning the data thereafter (for instance, discarding overlapping settlement areas), merging the data with other sources on control variables, and for generating tables, maps and figures in the eventual manuscript. I was also responsible for the eventual research design (model choice, which control variables to include) and for running the empirical analysis and robustness checks. However, although I conducted the empirical part, I did again implement each step only after consulting with my co-author, so that the eventually taken choices reflect his input as well. **Share of contribution: 80%**

Manuscript Writing and Submission Process

Similarly to the division of labor in chapter 2, Johannes Vüllers drafted the introduction, literature review and theory section of chapter 4, whereas I wrote the research design and analysis section. The drafting of the conclusion was a joint effort. The process of reviewing each others' drafts, suggesting and discussing changes, and implementing them resembled the proven approach we have followed already for chapter 2. We have jointly discussed the suggested changes and recommendations from the anonymous reviewers and editors, and assigned the tasks according to our areas of responsibility (i.e., I mainly implemented changes and recommendations pertaining to the research design and analysis). Afterwards, we have again reviewed the manuscript together before submitting it for publication. **Share of contribution: 50%**

We, the undersigned, endorse the above stated contribution of work undertaken for each of the published peer-reviewed manuscripts contributing to this thesis:

Witten, 7.9.2021

Place, Date

Vüllers

PD Dr Johannes Vüllers

Osnabrück, 7.9.2021

Place, Date

Rom Krtsh

Roman Krtsh, M.A.

ANLAGE 3**Erklärung an Eides statt über die Eigenständigkeit der erbrachten wissenschaftlichen Leistung¹**

Ich erkläre hiermit an Eides statt, dass ich die vorliegende Arbeit ohne unzulässige Hilfe Dritter und ohne Benutzung anderer als der angegebenen Hilfsmittel angefertigt habe. Die aus anderen Quellen direkt oder indirekt übernommenen Daten und Konzepte sind unter Angabe der Quelle gekennzeichnet.

Bei der Auswahl und Auswertung folgenden Materials haben mir die nachstehend aufgeführten Personen oder Organisationen in der jeweils beschriebenen Weise entgeltlich/unentgeltlich geholfen.

1. Kapitel 2 und 4 wurden in Co-Autorenschaft
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mit Johannes Vüllers verfasst (s. Declaration of Authorship)
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Osnabrück, 01. September 2021
(Ort, Datum)


(Unterschrift)

¹ Nach § 9 Absatz 3 Satz 3, § 7 Absatz 4 Satz 2 NHG darf die Universität von den Doktorandinnen und Doktoranden eine Versicherung an Eides statt verlangen und abnehmen, wonach die Promotionsleistung von ihnen selbständig und ohne unzulässige fremde Hilfe erbracht worden ist.

Die Abgabe einer falschen eidesstattlichen Versicherung ist strafbar. Bei vorsätzlicher, also wissentlicher, Abgabe einer falschen Erklärung droht eine Freiheitsstrafe bis zu 3 Jahren oder eine Geldstrafe. Eine fahrlässige Abgabe (obwohl hätte erkannt werden müssen, dass die Erklärung nicht den Tatsachen entspricht) kann eine Freiheitsstrafe bis zu einem Jahr oder eine Geldstrafe nach sich ziehen.

§ 156 StGB: Falsche Versicherung an Eides Statt

Wer vor einer zur Abnahme einer Versicherung an Eides Statt zuständigen Behörde eine solche Versicherung falsch abgibt oder unter Berufung auf eine solche Versicherung falsch aussagt, wird mit Freiheitsstrafe bis zu drei Jahren oder mit Geldstrafe bestraft.

§ 161 StGB: Fahrlässiger Falscheid, fahrlässige falsche Versicherung an Eides Statt:

(1) Wenn eine der in den §§ 154 bis 156 bezeichneten Handlungen aus Fahrlässigkeit begangen worden ist, so tritt Freiheitsstrafe bis zu einem Jahr oder Geldstrafe ein.

(2) Strafflosigkeit tritt ein, wenn der Täter die falsche Angabe rechtzeitig berichtigt. Die Vorschriften des § 158 Abs. 2 und 3 gelten entsprechend.

Appendix B

Supplementary Information for Chapter 2

SCAD Actors Coding

Table B.1 gives an overview of the codings for rebel and political affiliated groups who protested in the countries in our sample. We used the actor descriptions in SCAD for additional searches regarding the affiliations of the groups to either conflict party. However, the available information in SCAD is very broad and often the descriptions only refer to very general actor identities (e.g., radicals, fundamentalists). We opted for a conservative approach and only coded actors as affiliated with one conflict party if the actor descriptions suggested this (e.g., “warlord supporters” as rebel group, or “government organized protest” as political actor). It thus might be that we underestimate the number of events especially by rebel-affiliated groups. Future research on single case studies is needed to provide better data on this because news wire sources do not provide the necessary information for a more detailed coding of actor’s identity on an event level.

Table B.1. SCAD Actor Coding

Country	Actors
Algeria	Political actors: Front for Social Forces, Islamic Salvation Fron, Rally for Culture and Democracy, Opposition Supporters, Socialist Forces, Community Police, Opposition Political Party, Islamic Party MSP
Angola	Political actors: Government organized civilians, Opposition Activists, Party for Progress and Development in Angola
Burundi	Political actors: Main Opposition Party, Opposition Parties
Central African Republic	Political actors: Opposition Parties, Parliament, Pro-Government Supporters
Chad	Political actors: Government
Côte d'Ivoire	Political actors: Alliance of Young Patriots, Opposition Supporters, Police, Young Patriots
DRC	Political actors: UNC Party, Government organized Protesters, Jean Pierre Bemba Supporters, Opposition Parties, Opposition Supporters, Soldiers, Supporters of Etienne Tshisekedi, Tshisekedi Supporters, UN Employees, New Forces of Union and Solidarity, Unified Lumumbist Party Rebel actors: Congo Liberation Movement Supporters
Egypt	Political actors: Muslim Brotherhood, Police, Security Forces, Opposition Parties
Ethiopia	Political actors: Blue Party Opposition Group, Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front, Government-sponsored March, Opposition Party Members, Opposition Supporters, Pro-Government Supporters
Guinea-Bissau	Political actors: Soldiers
Lesotho	Political actors: BCP Supporters, Opposition Supporters, Opposition Coalition
Liberia	Political actors: Members of Parliament, Police
Libya	Political actors: Islamist Parliament Members, Parliament Members from Misrata, Secular Lawmakers
Mali	Political actors: Police, Political Parties, MNLA, Security Forces
Mozambique	Rebel actors: Renamo Supporters
Niger	Political actors: Democratic and Social Convention Party, Front for the Retoration and Defense of Democracy, Opposition Parties, Party Supporters
Nigeria	Political actors: Dino Melaye
Congo (Republic)	Political actors: Opposition Party
Rwanda	Political actors: Pro-Kabila Supporters, Democratic Republican Movement Members, Opposition Parties, Opposition Members Rebel actors: Rebel Supporters
Senegal	Political actors: Ruling Party Supporters, International Association of Peacekeepers, Opposition Organized Protest, Opposition Supporters, Pro-Government Protesters, Senegalese Peacekeepers
Somalia	Rebel actors: Islamic Court Supporters, Shabab Organized Protesters, Supporters of Mohamed Said Hirsi, United Somali Congress, Warlord Supporters (Abgal Clan)
Sudan	Political actors: Communist Party Members, Sudanese Congress Party Members, Democratic Unionist Party, Government Organized Protest, Government Sanctioned Protest, Islamic Liberation Party, Ruling Party, Politicians, National Congress Party, Popular Congress Members, Popular Congress Officials, Popular Congress Officials, members and sympathizers, Popular Defense Forces, Popular National Congress, Registered Political Parties, Soldiers Rebel actors: Sudan People's Liberation army, SPLA Supporters
Uganda	Political actors: Umma Party, Ethnic Baganda MPs, Forum for Democratic Change, Opposition Party, Members of Parliament, Opposition Protesters, Opposition Supporters




Fig. B.1. Administrative boundaries and grid cells.




Fig. B.2. Robustness I: Coefficients for different lags of the independent variable on the Admin 1-week level.

Table B.2. Robustness II: Alternative estimation approaches, first admin. unit

	Conditional logit		Negative binomial
	(R9) Protests All issues	(R10) Protests War violence	(R11) Protests All issues
Battles	0.0465 (0.0297)	0.1117* (0.0547)	0.0712** (0.0252)
One-sided violence	0.0691* (0.0286)	0.0256 (0.0375)	0.0795*** (0.0216)
Non-state violence	-0.0004 (0.1077)	0.2856** (0.0886)	0.0812 (0.0868)
Mountainous terrain	<i>Omitted</i>	<i>Omitted</i>	0.3383 (0.2850)
Forest cover (2009)	<i>Omitted</i>	<i>Omitted</i>	-0.0100** (0.0035)
Urban cover (2009)	<i>Omitted</i>	<i>Omitted</i>	-0.0738* (0.0369)
Total population (log)	0.1102 (0.5793)	-2.4864+ (1.2904)	0.1914+ (0.1025)
Mean annual nighttime lights	0.0147 (0.0193)	-0.0018 (0.0422)	0.0587*** (0.0070)
Excluded groups	0.1445 (0.1979)	0.5505+ (0.3181)	-0.2960* (0.1170)
Constant			-4.9005*** (1.3682)
Inalpha			0.6483** (0.2466)
year-dummies	✓	✓	✓
spatial lag	✓	✓	✓
country-dummies			✓
Observations	18,732	7,104	66,804
<i>AIC</i>	3910.2581	1100.7112	6079.9408

Robust standard errors (in parantheses) clustered on the admin1-level;

Months since last protest (3rd degree polynomial) not shown.

