Politics, Migration and Minorities
in Independent and Soviet Estonia, 1918-1998

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Note: Due to technical problems, each chapter had to be printed separately.
A Table of Figures, Maps, and Tables could unfortunately not be provided.
Preface

The present study is the result of half a decade of work on and in Estonia; counting in first contacts with the country, even more years have passed since the language course in 1993 which started the process. It was made possible by the Graduates’ College on Migration in Modern Europe at the University of Osnabrück’s Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural Studies (IMIS), whose scholarship and infrastructure were liberally put to the disposition of all members of the Graduate’s College between 1995 and 1998, including the present author. From the start of the actual research work in 1995, research visits to Estonia took place twice a year for between four and six weeks, resulting in a wealth of information in hard and ‘soft’ facts, augmented by further research visits within Germany. Many colleagues liberally dispensed with their time to discuss matters Estonian with the author, and provided material that would have been difficult to come by without their help. Apart from data collection and interviews with experts, the visits to a country that had internal and external problems in roughly inverse proportion to its size allowed for the special privilege to gage the mood of the population by keeping an ear on the ground, as it were. By trying to assess the immaterial determinants of value systems and collective mentalities in the country itself, by using the somewhat vaguely fixed and difficult to grapple thing called ‘empathy’, a gut feeling developed that may not be acceptable to everyone but proved to be helpful in developing and understanding for the situation of the country. These were the ‘soft’ facts alluded to above.

A special thanks is due to the author’s supervisors of the thesis, Professors Klaus J. Bade of IMIS, University of Osnabrück, and Gerhard Simon, of BIOst Cologne and the University of Cologne, for constant support even in rather unsettled times, for helping to clarify the underlying concept of the study, and especially for accepting a thesis by a German on an Estonian topic written in English at a German University. Not only this author’s second working language is English but also most academics have English at least passively. This is also true for Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic states in particular. Not many colleagues, though, know German, and this is the main reason for composing this dissertation in English: if there should be anything by way of constructive comment from Estonian or Russian colleagues in Estonia after the dissertation process has been concluded, restricting oneself to German would not have resulted in any comment from the country this work deals with. Admittedly this language also allows for a wider readership than German would. To both professors, suur tänu. Thanks are also due to Mrs. Joan Hogg, B.A. (Durham), and Mr. John Hogg, M.A. (Durham), who kindly agreed to review the author’s English and managed to return the files with the speed of lightning despite having a busy schedule themselves; all suggestions and corrections have been included in the versions that since then have still been added to and revised many times, hopefully not for the worse. Finally two people deserve mention whose support in every conceivable and even inconceivable way over the last two years and over the last thirty-two years, respectively, cannot be appreciated in words – Ms. Gerda Spellmeyer and Mr. Horst Demuth.

## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACE</td>
<td>Analysis of Current Events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJPH</td>
<td>Australian Journal of Politics and History</td>
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<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>Associated Press</td>
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<tr>
<td>AP(^1)</td>
<td>Außenpolitik</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBC WS</td>
<td>BBC World Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BFAI</td>
<td>Bundesstelle för Außenhandelsinformationen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIOst</td>
<td>Bundesinstitut für internationale und ostwissenschaftliche Studien, Cologne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bn</td>
<td>billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNS</td>
<td><em>Baltic News Service</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>cent: senti, Estonian and US currency decimals; circa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBSS</td>
<td>Council of Baltic Sea States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CC</td>
<td>Central Committee, see CPSU</td>
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<tr>
<td>CE</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEPA</td>
<td>CE Parliamentary Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFE</td>
<td>Conventional Forces in Europe; Treaty as well as Negotiations on CF Reduction</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency, USA</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPCS</td>
<td><em>Communist and Post-Communist Studies</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPE</td>
<td>Communist Party of Estonia</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPSU</td>
<td>Communist Party of the Soviet Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, <em>see OSCE</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Council of Senior Officials of the CSCE / OSCE</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSPP</td>
<td>Centre for the Study of Public Policy, Glasgow</td>
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<tr>
<td>DM</td>
<td>German Deutschmark</td>
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<tr>
<td>DR</td>
<td>Daily Report (see RFE/RL)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EBRD</td>
<td>European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Frankfurt</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEK</td>
<td>‘Eesti Krooni,’ Estonian Crowns, legal tender of the Republic of Estonia</td>
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<tr>
<td>EHS</td>
<td>Estonian Heritage Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>EHS</td>
<td>Estonian Heritage Society: <em>Eesti Muinsuskaitse Selts</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>ENIP</td>
<td>Estonian National Independence Party</td>
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<td>ENIP</td>
<td>Estonian National Independence Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPL</td>
<td><em>Eesti Päevaleht</em>, Tallinn, Estonia</td>
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<tr>
<td>ETV</td>
<td><em>Eesti Televisioon</em>, Estonian TV</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>[UN] Food and Agriculture Organisation, Rome</td>
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<td>FAZ</td>
<td><em>Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>FN</td>
<td>Footnote(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td><em>Frankfurter Rundschau</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FT</td>
<td><em>Financial Times</em>, London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, now WTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBP, £</td>
<td>British Pound</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GO</td>
<td>Governmental Organisation</td>
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\(^1\) This abbreviation is used only in bibliographic references; a confusion with the *Associated Press* news agency is unlikely if the context of this abbreviation is observed: ‘AP reported on...’ can only refer to the news agency, for with a reference to the there must be a precise location of a given article quoted from this very journal: ‘in: *AP* 22(1), 1995, pp. 102-123.’ can thus only refer to the journal.
HCNM High Commissioner on National Minorities, see OSCE, CBSS
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IBS Institute for Baltic Studies, Tallinn
IGO International Governmental Organisation
IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies, London
ILO International Labour Organization, Geneva
IMF International Monetary Fund
INGO International Non-Governmental Organisation
IO International Organization; *International Organization*
JBS *Journal of Baltic Studies*
k, ktons kilo, one thousand units, e.g. 1 kton, one thousand tons
m million
MFN Most Favoured Nation, Trading status accorded by USA
MIC Military-Industrial Complex
MRP-AEG *Molotov-Ribbentrop Pakti Avalikustamise Eesti Grupp*: Estonian Group for the Publication of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact
NACC North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NFA *Nachrichten für den Außenhandel*
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NYT *New York Times*
ODIHR Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the OSCE, *Warsaw*
OE *Osteuropa*
OEA *Osteuropa Archiv*
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris
OER *Osteuropa Recht*
OEW *Osteuropa Wirtschaft*
OMRI Open Media Research Institute, INTERNET provider
OMRI AB *OMRI Analytic Briefs*, INTERNET Journal
OMRI DD *OMRI Daily Digest*, INTERNET Journal
OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PCDEC Decision of the Permanent Council of the OSCE
PCI Permanent Council of the OSCE, Vienna
PF Popular Front (Rahvarinne)
PFE Popular Front of Estonia, *Rahvarinne*
PPF, PP NATO Partnership for Peace
PHARE (EU) Poland/Hungary Assistance for the Reconstruction of the Economy (cf. EU)
PL *Päevaleht*, Tallinn, Estonia
PM *Postimees*, Estonian Daily
RFE/RL *Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty*
RSSBS *Russia and the Successor States Briefing Service*
RT *Riigi Teataja*, Estonian State Gazetteer
RUSI Royal United Services Institute, London
S + F *Sicherheit und Frieden*
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Stockholm
SL *Sõnumileht*, Tallinn, Estonia
SU Soviet Union, *also USSR*
SZ *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Munich
TBI *The Baltic Independent*, Tallinn, Estonia
UdSSR German: *USSR*
UN, UNO United Nations Organisation
UNCTAD UN Conference on Trade And Development
UNDP UN Development Programme
UNESCO UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UP University Press
USD, US$, $ United States Dollar
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, *see SU*
WEU Western European Union, Paris, defense organisation of EU
WP Washington Post
WTO World Trade Organisation, Geneva; successor to GATT
WTO Warsaw Treaty Organisation, now defunct
ZIP Zeitschrift für Politik
1 Introduction
This work comprises eighty years of Estonian history: two short phases of independence, and one of fifty ‘Years of Dependence’ under Soviet rule. From 1918 to 1940, and from 1991 until today, Estonia has been an independent republic on the Baltic Sea with an interwar population of 1.1 million, of whom some 12% were non-Estonians. In the intermediate period, it was one of the 15 republics in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, USSR, and at its Western periphery. When the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic, ESSR, regained its independence in 1991 due to the USSR’s seminal collapse, some 600,000 or 38.5% of its population of 1.6 million were non-Estonians. The question is, who these non-Estonians are, where they came from and why, as well as under what conditions. In addition, it will be asked what relation, if any, these immigrants had or have with the local population, whether or not there were changes in the relation, and what influence the Soviet era as such might have had on Estonians and non-Estonians alike, especially with regard to the post-Soviet era.

The aim of this work is to reconstruct the causes, conditions, and consequences of the fundamental population change outlined above against the background of their historical context. The major determining factor for this change was the migration that took place during the period in which the ESSR was incorporated into the Soviet Union and it is this factor upon which the main focus of this work is placed. The Soviet Union was a single-party state with a party which claimed to have the historical duty and brief to steer the country in every aspect of life. Art. 6 of the 1977 Constitution even enshrined this principle, as according to this article, the CPSU was the ‘leading and guiding force in Soviet society, the centre of its political system, its state organs and public organisations.’ Because of the state and the system in which it took place, migration itself was heavily influenced by the changing political and economic conditions of the time that prevailed. All three factors, therefore, have to be seen together as they together changed the makeup of the population and the society that developed during the Soviet period until 1991. The following post-Soviet period, in particular the interethnic relationship and the ‘new’ minority problem that ensued after 1991 as a result of Estonia’s renewed statehood and the reversal in status of Estonians and non-Estonians, has been well researched from a multitude of disciplines, including political science, sociology, jurisprudence, and human geography, to name but a few. The historical component which reconstructs the actual genesis of the problem and seeks to explain whence these minorities came in the first place, and why, has so far not been included beyond the briefest mention. The present work attempts to close this gap.

The way to approach this complex problem is to use a model along whose three levels this work is structured. The three levels that have been developed for analysis are thus: 1., Politics and Economics; 2., Migration and Demography; and 3., Society and Inter-Ethnic Relations. To make this model operational, it is applied within a chronological framework that provides the macro-structure of this work. Following this introduc-

tion, there are thus five chronological units leading up to the post-Soviet period: 1., the interwar pre-Soviet period; 2.-5., the Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev eras. Each chronological unit forms a chapter with three sections representing the three levels outlined above. An outlook on the post-Soviet period is contained in the last section of the last chapter, dealing with the major traits of the Soviet legacy and pointing out some of the major consequences both on the domestic and international level.

1.1 CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
The changing political climate consequent upon the demise of the superpower rivalry, the end of the Cold War and the sea-change in the political landscape in Central and Eastern Europe around 1989-1990 allowed for substantial advances and improvements both in interstate cooperation on bi- and multilateral levels in general and in human rights questions in particular. Also, Minorities and Minority Questions became topical in the 1990s again after 45 years of life in the political wings. Oftentimes, however, they were treated as if they would have always existed at their current or actual place of residence. This is right on the first count and wrong on the second. Minorities have indeed somehow always existed, but the question is why this was so, therefore also how they came about. Migration is the missing link, for without it, no population movement would ever have taken place, therefore the world would be a composition of totally ethnically homogeneous peoples. This clearly is not the case. Oftentimes, too, minority problems were analysed on a judicial or human rights background only, or examined under socio-economic aspects couched in inclusion-exclusion or majority-minority terms. Many a survey and much factor analysis has been conducted to try and understand the current problems. Again, examining the dimension of migration will deliver a further facet of the picture that may otherwise be missing. For e.g., in international law there is until today no clearly accepted definition of the term and content of ‘minority’, as interpretations of their problems and treatments by a given majority and the various political interests behind them vary. The question is not only what problem these minorities might have or perceive to have and how to rectify this. Rather, the question is how this problem came about in the first place and why. Therefore, by looking at migration that may have led to the creation of one or more minorities one takes a step back and looks at the primary determinants of this minority problem as part of the overall makeup of a state’s society. In as intensely political a state as the Soviet Union, the state’s system in turn provides the primary determinant of the migration process. Ultimately, this means that to understand the formation of society and the creation of minorities through migration, one has to look at the role of the state.

1.1.1 Conceptualising Migration

To conceptualise the problem outlined above, the actual migration process has to be dealt with first. Because the problem in question is an intensely historical one, the perfect match to situate the present study is the concept of Socio-Historical Migration Research (SHMR). In conjunction with a five-phase model which reflects and encompasses the demands made by SHMR and adapts it to problem of providing a framework for the analysis of the migration process in the context of the Soviet Union, this construct provides the conceptual backbone. To accommodate the demands made by this context and form a workable model which can be made operational in this study, the complexities are reduced to three levels: 1., Politics and Economics; 2., Migration and Demography; and 3., Society and Inter-Ethnic Relations.

1.1.1.1 Socio-Historical Migration Research

In the briefest possible of terms, SHMF suggests that migration has to be located within a complex context of interdependent determining factors such as population development, economy and society so that the multi-dimensional and multi-causal character of migration becomes apparent. Although in the final analysis, the migration decision is taken on an individual level, this concept looks at the larger, structural context of bulk numbers. The historical structural context has to be analysed by looking at the determining forces and developing factors that lead to either intensifying or weakening migration. In addition, supra-individual factors and contexts can be divided into material factors, such as economic, social or institutional structures, and immaterial factors, such as value systems, collective mentalities, or needs of an individual or group. A caveat in this regard is the fact that the reconstruction of migration oftentimes has to be along the lines of rather varied and not always continuous data material.

The tasks are, therefore, first, to examine migration events with regard to questions of their volume, course of action, and structures; this has to include as far as possible the entire context in which the action as such takes place, so that the decision-making process, barring forced or other forms of coerced migration, becomes transparent. The second task is to analyse the course of action, or the process, of migration by looking at the above-mentioned material and immaterial determining factors, such as push- and pull factors in the sending and receiving areas; the motivations and intentions stimulating or inspiring the process, such as the intention to emigrate, or to find a (temporary) job; this may also be differentiated along regional, group, or class structures. Finally, this includes the examination of the specific conditions at the place of departure as well as at the place of arrival under which a particular migration event takes place. At the place of arrival this can be further elucidated by looking at the complex process of interaction with the local population in terms of the migrants’ integration, acculturation, or assimila-

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tion. Migration therefore has to be seen as a comprehensive process in space and time that for further clarification will be separated in five analytical phases.

1.1.1.2 A Model of Migration

This section is based on an earlier model which comprises four phases: a starting phase, a travelling phase, an arrival phase and a sojourner, settlement, or residence phase. The nature of migration in the Soviet Union made it necessary to insert a new second phase, for not only is the arrival subject to passing a gate but also the departure. This is due to the passport system and its rigorous administrative procedures of signing out and in at the police when moving from one place to another outside the administrative territory’s boundaries of last residence. In the final phase, the historical watershed that occurred in 1991 led to a marked extension of the aspects under which the settlement and residence of the non-Estonian are discussed; an outline of this discussion is provided below as it belongs to the context of the consequences of Soviet-era immigration. Those who only sojourned in the ESSR have largely re-entered the migration process and left Estonia.

As in SHMR, the basic idea of the model has been that in the final analysis, migration is the action of a single individual, for it is only the individual person that will decide to migrate or not. This may well happen within a group context, or on account of a family council decision. However, the decision to accept a family council’s decision that the second son go to the capital to find work is that of the second son as much as it is the decision of a potential migrant to join a migrating crowd of people. Therefore, to migrate an eventual individual decision is necessary, whatever the context. It then becomes a process, which may very well happen very erratically, and whose phases may happen much more chaotically than this model may appear to suggest: as little as there is hardly ever one clear-cut reason for, and type of, migration, neither is there a regular linear progression within the following four phases of the proffered model.