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B.3. Robustness III: Sub-samples, first administrative unit

	Cities >=100k		No Algeria		No Sudan	No CIV
	(R12) Protests All issues	(R13) Protests War violence	(R14) Protests All issues	(R15) Protests War violence	(R16) Protests All issues	(R17) Protests War violence
Battles	0.0721* (0.0346)	0.1174* (0.0504)	0.0662 (0.0489)	0.1408** (0.0545)	0.0828* (0.0340)	0.1410** (0.0451)
One-sided violence	0.0673* (0.0266)	0.0463 (0.0412)	0.0767* (0.0312)	0.0463 (0.0551)	0.0753* (0.0305)	-0.0002 (0.0456)
Non-state violence	0.0172 (0.0855)	0.2542*** (0.0472)	0.0362 (0.0833)	0.2396*** (0.0453)	0.0688 (0.0819)	0.2647*** (0.0380)
Mountainous terrain	0.0434 (0.4642)	-0.1963 (0.5068)	-0.0029 (0.4522)	0.4445 (0.4115)	-0.1724 (0.3480)	0.2898 (0.4114)
Forest cover	-0.0053 (0.0056)	0.0041 (0.0059)	-0.0146** (0.0048)	-0.0038 (0.0066)	-0.0110* (0.0051)	0.0000 (0.0071)
Urban cover	0.0476 (0.0397)	0.0981* (0.0481)	0.0465 (0.0560)	0.0825+ (0.0477)	0.0141 (0.0353)	0.0680+ (0.0368)
Total population (log)	0.0733 (0.1478)	0.0533 (0.1142)	0.3635* (0.1490)	0.1108 (0.1136)	0.3179* (0.1463)	0.1065 (0.1133)
Mean annual nighttime lights	0.0541** (0.0166)	0.0247 (0.0181)	0.0846*** (0.0147)	0.0376* (0.0183)	0.0784*** (0.0134)	0.0380* (0.0157)
Excluded groups	-0.1556 (0.1024)	-0.2445 (0.2627)	-0.0329 (0.1340)	-0.0154 (0.1765)	-0.1630 (0.1298)	-0.1031 (0.1405)
Constant	-5.0151* (2.3137)	-5.6305*** (1.6362)	-10.8397*** (2.0928)	-6.8680*** (1.5455)	-9.9647*** (2.0710)	-7.2627*** (1.6473)
var(Country)	0.9744+ (0.5689)	1.6092** (0.6006)	0.5650+ (0.2923)	0.9488** (0.3507)	0.5457* (0.2267)	0.8373* (0.3620)
var(Admin 1)	1.1883** (0.4151)	0.3108 (0.3240)	2.6685** (0.9144)	0.8781* (0.3646)	2.1998** (0.7292)	0.9646*** (0.2880)
year-dummies	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
spatial lag	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	16,248	15,408	54,396	52,776	59,412	63,948
AIC	3772.6182	1127.8426	4283.4244	1333.9509	4222.4664	1426.5863

Robust standard errors (in parantheses) clustered on the admin1-level; Months since last protest (3rd degree polynomial) not shown.
 + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B.4. Robustness IV: Alternative independent variables, first administrative unit

	Log-transformed		Fatalities		Share of losses	
	(R18) Protests All issues	(R19) Protests War violence	(R20) Protests All issues	(R21) Protests War violence	(R22) Protests All issues	(R23) Protests War violence
Battles (log)	0.2859** (0.1016)	0.4966** (0.1773)				
One-sided violence (log)	0.7367*** (0.1550)	0.6897** (0.2150)				
Non-state violence (log)	0.1400 (0.2517)	0.9889*** (0.2284)				
Battle-related deaths (log)			0.1590*** (0.0413)	0.2506*** (0.0655)		
Deaths one-sided violence (log)			0.2507*** (0.0595)	0.2547* (0.1194)		
Deaths non-state violence (log)			0.0967 (0.1023)	0.4588*** (0.1198)		
Share gov't. losses/ all combatant losses					3.5408** (1.1500)	5.8391** (2.1741)
Share gov't. losses/ all combatant losses ²					-3.2316** (1.1646)	-5.3786* (2.4588)
One-sided violence					0.0790** (0.0281)	0.0538 (0.0382)
Non-state violence					0.0228 (0.0916)	0.2383*** (0.0390)
Mountainous terrain	-0.1818 (0.3403)	0.1366 (0.4062)	-0.1749 (0.3376)	0.1287 (0.3897)	-0.1689 (0.3532)	0.1873 (0.4103)
Forest cover	-0.0126** (0.0048)	-0.0051 (0.0069)	-0.0127** (0.0047)	-0.0057 (0.0071)	-0.0121* (0.0048)	-0.0032 (0.0069)
Urban cover	0.0264 (0.0382)	0.0854* (0.0364)	0.0291 (0.0384)	0.0877* (0.0346)	0.0330 (0.0385)	0.0963** (0.0348)
Total population (log)	0.3322* (0.1434)	0.1159 (0.1098)	0.3360* (0.1435)	0.1131 (0.1076)	0.3426* (0.1459)	0.1351 (0.1162)
Mean annual nighttime lights	0.0718*** (0.0157)	0.0376* (0.0151)	0.0696*** (0.0157)	0.0355* (0.0153)	0.0691*** (0.0164)	0.0360* (0.0155)
Excluded groups	-0.0414 (0.1111)	-0.0087 (0.1542)	-0.0609 (0.1197)	-0.0518 (0.1481)	-0.0219 (0.1105)	0.0114 (0.1623)
Constant	-10.1412*** (1.9961)	-7.4373*** (1.5092)	-10.1039*** (1.9800)	-7.2458*** (1.4595)	-10.1993*** (2.0417)	-7.5061*** (1.5730)
var(Country)	0.4627* (0.2277)	1.1071** (0.3949)	0.4514* (0.2247)	1.0702** (0.3705)	0.4652* (0.2242)	1.0792** (0.4079)
var(Admin-1)	2.2825** (0.7114)	0.7790* (0.3129)	2.2399** (0.7241)	0.6995* (0.3035)	2.3101** (0.7645)	0.8447** (0.2861)
year-dummies	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
spatial lag	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	66,804	64,620	66,804	64,620	66,804	64,620
AIC	4972.8521	1516.2854	4976.8074	1505.6074	4996.2924	1534.9601

Robust standard errors (in parantheses) clustered on the admin1-level; Months since last protest (3rd degree polynomial) not shown.

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B.5. Robustness V: Accounting for temporal development, first administrative unit

	Deviation from previous development			Battle spell
	(R24) Protests All issues	(R25) Protests All issues	(R26) Protests All issues	(R27) Protests All issues
Battles (deviation from prev. month)	0.0672* (0.0301)			
Battles (deviation from mean past 6 months)		0.0629* (0.0273)		
Battles (deviation from mean past 12 months)			0.0510 (0.0353)	
Battles				0.1005** (0.0362)
Duration of battle spell				0.0226*** (0.0056)
Battles × Duration of battle spell				-0.0050*** (0.0011)
One-sided violence	0.0810** (0.0282)	0.0797** (0.0283)	0.0810** (0.0284)	0.0728* (0.0306)
Non-state violence	0.0312 (0.0809)	0.0326 (0.0811)	0.0329 (0.0809)	0.0327 (0.0853)
Mountainous terrain	-0.1742 (0.3488)	-0.1714 (0.3485)	-0.1710 (0.3493)	-0.1625 (0.3488)
Forest cover	-0.0123* (0.0048)	-0.0123* (0.0048)	-0.0123* (0.0048)	-0.0123* (0.0048)
Urban cover	0.0397 (0.0401)	0.0395 (0.0400)	0.0392 (0.0399)	0.0306 (0.0398)
Total population (log)	0.3548* (0.1487)	0.3534* (0.1488)	0.3528* (0.1486)	0.3449* (0.1457)
Mean nighttime lights	0.0657*** (0.0175)	0.0657*** (0.0176)	0.0657*** (0.0176)	0.0699*** (0.0153)
Excluded groups	-0.0236 (0.1163)	-0.0236 (0.1156)	-0.0250 (0.1159)	-0.0215 (0.1150)
Constant	-10.3489*** (2.0881)	-10.3244*** (2.0900)	-10.3126*** (2.0848)	-10.2474*** (2.0515)
var(Country)	0.4616* (0.2298)	0.4609* (0.2290)	0.4603* (0.2288)	0.4674* (0.2289)
var(Admin 1)	2.4058** (0.8432)	2.3945** (0.8351)	2.3886** (0.8305)	2.3377** (0.7919)
year-dummies	✓	✓	✓	✓
spatial lag	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	66,804	66,804	66,804	66,804
<i>AIC</i>	5007.0419	5007.9303	5010.8758	5001.8544

Rob. std. errors (in parantheses) clustered on the admin1-level; Months since last protest (3rd degree polynomial) not shown.
 + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$




Fig. B.3. Absolute number of protests by issue categories.