The model’s first phase is the phase in which migration starts; the model looks at the overall background of the decision to migrate, at the decision-making process which may or may not lead to migration, and explains to the greatest extent possible in the context of missing surveys how this decision may have come about. The migration that is subject to analysis in this study took place in a type of state which operated with stiff controls over society and vigorously enforced rules. Moreover, the state’s system was based on planning the economy and almost every other aspect of life – down to the birth


8 On historical migration cf. Leslie Page Moch: Moving Europeans. Migration in Western Europe since 1650, Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992. This book has almost an overload of examples at the beginning, which then peter out towards the end.
rates of the population (sic!). So long as these controls operated with full coercive power, as happened under Stalin, migration was therefore subject to severe penalty which could include many years in a labour camp if voluntary migrants were caught without proper authorisation.\(^9\) Migration in this era was therefore politically induced and administratively organised. Migrants were one element in the plan and their duty was like human robots to fulfil the function that the state gave to them and do as they were told. Over time, i.e. in the Khrushchev and especially in the Brezhnev eras, coercion was first abolished under the former leader and gave way to complacency and corruption under the latter which allowed for the circumvention or bending of rules, in addition to which theoretically applying penalties were no longer meted out. It was then that migration could take on a more voluntary character and other decision-making factors came into play that went far beyond purely economic betterment by means of higher salary. Further perks such as individual living quarters, which in the Soviet Union were constantly in short supply, or determinants, such as the geographical location and its climate, became more important than simple financial matters in influencing the decision-making process: there was a marked difference between the hardship endured in the High North in Siberia to the quality of life in the Crimea or in the Baltic republics in almost every aspect imaginable. Consequently, as the political climate under Brezhnev had undergone profound change and such decision-making had become possible, the type of migrants changed. This was not inconsiderably influenced by the quality of their mindsets which is very difficult to gage; yet still the cliché applies that they, too, were children of their time, and the outlook and demands made on state and society were different under the political, economic and social climate in the late Soviet Union than they were in the immediate post-War era. This had an impact on both their outlook on migration as such and on the host society in particular: the entire Soviet Union was one single entity in which they would travel, and republic borders were seen as mere administrative boundaries. Compared to some 140 million or so Russians, ethnic Estonians barely reached 1 million in 1989 – what good would it make to learn the language of a population as small as this?

The second phase is necessary to make it clear that in the Soviet Union, the control on the population was rather elaborated; the passport system included the mandatory signing out from the local police station which could lead to severe penalty if omitted. Similarly to the process outlined above, with the waning of control over time, this system was increasingly circumvented.\(^{10}\) Still, the form to be filled in while signing out, the vypiska, was the main base for recording migration in the Soviet Union, and provides the data on the geographical origin of the last residence of the migrant arriving at his new destination.

The third phase looks at the actual journey, and how this action is determined by factors such as destination, transport and communication infrastructure, information background, simply: the possibilities of migration. For in these days, distances are measured more in flight time than in miles, and the improvements in infrastructure do play a significant role in reaching the destination. Therefore, this phase also looks at the spatial factors in migration. In the Soviet Union, long-distance transport was mainly by rail, only later, during the 1980s, will air travel have come to a substantial share in long-distance

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\(^9\) Communication to the author from Dr. Bernd Knabe, formerly of BIOst, Cologne, 1 July 2000.

travelling. Contrary to the West, air travel costs, like many others, were so heavily subsidised that an agriculturalist from the Caucasus could make a good return on selling his deficit produce, e.g., fruit or tomatoes, in some secluded Siberian city. However, all travel will still have prevailed. The main railway lines to the ESSR linked its capital to the main metropolis of the northwest, Leningrad, and to the USSR capital, Moscow. Further travel in one and the same train was not impossible. Until the late 1990s, despite severe reductions in services, trains travelled from Riga in Latvia to Simferopol on the Crimea. Within the ESSR, coach travel has been used for medium and short distances, e.g. Tallinn-Tartu, Tallinn-Pärnu, or Tallinn-Narva for medium distances of up to 180 kilometres or two to three hours of travel. Short distances were e.g., Tallinn-Maardu, which was served by Tallinn city buses, and Tallinn-Rakvere or Tartu-Võru. Local trains also operated. The main focus of this phase, however, will not be how the actual travelling took place as here, too, information is missing, in whose stead the general synopsis above should give an idea. However, there will be a detailed examination of the geography of sending areas of migration in conjunction with the available data on migrants arriving in and departing from the ESSR. This will show that at the time of the break-up of the Soviet Union, the purportedly homogeneous mass of ‘the Russians’ within the non-Estonian population may represent the majority of migrants, but still only 71% and not 95% or 100%. Also, it will become clear that there was a wide regional differentiation which started migration from the areas closest to the ESSR, e.g. the Leningrad district, later including the entire Union. Other sending areas were the Ukraine and Byelorussia, indeed in 1989, the census recorded well over 100 different ethnic groups, only few of them speaking Estonian, and many if not most socialised on the basis of the Russian language. This makes it additionally problematic to use the general term ‘Russophones’, for the political overtones stemming from the Soviet era which especially in the Brezhnev era pushed the Russian language threatened to obliterate cultural differences.\footnote{Cf. Dmitri Mikhailov: ‘Vene küsimus ja Eesti rahvusriik [The Russian Question and the Estonian Ethnically-based State]’, in: Vikerkaar, (9-10), 1995.}

Within the ESSR, this phase looks at the spatial distribution of immigrants and shows the reason for their geographical concentration in the areas in and around the capital, Tallinn, and Harju County, as well as in the industrial power house of the republic, the north-east containing the Counties of East and West Viru, Ida- and Lääne-Virumaa. In short, the reasons behind this were in Soviet economy policy which led to both high industrialisation and urbanisation rates, fundamentally altering the rural structure and society of interwar Estonia into a predominantly urban structure and society. The overwhelming majority of in-migrants lived and settled in these rural areas. Both the process and the final outcome will be traced in this study.

The fourth phase is the phase in which the migrant arrives at a certain destination; it is about the lock gate he has to pass before being admitted into a country, or just another city, or different society. This is a very crucial phase. In general, it is a question of finding a safe haven or being rejected, having to orbit, continue to flee, or being temporarily admitted. It is at the gates of the lock that the reasons of the arriving migrant, and especially of the arriving refugee, for migrating and arriving at this particular lock gate will be scrutinised. Only if successful can the migrant enter the country, or, in the context of crossing borders, has to illegally enter, bypassing the lock gates, and start the fourth phase. In the Soviet Union, flight and refugees did not exist, at least not officially, as in a
climate of enduring and steady increasing friendship between all peoples there would never be a cause for this.\footnote{Contrary to this, cf. only Uwe Halbach: ‘Perestrojka und Nationalitätenproblematik. Der Schock von Alma-Ata und Moskaus gespanntes Verhältnis zur Nationalitätenproblematik’, in: \textit{Berichte des BIOst}, (38), 1987.} Still, the fourth phase is also the phase in which the migrant arriving at a destination, e.g. in the ESSR, has to sign in again at the local police station and fill in his \textit{propiska}. He will thus obtain a residency permit. This however is conditional upon him having a dwelling and a job. In the Soviet Union, it was the plants which not only gave the necessary job but also provided much of the living space. In times of increased scarcity of labour, these amenities were crucial for a firm to obtain necessary staff, quite apart from the administrative procedures. As far as the question of local ESSR governments possibly wanting to restrict access to the territory is concerned, the plants were fairly autonomous in their decision-making. If need be, they could threaten with production losses if not more labour would be allowed in, and no republic government could afford this. With regard to the local population, the problem outlined briefly above also explains why it was mostly in-migrants who received new housing space and why local inhabitants lost out. Clearly this influenced the inter-ethnic climate, too.

The fifth phase is one reflecting the status of the migrant in the new host society in every aspect: judicial, material / economic, or social, to name but a few. It pertains to the question whether or not the migrant will have a chance to integrate into the new society, and be included, or whether they will be excluded. The nature of industrial policy and its location, as noted above, led to high urbanisation rates near the industrial centres of the republic. Consequently, as labour was imported from outside the republic for a lack of sufficiently high supply from within and provided with housing, a ghettoisation developed. This was not a little enhanced by the comparatively mindless planning of housing stock which was measured in completed units and square metres per head without much care of local complexities or needs. The mindsets of the migrants, partially infused by constant mantras of Russian and Slavic greatness, did not help to create much social contact between the in-migrant and local groups, either. On the contrary; Estonians tended to keep to themselves and non-Estonians did likewise. In consequence, a basically bipolar society developed that was based on the two languages usually employed in the ESSR: Estonian and Russian. The latter was also the language for most non-Estonians, for at least two reasons: first, Russian was the main language, or \textit{lingua franca}, of the Soviet Union, and knowledge of this language was essential for any career or indeed for communication within the various areas of the Union. Secondly, the infrastructure from schools to administration was either Estonian or Russian. Schools using another language for instruction were not supported. The basic dichotomy behind this was that despite class ideology and identity were being extolled above all others, and any ethnic ‘self-aggrandisement’ vigorously combated, still an order of nationalities, or ethnic groups, existed – there were the Russians and ninety-nine other nationalities in a hundred. In spite of all the rhetoric of the ‘merger of nationalities’ in Soviet society on its way to Communism, the culture-specific identities of ethnic groups were even enshrined in the most crucial document any Soviet citizen would possess – his inland passport recorded his ‘nationality’ (\textit{narodnost‘}) in an entry known as the famous ‘5th point’ (\textit{pyaty punkt}). This official ascription of ethnic identity took place at the age of 16, when every person (except \textit{Kolkhoz} workers, who were a special case
for decades) was given his passport; children of mixed parentage could choose between their parents’ ethnic identity which could not be changed afterwards.

The Soviet authorities’ desire to control the society to the greatest degree possible, which is also reflected in this passport regime, has had far-reaching consequences until today, going as far as having assumed the paramount identity according to which people would identify themselves and others in the post-Soviet world – even in states such as Estonia which have abolished this entry. However, this study will concentrate on the historical genesis of the post-Soviet Estonian society. After 1991, the complete remodelling of the state and its political, administrative, judicial, economic and social structures would make another study necessary. Due to this, the study will stop at this juncture with an outlook on some of the most crucial links of the Soviet past to the Estonian present, 1991-1998. One of these is the obvious question of the further development of the post-Soviet society. Crucially, the tendencies show that the younger generation of non-Estonians are increasingly willing to integrate into the society which in the long run will hopefully develop from an ‘ethnic’ to a ‘civic’ one. For this, efforts on both sides of the bipolar society and their subdivisions are necessary. The relevant potential is growing not least due to the prospects of the country’s membership in the European Union (EU) which is much more attractive than the Russian Federation. Older generations will still have some problems to adapt: for older Estonians, becoming a member of one superstructure such as the EU is almost tantamount to rejoining the SU, even though they are clear that these are by far not the same. For older non-Estonians, there will be further need to adapt not only to the political and economic side which has happened to such an extend that almost no cleavage runs along ethnic, but e.g., along labour-specific lines. Rather, the political and economic base may have to be further superseded by also accepting Estonian language, culture and heritage to allow for a harmonisation of relations. In this process, Soviet attitudes will have to be discarded.

Another question for the post-Soviet era is the international arena in which Estonia is now one of the actors. A recent newcomer to the fold, it has to accept to be scrutinised extra thoroughly in the new and positive climate that ensued pursuant to the end of the Cold War and enshrined in the new rules governing interstate relations. Membership in organisations such as the Conference, later Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, CSCE/OSCE, the Council of Europe, the EU or NATO are conditional upon fulfilling requirements outlined by their insiders. Law usually makes little allowances for historically grown problems: they are scrutinised under the light of such laws as are applicable at the time a problem arises. One such problem is that 38.5% of the Estonian Republic’s population, as noted at the beginning, were non-Estonian. In 1991 a large majority of them became legal aliens in consequence of the doctrine of the restoration of the interwar state. They became thus stateless, despite having been born or lived in the republic for decades. Not only have the pertinent citizenship laws created a major problem for the non-Estonians who expected in their majority a bestowal of Estonian citizen-
ship across the board without conditions; not only have international organisations taken a close interest in the Estonian legislative process and given liberal advice that was not always received well; but also did the Russian Federation use this issue to link it with bilateral issues such as the withdrawal of formerly Soviet troops or the disputed border-line that had little or nothing to do with the problem of citizenship, language requirements or other laws. However, as opposed to the Russian Federation’s claim that the non-Estonians, especially the Russian population, would have their human rights endangered and that they are being discriminated against was one of the most controversial issues in Estonia’s bilateral and also multilateral relations in the entire post-Soviet era. Disenfranchisement is a question of political, i.e. civic rights; whatever the position on this question, this does not endanger human rights, even if the conditions imposed on the non-Estonians are open to discussion. Clearly, however, this was more a question of Russian power politics than any real concern for the plight of the non-Estonians who increasingly felt squeezed between a rock and a hard place. For ordinary people who had arrived in the ESSR, much more so those who had been citizens of the interwar republic, did not appreciate the Russian Federation’s vociferous claims as they were partially spurious and only worsened the climate in the Estonian society as a whole. Indeed, the Russian Federation’s threats led to increased efforts on the part of the Estonian government to integrate into international structures including EU- and NATO-membership to obtain at least passive, preferably active help to withstand any threat or pressure from the Russian Federation. Whereas the non-Estonians’ main concern was their economic well-being, they thus became a security problem for the Estonian state.

For the best


part of the post-Soviet era, they have now found themselves within the triangle of actors that has been outlined above: the Estonian state; the international community; and the Russian federation. The final section of this study will further detail some of the above points. The first chapter following this introduction, however, will provide the starting point for the reconstruction of the conditions, and consequences of the fundamental population change that took place between the phases of pre- and post-Soviet Estonia.

1.1.2 A Framework for Analysis

The developments of the period in which Estonia was part of the Soviet Union will then be examined in three stages: from a reconstruction of the framework conditions for migration, the reconstruction of the proper migration developments themselves take place. This is linked to and influenced by the political and economic conditions that form the framework. As the time progressed under Soviet rule, so did the change that over time occurred in the population living in the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic (ESSR) that was part of the consequences. These consequences not only included the change of the demographic makeup as such but also the development of two largely separated societies based on two fairly different cultures at the heart of which were two languages, but not two ethnic groups (1989 census: over 100): Estonian and Russian. At this stage, the political and economic conditions in the state, i.e. the Soviet Union, have another impact, for the state doctrine also included a vision of the final society that was to be formed, the Communist society. The framework follows from the concepts outlined in the above section and can be displayed in the following model along whose line each of the following chapters is structured.

Figure 1.1: The Framework for Analysis: Soviet Era Migration and Levels of Interaction in the ESSR

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1.2 TERMINOLOGY AND SOURCES

1.2.1 Terminology
In this, as in many other works, a number of terms will not necessarily be defined as their content is taken as being known. Among these may be the following: *ethnic, religious (or other) types of minorities; peoples; nationalities; self-determination; aggression; occupation; sovereignty; colonialism; annexation; seizure of a territory; autonomy; cultural autonomy* et al. As always, there is a number of definitions on it; standard international law is usually applied, where deviating, it will be to make a particular point such as to underline the view of a specific group on the matter in question.

1.2.1.1 Nationality, Ethnicity and Citizenship
It may be necessary to define the use of some of the most important terms for this volume. Note that the term ‘nationality’ will be used according to the Central European understanding which is synonymous with ‘ethnic group’ and ‘ethnicity’. ‘Nationality’ thus means ‘ethnic group’ or ‘ethnicity’ throughout this monograph, reflecting the Estonian *rahvus*, or the Russian *natsional'nost’*. Thus, although common in standard English usage, the term ‘nationality’ in this study does *not at any time* mean ‘citizenship,’ which in Estonian is *kodakondsus* and in Russian *grazhdanstvo*. ‘Nationality’ and ‘citizenship’ are used not as synonyms but as two different terms. This difference is vital with regard to the Soviet period, which has nationalities policies and nationality laws, which refer to ethnic groups, *not* citizenship; while all had Soviet citizenship, there were over 100 nationalities, i.e. ethnic groups counted in the Soviet census; various sources have mentioned up to 400.

1.2.1.2 Usage of Language, Individual and Place Names
This being a work dealing with Estonia, three major languages apply: Estonian, English, and Russian. Actors and places mentioned here are however much more varied; therefore, Estonian names are given in correct Estonian. Whereas it makes sense to use both the Estonian and Russian version of a place name in tandem because of the town’s location, i.e. Jaanilinn / Ivangorod (?????????) being on the Estonian-Russian, and Valga / Valka on the Estonian-Latvian border, for Tallinn and Tartu their Estonian names will be used throughout this volume; the German or the Russian names for Tallinn, i.e. Reval and Tallin (??????), as well as for Tartu, i.e. Dorpat and Yuriev (??????), respectively, only make sense for historical treatises dealing with the area in or before the nineteenth century. Any other place name is given in the customary English fashion, with transliteration not necessarily following linguistically correct procedure: Russian transliteration is simplified; not El’tsin (???????) but Yeltsin will be used.

Regarding the word ‘administration’ it is perhaps useful to point out that in this work it is taken in its old British English, literal sense, stemming from administrate, to manage or direct: the management of the affairs of an institution; the body of people who administer an organisation; in particular, this is to refer to the public service. At no time will it
be used in its American sense, being synonymous to and replacing, ‘government,’ which appears to be in the process of being adapted even in BBC English.

The usage of ‘Estonia’ itself needs a few words. Not only has the area carrying this name changed in size over time; it also experienced different forms of sovereignty as well. In line with the changes of sovereignty, terms used in this work will mean the following: pre-1918, ‘Estonia’ was a province within and under the domination of the Tsarist Empire since 1721, with smaller boundaries than at any one time afterwards; 1918-1940, the ‘Interwar Republic’ was independent and consisted of northern Livonia and both Petseri province and parts of the trans-Narvan area, all of which was contained in the Republic of Estonia, Eesti Vabariik. 1940-1991, ESSR: the Soviet Socialist Republic of Estonia was under Soviet rule and thus part of the USSR. After 1991, Estonia is an independent state again and treated as such. To make a difference between the two periods of full independence of the Estonian Republic, 1918-1940 will be ‘Interwar’ Estonia, 1991 and after it may also appear as ‘post-Soviet’ Estonia. Maps of the relevant territorial extent of Estonia are included in various chapters to help orientation with the many place names that will necessarily come up.

1.2.2 Sources and Material
The material for this study was collected on several research visits to Estonia from 1995 to 1997 during the author’s membership in the Graduates’ College on Migration in Modern Europe at the University of Osnabrück; earlier work had been undertaken during language courses at the University of Tartu in September and November 1993. Research visits have usually been four to six weeks long and included the Chair and Department of Human Geography, the Department of Estonian Language, the Departments of History, Political Science, Journalism and Sociology, as well as the University Library at the University of Tartu. Further Libraries consulted were the Library of the Academy of Sciences, the Estonian State Library, the Library of the Estonian Statistical Office as well as the library of the Council of Europe’s representative office situated in the State Library, all of which are based in Tallinn. Further material has been provided by individual Estonian and Russian colleagues who also dispensed freely with their time to discuss the dissertation project with its author. In Germany, the University libraries of Münster and Osnabrück as well as the library of the Federal Institute for Soviet and International Studies (BIOst), Cologne, were used.

1.2.2.1 Printed Material
As a general rule, the main source languages used in this work are English, Estonian, German, and Russian; additional material is in Latvian and French. Internet research has provided much of the original documents of international organisations such as the EU or the Council of Europe, but also newspaper articles. As a source for post-Soviet developments, the OMRI publications provided a wealth of information.

The major newspapers used were the Estonian Eesti Päevaleht, Tartu Postimees and Sõnumileht, with additions by the old Rahva Hääl and the new weekly, Luup. The Baltic-edited, but English-language weekly paper The Baltic Independent was also used. Among the West European papers, The Times, The Guardian, The Independ-
ent and The Financial Times should be mentioned for British papers, while in German
the respective broadsheets, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,
Frankfurter Rundschau, including the weekly Die Zeit, were used. Articles from any
of these papers or weeklies are listed in a special section in the appendix and are not
included in the ordinary bibliography. The main journals used in this study were Na-
tionalities Papers and the Journal of Baltic Studies, although a host of other journals has
also been analysed. A series of reports providing much of the background material on
the Gorbachev period are the so-called BIOst-Reports, which are Reports of the Fed-
eral Institute for Soviet and International Studies, Cologne.

The standard literature has become richer in the last decade, however from a fairly
poor base compared to other European areas, resulting from the comparable obscurity
the Baltic states had in a time when Kremlinology and Sovietology usually dispensed
with the problem of nationalities and ethnic groups by restating the CPSU’s mantra that
the question would have been ‘solved’. In addition, many of the writers on Baltic affairs
have had family or other ties to the area and are mostly Baltic exiles. Post-1991 litera-
ture deals usually more with the current problem of ‘the Russians’, and does so from
various angles and using different methods, depending on the writer’s background and
field of work. Only little has been said by way of introducing the various problems that
are linked to migration already during the Soviet period; although various articles by
Rein Taagepera have appeared over the decades, they have not resulted in an extensive
a study. A purely demographic study has been published by Ene Tiit in 1993; in 1994,
Lembit Tepp of the Estonian Statistical Office (Eesti Statistikaamet, ESA) published
a series of three articles commenting upon the migration data published in the ESA’s
monthly bulletin.

To construct the main framework, the works by Romuald J. Misiunas and Rein Taag-
gepera, two American writers of Baltic descent, as well as Georg von Rauch, are
indispensable, although none of them devoted more than a few lines in their longitudinal
studies to the matter of migration under the premises used in this study. Gerhard Simon
appears to be one of the few if not the only one who over the last two decades system-
atically analysed the Soviet nationalities policy over time. Together with his treatment of
the nationalities question in many journal articles and BIOst-Reports, his book is of
prime importance. Bernd Knabe, Hans-Hermann Höhmann and Gertraud Seidenste-

cher were important for the economic side, especially for the labour market and its determining factors and consequences especially for the migration of the 1970s. The political and economic framework of this study receives further input from the works by Geoffrey Hosking and Robert Service, as well as the work by Rauch, all three of whom have written extensive overviews of the Soviet Union’s history, although Service calls his ‘A History of Twentieth Century Russia’; the works by Alec Nove are indispensable for any idea on the Soviet economy, although he also wrote an informative study on the workings of glasnost which provides superb overviews over the actual discussions that took place in Gorbachev’s era, e.g. on the ‘blank spots’ of Soviet history and historiography.

As most if not all of the documents on the political decisions taken in the Central Committee or the Politbureau will not be available for the foreseeable future, a slight detour is necessary to get as close as possible to the centre of power; the autobiographies of Valentin Falin and Georgii Arbatov do provide some more background than would otherwise be available, coming as they do the closest to protocols or transcriptions of recorded conversations in the USSR’s leadership. Such documents would be necessary to be able to reach a conclusion what was decided with regard to migration in the Soviet Union and whether or not there was a design behind e.g., the building of industry in the Estonian SSR other than economic motifs – namely, as some writers suggest, to have a pretence to effect migration into the area as the huge demand on labour such large projects would normally demand could not be supplied from local sources. However, this problem will be discussed below.

1.2.2.2 Data Use and Caveats: Ethnicity and Census Figures in the Soviet Union

Hardly any issue needs to be taken as much with a pinch of salt as the reliability of available data on the former Soviet Union. Falsification of data, especially of statistical information, originated in the 1920s and thence during the lifetime of the Soviet Union resulted in there being hardly any unadulterated information at all.

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lished data there usually existed two sets. The first was the official set which was usually published, although e.g. with regard to the 1970 and 1979 there remain some problems with regard to their rather different volume, which suggests that quite a bit of the data has been cut out, for whatever reason. The second set was secret (??????? ??), and available only to a chosen few. Even though these figures will be more credible than the former set, this data is usually somewhat hard to come by. Most of the data used in this publication is official data issued by the Estonian Statistical Office (Eesti Statistikaamet).

While the province of Estonia belonged to the Russian Tsarist Empire, seven population counts were conducted between 1782 und 1858. In 1863, statistical committees were established in both Estonia and the southern province of Livonia, with the aim of following internationally established procedures at the following counts. On 3 March 1867 the first census which used these newly enacted principles took place in Livonian towns, which at that time also included the towns of Pärnu, Tartu, Valga, Viljandi, and Võru. Four years later on 16 Nov. 1871 the Estonian Statistical Committee carried out a census in Tallinn. After these forerunners, the Estonian and Livonian committees jointly organised a census in their respective provinces which took place on 29 Dec. 1881. This census did at that time not include the towns of Narva and Petseri, as they belonged to the St. Petersburg and Pskov provinces, respectively. The first Empire-wide population census then took place on 28 Jan. 1897 (old calendar).24

The next census in Estonia took place only during the time of independence, clearly triggered by the new state’s necessity to obtain reliable information about its population. Within the boundaries of the Tartu Peace Treaty of 1920, a census took place on 28 Dec. 1922, thus comprising parts of the former St. Petersburg and Pskov oblasts as well as half of the Province of Livonia which in 1917 had been split up between the two new states of Estonia and Latvia. Although the next census was to take place in 1930, the global economic crisis of the day caused a delay until 1934, when it was finally carried out on 1 March. The next two censuses took place in 1939, and under Geman occupation in 1941; the events of the time however make these censuses more an approximation than a reliable source and have thus not been included. In addition, the deportations of 1940-41 and 1949 not only reaked a heavy toll on the population, but the numbers of the deported can also only be approximated, based on educated guesses. After the Soviet annexation of Estonia, the following censuses were carried out on a Union-wide scale on 15 Jan. 1959; 15 Jan. 1970; 17 Jan. 1979; and 12 Jan. 1989.25 This leads to the problem that the first figures that are ‘almost believable’ are only those from the 1959 census on – which leaves a gap of 25 years between credible censuses. Still, Estonian writers have tried to bridge this gap, and most of their material has been used and included in the present work, to mention only Ene Tiit and Jüri Kõre.

The Soviet censuses from 1959 onwards and the data published subsequently seem to suffer from unclear or changing definitions, or interpretations, or both. Compare the figures provided in different sources, all based on official data, in the following table. At

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25 Ibid. (FN 24).
issue is the in-migration into the ESSR during the periods 1961-65 and 1966-70, whose combined results as well as the data on the entire period 1961-90 are presented below. The results of this comparison are, put mildly, rather confusing. One source claimed that after 1953, in-migration largely ceased (Misiunas/Taagepera). Another source (Saar/Titma) suggested that during the 1960s in-migration sank and in the 1970s suddenly rose again.26 A third source counters this and actually states that the 1960s and 1970s saw the highest mechanical population increase, i.e., through migration.27 Much of the work on the data presented in this study has gone towards rectifying errors, explaining differences or weighing the probabilities which of the data appear to be more to the point and re-calculating some data or newly calculating other data.

### Table 1.1: Data Quality and Confusion - Alphabetical Returns of 1960s ESSR Migration Balance, by author

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<td>40,500</td>
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<td>83,000</td>
<td>178,814</td>
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<td>62,000</td>
<td>95,000</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perevedentsev, table 16, p. 12: Goskomstat</td>
<td>43,200</td>
<td>48,000</td>
<td>91,200</td>
<td>197,500</td>
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Interestingly, the available data from the USSR State Committee on Statistics give higher saldo figures for all covered periods from 1961-1990, the total of which is, according to the figures provided by Perevedentsev, 197,500. For this period, the data is as follows: 1961-1965: 43,200 (average: 8,640/a); 1966-1970: 48,000 (9,600); 1971-1975: 32,900 (6,580); 1976-1980: 27,500 (5,500); 1981-1985: 27,900 (5,580); 1986-1990: 18,000 (3,600); compared to the figures from ESA, whose total for 1961-1990 is 178,814, there is a difference between the two grand totals of 18,686. Also, while until 1975 the USSR Goskomstat data are higher than the Estonian, from 1976 to 1985 the differences decrease; however, for the 1986-1990 period the difference is especially high: 10,490. Unfortunately, these differences can only be recorded, as there is no precise information available conducive to explaining it.28

In this respect it should be added that it is not completely certain whether or not Soviet military personnel is included in any of the figures given here, as there are conflicting positions; on the one hand, any inclusion of such highly important data as military forces’ figures is unlikely as they would normally be kept secret. Yet if indeed the stationing of Soviet troops did not show in any statistics, and army troops were not included in the migration balance, this must be counted as hidden in-migration. On the other hand, at least the 1989-91 survey does give among the reasons also those connected to military service. Whether or not migration of military personnel is included in the migration bal-

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26 Saar/Titma state against all available sources that this was a time of low immigration. Cf. ibid., p. 9: ‘Anfang der 60er Jahre sank die Zuwanderung wesentlich, um dann Anfang der 70er Jahre wieder jäh zu steigen.’


ance is therefore not clear. There is however a particular category of migration, so-called ‘special or separate migration’ (erimigratsioon) data on which subsumes both migration by military personnel as well as prisoners’ migration in connection with their sentence (sic!). This data has been provided by Ms. Anne Herm of the Estonian Statistical Office, Tallinn. The question of military numbers is not without consequence, for those troops remained in Estonia until long after it had regained its independence in 1991, and they were both a source and means of high tension in the bilateral Estonian-Russian relations until their final withdrawal in 1994. Estonia, like the other Baltic states and the Kaliningrad / Königsberg district, belonged to the north-western military district. In the Baltic area, 80 air fields were reported; 10% of all Soviet troops and 21% of all European troops were stationed in the Baltic area.\(^{29}\) Clearly, therefore, the migration of military personnel, or indeed military pensioners who may be as young as 40 years of age, is of relevance to the problem; Vertmann reports that many of the retirees from the Tartu Air Base were taken on in a factory belonging to the military-industrial complex (MIC) producing control instruments and panels.\(^ {30}\)

Beyond this, the Soviet passport system and its famous ’point five’ had as much an impact on this problem of using census data as the collection of the census data itself: the 1959 and 1970 censuses referred to the legally resident population, while the 1979 and 1989 censuses had yet a different base, referring to the permanently resident population, which is bigger/smaller. Also, the category of ‘nationality’ in Soviet times was deemed a social, rather than biological, category which an individual would consciously identify with. Indeed, since Stalin’s famous toast to the Russian nationality, there was an order of nationalities, which the people were aware of. Thus, the passport of an individual interviewed for a state-wide census could show in its entry number five an entirely different ‘nationality’ to the one declared in a census: ethnicity or nationality (natsional’nost’) was in this instance established by oral declaration during data collection.

This would mean that the son of an Uigur and a Tartar would be either of the two in terms of his passport entry; on the other hand, he could have grown up in a Russian city the child of some academics using mainly Russian as their language of communication, thus being fully socialised in the Russian culture, and consequently giving ‘Russian’ as his native language, although his ethnic origin may be determined as ‘Uigur’. This dichotomy would lead to the ambivalence in declaring one’s nationality: while the passport system would make the young adult choose his nationality at age 16, leaving a choice of the two: Uigur and Tartar, he may have felt Russian all his life and in a survey or census would declare himself Russian.\(^ {31}\) This too could happen, as the census data were taken on an oral basis by an interviewer putting questions to an interviewee; the interviewer


\(^{31}\) Cf. Zaslavsky (FN 23), ch. 5, pp. 92-94 on ‘Nationality and the Passport System’; pp. 94-96 on ‘Mixed Marriages’.
was not permitted to check any of the statements by requesting documentary evidence.\textsuperscript{32}

Also the choice of nationality may be contingent on the advantages and disadvantages of a particular nationality, or in other words, on the political system and its assessment of particular nationalities: in the Soviet Union, the Jews, who have numbered around 6 Mio.\textsuperscript{33}, had always experienced open or latent discrimination, hence many of them Russianised their names, or chose ‘Russian’ as their nationality to escape this predicament.\textsuperscript{34} When emigration to Israel became increasingly possible, many mixed Russian-Jewish children who at age 16 had previously declared themselves ‘Russians’ changed back to being ‘Jews’, for it allowed to effect their emigration much more easily. Therefore, nationality and mother tongue do not have to correspond at all.