Appendix C

Supplementary Information for Chapter 3

Supporting Information on the Number of Relevant Groups in India

The statement that I conceive the CPI-Maoist as the only relevant violent resistance group in the time period of investigation is based on information from the UCDP ACD, which lists all countries as active conflicts if they result in more than 25 battle-related deaths per year. Fig. C.1 shows that for the observation period, there have indeed been only few instances of violence by other armed groups: 1 instance of one-sided violence by the People's Liberation front of India (PLFI) in Khunti district (Jharkhand), 1 incident of one-sided violence by Islamist radicals in Hyderabad, and 5 violent encounters between the government and the Communist Part of India (Marxist-Leninist Janashakti) in Andhra Pradesh. No incident of inter-group clashes involving the CPI-Maoist have been reported by GED for the observation period (in fact, no incident at all in the states I consider for the analysis, see Fig. C.2). Given the relatively few incidents as compared to violence related to the CPI-Maoist, I thus consider the latter group to be the only dominant armed resistance group for the time period of observation.




Fig. C.1. Violent events without CPI-Maoist involvement, 2006-2009 (data obtained from UCDP GED).




Fig. C.2. Intergroup violence with CPI-Maoist involvement, 2006-2009 (data obtained from UCDP GED).

Table C.1. Different estimation strategies, reduced sample sizes

	Random intercept models		Exclude districts most casualty events		Exclude districts most strike events	
	(A1) OLS	(A2) Logit	(A3) OLS	(A4) Logit	(A5) OLS	(A6) Logit
DV: Maoist general strike						
Rebel casualties, t_{-1}	0.0082** (0.0027)	0.1778*** (0.0514)	0.0117 (0.0072)	0.2574* (0.1100)	0.0072* (0.0027)	0.1831*** (0.0476)
Police / paramilitary casualties, t_{-1}	-0.0017** (0.0005)	-0.2002 (0.1807)	-0.0014 (0.0009)	-0.0849 (0.0803)	-0.0012+ (0.0007)	-0.1279 (0.1150)
Adivasi population in %	0.0140 (0.0143)	1.4354*** (0.3732)				
Share of Forest Area in km ²	-0.0027 (0.0044)	-0.0449 (0.2142)				
Infrastructure	-0.0121*** (0.0030)	-0.8442*** (0.1789)				
District GDP/capita (log)	-0.0010 (0.0046)	0.3123 (0.2193)				
Population 2001 (log)	0.0027 (0.0039)	0.3894 (0.2982)				
Share of urban pop. %	0.0068 (0.0164)	-0.5938 (0.7702)				
Election week	-0.0101 (0.0161)	-0.1275 (0.5908)	-0.0103 (0.0145)	-0.0776 (0.6756)	-0.0089 (0.0089)	-0.4330 (0.9118)
Public holiday	0.0229+ (0.0124)	0.9786*** (0.2896)	0.0214* (0.0078)	0.9568*** (0.2028)	0.0124+ (0.0068)	0.7939** (0.2819)
Constant	-0.0058 (0.0631)	-10.7890* (4.2617)	0.0156** (0.0049)	-4.1418*** (0.2797)	0.0229*** (0.0033)	-3.6874*** (0.2255)
year-FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
district-FE			✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	12,420	12,420	12,420	9,108	12,420	9,108
Log lik.	7636.5776	-950.1367		-886.3350		-716.5384
R^2			0.0486		0.0193	

Robust standard errors (in parantheses) clustered on the district-level;
 Weeks since last protest (+ 2nd and 3rd degree polynomial) and spatial lag not shown.
 + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.005$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table C.2. Different independent variables

	Log-transformed ind.var		Alternative data: GED	
	(A7) OLS	(A8) Logit	(A9) OLS	(A10) Logit
DV: Maoist general strike				
Rebel casualties, t_{-1} (log)	0.0228* (0.0100)	0.6865** (0.2144)		
Police / paramilitary casualties, t_{-1} (log)	-0.0048 (0.0051)	-0.2286 (0.2150)		
Rebel casualties, t_{-1} (GED)			0.0137* (0.0057)	0.2912*** (0.0746)
Police / paramilitary casualties, t_{-1} (GED)			-0.0004 (0.0008)	-0.0379 (0.0667)
Election week	-0.0105 (0.0133)	-0.1259 (0.6676)	-0.0142 (0.0137)	-0.4985 (0.8505)
Public holiday	0.0203* (0.0074)	0.9251*** (0.1987)	0.0200* (0.0074)	0.8989*** (0.2025)
Constant	0.0196*** (0.0046)	-3.9431*** (0.2605)	0.0197*** (0.0046)	-3.9351*** (0.2592)
year-FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
district-FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	13,455	10,143	13,455	10,143
Log lik.		-971.3606		-969.7774
R^2	0.0445		0.0453	

Robust standard errors (in parantheses) clustered on the district-level;

Weeks since last protest (+ 2nd and 3rd degree polynomial) and spatial lag not shown.

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.005$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table C.3. Deviation from moving average

DV: Maoist general strike	Deviation from previous development							
	(A11)	(A12)	(A13)	(A14)	(A15)	(A16)	(A17)	(A18)
	OLS	Logit	OLS	Logit	OLS	Logit	OLS	Logit
Deviation of rebel casualties t_{-1} ...								
...from t_{-2}	0.0041** (0.0014)	0.1567*** (0.0433)						
...from mean of prior 2 weeks			0.0059*** (0.0017)	0.1803*** (0.0393)				
...from mean of prior 3 weeks					0.0070*** (0.0019)	0.1967*** (0.0412)		
...from mean of prior 8 weeks							0.0078** (0.0024)	0.1944*** (0.0443)
Police / paramilitary casualties, t_{-1}	-0.0012** (0.0004)	-0.1385 (0.0871)	-0.0015** (0.0005)	-0.1575 (0.1009)	-0.0016** (0.0006)	-0.1805 (0.1129)	-0.0017* (0.0006)	-0.1806 (0.1169)
Election week	-0.0108 (0.0133)	-0.1491 (0.6685)	-0.0100 (0.0132)	-0.0930 (0.6606)	-0.0103 (0.0132)	-0.1047 (0.6675)	-0.0108 (0.0132)	-0.1290 (0.6677)
Public holiday	0.0204* (0.0075)	0.9273*** (0.1983)	0.0201* (0.0074)	0.9186*** (0.1982)	0.0061 (0.0066)	0.3612 (0.2805)	0.0059 (0.0066)	0.3508 (0.2816)
Constant	0.0208*** (0.0047)	-3.8894*** (0.2646)	0.0218*** (0.0048)	-3.8482*** (0.2690)	0.0133* (0.0049)	-4.4047*** (0.3048)	0.0162** (0.0055)	-4.2678*** (0.3212)
year-FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
district-FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	13,390	10,094	13,325	10,045	13,260	9,996	13,000	9,800
Log lik.		-970.6087		-968.5854		-935.7956		-927.5641
R^2	0.0444		0.0449		0.0457		0.0465	

Robust standard errors (in parantheses) clustered on the district-level;

Weeks since last protest (+ 2nd and 3rd degree polynomial) and spatial lag not shown.

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.005$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table C.4. Regression tables for event-study (corresponding to figure 3.3)

	All observations		Only observations with 0 or 1 casualty event within 4 weeks	
	(5) OLS	(6) Logit	(7) OLS	(8) Logit
DV: Maoist general strike				
Rebel casualties, $t+4$	0.0005 (0.0029)	0.0161 (0.1938)	0.0007 (0.0040)	0.0634 (0.1787)
Rebel casualties, $t+3$	0.0010 (0.0021)	-0.0169 (0.1429)	0.0021 (0.0027)	0.1163 (0.1007)
Rebel casualties, $t+2$	0.0084** (0.0030)	0.1847*** (0.0503)	0.0035 (0.0048)	0.1600 (0.1402)
Rebel casualties, $t+1$	0.0005 (0.0028)	0.0232 (0.1102)	-0.0014 (0.0018)	-0.2266 (0.2554)
Rebel casualties, t_0	0.0002 (0.0031)	0.0274 (0.1149)	0.0002 (0.0023)	0.0289 (0.1042)
Rebel casualties, $t-1$	0.0079* (0.0028)	0.2184** (0.0690)	0.0073+ (0.0041)	0.2212* (0.0904)
Rebel casualties, $t-2$	0.0001 (0.0014)	0.0268 (0.0564)	-0.0003 (0.0024)	-0.0113 (0.1410)
Rebel casualties, $t-3$	-0.0018 (0.0017)	-0.0456 (0.0821)	-0.0005 (0.0019)	-0.0181 (0.1326)
Rebel casualties, $t-4$	-0.0018 (0.0013)	-0.1483 (0.1729)	-0.0018 (0.0016)	-0.1910 (0.2508)
Police / paramilitary casualties, $t+4$	-0.0005 (0.0005)	-0.0800 (0.0818)	-0.0007 (0.0007)	-0.0572 (0.0697)
Police / paramilitary casualties, $t+3$	-0.0001 (0.0006)	-0.0242 (0.0457)	-0.0003 (0.0005)	-0.0272 (0.0393)
Police / paramilitary casualties, $t+2$	0.0012 (0.0016)	0.0379 (0.0242)	-0.0016** (0.0005)	-0.4910+ (0.2562)
Police / paramilitary casualties, $t+1$	-0.0004 (0.0006)	-0.0671 (0.0930)	-0.0004 (0.0005)	-0.0436 (0.0732)
Police / paramilitary casualties, t_0	0.0020 (0.0016)	0.0553* (0.0214)	0.0019 (0.0016)	0.0564* (0.0206)
Police / paramilitary casualties, $t-1$	-0.0013* (0.0006)	-0.1320 (0.1059)	-0.0007* (0.0004)	-0.1244 (0.1077)
Police / paramilitary casualties, $t-2$	0.0004 (0.0009)	0.0251 (0.0249)	0.0006 (0.0014)	0.0229 (0.0279)
Police / paramilitary casualties, $t-3$	-0.0000 (0.0007)	-0.0136 (0.0469)	-0.0002 (0.0008)	-0.0170 (0.0488)