Jüri Kõre shows that whereas 474,834 individuals were counted as ethnic Russians in the 1989 census, 544,933 individuals identify Russian as their first language. The difference of 70,099 does come from the contingent of 127,547 ‘Other’ non-Estonians, of whom only some further 5,713 declared Estonian their first language. The remaining 51,735 ‘Others’ use the language of their respective \textit{ethnie} as first language. This shows that but for a small proportion of the non-Estonian, non-ethnic Russian population their socialisation took place in Russian.\textsuperscript{35}

So even if the Soviet data for all the above reasons is hardly fully trustworthy, noting the difficulties is all this author can do: this work is not about recalculating and re-researching all mistakes in the demographic picture that exists today, besides, this effort is already being made by Estonian demographers. More importantly, the data and figures used in this work are not only generally available but have been used extensively, both by the Estonian academic community and by Estonian politicians; furthermore, as some of the ESA data quoted here is available in English or Russian, the wider European and Western, as well as the Russian world, have used these figures, although Russians and Russian-speakers will normally use the data provided from the former All-Union Statistical Office, \textit{Goskomstat}, rather than the Estonian data. This also accounts for some of the differences in figures noted above.

The last Soviet census was conducted in 1989, on which most of the data in use is based, the first independent Estonian census after 1934 was conducted in March 2000.\textsuperscript{36} The census data from 2000 have consequently not been available for this study.


\textsuperscript{34} Zaslavsky notes that 93% of the Jewish-Russian children chose ‘Russian’ as their nationality for the reasons outlined above: mainly, to escape discrimination. Cf. ibid., p. 97.


\textsuperscript{36} Information provided to the author by Mr Lembit Tepp, Statistical Office of Estonia (Eesti Statistikaamet), Tallinn, 27 November 1996.
All data is generally based on the 1989 census; however, there is some confusion arising from varying figures which can be found in official, semi-official and journalistic sources. The data published until today is therefore somewhat problematic; while the Statistical Office do as best they can, researchers at the Estonian Demographic Research Centre pointed out that nobody would really know about the exact figures, and that only for Tallinn to find out the correct data is already a major problem.\(^{37}\) Thus, for the time being, the study will have to make do with the available material, referring to birth rates, migration patterns and the like. The differentiation between ethnicity and nationality, i.e. citizenship, and non-citizens or aliens with (denizens) or without the right of abode, creates new problems. Additionally, some of the non-citizens may have applied for Estonian or Russian citizenship while a number of Estonian citizens are of Russian origin. It is however certain that Estonia is not, nor will it be, an ethnically homogeneous state. Since Estonians generally seem to think of the ‘nation’ in the German sense of \textit{jus sanguinis,}\(^{38}\) and only a minority seem to see as Estonian all those with an Estonian passport, regardless of their ethnic background, there will quite probably never be a ‘nation-state’ in that sense, either. Estonia is specifically under stress because of the high number of inhabitants who are not of Estonian origin, the greatest part of whom consists of ethnic Russians. From the historic development outlined above, it is clear that this is a consequence of the time as a part of the Soviet Union and Soviet economic, nationalities’ and migration policies from 1940 to 1991.

1.3 \textbf{POLITICS, MIGRATION AND MINORITIES IN INDEPENDENT AND SOVIET ESTONIA, 1918-1998}

One of the most disputed questions regarding migration in the Soviet Union is less whether or not there has been migration of Russians and other ethnic groups during the Soviet Union; the fact of 25 million Russians living outside the RSFSR at the time of the Soviet Union’s collapse is well established. What is not is the question \textit{why} this dispersal happened, and what its determining factors were, for the political and economic conditions of this state had an overriding influence in almost all aspects of life, in addition to which there was a strong ideological component underlying the entire structure.

\textit{1.3.1 Interpretations of Soviet Migration}

One position in assessing the strong in-migration of non-Estonians from other parts of the Soviet Union states that the migrants were instruments of securing Soviet power in the Baltic states. They would be used in particular within the party apparatus, the state administration, and within the police / militia and security services, where they would dominate both in number and rank over the members of these bodies belonging to the titular nations. At the same time, the migrants were instrumentalised as a vehicle to both Russify and sovietise the Estonian society.\(^{38}\) The 1989 census recorded some 110 eth-

\(^{37}\) Information provided by Mrs. Luule Sakkeus of the Estonian Inter-University Centre for Demography (EKDK) in Tallinn, November 1996.

nic groups, or nationalities, 10 of which for 98% of the entire non-Estonian population. Of those 10 ethnic groups, ‘the Russians’ are by far the largest group, which is also true about the ethnic Russians: they in fact form the core of the non-Estonian population, i.e. they are the most numerous – some 80% of the total. The other two main groups usually, but not entirely correctly, subsumed under the heading, ‘the Russians’ are Ukrainians and Byelorussians.

However, interpretations vary between two major poles why this may be so, at times taking a middle position. Either a socio-economic or an ethno-political explanation is given. In short, the first suggests that basically macroeconomic conditions determined the decision-making process of migrants which chose according to their own criteria whether or not to go and where; as the ESSR had very good living conditions and wage levels, this might be one explanation. The second suggests that the basic ideology of the Soviet Union of creating homo sovieticus is the main driving force behind migration into all outer republics, in addition to which sometimes the element of controlling the republics from the centre by sending in prefects and establishing colonies of non-titular populations would be mentioned. The first position would be taken by Perevedentsev and Marksoo; the second e.g., by Titma/Tuma and Saar/Titma. This section will now posit a few thoughts before returning to this dichotomy and providing the main findings. It will cover a number of areas related to the political-economic sphere and ask for the influence that ideology may have had, if any, and if that was consistently the case.

The main theme of this study is the in-migration of non-titular ethnic groups into a specific area of the USSR, i.e., the Estonian SSR. Its contention is with regard to post-Soviet connotations and developments that the one cannot be understood without the genesis of in-migration during Soviet times, both with regard to the final demographic outcome and the interethnic relations that had developed during that period. While common wisdom has it that everything in the SU was totalitarian, and thus every single move controlled by the all-mighty Party, it would appear that the ever-solid monolith called SU was anything but such a monolith, and that the study of migration within the SU would contribute to an understanding how heterogeneous that Union actually was. In particular, looking at Lane/Ross, this study questions the overcome assumption that nationalities policy and in-migration of non-Estonians were necessarily coordinated at all times, that the import of migrants was conducted with the aim of completely Russifying the ESSR, which would particularly be important with regard to the import of labour.

Rather, this study argues that following the results of Lane/Ross, and looking at labour policy from Khrushchev to Gorbachev’s assent to power, there were two levels at least that may have had occasional, maybe even oftentimes, contact but that this contact was much less pre-determined by the Party which controlled everything than a successful selling of co-incidences in ideology as pre-determined by The Party. In fact, as

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Khrushchev’s experience shows, and what under Brezhnev was identified as a cancer to the system as a whole which the First could not only not overcome but totally succumbed to, was the relative if not complete independence of the economic apparatus of the Governmental Bureaucracy, in particular the Military-Industrial Complex (MIC), against whose wishes nothing much could, and thus neither would, happen. If this was indeed the case, then ideology, particularly the nationalities question, and economy, as far as labour import is concerned, are two distinct entities that may coincidentally have come together, but nowhere near as pre-determined and planned as e.g. Saar/Titma and Titma/Tuuma, but also other writers on Baltic and Soviet affairs would suggest. Rather than being a monolithic and unitary power (along the theoretical lines of the totalitarian model) with an omnipotent party that was bent on genocide in the Baltics, the sudden jerks in ideology pertaining to the nationalities question would receive another meaning if migration were included in the analysis. Contrary to their position, Central interests as far as migration is concerned would be limited to getting the workers to the position where they were wanted, and to that extent Perevedentsev may have been right, only with the qualification that Nove made: Indeed, a man was seen as a means of production that had to function. However, men, in contrast to shirt fronts or tyres have a will of their own, which leads to a somewhat important qualification and less predictability of migration – indeed, may explain the problems the planners had in getting their plan to work. The realm of the Party, however, was concerned with other aspects of socio-cultural life in the Union: controlling the Union, its population, and keeping the Union together; education and cultural questions belonged to this realm. Yet it gave only the strategic goals to the ever-mushrooming ministries which could basically decide whatever goals, and how, they would make the base for the next plan.

As an important caveat it must be stressed that the following is confined to observations and statistics mainly limited to the ESSR, which however have to be set within the USSR context. Returning to a quote from Lane/Ross:

> If the party was so omnipotent, why did it fall from power so easily? If the party did exercise such power, why was it that government bureaucracy was able to prevent the implementation of economic or political reforms which challenged its privileged political position in Soviet society?\(^{42}\)

If Perevedentsev\(^{43}\) were right, and a person was just a means to achieve a particular (and only economic?) goal, whose goal was it to effect migration into the Baltic States, into the ESSR in particular, and what was the actual background to doing that?

In other words, what goal did migration into the ESSR have? Was it really, as Saar/Titma and Titma/Tuuma, but also others (Taagepera, Tepp)\(^{44}\) suggest, colonising

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42 Lane/Ross, p. 20.
migration, and was it possibly aimed at the extinction of distinct ethnic groups such as the Estonians or Latvians with the simultaneous creation of the *Homo Sovieticus*? Or might it just have been a consequence of coincidental politics by the political ideologues in the Party on the one hand, and economic interests of the governmental bureaucracy and its planning bodies that migration nicely tied in with either realm? Very often the actual decision-making actor is not at all clear: Party, Government, The ‘First’, Bureaucratic *Apparat*? Did Migration follow a policy, and if so, whose and what? If it was indeed ‘scientifically based’, as Soviet writers have suggested, what assumptions and aims were there? Was it the totalitarian Partocracy who would determine every little event, or did it not at times have to follow events and retrospectively justify policies by adapting ideology to events, rather than taking ideology, as was under Lenin, as guideline for political action – witness the sudden change from a ‘growing together’ of nationalities where differences would disappear to the ‘Soviet Society’ where the Passport point 5 still existed, where ethnic differences were indirectly acknowledged, although this would go contrary to previous party lines? Why if the admixing, growing together and consequential mixing of peoples was the final aim, were two complete systems established in every republic, resulting in the ESSR in a two-language school system, not to say two parallel societies which in the ESSR *hardly ever* mixed, as evidenced by very low rates of interethnic marriages and other factors?

If the Party would indeed be omnipresent and omnipotent, why was it that in 1956 labour migration became possible, and workers could leave their jobs at two weeks’ notice, while at the same time this must have been expected to reek havoc in fulfilling the Plan – moreover, does the fact that *voluntary* migration had thus become possible not give pause for thought to any one suggesting that everything in the USSR was carried out strictly according to Plan? Why then could labour shortages (sic!) occur, if the plan were the be-all and end-all? The Plan must therefore not have been working properly. This, however, was the realm of the governmental ministries and its bureaucracy. If the governmental bureaucracy would therefore have its own life and goals, as Lane/Ross show, would that not indicate that they would build both what and where they needed? Especially if one considers that the MIC would have huge powers, further mushrooming under Brezhnev to reach an absolutely uncontrollable and unassailable position, would this in turn not suggest that they would also take care of their workforce in every aspect? Indeed, union-wide migration took place from special vocational schools to certain factories; the same applies to university graduates, or construction worker groups belonging to special ministries. The Moscow based ministries were at the centre, and

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they controlled, as every writer on Estonian affairs would concede, up to 90% of the industry in the ESSR. But as Service asserts, the Party set the policy guidelines and priorities, and ministries would follow their own interests and could basically decide which priority given them by the Presidium they might follow – not least because it was they themselves who drew up the plans.46

[The] …fragmentation of the state administrative system into tens of branch ministries…led to circumstances where the government bureaucracy was able to exert an enormous influence over industrial development. The result was that cities and regions were dominated, not by the interests and plans of the party, but by those of the ministries in Moscow (Ross, 1987, chapters 4,5). Emphasis added. 47

Therefore it may well be that much as the Party would probably wish to achieve certain goals of, e.g., Russification, Creation of the Homo Sovieticus, any such plan or ideology that would directly or indirectly go against ministries’ interest surely would falter – as evidenced by the regional economic councils (sovnarkhozy), or the increase of consumer goods in rejection or at any rate severe curtailment of heavy industry and the military, which drew heavy fire from the relevant quarters, which would be the fiercer the more anything connected to the large military-industrial complex (MIC) would be set for curtailment. Consequently, it would appear that the idea to establish certain industries which would pump non-Estonians into the area could only work if that was in the interest of the military-industrial complex (MIC) and the governmental bureaucracy. Thus, migration into the ESSR would have to be divided between such that was centrally induced by the Party and such that came directly from ESSR factories, which usually had direct connections with the ministry they belonged to, which in turn would centrally decide whom to send – as long as the process would work along the lines of the command economy; the more the migrants would seek their work along the lines of their interest, the more this system would have problems. Simple incentive mechanism would not work by themselves, as the increasing problems of labour shortages in Siberia show. A controlled in-migration into the ESSR was therefore only possible by degree and could only represent part of the actual in-migration which especially during the 1970s and 1980s included family migrants. Could it therefore not be that a small part of migration was there to keep political / admin control on the Rep. on one level, but that the rest of migration followed purely economic interests – both from gov-bur and migrants? And did that have to be linked to the idea of the homo sovieticus that economic planners of all would want to create?

It is highly interesting to compare the list of ministries that Lane/Ross subsume under the main category of, MIC, with those industries that were built and worked in the ESSR:


46 Service, pp. 346-347.
47 Lane/Ross p. 21.
48 Lane/Ross, FN 19, p. 31.
Most if not all writers concede, and indeed copy the figure, that 90% of ESSR industry was under the control of Moscow ministries – which comparing industries in the ESSR\(^9\) with the list above is hardly surprising. In the light of the above by Lane/Ross this would rather suggest an almost total preponderance of the governmental bureaucracy decision-making with regard to migration was (a) because of most industries belonged to the MIC, and (b) party control of migration was consequently confined to a selected area, ‘special migration’, and would at best provide an ideological background to developments. On the other hand, as in Directing and Planning, Defence/Foreign/Security Affairs, and Culture and Education ministries the party had some influence, so too a certain influence in nationalities and especially migration policy might be the case (but in how far, if the MIC had enormous political influence?) Might it not actually be that the special migration which existed during all the time Estonia was part of the USSR did decrease from the mid-1950s, suggesting that control was relatively safely established and that here a reduction of personnel was possible? It was this realm, that of the ideological, cultural and state control which was according to Lane/Ross under party control, hence this comparative trickle may be influenced by the party directly.

If ideology and cultural questions were part of the Party realm of power, this suggests that nationalities policies in general and Russification and language policies in particular would be Party territory. Taking the two realms of the Party and the Governmental Bureaucracy above together, this leads to the conclusion that there were two levels which influenced developments in the ESSR, and that they did not necessarily have to work together, or even be consequent upon each other; on the contrary, factors such as migration would happen to coincide with the Russification postulate and vice versa, but against the totalitarian monolithic approach there may well have been not one, but two distinct events that may have been sold as intentional coming together. Taking this one step further, might it not be that given the enormous power of the MIC, Politics followed Economics, that Economic Policy was planned and carried out by the Bureaucracy and that Politics followed? After all, the migrants that were necessary to man the plants needed the correct environment to work in, now that they would have been imported to the ESSR. This affected however not only housing and other social benefits, which again largely the firms and factories were responsible for, but also the language sphere: Slavic ethnic groups making up over 70% of the USSR population, the ideology was happily followed which declared Russian as the most important language and that of ‘international’ communication (probably rather, mezhnarodov, inter-ethnic: Slavic leads, the rest follow or go under). Consequently, might not the Russification attempts have been a function of the economic necessities, therefore however a reaction of the Party to economic / governmental-bureaucratic demands: This is also exemplified by the Union-wide search for adequate personnel: the ministries operated Union-wide, and therefore a common language was necessary to facilitate all factories with workers who work in and understand in the same language. Again, here economic interest leads the political, and governmental bureaucracies lead party ideologies. Then again, under the conditions of a moderately free labour market which tended to experience labour shortages despite its belonging to a planned economy, increasingly voluntary migration with changes in the

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place of residence to such areas that had better living conditions, not only better pay (for
the Northern RSFSR areas have experienced incredibly high fluctuation in migration,
with few people actually settling down), but also lower costs, e.g., availability of fruit,
and good housing were of much more interest; by consequence, not ideological conse-
quences will have been of much importance in the decision-making process of the po-
tential migrants, but those ‘profane’ aspects of life that spurred their in-migration, not
least because again, the ministries governing the industries in the ESSR would be part of
the MIC and thus control unlimited financial resources and political powers – hardly
surprising, what with up to 40% of the total economy being linked to the MIC and 15%
or more of GDP spent on it.

If however many in-migrants would work in the MIC factories in Nort-East Estonia
and Tallinn, clearly they would also feel a certain special importance going beyond the
mere Great Russian feeling of being something special because of being Russian; even if
one would work as a blue collar worker, the importance of a certain combine for the
Union would raise that sort of feeling considerably. The language issue where Russians
would bark at Estonians not to speak their dogs’ language but a human one, i.e. Rus-
sian, in this case would only be an outcome of this over-exaggeration of all matters Rus-

Russification therefore was a cultural question; it belonged more to the Party’s
realm than to the Governmental bureaucracy realm; Labour import was an economic
question, which by coincidence may have fitted the ideological bill, but in view of the
economic and political clout the Governmental bureaucracy Apparat would wield may
just as well have not and still not have been of too much an importance for the Bureau-
crats. To put it differently: had the ideological line been the total isolation of the ESSR
and of Estonians in a confined area where only Estonians would live, the Governmental
bureaucracy complex would have ignored it would it have seen fit to do so – colonisa-
tion or not, getting the system to work may have been the important point, and if mi-
grants were needed for that, so be it. Following this, Russification may in this regard
have been a means to make everyone use the same language so that work and control
of workers / persons would be easier, so would this present any grounds for supposing
that Russification was in the governmental bureaucracy interest and hence Party went
on?

Conversely, Khrushchev and Brezhnev could jump on the running train only, which
may well explain the jerks and jumps in nationalities policy and ideology outlined above;
notably Brezhnev was known to have totally succumbed to the MIC whom he provided
with every means available, leading also to the mushrooming of this complex (see
Lane/Ross), might it not be that the economic system dictated to the political, and that
the latter was only a façade or facilitator for the former? It has been pointed out time
and again that the MIC had become almighty under Brezhnev. Language policy and the
promotion of Russian in this respect was a function of the economy’s need to combine
everything in one language, especially if migrants moved to a non-Slavic republic for
economic or other reasons.

To return to the starting point, Kolstø follows the idea of the two positions outlined
above to explain the causes of the dispersal of Russians over the whole Soviet Union: a
socio-economic one and an ethno-political one. He states further that the two positions outlined above are contradictory due to which one would have to be chosen. However, he also points out that many writer position themselves in between the two and may therefore become more nuanced, but less clear. The problem here is that Kolstø ignores the time component. This study suggests that it is not a question of either-or. If allowance is made for the changing of times and the changing of political aims and positions, it becomes clear that both interpretations have their merits and can both be used, provided one takes good care of the political climate: even if the near-total control never subsided fully, it nevertheless abated substantially enough to allow for much more voluntary migration, even more than the planners wished for; these were the contradictions already inherent in the state system which increased with the ever-growing size of the economy. Among the many examples, suffice it to mention two: a planned economy vis-à-vis increased freedom of movement and choice of workplace posits a fairly static (and therefore constantly improved-upon) entity versus a fairly volatile one (because in contrast to light bulbs or shirts men have a will that is expressed if total state control is absent); further, even though a mix of populations into one Soviet people was the official doctrine, the settlement structures of in-migrating Russians have been such that they live in fairly secluded areas with little contact to the local population and two parallel infrastructures: a statistical cohabitation in an area does not mean that there is necessarily interethnic contact, let alone mixing. In addition, the fifth entry of the passport even fixed a person’s ethnic identity on him for life, even if the son of an Uigur and a West-Ukrainian Pole may have been born in the Lithuanian SSR, e.g., in Kaunas, and gone to Lithuanian school there, speaking fluent Lithuanian and Russian but not a single word of either Polish or Uigur – he would still remain a Uigur.

Including the time component as expressed in the four Soviet eras shows that an exclusive choice between an ethno-political and a socio-economic framework is misleading as both elements have explanatory powers that married together may come closer to an explanation of the determining factors and consequences of migration in the Soviet Union. Because of the changing political and economic framework the state developed from the well-nigh omnipotent centre with considerable influence on the socio-demographic development of the population to a complacent political centre which let things roll as long as they would not go counter their general line. Therefore an increasingly uncontrollable governmental bureaucracy could act almost at will, at least from the mid-1970s, and see to its interests. Hence if modernisation is seen as industrialisation, this did indeed happen, to the extent that the Soviet Union’s economy grew so much that even 100 ministries would not manage to give it a coherent ‘plan’ – and as the plan was a political means to control the economy which failed, so did the plan: it failed.

1.3.2 Main Findings
Thus, as the interwar period forms the first chronological unit, the nature of Soviet politics and government makes it most sensible to structure the Soviet period according to the current leader at the top. Although the basic long-term parameters of the Soviet system would not change, the political conditions and climate in each era are sufficiently

distinct to warrant this approach which consequently results in four consecutive chronological units: the Stalin era, in which Estonia was incorporated into the Soviet Union and whose brutal regime allowed little or no opposition; the Khrushchev era, in whose era the Stalinist terror was exposed, criticised and revoked and where the efforts to reform the economy led to a certain form of autonomy for the republics; the Brezhnev era, which includes the short-lived leaderships of Andropov and Chernenko and in which the control over the population became increasingly lax and the economy fell to pieces despite unceasing stories of economic success; and the Gorbachev era, in which not only the control over the population was softened by design so that popular support could be obtained for the renewed effort to reform the ruined economy but also was the lid removed from decades of pent-up problems that exploded into the leadership’s faces and eventually led to the collapse of the Union. The period of renewed independence forms the last chronological unit of this work and provides an outlook on the developments in the post-Soviet era with particular regard to the changed international conditions in which Estonia found itself and what effect this had on its domestic policies.

When inter-war Estonia experienced only little migration, much of this was immigration in the context of the Civil War in Tsarist and Soviet Russia which later led to some settlement. Together with other predominantly Russian immigrants of the Tsarist era, these people formed the core of the non-Estonian population together with ethnic Swedes and Germans who were the descendants of earlier immigrants. Estonians emigrated both overseas as far as America and to Soviet Russia. Most of the German and Swedish population left the area during the Second World War. After the incorporation into the Soviet Union, developments changed fundamentally. Under Stalin a high number of migrants entered the area, including prisoners of war, labour camp inmates, and others; in all, some 170,000. Migration in this time was politically induced and overwhelmingly coercive, not only with regard to the population transfer into the ESSR but with regard to the deportations in 1941, 1944 and 1949 to help establishing the political and economic system. These three waves of deportation left a trauma on the Estonian psyche which has been retained until today. Under Khrushchev war-time regulations were revoked which until 1956 had bound each person to his work place; a limited freedom of movement was permitted and migration began tentatively. In both eras, however, labour migration predominated, the difference being that a voluntary element had latterly been introduced. Because of the lack of relevant data, it cannot be shown how many migrants were administratively transferred and how many migrants arrived voluntarily in the ESSR. The voluntary element, however, would develop increasing strength during the Brezhnev era where control over economy and population was too complacent to exert any pressure lest someone deliberately went publicly against the state’s interests. Increasingly, family migration and migration for ‘personal’, which may be taken to mean largely economic, reasons picked up. Especially in this era the Soviet way of running the economy led to shortages in the workforce and with increased social security not least in the sense of a guaranteed place to work, people began to be choosy where to go, consequently wreaking havoc in the ‘planned’ economy of the day. Finally under Gorbachev, no major changes occurred from the Brezhnev era until the ESSR reasserted its independence and severely curtailed in-migration in 1990. In the final period after 1991, out-migration reached a peak in 1992-1993 after which net migration remained constantly negative. Over the entire period, some 1 million in-migrants and 700,000 out-
migrants resulted in a net balance of 300,000 immigrants with another 250,000 or so descendants living in the ESSR. 80% of these immigrants were ethnic Russian, the remainder were mainly Ukrainians and Byelorussians, although in total more than 100 ethnic groups would be counted.

This study shows that the immigration during the Soviet era resulted in fundamental population change and retraces this development. This population change cannot be clearly attributed to a genocidal or other attitude over the entire period. Nor can it indeed be proved what specific aims the Politbureau had, for its records have not been and will not become accessible. Clearly the ideologically based idea of a ‘merger of nations’ failed to materialise in Estonia. Rather, two bipolar societies with their own infrastructure and little horizontal contacts developed, which in the post-Soviet period could not automatically lead to a free and buoyant civil society without cleavages. However, this study also shows that these two poles of are not static, nor entirely homogeneous, on the contrary. As much as in the Soviet Estonian society political differentiation occurred at the first possible moment, and which developed into the post-Soviet phase, the non-Estonian population consisted not simply of ‘Russians’. True, they may have constituted 30% of the entire population and represented the largest non-Estonian group. Yet Ukrainians and Byelorussians also lived in the ESSR territory, making up for the missing 8.5% of the population together with much smaller ethnic groups. Differentiation occurred also within the group of ethnic Russians, which is firstly due to their arrival in different periods: the pre-Soviet immigrants were mostly part of the interwar Estonian state and were much more integrated into the Estonian society than later arrivals, the least integrated and adapted of whom were those coming in the 1970s and early 1980s. These different dates of arrival also represent different shades of attitudes which may be difficult to grapple but vary with the political and socio-economic climate of the day: clearly this differed between the coerciveness under Stalin and the complacency under Brezhnev. While the main work stops with the seminal events of 1991, it nevertheless shows in the outlook on the post-Soviet period that the process of differentiation continues along both ethnic and ordinary socio-economic lines and interests, so that two ethnically different workers have basically the same interests. An important caveat determining the status and differences between the two groups is the language requirement that Estonia has enacted for certain jobs in the public arena. Indeed, the complex and complicated issue of citizenship and language policies can only be outlined. More importantly, the problem obtained an unhelpful international quality which made it a chess pawn in bilateral Estonian-Russian relations and a security issue in Estonian foreign policy with huge repercussions in the domestic arena. With the invitation to join the European Union, however, a substantial aspect of the Estonian security concerns will be alleviated. In the more stable climate that has developed since 1995-1996, and which has been enhanced by the feeling of passive security granted by EU membership, the bipolar cleavages will over time disappear, starting in the political and economic spheres. Then again, adaptation of non-Estonians would not mean to completely submit or assimilate into Estonian culture at the expense of their own cultures. The acceptance and respect for Estonian culture will fully suffice for any Estonian.

This study started out by pointing out that it encompasses eighty years of Estonian history, and indeed Estonia celebrated its 80th birthday on 24 February 1998. Whatever further development Estonia will take during the time to its 100th birthday, its society is a
radically different one from that of interwar times. The main cause for this was migration that took place under the political and economic conditions of the Soviet era. Before the aspects of this change of this Soviet era are retraced and its fundamental impact examined, it is therefore apposite, indeed necessary, to commence this study with the historical inception of the Estonian state and first retrace its basic features as a means and base for comparison. Only by including their historical component can post-Soviet developments be understood more clearly.
2 Independent Estonia, 1918/20-1939/40

Estonia and the provinces of Estonia and Livonia (Liivimaa) existing prior to Estonian statehood have seen many different foreign powers dominating their area, starting with Danes and the Teutonic Order in the late 12th century, which later gave way to the Livonian Order as the dominant force. The history of domination by outside forces was finally turned into independent statehood in 1918, and secured with the Treaty of Tartu in 1920, after which Estonia stood on its own feet until 1939/40.

It is within this framework that migration and minority questions will be examined: politics determines the conditions under which either question develops, notwithstanding the connections between the two and their consequences. Hence this chapter will first explore the developments leading up to the establishment of the Estonian state, after which the independence period of 1918-1939/40 will come into focus. This period is dealt with along the lines of the political and economic developments which form the framework for Estonia’s demographic developments, both in terms of migration and natural population growth. As there were around 10% of non-Estonian minorities, this population group is dealt with next. The chapter concludes with the Soviet annexation in 1939/40 and its preconditions which de facto ended Estonia’s independence. This brings the importance of both achieving independence and losing it within the space of around twenty years into sharp focus; in living memory, this period will also gain further importance when post-Soviet Estonia uses it both to connect to the history it lost during the Soviet era and as a tertium comparationis for the very same post-Soviet era.

2.1 Political and Economic Developments

The First World War, the October Revolution and the Civil War led to a situation within which ethnic Estonian political figures managed not only to unify the Estonian province with the area of Northern Livonia inhabited by ethnic Estonians, but at the same time to take the major steps necessary to establish this combined area as an independent state.

This subchapter will first deal with the preconditions and developments up to the establishment of independent statehood after which the main traits of independent Estonia are related: breaking free from the Tsarist Empire in the turmoil of the October Revolution and creating and running the political, judicial and socio-economic structures required for independent statehood. Establishing their own state in 1918 has been regarded as a seminal event in Estonian history, the culmination of the Estonian awakening which started in the 1860s. For some 20 years at least, this Fenno-Ugric people would have its own state until the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop-Pact provided the conditions for its undoing. This explains why living memory has clung so fervently to the existence of the state, its unjust undoing, and the necessity of regaining independence. It explains why the historical background to any post-Soviet development cannot be ignored: even if lawyers may have the proviso that everything has to be analysed under current rules and norms, people have memories which makes them select quite different points and attach a maybe somewhat different value to them than a jurist would do. This is especially true for Estonia and the Estonians in the late 1980s and 1990s.
2.1.1 Establishing and Securing the Independent Republic of Estonia

2.1.1.1 The Precursor to Statehood: The Province of Estonia, 1721-1917

The long domination by outside powers and their representatives which the interwar republic broke with forms part of the Estonians’ collective memory. Since Teutonic times started c. 1227, a Baltic German aristocracy dominated the mainly agriculturally oriented area that ethnic Estonians inhabited, where through the ages Denmark, Sweden, and finally Tsarist Russia have also ruled. In 1558, the Livonian war started; looting on the part of Russian troops resulted in appeals by the city council of Tallinn for Swedish protection which duly arrived in 1561. Tallinn and the surrounding nobilities of Harju-Viru and Järvamaa, i.e. the northern part of the Baltic area formerly belonging to the Teutonic Order, submitted in negotiated treaties to Swedish domination; in 1584 the duchy of Estonia was carved out of Old Livonia and became a part of the Swedish empire, while the southern parts of Livonia and Courland were incorporated into the Polish-Lithuanian kingdom of the Jagiellons. The province of Livonia came to Sweden only in 1622. However, much earlier the first Swedes had come to the area of present day Estonia; this happened probably at the end of the 13th century.51

At the beginning of the 18th century, Russia under Peter the Great had defeated the Swedish Kingdom in the Great Northern War. As an effect of the capitulation of 1710 and following the Treaty of Nystad of 1721, the two provinces of Estonia and Livonia were incorporated into the Russian Tsarist Empire.52 At the end of this 18th century, the third partition of the Jagiellonic empire in 1795 gave Courland to Russia, too, which remained the supreme ruler of the Baltic area until its collapse in 1917/18. It should be noted, however, that the provincial and administrative boundaries of Estonia and Livonia pre-1918 did not correspond to the ethnic boundaries: the northern part of Livonia was also inhabited by ethnic Estonians, the southern part was inhabited by ethnic Latvians. Only during the turmoil of the civil war of 1917-18 did the Baltic provinces manage to gain their independence, to unite their people by dividing Livonia along ethnic lines, destroy a major part of the Baltic Germans’ power base, and to set up their own statehood thence.53

During most of the two centuries the Baltic provinces belonged to the Russian Empire. The Tsarist rule generally followed some enlightened pragmatism, favouring stability of the area and loyalty of the inhabitants. As a rule, for some 150 years until the mid-


19th century the Tsarist policy left the social, political and cultural status quo intact and respected traditional rights. Moreover, whenever possible, the Russian court co-opted the non-Russian elites of the area, though at times this was also dictated by the lack of any Russian elite that could be drawn upon. Consequently, in the Baltic provinces, the Baltic German nobility continued to rule the area: their position was virtually left untouched, their privileges and rights, which were based on the privilegium Sigismundi Augusti from 1561, were regularly confirmed by the ruling Tsar, starting from the Nystad treaty. Indeed, in the first half of the 19th century the Baltic Germans, together with the Polish and Finnish nobility, had more privileges than the Russian nobility. German law, administration, Lutheran religion and the German language in law, administration and education continued unabated at least until the mid-19th century.