Table continues on next page

Table C.4 (continued): Regression tables for event-study (corresponding to figure 3.3)

	All observations		Only observations with 0 or 1 casualty event within 4 weeks	
	(5) OLS	(6) Logit	(7) OLS	(8) Logit
DV: Maoist general strike				
Police / paramilitary casualties, $t-4$	-0.0007 (0.0005)	-0.1198 (0.1695)	-0.0011 (0.0007)	-0.1205 (0.1657)
Maoist general strike in adjacent districts (dummy), $t-1$	0.0182 ⁺ (0.0095)	0.4364* (0.1942)	0.0193* (0.0096)	0.4945* (0.1924)
Election week	-0.0095 (0.0128)	-0.0972 (0.6467)	-0.0105 (0.0128)	-0.1412 (0.6400)
Public holiday	0.0058 (0.0069)	0.3452 (0.2935)	0.0066 (0.0070)	0.3549 (0.2965)
Constant	0.0138** (0.0048)	-4.3577*** (0.3103)	0.0123* (0.0047)	-4.4992*** (0.3204)
year-FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
district-FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	13,000	9,600	12,846	9,065
Log lik.		-890.9912		-859.6533
R^2	0.0431		0.0431	

Robust standard errors (in parantheses) clustered on the district-level; weeks since last protest (+ 2nd and 3rd degree polynomial) and spatial lag not shown.

⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.005$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table C.5. Logistic regression results for table 3.2, models 9 through 12 (Alternative explanations)

	Additional controls:		Alternative dependent variable:	
	Previous battles (9b) Logit	Mov.average (10b) Logit	Maoist attacks (11b) Logit	Maoist protests (12b) Logit
Rebel casualties, $t-1$	0.1865*** (0.0466)	0.2044*** (0.0459)	-0.0093 (0.0170)	-0.0095 (0.1577)
Police / paramilitary casualties, $t-1$	-0.1918+ (0.1023)	-0.1808 (0.1192)	0.0193+ (0.0113)	0.0596** (0.0199)
Number of battles, $t-1$	0.1439 (0.2317)			
Deviation of previous battles from 4-week average		-0.0151 (0.2435)		
Election week	-0.1264 (0.6673)	-0.1455 (0.6752)	-0.0402 (0.4305)	0.0000 (.)
Public holiday	0.9308*** (0.1977)	0.3564 (0.2818)	-0.1749 (0.3521)	1.5773*** (0.2774)
Constant	-3.9330*** (0.2615)	-4.4088*** (0.3040)	-5.2753*** (0.5389)	-5.7653*** (0.9444)
year-FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
district-FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	10,143	9,996	10,971	4,946
Log lik.	-969.9400	-935.8023	-1597.1077	-301.4330
R^2				

Robust standard errors (in parantheses) clustered on the district-level;

Weeks since last strike/attack/protest (+ 2nd and 3rd degree polynomial) and spatial lag not shown.

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.005$, *** $p < 0.001$

Districts included in the Sample

The eventual districts included are based on their extent in 2006, for which the district census handbooks (from which some of the control variables were obtained) were considered as the main source of reference. For the collection of event data (both for violent events and general strikes), the reliance on fixed administrative units entailed the challenge that reports referring to events after 2006 sometimes named new districts that have not yet existed in 2006. In these instances, I relegated these events to the respective former districts from which they were carved out. The following tables list the districts contained in the sample, along with information on whether they have been under Maoist control in 2005 and the respective districts that came into existence after 2006. Note that district splits are only mentioned when they were relevant, i.e., if an event report in the data pointed to a district location that was absent in 2006. The original data from Mukherjee (2017) which lists the districts under Maoist control is based on the extent of districts from 1991. Districts used here that were created between 1991 and 2006 are assigned with the value of “Maoist control” from their parent district. For example, “Buxar” was split from “Bhojpur” district in 1992 and is hence not contained in the sample from Mukherjee (2017). As “Bhojpur” was considered being under Maoist control in the original data from Mukherjee (2017), the variable also has the value 1 for “Buxar” district here.

Table C.6. List of districts (Bihar, Jharkhand, West Bengal)

District name	Maoist control	New districts post-2006	District name	Maoist control	New districts post-2006
East Champaran (BI)	1		Garhwa (JH)	1	
West Champaran (BI)	1		Palamu (JH)	1	
Sheohar (BI)	1		Latehar (JH)	1	
Sitarmahi (BI)	1		Chatra (JH)	1	
Madhubani (BI)	0		Hazaribagh (JH)	1	
Supaul (BI)	0		Kodarma (JH)	1	
Araria (BI)	0		Giridih (JH)	1	
Kishanganj (BI)	0		Deoghar (JH)	0	
Purnia (BI)	0		Godda (JH)	0	
Katihar (BI)	0		Sahibganj (JH)	0	
Madhepura (BI)	0		Pakur (JH)	0	
Burundi (BI)	0		Dumka (JH)	0	
Saharsa (BI)	0		Jamtara (JH)	0	
Darbhanga (BI)	0		Seraikela Kharsawan (JH)	1	
Muzaffarpur (BI)	0		Dhanbad (JH)	1	
Gopalganj (BI)	0		Bokaro (JH)	1	
Siwan (BI)	0		Ranchi (JH)	1	Khunti
Saran (BI)	0		Lohardaga (JH)	1	
Vaishali (BI)	0		Gumla (JH)	1	
Samastipur (BI)	0		Simdega (JH)	1	
Begusarai (BI)	0		West Singhbhum (JH)	1	
Khagaria (BI)	0		East Singhbhum (JH)	1	
Bhagalpur (BI)	0		Darjiling (WB)	0	
Khagaria (BI)	0		Jalpaiguri (WB)	0	Alipurdua
Banka (BI)	0		Koch Bihar (WB)	0	
Munger (BI)	0		Uttar Dinaipur (WB)	0	
Lakhisarai (BI)	0		Dakshin Dinaipur (WB)	0	
Sheikhpura (BI)	0		Maldah (WB)	0	
Nalanda (BI)	1		Murshidabad (WB)	0	
Patna (BI)	1		Birbhum (WB)	0	
Bhojpur (BI)	1		Bardhaman (WB)	0	
Buxar (BI)	1		Nadia (WB)	0	
Kaimur / Bhabua (BI)	1		24 Parganas North (WB)	0	
Rohtas (BI)	1		Hooghly (WB)	0	
Jehanabad (BI)	1		Bankura (WB)	1	
Arwal (BI)	1		Purulia (WB)	1	
Aurangabad (BI)	1		West Midnapur (WB)	1	Jhargram
Gaya (BI)	1		East Midnapur (WB)	1	
Nawada (BI)	1		Haora (WB)	0	
Jamui (BI)	0		Kolkata (WB)	0	
			24 Parganas South (WB)	0	

Table C.7. List of districts (Odisha, Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh)