The social strata of the area thus had two main echelons: the Baltic Germans, who since the 13th century had represented the upper echelon of society whereas the lower echelon consisted mainly of the rural and urban Estonians, with hardly any middle ground between the two strata and an almost total absence of a native, i.e. Estonian, nobility and clergy. The reason was not that upward mobility would not take place, but that the integration and assimilation of all those reaching the higher echelons of society drew them into the German-speaking elite of the Ritterschaften. Until today, the German cultural influence has been seen to have had a fair share in the Estonian cultural development, and most Estonians seem to regard this share in, and influence on, their heritage generally positive – especially vis-à-vis the Russian and Soviet experience. Interestingly this omits or ignores the fact that the period of national awakening, triggered by the European Age of Enlightenment, also saw significant agitation against the Germans and their political and cultural influence. In the 19th century, the differences between the social strata not only led to several struggles for more rights on the part of the serfs or freeholders against the German barons but also there was change from a socio-economically based struggle to an ethnicised one, from native poor to poor Estonians serfs and peasants, and from native and non-native rich land-owners dominating the area to German barons. There was a change of attributes attached to each individual.

One of the most important preconditions for the period of awakening was the abolition of serfdom in Estonia and Livonia in 1816 and 1819: having gained personal freedom, the peasantry had lost their economic security, a problem that was only tackled with the advent of the agrarian reforms effected during the period between 1840 and 1860. With the German barons’ introduction of tenancies granted against rental payments, the peasants’ security was restored. From the mid-19th century the Baltic

55 Kappeler (FN 54), p. 177.
58 In much more detail, and with slightly differing positions to Raun, cf. Pistohlkors, Inversion of Ethnic Group Status (FN 53).
59 Rauch, Baltic States (FN 53), p. 6.
provinces experienced the influence of the Age of Enlightenment, putting in motion a trend towards more self-assertion by the Estonians. This seems to have evolved in parallel with the increase in mass literacy, which itself led to the development of a native Estonian intelligentsia. Already in the 1820s over 75%, and by the time of the 1897 census, some 95% of ethnic Estonians over 14 years of age were literate – a legacy of the Swedish domination, under which the early rise of universal literacy began. By comparison, the average rate for European (Tsarist) Russia was 28.4%.

Building on this high degree of literacy among the Estonians, the literature of their writers could start to take on a new identity and a national consciousness, thus influencing the Estonian population. What Krišjāns Barons and his massive compilation of Latvian folk songs was for the Latvians, Friedrich Reinhold Kreutzwald became for the Estonians. An ethnic Estonian working as a medical officer in the town of Võru (then Werro) in northern Livonia (Livland), he collected a huge number of folk tales. His most important achievement for Estonian literature was the editing of the Estonian folk epos, Kalevipoeg, ‘The Son of Kalev’, in 1857. This Estonian opus magnificum has to Estonians the same almost mythical importance as William Tell has to the Swiss. Kreutzwald was a friend of F. R. Fählmann’s, who shared his occupation as a medical doctor, but most importantly, was the leader of the Estonian Learned Society, founded in 1838 in Tartu (then Dorpat). This society was one of an increasing number founded in the second half of the 19th century with the aim of taking care of Estonian cultural life: not only literature, but also music, theatre, and education were strongly promoted and participation encouraged. A number of newspapers and journals were set up. The Estonian paper, the Postimees (The Postman), was founded in 1857 in Pärnu and moved in 1864 to the intellectual centre of Estonia, Tartu, when its owner, Woldemar Jannsen, had to move there for job reasons. In Tartu, he also launched the Vanemuine choral society. The first all-Estonian song festival, then, held in 1869 in Tartu, quickly acquired a supra-regional importance, spreading through the whole of Estonia both the event and the self-conscious message of a distinct ethnic group – the Estonians. Unsurprisingly, the collector and publisher of another large edition of Estonian songs, the pastor Jakob Hurt, also became famous and one of the Estonians’ intellectual heroes. In 1871 he became the first president of the newly founded Estonian Society of Writers, the Eesti Kirjameeste Selts.

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62 Other important pioneers of Baltic Latvian studies were the German Johann Gottfried Herder and Gottfried Friedrich Stender. Herder collected folk songs and Dainas, specific forms of Latvian rhymes, which were of great importance for the development of Latvian script, sparking the development of a specific Latvian identity. Stender was the author of the first Latvian dictionary, published in 1789 in Riga. Cf. Graudin, p. 13. In greater detail, cf. Rauch, Baltic States (FN 53), pp. 6-18 for Estonia and Latvia.
63 Rauch, Baltic States (FN 53), p. 7. It is also in Tartu that the F.R. Kreutzwald Museum of Literature is based (in Vanemuine Street, opposite the ‘old’ Vanemuine Theatre which gave the street its name).
64 Rauch, Baltic States (FN 53), p. 8.
65 A. Schmidt, Geschichte des Baltikums (FN 56), pp. 119-120.
Thus a modern Estonian culture and a civil society developed especially during the second half of the 19th century: as it were, peasants were made into Estonians by imbuing a national consciousness. Together with the above-mentioned socio-economic factors, these are main conditions for achieving state- and nationhood. In this period, known as the Baltic awakening, ever-increasing efforts on the parts of the Baltic peoples were made, on the one hand, to establish their own indigenous cultures vis-à-vis the Baltic German culture of the noblemen and the Russian culture; on the other, to withstand Russification efforts as directed by the Tsarist governments of Alexander III and Nicholas II.

Under Alexander III the government in a political change of tack turned more repressive and authoritarian again, although forerunners had been emerging for about a decade. Alexander III’s government prescribed the use of Russian in provincial and municipal administration as well as for the courts; at the local level, indigenous languages could still be used both in judicial and administrative matters. Also, Russian was prescribed for use in instruction on all levels of education. Since at times the only qualification for a teacher was his command of Russian, and not quite his knowledge of the subjects he was to teach, this measure created havoc in the educational system of the non-Russian provinces. In the province of Estonia, native Estonian teachers, who were the bedrock of Estonian rural schools, were largely dismissed. The universities suffered by the same token: now Russian was demanded as the language of instruction, and in addition, overall academic freedom was severely curtailed. These measures were to a great extent aimed at Russifying the German nobility – in the Estonian university, German had been the major language of instruction, it had been the language used in administration, and it was generally the language of the elites in the Baltic region. The ill-advised intensification of Russification policies between 1890 and 1905, including the sudden imposition of the Russian language and the heavy-handed promotion of converting the mainly Lutheran population to Orthodoxy, led to massive irritations in the population with increasing calls for the province’s autonomy. Only after the shock of the 1905

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68 From 1945 onwards, Estonians and others must have had a sense of déjà-vu in this respect, as Russification and Sovietisation set in. On the Tsarist era, see the splendidly organised and written article by Wolfgang Tenhagen: ‘Russifizierung und Aufhebung von Sonderrechten: Die baltischen Provinzen’. Münster: unpublished Manuscript, 1999.


70 Cf. Tenhagen (FN 68); Pistohlkors, Inversion of Ethnic Group Status (FN 53), p. 188.

71 Raun, Independence redefined (FN 57), p. 407. Kappeler (FN 54) at p. 177 points to the long period in which the Russian centre from the 16th century onwards was cosmopolitan: first was Tartar aristocracy highly influential in court circles, holding important political positions. During the 17th and 18th century foreigners from Western and Central Europe were imported to serve at the court and in government, from whom the Baltic Germans took over in being the most influential non-Russian group. Later Poles, Swedes from the Finlandian provinces, as well as Transcauscians joined the fold (ibid.). By implication, such strong Russianisation should not
revolution was the old approach to nationalities politics readopted; however, the overall disenchantment with the government did not abate.\textsuperscript{72}

In addition to the transregional tensions in the relations with the centre and its local governors, a more self-asserting Estonian population clashed with the German nobility. The Estonians were first led by Carl-Robert Jakobson in attacking the German provincial administration, until it became much clearer that it was not the Germans who were the actual culprits but the Russian nationalists with whom they had previously allied themselves.\textsuperscript{73} Thus, in the years around the turn of the century, a multi-layered conflict ensued in the Baltic provinces not least as a consequence of the central government’s rather inept policies.

During the years from 1899 through 1903, the empire was in economic decline, factories were closed and people were increasingly unhappy about the circumstances they had to endure. Half-hearted reforms under Stolypin helped rectify some of the economic problems, but political measures such as a promised parliament were ineffective. Not surprisingly, several protests and demonstrations took place whose brutal crushing resulted in the 1905 revolution.\textsuperscript{74} Whatever else these events may have caused, they did cause an upsurge in self-assertion in the late Tsarist Empire.\textsuperscript{75} Everywhere the non-Russian peoples called for emancipation from the empire. In the province of Estonia, they were led by charismatic persons such as Jaan Tõnisson, who had assumed editorship of the Postimees in 1896, and Konstantin Päts, who was the editor of the Tallinn Teataja (Gazette, or Herald) newspaper from 1901 to 1905.\textsuperscript{76} Of the two, Tõnisson was more the evolutionary type of reformer, while Päts was a more radical type. Both individuals were to play a most important role throughout Estonia’s interwar period from 1918 to 1940. Yet around the turn of the 19th / 20th century, their different standpoints on achieving greater emancipation led to a war of words between their respective papers, which, apart from verbal injuries, resulted in the widespread distribution in the population of the very idea of emancipation, one of the main demands of the 1905 revolution. This idea prevailed until the October revolution and the ensuing turmoil allowed for breaking free from Tsarist domination by calling out the Estonian state in 1918.

2.1.1.2 The October Revolution and the Declaration of Independence, 1917-1920

The ineptness prevalent in the Tsarist government came to full light after the outbreak of the First World War. At the end of 1916, not only did German troops reach far into the

\textsuperscript{72} Kappeler (FN 54), ibid., p. 173-4.
\textsuperscript{74} In detail cf. Rauch, \textit{Baltic States} (FN 53), pp. 14-15. Pistohlkors, \textit{Inversion of Ethnic Group Status} (FN 53), reports p. 192 that around 2,000 Estonian and Latvian individuals were sent to Siberia.
\textsuperscript{76} Rauch, \textit{Baltic States} (FN 53), p. 10.
Russian territory, but the mood of the population was such that even previously staunch supporters of the Tsar turned against him and forced him to abdicate in March 1917. The volatile situation until the outbreak of the October Revolution was passed under a provisional government in St. Petersburg.\textsuperscript{77} The St. Petersburg / Petrograd Provisional Government and its decree from 30 March / 12 April 1917 were instrumental in the birth of the Estonian state; this decree connected the province of Estonia with northern Livonia, thus linking all territory settled by ethnic Estonians and combining their territory into one unit.\textsuperscript{78} At the same time, the dissolution of the old provinces deprived the Baltic nobility of their main power centre, Livonia, which ceased to exist. In terms of international law, this provides two of the major components for the existence and recognition of a state. The third major component, a sovereign government, was about to be established.\textsuperscript{79}

The Petrograd Provisional Government appointed a Gubernatorial Commissioner for the new area of Estonia, who should rule the area together with a Maapäev, or Estonian diet; the former mayor of Tallinn, Jaan Poska, became the first Commissioner. The first elections to the Maapäev took place in May 1917 and its inaugural meeting took place on 1 July 1917; also in July, the Maapäev elected the first government for the territory.\textsuperscript{80} In its session of 9 October, it decided that the future form of the state-to-be should be decided by a constitutional assembly, a constituant.\textsuperscript{81} Shortly after the Maapäev’s election, the Bolsheviks in October 1917 staged a coup in the Estonian capital, Tallinn, and declared an ‘Estonian Soviet Executive Committee’ as the supreme and sole government in Estonia, increasing the volatility of the situation.

On 2 November 1917 a ‘Declaration of the Rights of the Russian Peoples’ was issued in St. Petersburg. This declaration conceded the right to self-determination to all

\textsuperscript{77} For the period of the Russian Revolution and the ensuing Civil War, cf. in extenso Pipes, pp. 3-140. Further : Rauch, Baltic States (FN 53), pp. 24-39; on the German occupation cf. ibid., pp. 39-49; Georg von Rauch: Geschichte der Sowjetunion, Stuttgart: Kröner, 8th, impr. and exp. ed., 1990, on the Revolution pp. 41-90, on the Civil War pp. 91-143. Henceforth as Rauch, Geschichte der Sowjetunion. Hosking is somewhat shorter; cf. on the October Revolution pp. 35-56, on the War and development of Communism, pp 57-92. The standard work on this remains Edward H. Carr’s; for a shorter version of his three volumes making up the Bolshevik Revolution within his fourteen-volume History of Soviet Russia, cf. idem: The Russian Revolution From Lenin to Stalin. 1917-1929, London and Basingstoke: Papermac, ’1987. Curiously enough, at p. 14, Carr writes ibid.: ‘...small countries which had once been part of the Russian Empire, and were now recognised as Soviet Republics, including the Ukraine, Belorussia, the Baltic countries...’. In March 1919, the date to which Carr refers, independence had long since been declared in Estonia, and a Soviet Republic it was not until 1940.


\textsuperscript{79} On the German occupation cf. Rauch, Baltic States (FN 53), pp. 39-49; on the War of Liberation cf. ibid., pp. 49-70.

\textsuperscript{80} Pistohlkors, Inversion of Ethnic Group Status, pp. 194-197; Toivo U. Raun: Estonia and the Estonians, Stanford: Stanford UP, 1987, at p. 100. According to Raun, the 62 Maapäev seats were distributed as follows: Bolsheviks: 5 seats; Estonian Social Democrats (formerly Mensheviks, 9); Estonian Social Revolutionaries (8); Workers’ Party (11); Democrats (7); Radicals (4); Agrarian League (13), German and Swedish minorities (2); independent (3).

\textsuperscript{81} Uibopuu, Freistaat Estland (FN 78), p. 52.
peoples contained within the Russian Empire, including the right to separation from the Empire and the formation of their own independent states. On the other hand, from February 1917 onwards a power struggle between the Provisional Government and the Soviets took place, which also incorporated the Baltic provinces. In Estonia, a power struggle ensued between the Bolshevik Soviets and the elected Maapäev. On 12/25 November 1917 the Soviets declared the distinctly un-Bolshevik Maapäev dissolved, which however met on 15/28 November 1917 and declared itself to be the sole bearer of supreme political authority in Estonia. 82 In the ongoing struggle for power in Tallinn it appeared that the Bolshevik Committee had usurped power for the time being; still, the Maapäev had transferred power to its Council of Elders and its organs went underground. With the German troops advancing in early 1918 and the Bolshevik troops being forced to withdraw, the political parties in the Maapäev joined forces and on 19 February 1918 formed the Estonian Salvation Committee that on 23 February proclaimed its ‘Manifesto To All Estonian People’ in Pärnu. 83 On 24 February 1918 it repeated the proclamation in Tallinn, where the Committee declared Estonia independent, proclaimed the independent Republic of Estonia, 84 and formed a provisional government under Konstantin Päts. Until today, this day is celebrated as the Estonian state’s birthday.

However, the declaration of independence did not lead directly to the establishment of a fully sovereign Estonia. Not only went on the tripartite internal power struggle between the Bolsheviks, the Estonian alliance of conservative, liberal and socialist politicians, and the Baltic German nobility, none of whom seemed to be able to compromise with either opponent but also outside forces again took a strong hand. The Germans, whose troops were already far advanced into Poland, Galicia and parts of Lithuania, did not recognise the newly declared independence of Estonia and, advancing further, occupied the territory just one day later. A little over a week later, in the treaty of Brest-Litovsk of 3 March 1918 85, a severely weakened Russia had to concede to the German Kaiserreich all her Western borderlands which included Finland and the Baltic provinces, renouncing its sovereignty over the region in Article 7 of the Additional Protocol of 27 August 1918. 86 Until shortly before Germany’s capitulation on 24 November 1918, Estonia was administered and ruled by the Germans, and the Estonian provisional government was prevented from assuming power until 11 November 1918, when the German troops started to retreat from the Baltic area.

83 Uibopuu, Freistaat Estland (FN 78), p. 52. Also cf. Rauch, Baltic States (FN 53), p. 45. It is not clear, yet very unlikely, whether or not the Bolsheviks were party to that Salvation Committee.
No sooner did the German troops leave, than Soviet Russia (RSFSR)\(^{87}\) made an effort to fill the vacuum and fight the Baltic independence declarations and their consequences. Declaring the Brest-Litovsk Treaty null and void on 13 November 1918, they marched into the Baltic states, allegedly with the aim to ‘free the people from the imperialist burden.’ Although the Bolsheviks did at first have considerable support, especially in Latvia, from local communists, they antagonised the population quickly by the terror they instigated: fairly early they used the measure of deportations, in addition to which their denial of political participation to any other group as well as their black-and-white views of class struggle drove support away again. Thus Estonians, together with German Free Corps and Finnish volunteers, as well as British naval support, fought a War of Liberation to drive the Soviets out, a goal they finally achieved only in 1920 when Lenin decided to yield to German pressure and stop the civil war in the West after two years.\(^{88}\) As before, so too in this epoch, great powers’ rivalry influenced the history of the area, though this time the power vacuum it entailed at the end of the First World War led to the final establishment of independent and sovereign states in the wake of the Versailles Peace Treaties.

Estonian independence was finally secured by the Tartu Peace Treaty of 2 February 1920. As most of the hostilities ceased in February 1919, apart from a few skirmishes, negotiations were proposed by the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, George V. Chicherin, on 31 August 1919, with a view to obtain ‘...the secession of hostilities, establishment of boundaries, and recognition of Estonia’s sovereignty and independence.’ The negotiations commenced on 17 September 1919 in Pskov, led to an armistice on 31 December 1919, and ended with the signing of the Tartu Peace Treaty on 2 February 1920.\(^{89}\) The treaty was ratified almost immediately by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on 4 February, and by the Estonian Constitutional Assembly on 13 February 1920; the ratification documents were exchanged on 30 March 1920 in Moscow. The Tartu Peace Treaty thus entered into force.

As a first consequence of the treaty conditions, on 15 March and 15 April 1920, 8 and 7 million gold roubles, respectively, were paid to Estonia in compensation.\(^{90}\) The most important stipulation of this treaty was that Soviet Russia renounce ‘voluntarily and for ever’ all former sovereign rights over the territory of Estonia, which the RSFSR in-

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\(^{87}\) Soviet Russia, which was the rump of the former Tsarist Empire minus the Baltic provinces and the Transcaucasian lands of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, constituted itself in July 1918 as the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, RSFSR, which in 1924 was the basis for the USSR: the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.


This treaty obligation would play a most important role in 1939-40, 1945, and in the 1990s in the Russian relations with Estonia, for not only would recognising the treaty imply the de jure recognition of Estonian independent statehood both in 1919 and 1991; Soviet Russia also had to concede to the victorious Estonians areas that in the post-Soviet era of the 1990s were cause for dispute, areas that were mainly inhabited by ethnic Russians. In 1920, Estonia could demand these border-realignments from a position of strength: these areas, which extended the earlier, provincial borders by some 10-20 kilometres, were to be used as strategic reserve, as quasi-forward positions to secure Estonia against any surprise attack from the Russian side. Most importantly, the Tartu Peace Treaty was the basis on which the Estonian Republic was founded and internationally recognized, as it also delineated the borders of the country. Lenin sold the treaty as a success, stating that ‘...we have opened a window on Europe, which we shall utilise as extensively as possible...’. However, in the 1990s the Russian Federation disputed the terms of the treaty, refusing to return the areas that Stalin later annexed to Russia as well as ipso facto the recognition of Estonian statehood.

Still, during 1920 and 1921, Estonia was de jure recognised: by Finland on 7 July and by Poland on 31 December 1920; by the Supreme Allied Council, whose members were Belgium, France, Italy, Japan, and the UK, on 21 January 1921; the US de jure recognised Estonia on 25 July 1922. Prior to this, on 26 October 1920, Estonia

91 The second article of the Tartu Peace Treaty reads as follows: ‘On the basis of the right of all peoples freely to decide their own destinies, and even to separate themselves completely from the State of which they form part, a right proclaimed by the Federal Socialist Republic of Soviet Russia, Russia unreservedly recognizes the independence and autonomy of the State of Estonia, and renounces voluntarily and forever all rights of sovereignty formerly held by Russia over the Estonian people and territory by virtue of their former legal situation, and by virtue of international treaties, which, in respect of such rights, shall henceforth lose their force.’ Quoted in Hough (FN 89), at p. 357. Italics added.


93 Information by Professor Rein Taagepera; conversation with the present author on 9 May 1996 in Tartu.

94 The Tartu Peace Treaty is reprinted in part in Mattisen, Dignified Compromise (FN 92), Appendix 6, pp. 119-121, with particular regard to the border delineation; on the negotiations cf. ibid., inside covers, for maps; for a discussion of the frontier issues 1917-1919 as well as a narrative of the negotiation process, cf. ibid., pp. 25-51. This explains why the Tartu Treaty has paramount significance until today: the borders are a constitutional question. Questioning the Tartu Treaty borders of Estonia by extension means questioning the very existence of Estonia. For a treatment of the international problems and the Russo-Estonian foreign relations, including a possible amendment of the Tartu Treaty as discussed in Autumn 1996, see below.

95 Quoted in Carr, The Russian Revolution, p. 43, in German: Rauch, Geschichte der Sowjetunion (FN 77), quoting Lenin, Sochineniya, Vol. XXV, p. 23, who called it even an ‘unheard-of victory over international imperialism...’, at p. 140. Note that this picture had been used first by Peter the Great when he had gained the access to the Baltic Sea.

96 Pajur (FN 90), p. 147.

97 Rauch, Baltic States (FN 53), p. 81 confirms the Allied Supreme Council’s de jure recognition on 21 January 1921, while giving 22 July 1922 (not 25 July) for the USA’s recognition as does Meissner, ‘The Baltic States’ (FN 52), p. 331. Hough (FN 89) p. 358 gives 28 July 1922 in conjunction with the USA’s recognition of Lithuania ‘...by simultaneously extending de jure recog-
had applied for membership of the League of Nations; the Council of the League of Nations discussed the question of recognition of all three Baltic states on 26 January 1921, deciding however that recognition should be extended to only Estonia and Latvia, with Lithuania having to settle the Vilnius question with Poland first.\(^98\) On 22 September 1921 Estonia was admitted as membre ordinaire\(^99\), together with Latvia and Lithuania. Thus Estonia had become a fully-fledged, fully accepted state and member of the international community. The reason for a certain reluctance on the part of the League of Nations to accept the Baltic states must be seen in their internationally vulnerable position which at that time was considered as rendering them unstable – a striking parallel to post-Soviet developments.\(^100\)

### 2.1.2 Domestic Politics Between Extreme Liberalism and Authoritarian Rule

The interwar period of independence can be divided into two parts: the first, from 1920 through 1934, which was characterised by building and running a liberal state; the second followed the soft coup by the then president and was one of authoritarianism.

#### 2.1.2.1 Liberalism, 1920-1934

The first, rather liberal, Estonian Constitution was modelled after the Swiss example. In 1919, a Constitutional Assembly was elected;\(^101\) on 15 June 1920 it declared the new Constitution which came into force on 16 December 1920.\(^102\) This strongly parliamentary constitution was almost overly democratic in that it all but eliminated the executive, firmly favouring the Riigikogu parliament as the elected legislature representing the population; the population in addition had the rights of initiatives and referenda...
stowed upon them. The Riigikogu was a single chamber parliament to be elected every three years, which had permanent control over the government and which could not be dissolved except by a plebiscite. The government’s leader was to be the Riigivanem, a state elder, who at the same time had the function of the head of state.\textsuperscript{103}

Any law adopted by majority vote could be delayed by two months if a third of the parliament would request this to organise a popular referendum (Art. 30 of the 1920 constitution). 25,000 citizens or around 5% of the electorate were necessary to initiate such a referendum, which, if it went against the parliament would make new elections mandatory (Art. 32).\textsuperscript{104} From 1920 through 1934 there were five elections to the parliament\textsuperscript{105} based on the system of proportional representation. As a direct result of the election system the only regular feature of the time was the somewhat fragmented multi-party system. This in turn led to the government’s coalitions shifting almost continually, even if the major parties, such as the Liberals, Social Democrats, or the Farmers’ Union, represented the bedrock of many governments. Yet if between nine and fourteen political parties make up a government, this must make it inherently unstable. Its structural weakness as framed by the constitution was further increased by the need for political compromise. This had to be a hard bargaining process, as too many parties wanted to achieve at least some of their main aims; clashes were therefore preprogrammed.\textsuperscript{106}

In the fourteen-year period until parliament was suspended in 1934, the country saw no less than twenty different parliamentary governments with an average life span of some eight months – sometimes even shorter: e.g. the 1933 government of Karl Einbund stayed in power for only two and a half months, from 19 July through 3 Oct. 1933, after which the power vacuum lasted until 1 Nov. 1933.\textsuperscript{107} In a way, this makes the domestic political situation of interwar Estonia look somewhat akin to Weimar Germany or post-1945 Italy which perhaps was a hallmark of the time. A communist coup attempt on 1 December 1924 did not help to stabilise the political situation, even though the party was forbidden until shortly before the staged ‘elections’ of 1940.\textsuperscript{108}

Even if the politicians seem to have squabbled more than agreeing on something, some important tasks could be completed. Until the war, the agricultural sector had been dominated by large estates owned by Baltic Germans for centuries. On these almost feudal-type estates, indigenous yet principally landless Estonian farmers worked the land. Therefore land ownership was a burning issue in the early days of independent Estonia, for it had not only economic and social, but also political connotations: while 58% of all agricultural land in 1918 had been owned by the 1149 large estate owners, with an average area of over 2,100 hectares, 42% or a total of around 51,600 Estonian

\textsuperscript{103} Uibopuu, Freistaat Estland (FN 78), p. 54.
\textsuperscript{104} Taagepera, Estonia’s Constitutional Assembly (FN 101), p. 212.
\textsuperscript{105} Misiunas / Taagepera, p. 11; the elections were on 27-29 Nov. 1921 for the first Riigikogu; 5-7 May 1923 for the second; 15-17 May 1926 for the third; 11-13 May 1930 for the fourth; 21-23 May 1932 for the fifth Riigikogu. Pajur (FN 90), pp. 147, 151, 156, 160, 163.
\textsuperscript{106} Taagepera, Estonia’s Constitutional Assembly (FN 101), p. 212. On the political parties in the Baltic states cf. in detail Rauch, Baltic States (FN 53), pp. 91-99; a list of 21 premierships is in Appendix B, p. 256. Also cf. Misiunas / Taagepera, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{107} Misiunas / Taagepera, p. 11; Pajur (FN 90), pp. 136-193.
farms owned the rest of the country. About half a million rural inhabitants, or 2/3 of the rural population, did not own any land at all.\textsuperscript{109} The land reform, started in 1919, confiscated the estates and expropriated the former owners. In total, an area of some 2.35 million hectares was nationalised, and slightly over 1.25 million remained in the state’s possession. Some 700,000 hectares of land were split up into smaller farms and given to the landless native peasantry, a total of 53,000. The former owners were compensated only late, and rather inadequately, in 1926, after many of them had been ruined and left the country, or individually sued the government for compensation. Economically, the reform was a major success, as before the land reform, there were only 51,600 farms, in 1925 however, there were already almost 126,600, with the number still rising: now 2/3 of the rural population owned their land. The share of landless labourers went down to 17\%.\textsuperscript{110}

However, if the one side of the land reform was to solve a pressing economic problem, the other side of it was to gain mass support; further, it simultaneously intended to decrease the former landlords’ political clout.\textsuperscript{111} Thus, Estonian political influence was to be strengthened, non-Estonian, Baltic German influence weakened so as to give Estonians such political power as was reflected by their size as the majority population in their newly established state. Therefore, this agrarian reform is not only part of economic history. It is also of relevance to a further political emancipation of the majority Estonians and a politically weakened minority, in this case, the Germans, the second largest population group.\textsuperscript{112} Nevertheless the rather efficacious Baltic German politicians of the day advocated co-operation and strongly supported the newly won independence of the Baltic states, not least by the important role they played in the Baltic economy.\textsuperscript{113} For the democratic parties in Estonia, the land reform helped consolidate their position, also thwarting further Bolshevik efforts. For the population, a major change in society took place, with a similar shift in political, economic and social power to the Estonians.

2.1.2.2 Authoritarianism, 1934–1939/40

The global economic downturn known as the Great Depression not only made a considerable dent in the country’s economic development but also had almost catastrophic effects on the political scene. Rather powerful parties emerged on the far right. They demanded a new constitution with far stronger executive powers; their influence and popular support resulted in the 1933 Constitution.\textsuperscript{114} The powers afforded by the second Estonian Constitution to the newly created office of state president were indeed immense and took effect from 1 January 1934.

\textsuperscript{109} Rauch, \textit{Baltic States} (FN 53), pp. 87-91, at p. 87, p. 89.

\textsuperscript{110} Pistohlkors, \textit{Inversion of Ethnic Group Status}, pp. 198-199; it appears that a printing error occurred with regard to the area distributed to the landless, as the total size must be 700,000, not 70,000 ha., as printed with Pistohlkors.

\textsuperscript{111} Alexander Veiler, Deputy of the Party of Labour, said in the second session of the Constitutional Assembly in 1919, ‘Your kill an animal by breaking its backbone. The estates were the backbone of the barons.’, quoted in: Cornelius Hasselblatt: \textit{Minderheitenpolitik in Estland. Rechtsentwicklung und Rechtswirklichkeit 1918-1995}, Hamburg: Bibliotheca Baltica, 1996, p. 2 (in German, translated into English by the present author).

\textsuperscript{112} In detail, cf. Hasselblatt, pp. 38-43, with further references.


\textsuperscript{114} In detail, cf. Uibopuu, \textit{Freistaat Estland} (FN 78), p. 55.
In consideration of the political situation and by virtue of his position and powers, the Estonian president, Jan Tõnisson, declared a state of emergency. The following prime minister, Konstantin Päts, at first headed a provisional government until the constitutionally binding new election of both president and parliament which were to take place within the first 100 days after 1 January 1934. Because of the election battle and right-wingers gaining ground, Päts again declared a state of emergency on 12 March 1934 when he dissolved parliament and henceforth ruled by decree through 1937, a period during which the state of emergency persisted. This time is called the Silent Age, vaikiv ajastaju.\textsuperscript{115}

Päts could afford to do that not least because he had been instrumental in the foundation of Estonia in the first place. Also, he would claim to want to rescue the state from worse: the rationale was that this ruling by decree of a moderate authoritarian government was better than a strongly right-wing if not fascist government which would thus be obviated. Indeed, in view of the regimes in place in Italy, Germany and, closer to home, Lithuania, none of the democratic forces voiced any significant opposition to these measures. On the contrary, it appears that many moderate politicians reacted even favourably to Päts’ regime and co-operated, even though the freedom of speech was restricted and political parties disbanded in 1935 in favour of the new corporate body, the Isamaaliit (Fatherland Union).\textsuperscript{116} Above all, the business community welcomed a new prospect of stability.\textsuperscript{117}

It must however be pointed out that Päts’ action did not find favour with all parts of the population. Clearly the right-wingers would not like it, being the target of the measures.\textsuperscript{118} Yet also liberal intellectuals could not quite muster support for the developments in 1934 and thereafter, mostly criticising the restrictions on the freedom of political expression. Still, the greatest part of the population being rural, it welcomed the developments, as did the military. Therefore, it may be concluded that there probably existed an overall agreement to Päts’ policies in the country.\textsuperscript{119} It was only shortly before the onset of the Second World War that steps were taken to return to democratic, constitutional rule. In 1938, a third constitution was ratified: it was deemed even more liberal than the first one, and certainly more balanced than the second.\textsuperscript{120} In 1939 a new parliament was

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{116}{Rauch, \textit{Baltic States} (FN 53), p. 155. Note that this was the name of a conglomerate of parties in 1991-1997(?) which was the major party in government in the first years of post-Soviet Estonia.}
\footnotetext{117}{Misiunas / Taagepera, p. 12-13.}
\footnotetext{118}{The ambitious lawyer and right-winger, Arthur Sirk, who was the actual leader of the Estonian Freedom Fighters, was put into prison, whence he escaped in November 1934, and fled into exile where he died in 1937. His organisation went underground around that time, and his successor proposed to arrest the government in a coup. This coup was frustrated by the government and the members sent to prison. Rauch, \textit{Baltic States} (FN 53), p. 157.}
\footnotetext{119}{Misiunas / Taagepera, p. 13.}
\footnotetext{120}{Cf. Uibopuu, \textit{Freistaat Estland} (FN 78), pp. 56-8. Taagepera, \textit{Estonia’s Constitutional Assembly} (FN 101), suggests on p. 212 that the position that the 1937 Constitution would be more moderately presidential than the 1933 one would be mere propaganda spread out by Päts, as according to a model by Shugart and Carey the 1937 Constitution would be ‘...superpresidential to a degree matched only by Paraguay.’ The 1933 Constitution in his view would give the Estonian president powers comparable to the US president.}
\end{footnotes}
elected. Only one year later, the Soviet Union forced new elections and a ‘voluntary’ application for accession to and incorporation into the Soviet Union.