District name	Maoist control	New districts post-2006	District name	Maoist control	New districts post-2006
Bargarh (OD)	0		Jangjir-Champa (CH)	0	
Jharsuguda (OD)	0		Bilaspur (CH)	0	
Dabargarh (OD)	0		Kawardha (CH)	1	
Sundargarh (OD)	1		Rajnandgaon (CH)	1	
Kendujhar (OD)	1		Durg (CH)	0	
Mayurbhanj (OD)	1		Raipur (CH)	0	
Baleshwar (OD)	0		Mahasamund (CH)	0	
Bhadrak (OD)	0		Dhamtari (CH)	0	
Kendrapara (OD)	0		Kanker (CH)	1	
Jagatsinghapur (OD)	0		Baster (CH)	1	Narayanpur, Kondagaon
Cuttack (OD)	0		Dantewada (CH)	1	Bijapur, Sukma
Jajapur (OD)	0		Adilabad (AP)	1	
Dhenkanal (OD)	0		Nizamabad (AP)	1	
Anugul (OD)	0		Karimnagar (AP)	1	Peddapalli
Nayagarh (OD)	0		Medak (AP)	1	
Khordha (OD)	0		Hyderabad (AP)	0	
Puri (OD)	0		Rangareddi (AP)	0	
Ganjam (OD)	0		Mahbubnagar (AP)	1	
Gajapati (OD)	0		Nalgonda (AP)	1	Suryapet
Kandhamal (OD)	0		Warangal (AP)	1	
Baudh (OD)	0		Khammam (AP)	1	Bhadradri Kothagudem
Sonapur (OD)	0		Srikakulam (AP)	1	
Balangir (OD)	0		Vizinagaram (AP)	1	
Nuapada (OD)	0		Visakhapatnam (AP)	1	
Kalahandi (OD)	0		East Godavari (AP)	1	
Rayagada (OD)	1		West Godavari (AP)	0	
Nabarangpur(OD)	1		Krishna (AP)	0	
Koraput (OD)	1		Guntur (AP)	1	
Malkangiri(OD)	1		Prakasam / Ongole (AP)	1	
Koriya (CH)	1		Nellore (AP)	0	
Surguja (CH)	1		Kadapa (AP)	0	
Jashpur (CH)	0		Kurnool (AP)	1	
Raigarh (CH)	0		Anantapur (AP)	1	
Korba (CH)	0		Chittoor (AP)	0	

Appendix D

Supplementary Information for Chapter 4

Note on the composition of the sample: A total of 48 peace agreements have been concluded in 20 African countries in the observation period. Somalia and Comoros were discarded as Geo-EPR 2014 does not provide geo-referenced data on the three nations' ethnic groups. Burundi and Rwanda were discarded as the involved ethnic groups were not geographically distinguishable. Similarly, the control groups in South Africa overlapped entirely with the rebel-supporting groups (see Fig. D.1 below). In almost all cases, it was not necessary to consider splits and unification of groups for the countries' respective observation periods. The only exceptions were the split of the group of "Blacks" in South Africa after 1993 (eventually not relevant due to the omission of South Africa from the sample) and the unification and later split of the Sierra Leonan groups of "Temne" and "Limba" into "Northern Groups" in 1997 and 2008, respectively. we decided to aggregate the split groups as the "Northern Groups" ethnic group was relevant for the majority of Sierra Leone's post-conflict period.



Fig. D.1. Affiliated (left) and unaffiliated (right) ethnic groups in South Africa.




Fig. D.2. Predicted probabilities for different values of power-sharing practices with 95% CIs.

Table D.1. Post-conflict power-sharing agreements in Africa, 1989-2006

Country	Agreement	Post-conflict period	PA signature
Guinea Bissau	Agreement Between the Government of Guinea Bissau and the Self-Proclaimed Military Junta	01.11.1998-31.01.1999	01.11.1998
Mali	Tamanrasset Accord	31.12.1990-06.01.1996	06.01.1991
Senegal	Accord general de paix entre le gouvernement de la republique du Senegal el le Mouvement des forces democratique de la Casamace (MFDC)	31.12.2003-30.12.2009	30.12.2004
Niger	Paris Accord	31.12.1992-16.05.1994	10.06.1993
Niger	Ouagadougou Accord	09.10.1994-09.10.1999	09.10.1994
Côte d'Ivoire	Linas-Marcoussis Peace Accords	23.01.2003-24.01.2003	23.01.2003
Côte d'Ivoire	Accra II	07.03.2003-07.06.2004	07.03.2003
Côte d'Ivoire	Accra III	30.07.2004-09.11.2004	30.07.2004
Coted'Ivoire	Pretoria Agreement on the Peace Process in Côte d'Ivoire	31.12.2004-06.04.2010	06.04.2005
Liberia	Banjul III Agreement	24.10.1990-21.12.1990	24.10.1990
Liberia	Banjul IV Agreement	21.12.1990-31.10.1992	21.12.1990
Liberia	Accra Peace Agreement	18.08.2003-18.08.2008	18.08.2003
Sierra Leone	Abidjan Peace Agreement	30.11.1996-13.05.1997	30.11.1996
Sierra Leone	Lomé Peace Agreement	07.07.1999-26.05.2000	07.07.1999
Sierra Leone	Abuja Ceasefire Agreement	10.11.2000-10.11.2005	10.11.2000
Chad	El Geneina Agreement	31.10.1992-31.12.1993	31.10.1992
Chad	Abeche Agreement	12.10.1994-12.10.1999	12.10.1994
Chad	Tripoli-1 Agreement	16.10.1993-22.10.1993	16.10.1993
Chad	Bangui-2 Agreement	11.08.1994-11.08.1999	11.08.1994
Chad	Dougia Accord	28.02.1993-15.12.1997	22.11.1995
Chad	Reconciliation Agreement	31.12.1997-03.07.2004	03.07.1999
Chad	Donya Agreement	07.05.1998-07.05.2003	07.05.1998
Chad	Tripoli-2 Agreement	07.01.2002-27.05.2002	07.01.2002
Chad	Yebibou Agreement	31.12.2002-18.08.2010	18.08.2005
Chad	Tripoli Accord	24.12.2006-24.12.2011	24.12.2006
Congo, Rep.	Agreement on Ending Hostilities in the Republic of Congo	29.12.1999-14.06.2002	29.12.1999
DR Congo (Zaire)	Lusaka Accord	10.07.1999-06.08.1999	10.07.1999
DR Congo (Zaire)	Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations (The Final Act)	31.12.2001-02.04.2008	02.04.2003
Uganda	Yumbe Peace Agreement	31.12.1997-24.12.2007	24.12.2002
Burundi*	Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi	08.05.1998-28.08.2005	28.08.2000
Burundi*	Global Ceasefire agreement between Transitional Government and the Forces pour la defence de la democratie (CNDD-FDD)	16.11.2003-16.11.2008	16.11.2003
Burundi*	Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of Burundi and the Palipehutu-FNL	07.09.2006-01.03.2008	07.09.2006
Rwanda*	Arusha Accords	04.08.1993-31.08.1993	04.08.1993
Somalia*	Addis Ababa Agreement	27.03.1993-05.06.1993	27.03.1993
Somalia*	Nairobi Declaration on National Reconciliation	24.03.1994-23.06.1994	24.03.1994
Djibouti*	Agreement on Peace and National Reconciliation	26.12.1994-26.12.1999	26.12.1994
Djibouti	General Agreement on Reform and Civil Concord	31.12.1999-07.02.2005	07.02.2000
Angola	Gbadolite Declaration on Angola	22.06.1989-24.08.1989	22.06.1989
Angola	Bicesse Agreement	31.05.1991-17.10.1992	31.05.1991
Angola	Lusaka Protocol	20.11.1994-23.11.1994	20.11.1994
Angola	Memorandum of Understanding	04.04.2002-04.04.2007	04.04.2002
Angola	Memorandum of Understanding on Peace and National Reconciliation in Cabinda province	31.12.2002-01.08.2011	01.08.2006
Mozambique	Acordo Geral de Paz	04.10.1992-04.10.1997	04.10.1992
South Africa*	Interim Constitution	31.12.1988-18.11.1998	18.11.1993
Comoros*	Famboni Declaration	13.12.1997-26.08.2005	26.08.2000
Sudan	Comprehensive Peace Agreement	31.12.2004-09.01.2010	09.01.2005
Sudan	Cairo Agreement	31.12.2001-18.06.2010	18.06.2005
Sudan	Darfur Peace Agreement	05.05.2006-05.05.2011	05.05.2006

* dropped due to problematic assignment of ethnic groups' settlement regions.

Table D.2. Groups included in the sample, 1989-2006.

Country	Ethnic group	Rebel group(s)	Country	Ethnic group	Rebel group(s)
Guinea-Bissau	Balanta		Congo, DRC	Ngbaka	MLC
Guinea-Bissau	Manjaco		Congo, DRC	Luba Shaba	
Guinea-Bissau	Papel		Congo, DRC	Ngbandi	MLC
Guinea-Bissau	Cape Verdean		Congo, DRC	Lulua	
Mali	Blacks (Mande, Peul, Voltaic etc.)		Congo, DRC	Other Kivu groups	
Mali	Tuareg	MPA	Congo, DRC	Lunda-Yeke	
Mali	Arabs/Moors		Congo, DRC	Tetela-Kusu	
Senegal	Wolof		Congo, DRC	Tutsi-Banyamulenge	RCD
Senegal	Pulaar		Uganda	Asians	
	(Peul, Toucouleur)		Uganda	Baganda	
Senegal	Serer		Uganda	Basoga	
Senegal	Mandingue (and other eastern groups)		Uganda	Langi/Acholi	
Senegal	Diola	MFDC	Uganda	Teso	
Niger	Djerma-Songhai		Uganda	Banyarwanda	
Niger	Hausa		Uganda	South-Westerners	
Niger	Kanouri			(Ankole, Banyoro, Toro)	
Niger	Toubou		Djibouti	Isaas (Somali)	
Niger	Tuareg	FLAA; CRA	Djibouti	Afar	FRUD; FRUD - AD
Côte d'Ivoire	Baule		Angola	Bakongo	FLEC-R
Côte d'Ivoire	Kru		Angola	Cabindan Mayombe	FLEC-R
Côte d'Ivoire	Northerners	MPCI; FRCI	Angola	Lunda-Chokwe	
	(Mande and Voltaic/Gur)		Angola	Mbundu-Mestico	
Côte d'Ivoire	Other Akans		Angola	Ovimbundu-Ovambo	
Côte d'Ivoire	Southern Mande	MPIGO; FRCI	Mozambique	Makonde-Yao	
Liberia	Americo-Liberians		Mozambique	Shona-Ndau	
Liberia	Gio	NPFL; INPFL	Mozambique	Tsonga-Chopi	
Liberia	Krahn (Guere)		Sudan	Azande	
Liberia	Mandingo		Sudan	Bari	
Liberia	Mano	NPFL	Sudan	Beja	SPLM/A
Sierra Leone	Creole		Sudan	Dinka	SPLM/A
Sierra Leone	Kono		Sudan	Fur	
Sierra Leone	Mende		Sudan	Latoka	
Sierra Leone	Northern Groups		Sudan	Masalit	
	(Temne, Limba)		Sudan	Nuba	SPLM/A
Chad	Arabs		Sudan	Nuer	NDA; SPLM/A
Chad	Hadjerai		Sudan	Other Arab groups	
Chad	Zaghawa, Bideyat		Sudan	Other Northern groups	
Chad	Sara	CSNPD	Sudan	Other Southern groups	SPLM/A
Chad	Toubou		Sudan	Shaygiyya, Ja'aliyyin and Danagla (Arab)	
Congo	Batéké		Sudan	Shilluk	SPLM/A
Congo	Bembe		Sudan	Rashaida	
Congo	Lari/Bakongo	Ntsiloulous	Sudan	Zaghawa	SLM/A - MM
Congo	Kouyou				
Congo	Mbochi (proper)				
Congo	Vili				
Congo, DRC	Azande-Mangbetu cluster				
Congo, DRC	Mbandja	MLC			
Congo, DRC	Bakongo				
Congo, DRC	Mongo	MLC			
Congo, DRC	Luba Kasai				

Table D.3. Regression Results—Robustness Checks 1

	No controls included				Only group-controls
	(R1)	(R2)	(R3)	(R4)	(R5)
DV: Protest occurrence	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
Power-sharing promise t_{-1}	-0.579 (0.658)				
Power-sharing practice t_{-1}		0.301* (0.153)		0.196 (0.192)	0.306 (0.193)
Power-sharing practice t_{-1} × Group affiliated with rebel-party				0.785 (0.666)	0.933+ (0.553)
Political power-sharing practice t_{-1}			0.530* (0.243)		
Military power-sharing practice t_{-1}			0.213 (0.206)		
Economic power-sharing practice t_{-1}			-0.628 (0.682)		
Territorial power-sharing practice t_{-1}			0.980* (0.355)		
Group affiliated with rebel-party				-1.301** (0.401)	-1.906*** (0.517)
Sum of group nighttime lights (log)					0.562*** (0.0862)
Group excluded from political power					-0.495 (0.388)
Relative population size					4.343 (2.870)
Relative population size ²					-7.044+ (4.106)
Years passed since last conflict (group)					-0.0258*** (0.00752)
Constant	-2.243*** (0.274)	-2.272*** (0.265)	-2.307*** (0.262)	-1.769*** (0.348)	-11.79*** (1.723)
Insig2u	-0.273 (0.368)	-0.258 (0.375)	-0.244 (0.385)	-0.556 (0.382)	-1.273** (0.430)
Year and country-fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	7,991	7,991	7,991	7,991	6,816
AIC	1752.898	1752.473	1748.381	1741.043	1600.311

Robust standard errors clustered at the country level. Months since last civilian activism not shown.

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.005$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table D.4. Regression Results—Robustness Checks 2

	No influential case	DV: Organized violence		Cont. IV
	(R6) Logit	(R7) Logit	(R8) Logit	(R9) Logit
Power-sharing practice t_{-1}	0.310 ⁺ (0.160)	-0.177 (0.271)	0.113 (0.484)	
Power-sharing practice $t_{-1} \times$ Group affiliated with rebel-party			-0.821 (0.973)	
Power-sharing practice (count) t_{-1}				0.0747*** (0.0128)
Group affiliated with rebel-party	-1.501* (0.653)	0.350 (0.443)	0.462 (0.521)	-1.785*** (0.516)
Sum of group nighttime lights (log)	0.634** (0.212)	0.142 (0.125)	0.144 (0.124)	0.610*** (0.116)
Group excluded from political power	-0.214 (0.268)	-0.672* (0.334)	-0.685* (0.337)	-0.549 (0.411)
Relative population size	7.285 ⁺ (3.792)	-5.419*** (1.523)	-5.595*** (1.501)	4.653 (3.041)
Relative population size ²	-11.09* (5.648)	5.365** (1.858)	5.556** (1.891)	-7.592 ⁺ (4.313)
Years passed since last conflict (group)	-0.0192 (0.0129)	-0.00143 (0.0120)	-0.000837 (0.0123)	-0.0275** (0.00866)
Polity score	0.118** (0.0371)	0.115** (0.0375)	0.116** (0.0373)	0.119** (0.0368)
Polity score ²	-0.0303 (0.0204)	-0.0284* (0.0107)	-0.0288* (0.0107)	-0.0294 ⁺ (0.0162)
Unresolved power-sharing issues/post-conflict agreement t_{-1}	-0.159 (0.339)	0.0729 (0.395)	0.0661 (0.406)	0.686 (0.523)
Elections or referendum t_{-1}	0.171 (0.512)	-0.273 (0.213)	-0.254 (0.229)	0.393 (0.397)
Prior conflict intensity: Civil war	3.325* (1.410)	-1.170*** (0.347)	-1.168*** (0.349)	3.263** (1.001)
Prior conflict type: Internationalized	-2.723* (1.057)	2.612*** (0.309)	2.618*** (0.309)	-1.051 ⁺ (0.575)
Constant	-14.66*** (4.249)	-3.007 (2.323)	-3.053 (2.274)	-13.73*** (2.303)
lnsig2u	-1.873* (0.892)	-1.715*** (0.381)	-1.677*** (0.394)	-1.141* (0.449)
Year and country-fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	5,237	6,372	6,372	6,816
AIC	1242.344	1175.449	1173.346	1583.881

Robust standard errors clustered at the country level. Months since last civilian activism not shown.

⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.005$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table D.5. Regression Results—Robustness Checks 3

DV: Protest occurrence	Country-level analysis			
	(R10) Logit	(R11) Logit	(R12) Logit	(R13) Logit
Power-sharing promise t_{-1}	-0.378 (0.547)			
Power-sharing practice t_{-1}		0.354+ (0.183)	0.407+ (0.217)	
Political power-sharing practice t_{-1}				0.550*** (0.147)
Military power-sharing practice t_{-1}				0.286 (0.246)
Economic power-sharing practice t_{-1}				0.0443 (0.775)
Territorial power-sharing practice t_{-1}				-1.515*** (0.199)
Prior conflict intensity: Civil war	0.154 (0.497)	0.141 (0.501)	0.190 (3.447)	0.142 (0.493)
Prior conflict type: Internationalized	-1.267*** (0.346)	-1.255*** (0.350)	1.153 (2.240)	-1.250*** (0.346)
Number of excluded groups	0.0409 (0.108)	0.0339 (0.106)	-0.204* (0.0933)	0.0354 (0.107)
Years passed since last conflict (Country)	-0.0416 (0.0775)	-0.0450 (0.0746)	-0.0852 (0.101)	-0.0431 (0.0745)
GDP (log)	0.296 (0.240)	0.299 (0.244)	1.752* (0.670)	0.304 (0.245)
Total population 1990 (log)	0.706* (0.330)	0.722* (0.323)	0.385 (2.459)	0.722* (0.325)
Polity score	0.0717* (0.0279)	0.0692* (0.0261)	0.0498* (0.0181)	0.0689* (0.0263)
Polity score ²	-0.0121+ (0.00634)	-0.0118+ (0.00646)	-0.0212* (0.00782)	-0.0118+ (0.00654)
Unresolved power-sharing issues/post-conflict agreement t_{-1}	-0.112 (0.441)	-0.137 (0.417)	-0.107 (0.416)	-0.116 (0.419)
Elections or referendum t_{-1}	0.610* (0.296)	0.593* (0.299)	0.620+ (0.335)	0.616* (0.301)
Constant	-12.81* (6.455)	-13.07* (6.394)	-17.70 (38.54)	-13.12* (6.430)
lnsig2u	-1.828 (1.305)	-1.728 (1.218)	-15.56 (.)	-1.722 (1.245)
Year-fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country-fixed effects			✓	
Observations	1,689	1,689	1,469	1,689
AIC	1587.869	1586.017	1526.867	1583.446

Robust standard errors clustered at the country level. Months since last civilian activism not shown.

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.005$, *** $p < 0.001$




Fig. D.3. Average marginal effect of implemented power-sharing practices (no abolition steps included).




Fig. D.4. Average marginal effect of political (upper left), military (upper right), economic (lower left) and territorial (lower right) power-sharing practices. Note that there is no variance for affiliated groups with economic power-sharing practices.

Appendix E

Supplementary Information for Chapter 5




Fig. E.1. Protest propensity in comparison to other countries surveyed in Afrobarometer round 4 (mean value: .1290142)

Table E.1. Overview of the most severe (top 10%) conflict-dyads according to UCDP *Battle-Related Deaths data set* (v.19.1)

Total casualties	Dyad-ID	Location	Side A	Side B
5,399	586	DRC (Zaire)	Govt. of DRC (Zaire)	RCD
5,535	459	North Yemen	Govt. of N. Yemen	AQAP
5,561	818	Sierra Leone	Govt. of Sierra Leone	RUF
5,761	584	DRC (Zaire)	Govt. of DRC (Zaire)	AFDL
5,776	747	Somalia	Govt. of Somalia	USC/SNA
5,858	14669	Nigeria	Govt. of Nigeria	IS
5,861	697	El Salvador	Govt. of El Salvador	FMLN
6,012	727	Afghanistan	Govt. of Afghanistan	Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction
6,114	830	Algeria	Govt. of Algeria	AQIM
6,193	631	Peru	Govt. of Peru	Sendero Luminoso
7,927	883	Australia, Iraq, UK, USA	Govts. of Australia, UK, USA	Government of Iraq
7,928	842	Tajikistan	Govt. of Tajikistan	UTO
7,970	411	Philippines	Govt. of Philippines	CPP
8,165	775	India	Govt. of India	Sikh insurgents
8,452	14320	Afghanistan	Govt. of Afghanistan	IS
8,549	688	Uganda	Govt. of Uganda	LRA
9,033	734	Afghanistan	Govt. of Afghanistan	Jumbish-i Milli-yi Islami
9,579	726	Afghanistan	Govt. of Afghanistan	Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan
9,729	835	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Govt. of Bosnia-Herzegovina	Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
9,915	562	Nepal	Govt. of Nepal	CPN-M
10,000	862	Congo (Rep.)	Govt. of Congo	Cobras
10,216	829	Algeria	Govt. of Algeria	GIA
12,211	640	Nigeria	Govt. of Nigeria	Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad
15,717	14595	North Yemen	Govt. of N. Yemen	Forces of Hadi
16,854	623	Colombia	Govt. of Colombia	FARC
18,040	792	India	Govt. of India	Kashmir insurgents
18,164	852	Russia (SU)	Govt. of Russia (SU)	Chechen Rep. of Ichkeria
18,554	750	Somalia	Govt. of Somalia	Al-Shabaab
22,848	799	Iraq, Kuwait	Govt. of Iraq	Government of Kuwait
25,785	736	Afghanistan	Govt. of Afghanistan	UIFSA
27,332	857	Pakistan	Govt. of Pakistan	TTP
30,118	781	Turkey	Govt. of Turkey	PKK
30,227	714	Angola	Govt. of Angola	UNITA
31,240	663	Sudan	Govt. of Sudan	SPLM/A
41,269	558	Ethiopia	Govt. of Ethiopia	EPRDF
41,467	14620	Syria	Govt. of Syria	IS
43,470	571	Ethiopia	Govt. of Ethiopia	EPLF
60,674	776	Sri Lanka	Govt. of Sri Lanka	LTTE
61,060	524	Iraq	Govt. of Iraq	IS
98,217	865	Eritrea, Ethiopia	Govt. of Eritrea	Government of Ethiopia
146,342	735	Afghanistan	Govt. of Afghanistan	Taleban
242,041	11973	Syria	Govt. of Syria	Syrian insurgents

Generation of Primary Control Variables

I include a set of control variables into the models that are based on survey responses from the Afrobarometer round 1 (2000). The creation of the control variables follows the same approach as applied in Rohner et al. (2013): I take the district-mean of each variable in order to capture differences in propensities for grievances and ethnic identification prior to the observation period. Unfortunately, the items are not identical across the survey rounds, but the three questions chosen here should capture both phenomena to a sufficient extent: In order to capture pre-treatment levels of collective grievances, I rely on the survey question “In your opinion, how often are (respondent’s identity from q18) treated unfairly by the government?”. Note here that the question – unlike in the 4th round – does not explicitly ask for the ethnic group. It thus captures the idea of perceptions of collective deprivation, albeit not specifically targeted at ethnic groups. In contrast to the 4th round of the Afrobarometer, there is no corresponding question contrasting ethnic with national identity. However, question 18 asks about the respondent’s self-identification more broadly conceived: “Besides being Ugandan, which specific group do you feel you belong to first and foremost?”. I create a dummy variable here taking the value 1 if the respondent answered with “Ethnic”, and 0 otherwise (see also Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti 2013). Additionally, I collapse the question “How much do you trust each of them to do what is right? Someone from your own ethnic group” into a binary variable in order to approach the concept of in-group social trust more closely.

Operationalization of the Alternative Measure for County-Level Violence in Table E.3 based on UCDP GED (Sundberg and Melander 2013)

The operationalization procedure is equivalent to the one used for the main variables: I focus on all violent events in the respective time period and include all forms of organized violence, that is, state-based violence (battles) between rebels and the government, one-sided violence against civilians, and non-state violence between militant groups.

Table E.2. Robustness checks I

	Logit	Protests pre-2000	District- level	No Acholi respondents	Afrobarometer round 5
	(A1)	(A2)	(A3)	(A4)	(A5)
DV: Protest participation	Logit	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
Violent events in county (log)	0.0125* (0.0056)	0.0138* (0.0056)		0.0118+ (0.0068)	-0.0087 (0.0087)
Protest occurrence pre-2000		-0.0148 (0.0419)			
Individual controls:					
Urban location	0.0015 (0.0200)	-0.0035 (0.0224)	-0.0080 (0.0240)	0.0038 (0.0232)	0.0004 (0.0423)
Female	-0.0359*** (0.0098)	-0.0353*** (0.0098)	-0.0354*** (0.0094)	-0.0334*** (0.0098)	-0.0500*** (0.0134)
Level of education	0.0103 (0.0138)	0.0104 (0.0138)	0.0102 (0.0167)	0.0174 (0.0143)	-0.0011 (0.0044)
Respondent's age	-0.0014** (0.0005)	-0.0013** (0.0004)	-0.0013* (0.0005)	-0.0009* (0.0004)	-0.0009+ (0.0005)
Public services (individual)	0.0134* (0.0061)	0.0143* (0.0066)	0.0137+ (0.0070)	0.0149* (0.0068)	0.0146+ (0.0082)
TV/Radio ownership	0.0380* (0.0166)	0.0317* (0.0132)	0.0306* (0.0122)	0.0351* (0.0135)	0.0073 (0.0149)
Employed	0.0002 (0.0122)	0.0010 (0.0127)	0.0010 (0.0108)	0.0087 (0.0131)	0.0255 (0.0179)
County-level controls:					
Total population (log)	-0.0209* (0.0092)	-0.0219 (0.0147)	-0.0182 (0.0122)	-0.0223+ (0.0124)	0.0209 (0.0172)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.0815* (0.0368)	0.0867* (0.0365)	0.0908* (0.0358)	0.0940* (0.0411)	0.0051 (0.0521)
Public services (county)	-0.0531+ (0.0314)	-0.0541 (0.0461)	-0.0543 (0.0386)	-0.0609 (0.0396)	0.0401 (0.0666)
Religious fractionalization	-0.0709 (0.0988)	-0.0708 (0.1026)	-0.1034 (0.0879)	-0.0861 (0.1113)	0.0557 (0.1500)
Violent events in district (log)			0.0094 (0.0065)		
Constant		0.4664* (0.2082)	0.4324* (0.2008)	0.4621* (0.2005)	-0.4442+ (0.2294)
Controls from AB round 1	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	2,220	2,220	2,220	2,045	2,070
R^2		0.027	0.026	0.027	0.029

Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered on the county-level (A4: district-level).

Results for logit models show average marginal effects

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table E.3. Robustness checks II

DV: Protest participation	Alternative independent variables					
	(A6) OLS	(A7) OLS	(A8) OLS	(A9) OLS	(A10) OLS	(A11) OLS
Violent events in county	0.0008*** (0.0002)					
Fatalities in county (log)		0.0090* (0.0037)				
Violence against civilians in county (log)			0.0154* (0.0069)			
Violent LRA events in county (log)				0.0157** (0.0055)		
Violent events in county, GED (log)					0.0178* (0.0068)	
Maximum number of IDPs in district, 2000-2005 (log)						0.0029* (0.0013)
Individual-level controls:						
Urban location	-0.0034 (0.0231)	-0.0043 (0.0220)	-0.0042 (0.0219)	-0.0064 (0.0237)	-0.0052 (0.0230)	-0.0100 (0.0232)
Female	-0.0355*** (0.0098)	-0.0353*** (0.0098)	-0.0353*** (0.0098)	-0.0351*** (0.0098)	-0.0355*** (0.0098)	-0.0353*** (0.0097)
Level of education	0.0097 (0.0138)	0.0107 (0.0138)	0.0102 (0.0139)	0.0107 (0.0138)	0.0095 (0.0139)	0.0101 (0.0139)
Respondent's age	-0.0013** (0.0004)	-0.0013** (0.0004)	-0.0012** (0.0004)	-0.0012** (0.0004)	-0.0013** (0.0004)	-0.0013** (0.0004)
Public services (individual)	0.0149* (0.0067)	0.0146* (0.0067)	0.0136* (0.0067)	0.0139* (0.0068)	0.0144* (0.0067)	0.0128+ (0.0067)
TV/Radio ownership	0.0312* (0.0129)	0.0308* (0.0132)	0.0307* (0.0134)	0.0325* (0.0132)	0.0314* (0.0131)	0.0313* (0.0131)
Employed	0.0013 (0.0124)	0.0014 (0.0125)	0.0017 (0.0124)	0.0003 (0.0125)	0.0013 (0.0125)	0.0016 (0.0124)
County-level controls:						
Total population (log)	-0.0223* (0.0110)	-0.0218+ (0.0116)	-0.0228+ (0.0118)	-0.0158 (0.0109)	-0.0194+ (0.0111)	-0.0121 (0.0112)
Ethnic fraction- alization	0.0769* (0.0350)	0.0906* (0.0375)	0.0847* (0.0368)	0.0842* (0.0354)	0.0780* (0.0349)	0.0897* (0.0370)
Public services (county)	-0.0521 (0.0399)	-0.0553 (0.0393)	-0.0615 (0.0414)	-0.0396 (0.0392)	-0.0492 (0.0399)	-0.0358 (0.0398)
Religious fraction- alization	-0.0444 (0.1005)	-0.0993 (0.0936)	-0.0784 (0.1033)	-0.0801 (0.0931)	-0.0751 (0.1008)	-0.1537 (0.0930)
Constant	0.5074* (0.2015)	0.4854* (0.1979)	0.5062* (0.2002)	0.4558* (0.1995)	0.4793* (0.1996)	0.4182* (0.2006)
Controls from AB round 1	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	2,220	2,220	2,220	2,220	2,220	2,220
R^2	0.028	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.026

Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered on the county-level.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table E.4. Interaction effects

	(A12)	(A13)	(A14)
DV: Protest participation	OLS	OLS	OLS
Violent events in county (log)	0.0198** (0.0065)	0.0217** (0.0065)	0.0200* (0.0088)
Violent events in county (log) × Ratio (own group/other group, log)	0.0096** (0.0032)	0.0081* (0.0034)	0.0087* (0.0039)
Ratio (own group/other group, log)	-0.0436*** (0.0113)	-0.0379** (0.0124)	-0.0379* (0.0146)
Individual controls:			
Urban location	-0.0015 (0.0206)	-0.0041 (0.0206)	-0.0021 (0.0219)
Female	-0.0337*** (0.0098)	-0.0335*** (0.0098)	-0.0358*** (0.0101)
Level of education	0.0090 (0.0140)	0.0080 (0.0140)	0.0108 (0.0141)
Respondent's age	-0.0013** (0.0004)	-0.0013** (0.0004)	-0.0013** (0.0005)
Public services (individual)	0.0169* (0.0068)	0.0162* (0.0068)	0.0179** (0.0065)
TV/Radio ownership	0.0322* (0.0137)	0.0329* (0.0137)	0.0320* (0.0133)
Employed	-0.0031 (0.0121)	-0.0027 (0.0122)	-0.0076 (0.0124)
County-level controls:			
Total population (log)	-0.0311** (0.0117)	-0.0317** (0.0118)	-0.0334* (0.0146)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.0410 (0.0365)	0.0439 (0.0351)	0.0672+ (0.0398)
Public services (county)	-0.0499 (0.0397)	-0.0488 (0.0411)	-0.0469 (0.0421)
Religious fractionalization	-0.2385* (0.1061)	-0.2894* (0.1158)	-0.3200* (0.1312)
Ethnic group-level controls:			
Nation-wide total population: own group (log)	-0.0187 (0.0141)	-0.0186 (0.0144)	-0.2665*** (0.0424)
Religious fractionalization w/n ethnic group	0.3029* (0.1248)	0.2470+ (0.1286)	0.8972*** (0.1312)
Mean availability of services (ethnic group)	0.4405** (0.1382)	0.4294** (0.1552)	-2.0838 (2.2994)
Constant	0.6193* (0.2724)	0.7007* (0.2950)	4.4954*** (0.3229)
Ethnic group-dummies			✓
Region-dummies		✓	✓
Controls from AB round 1	✓	✓	✓
Observations	2,193	2,193	2,193
R^2	0.040	0.041	0.057

Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered on the county-level.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table E.5. Interaction effects (10 km radius)

DV: Protest participation	(A15) OLS	(A16) OLS	(A17) OLS
Violent events in county (log)	0.0196** (0.0065)	0.0216** (0.0065)	0.0200* (0.0088)
Violent events in county (log) × Ratio (own group/other group, 10km, log)	0.0096** (0.0032)	0.0081* (0.0034)	0.0087* (0.0039)
Ratio (own group/other group, 10km, log)	-0.0430*** (0.0112)	-0.0374** (0.0123)	-0.0374* (0.0145)
Individual controls:			
Urban location	-0.0022 (0.0207)	-0.0047 (0.0207)	-0.0025 (0.0219)
Female	-0.0338*** (0.0098)	-0.0336*** (0.0098)	-0.0358*** (0.0101)
Level of education	0.0091 (0.0140)	0.0081 (0.0139)	0.0109 (0.0140)
Respondent's age	-0.0013** (0.0004)	-0.0013** (0.0004)	-0.0013** (0.0005)
Public services (individual)	0.0168* (0.0068)	0.0161* (0.0068)	0.0178** (0.0065)
TV/Radio ownership	0.0322* (0.0137)	0.0330* (0.0137)	0.0320* (0.0133)
Employed	-0.0032 (0.0121)	-0.0029 (0.0122)	-0.0077 (0.0124)
County-level controls:			
Total population (log)	-0.0301* (0.0116)	-0.0307** (0.0117)	-0.0326* (0.0146)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.0426 (0.0365)	0.0454 (0.0350)	0.0685+ (0.0397)
Public services (county)	-0.0477 (0.0397)	-0.0466 (0.0413)	-0.0451 (0.0423)
Religious fractionalization	-0.2430* (0.1059)	-0.2937* (0.1155)	-0.3231* (0.1311)
Ethnic group-level controls:			
Nation-wide total population: own group (log)	-0.0185 (0.0141)	-0.0184 (0.0144)	-0.2665*** (0.0424)
Religious fractionalization w/n ethnic group	0.3077* (0.1252)	0.2509+ (0.1288)	0.8977*** (0.1312)
Mean availability of services (ethnic group)	0.4387** (0.1380)	0.4288** (0.1552)	-2.0885 (2.3000)
Constant	0.6061* (0.2732)	0.6878* (0.2966)	4.4913*** (0.3233)
Ethnic group-dummies			✓
Region-dummies		✓	✓
Controls from AB round 1	✓	✓	✓
Observations	2,193	2,193	2,193
R^2	0.040	0.041	0.057

Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered on the county-level.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table E.6. Interaction effects (national group-level exposure)

DV: Protest participation	(A18) OLS	(A19) OLS
Violent events in county (log)	-0.0069 (0.0144)	-0.0042 (0.0139)
Violent events in county (log) × Own group violent exposure nationwide (log)	0.0058* (0.0024)	0.0055* (0.0023)
Own group violent exposure nationwide (log)	-0.0071 (0.0053)	-0.0044 (0.0054)
Individual controls:		
Urban location	-0.0068 (0.0207)	-0.0107 (0.0208)
Female	-0.0358*** (0.0097)	-0.0356*** (0.0097)
Level of education	0.0108 (0.0137)	0.0095 (0.0137)
Respondent's age	-0.0013** (0.0004)	-0.0013** (0.0004)
Public services (individual)	0.0152* (0.0064)	0.0148* (0.0065)
TV/Radio ownership	0.0336* (0.0134)	0.0339* (0.0135)
Employed	-0.0027 (0.0120)	-0.0018 (0.0122)
County-level controls:		
Total population (log)	-0.0287* (0.0125)	-0.0291* (0.0126)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.0864* (0.0348)	0.0824* (0.0353)
Public services (county)	-0.0494 (0.0406)	-0.0494 (0.0423)
Religious fractionalization	-0.2631* (0.1035)	-0.3325** (0.1087)
Ethnic group-level controls:		
Nation-wide total population: own group (log)	-0.0149 (0.0134)	-0.0161 (0.0137)
Religious fractionalization w/n ethnic group	0.3717*** (0.1055)	0.3252** (0.1050)
Mean availability of services (ethnic group)	0.2987** (0.0909)	0.2521** (0.0904)
Constant	0.6076** (0.2182)	0.6988** (0.2297)
Region-dummies		✓
Controls from AB round 1	✓	✓
Observations	2,220	2,220
R^2	0.036	0.038

Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered on the county-level.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$




Fig. E.2. Average marginal effects “Violent events in county (log)” for different values of “Own group violent exposure nationwide (log)” with 95% CIs (based on model A18).




Fig. E.3. This graph visually depicts the sensitivity of the findings in model 3 (causal mediation analysis) to violations of the sequential ignorability assumption, which is, that the error terms from the mediator and outcome are independent from each other. The sensitivity analysis shows that the mediation effect (ACME) becomes zero once both error terms show a correlation larger than .06.

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