2.1.3 The Economy
Compared to the political developments, the interwar economy developed somewhat better. The start was rather inauspicious, as the Tsarist era and Word War I legacy left the economy all but vanished and the rouble currency highly inflated. Thus, the economy had to be recreated from scratch.\textsuperscript{121}

Although some industry existed on Estonian territory since the 17\textsuperscript{th} century, the area was mainly agricultural. In the early 19\textsuperscript{th} century the first wool mills were established in Narva (1820), Hiiu-Kärdla (1829), and Sindi (1832); also some printing works were founded. Other newly founded plants produced beer, glass, or preserves. From the middle of the century, industrialisation increased, and further woollen mills were built in Narva, Tallinn and Voltveti. The textile industry became the dominating industrial sector in Tsarist Estonia, holding 53\% of all industrial production, with Narva as the main centre.\textsuperscript{122}

In addition, there were some defence-related plants as well as mechanical engineering and metallurgy; further paper, cellulose and plywood factories were built in Tallinn, Kohila, Türi and Pärnu. Three shipyards were located in Tallinn and Paldiski.\textsuperscript{123} Together with the textile industry, mechanical engineering and metallurgy used 2/3 of the industrial workforce before and around the time of the First World War. Most of the industries were geared towards the Russian Empire’s economic needs, aided by the new railroad, which linked Paldiski, Tallinn and St. Petersburg from 1870. Still, those industries introduced during Tsarist times helped raise living standards which consequently led to higher consumer demands, followed again by the introduction of relevant consumer and service industries. Most importantly, this led to increasing urbanisation.

In interwar Estonia, the industrial sector changed, as did the concentration of most industries in and around Tallinn, which shifted more to the centre of the country.\textsuperscript{124} At first, it grew only moderately. In the process of turning to the country’s own raw materials and natural resources, oil-shale mining started in 1916. The first excavations in Estonia began at Kukruse, east-north-east of Kohtla-Järve.\textsuperscript{125} After two years of research and development an industry for the treatment of oil-shale was established in Northern Estonia. Further mines opened at Kohtla-Järve and Vanamõisa near Rakvere. After the first Estonian steps in this industry, initiated by the Ministry of Trade and Industry, two private firms joined the fold in 1922 and 1925. In 1928, a Swedish firm built an oil-

shale distillation plant, and from 1930 underground mining took place in addition to open-cast mining.\textsuperscript{126} Most of the economy was still not heavy industry-based but consisted mainly of small and medium-sized firms owned by a large supply of native entrepreneurs. In 1930, slightly over 17% of the labour force worked in manufacturing industries.\textsuperscript{127}

On 1 Jan. 1928 a reform of the currency and banking sector took place. Instead of the formerly used \textit{Marks} and \textit{Pennies}, the Estonian \textit{Kroon}, or Crown, was introduced, with \textit{senti}, Cents, used as smaller denominations. It was also brought up to and linked with the Gold Standard: 1 \textit{Kroon} = 0.4072 grams of gold. Finally, it was also equalised with the Swedish Crown. The reforms were supported by a British loan of £1.35 million.\textsuperscript{128}

As indicated above, the agriculture sector seems to have been an even greater success. Even though the agricultural reforms had their very political overtones and underlying political power goals of dismantling the Baltic German barons’ position, it appears that by the splitting up of the great estates they had owned, and thus creating more than 50,000 new farms, the output of produce was diversified, too.\textsuperscript{129} The former concentration on grain production was reduced in favour of more dairy farming whose produce was dearly needed in the whole of Western Europe. Extra cattle were bought, the Danish system of dairy-cooperatives introduced, and poultry production rose so fast as to allow for massive exports of eggs.\textsuperscript{130} Indeed, the Estonian and Baltic agricultural products were exported as far as Britain, which was one of the major recipients in the 1920s and 1930s. World overproduction and low prices, however, made it necessary to secure other markets for the Baltic economies, too, and diversify. Besides their agriculture, 72% of whose produce went to the domestic market in 1937\textsuperscript{131}, the Baltic states had major timber and flax productions.

Although the Baltic economies were hit by the global recession around 1931-1933\textsuperscript{132}, they seemed to have survived much better than other European states. In June 1931, a new plant with 600 workers was opened by \textit{Eesti Kiviõli} which produced 2,500 tons of shale oil and 300 tons of petrol per month.\textsuperscript{133} From 1929 to 1939 Estonia increased its industrial production by 81% and industrial employment by 63%.\textsuperscript{134} A

\textsuperscript{127} Misiunas / Taagepara, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{128} Pajur (FN 90), p. 158.
\textsuperscript{129} Prior to independence, more than half of lands were owned by the barons, three quarters of which were used by large-scale farms of an average size of 1,630 hectares, while peasant single owners had farms of an average size of 34 hectares; (Pächter) had an average of 24 hectares. Cf. Järvesoo (FN 121), pp. 9, 12.
\textsuperscript{130} Cf. Hough (FN 89), FN 210, pp. 359-360, at p. 359: from 1919 to 1939, the pork production increased by 200%; the output of eggs by 232% and that of butter by 369%; the average yield of milk per cow by 98% and that of grain by 26%. Hough refers to J. Swettenham, \textit{The Tragedy of the Baltic States}, p. 56.
\textsuperscript{131} Rauch, \textit{Baltic States} (FN 53), p. 89.
\textsuperscript{132} Pajur (FN 90), p. 160.
\textsuperscript{133} Pajur (FN 90), p. 162.
\textsuperscript{134} Hough (FN 89), FN 210, pp. 359-360, at p. 359.
major factor in this development was the increased mining of oil-shale in north-eastern Estonia, an area that took precedence especially in the energy sector. The oil-shale was treated and products derived from it were oil, petroleum, and asphalt, which were also exported.\textsuperscript{135} By 1939, some 60,000 people worked in industry and construction (tööstuses ja ehituses). Including their dependants, these two sectors affected probably a quarter of the entire Estonians population.\textsuperscript{136}

Overall, Estonia developed an export-based economy, with products including butter, bacon, linen, cellulose as well as ply-wood and furniture. Its principal markets were Scandinavia and Western Europe, as well as the USSR, with Great Britain taking up a third, and Germany a fourth of all trade in the 1930s.\textsuperscript{137} Germany was the major source of imports into Estonia. Because of the problematic political relations between Estonia and Russia during the 1920s, a trade agreement could only be reached on 17 May 1929.\textsuperscript{138} Still, economic ties with the USSR existed at least in so far as all Baltic States granted the U.S.S.R. free transit over their harbors, rail, water, and air-ways. [...] In the port of Tallinn, Estonia, the Soviet Union had its own port-territory. Latvia and Estonia also preserved the wide-gauge Russian railways from the Soviet frontier to their harbors and reduced railway tariffs 10-70\% for Soviet export goods. Railway agreements providing for direct passenger traffic and dispatch of goods in transit to foreign ports were signed with the Soviet Union, as well as trade agreements granting the U.S.S.R. a minimum import tax tariff.\textsuperscript{139}

At the end of the 1930s, the economy was reported to be comparable in quality and status to Sweden or Finland, with equally good living standards – although after independence it had to be built practically from scratch.\textsuperscript{140} The products produced and exported were made by medium-sized firms and of a structure much different from what was to come: in 1937, there were 24,300 firms working in industry, only 299 of which were large enterprises; 728 firms were medium-sized and 2,661 were small firms; the majority of 20,066 were artisan businesses.\textsuperscript{141} With the complete incorporation of Estonia into the Soviet system that was to follow from 1939-1940 and from 1944, the interwar economy and its economic system were completely changed, if not destroyed, as were the old living standards.

This represents a major part of the Estonians’ trauma, which was relayed to further generations during the Soviet era and caused a backlash when independence was re-

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{135} Raun, \textit{Independence redefined} (FN 57), p. 409, and Hiden (FN 113), p. 5.
\item \textsuperscript{136} Kala (FN 124), p. 510.
\item \textsuperscript{137} In 1938, the main Estonian products that went into export were, butter, 25,152 ktons; cellulose and other paper products, 10,026 ktons; boards and planks (lauad ja plangud), 7,263 ktons; linen, 5,418 ktons; oil-shale, 4,983 ktons; plywood and plywood chair bases (vineertoolipõhjad), 4,291 ktons; cotton yarn and thread, 4,159 ktons; bacon and pork, 3,216 ktons; eggs, 2,750 ktons; cotton clothing (puuvillane riie, 2,365 ktons); more than 1 m. Crowns each was exported in paper, other meat products, fresh fish, spiritus, potatoes, rye, galalith, raw hides. Cf. Leo Õispuu (FN 121) p. 141. Trade agreements were concluded with France on 7 Jan. 1922; Hungary, 19 Oct 1922; Germany, 27 June 1923; Sweden, 7 July 1923; Cf. Pajur (FN 90), pp. 148-151; with Germany a trade agreement came only on 7 Dec. 1928; Pajur, ibid., p. 159; with Finland, 11 Apr. 1931, ibid., p. 162.
\item \textsuperscript{138} Pajur (FN 90), p. 160.
\item \textsuperscript{139} Hough (FN 89); FN 210, pp. 359-360, at p. 360.
\item \textsuperscript{140} Trade Details in Leo Õispuu (FN 121), p. 141.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
stored in 1991. The group who got most of the blame in the post-Soviet era were those migrants who came to the ESSR; those who remained found themselves at the receiving end of pent-up rejection by the Estonians after 1991. It is most instructive to assess the changes that in Soviet times were introduced in the political, economic and social sphere by comparing the post-Soviet to the interwar period – over the Soviet period, the population increased by more than a half, despite the heavy losses through war and deportations.

2.2 DEMOGRAPHY, MIGRATION, AND SOCIO-CULTURAL DEVELOPMENTS

Common wisdom has it that the area inhabited by Estonians in the 19th and 20th centuries has been settled by their ancestors since time immemorial – some histories go back to 4,000 years B.C., one even starts 11,000 B.C. (sic!). Even though the area has usually had a fairly stable population, whose natural growth was time and again decimated by plagues and wars, from the middle ages further tribes arrived in the area, whose numbers however remained comparatively small until the early 20th century. The domination by Danes, Swedes, Germans, and Russians over some 600 years or more left a certain cultural legacy in customs, language and traditions; chain migrants, i.e. migrants following earlier migrants to or from the same area, continued pioneer’s movements, which led to a modicum of Swedish, German, and Slav migrants coming and settling in the area on the north-eastern shores of the Baltic Sea.\(^{142}\)

2.2.1 Demography, Migration, and Minorities

Interwar Estonia had a share of some 10% of non-Estonian population, the largest ethnic group being ethnic Russians. However, these were a rather loose community, consisting of several groups whose diversity sprang from their different arrival dates in Estonia which date back into the middle ages. These dates not a little reflected their migration background. Although Swedes and Germans also came to the Baltic, Russians and other Slavic migrants will be the main focus of this chapter.

2.2.1.1 Migration and Demography

The first Swedes may have arrived as early as 1279; first written sources confirm resident Swedes in the Bylaw of Haapsalu from 1294. After an uprising in 1343, further Swedes were reported to arrive. Their settlements were usually concentrated in the Western continetal shores and especially the Western islands: in the same year 1343, the island of Suur-Pakri was bought. Swedish settlement continued to increase in this area (Lääne ma, West Country) until the Livonian war and comprised Vormsi, Noarootsi and Eyland. Extensive settlements also existed on the island of Hiiumaa and in Harjumaa, the area in northern Estonia around Tallinn but reached as far south as the island of Ruhnu in the Livonian bay. As this island, too, belongs to the Western shores

\(^{142}\) E.g., the book edited by the respected historian, Sulev Vahtre, even starts ‘-11 000’: cf. Sulev Vahtre (Ed., FN 90). As with quite a number of other publications, this far-reaching draw on earliest history has the aim to assert the Estonian claim to the area they have lived in ‘since time immemorial’. Usually the implication is that everyone else was an intruder.
of the continent, their settlement earned them the name of Rannarootslased, the ‘Swedes of the Shores.’ They had mostly come via Finland, although others came directly from Sweden. Their status was legally based on Swedish Law, giving the Swedish peasantry personal freedom which it would lose were it to move to an Estonian settlement: Estonians were serfs then. This may explain why Swedes usually remained unto themselves and their settlements remained concentrated on the Western shores and islands, as the loss of personal freedom in a time of serfdom was severe enough a disincentive to migrate.\(^{143}\)

The first Slavs arrived in the Alutagus area and at the western shores of Lake Peipsi already sometime around the 13\(^{\text{th}}\) Century, following the arrival of Danish and later the German Orders. A second group seems to have arrived in the early 16\(^{\text{th}}\) Century and built the first small villages. Then emerged the first permanent villages with predominantly Russian settlement, like Nina village, but also laid down the Russian peculiarities in Mustvee and Lohusuu.\(^{144}\) In the mid-16\(^{\text{th}}\) Century, the overall population reached 250,000 before the onset of the Russian-Livonian war’s huge impact.\(^{145}\) The Old Believers ( ??????????), who had fled religious persecution in the Russian Empire, came during the 17\(^{\text{th}}\) Century.\(^{146}\) They settled on the Western shore of Lake Peipsi; at that time, the provinces of Estonia and Livonia were under Swedish domination and provided an early safe haven for the first religious minorities to have fled there. At the beginning of the 18\(^{\text{th}}\) Century, the entire population stood at 350,000 to 400,000, only to be decimated again by the Russian-Swedish war.\(^{147}\) After the 1721 Treaty of Nystad, Estonia and Livonia became part of the Russian Empire and during the 18\(^{\text{th}}\) and 19\(^{\text{th}}\) Centuries Russian trades- and craftsmen moved into Estonian towns. Some of them came from the south, from Latgale; a further group came from the neighbouring province, from towns like Gdov, Narva or St. Petersburg; others came from as far afield as from the Tver and Novgorod gubernii.\(^{148}\)

In the area that was later to become the Republic of Estonia, the population in 1881 was 881,455, with 792,000 or 89.8% Estonians in the first census covering Estonia and Livonia. In the first empire-wide census in 1897, the figure was 945,068 based on the

\(^{143}\) Cf. Piirimäe, Estonia and her Nordic Neighbors (FN 51) pp. 50-51.


\(^{146}\) In 1653, the Russian Orthodox Patriarch Nikon started a reform of the Church’s ritual; those who refused to accept this were harassed and had to flee, for the Church at that time acted as the ‘...spiritual arm of the tsarist state...’. Cf. Service, pp. 10-11. According to Ruutsoo, Herausbildung, p. 571, some 7,000 Old Believers still lived in Estonia in the interwar period, around 1920.

\(^{147}\) Tiit (FN 145), p. 1658.

territory covered in the 1881 census; this is a rise of 63,613 or 7.2% within 16 years. Estonians had a share of c. 893,000 or 90.6% in the population. However, compared to the 1881 census, the later one had an extended territory that it covered; consequently, the population for this territory was 986,000. The main part of the Estonian population at that time was split between the two provinces of Estonia and Livonia; the major part lived in Livonia with a population of 518,594; the Estonian province held a population of 365,959.\textsuperscript{149} Before the First World War, the overall natural increase in the population between 1897 and 1914 was 1897-1899, 9.8 per 1,000 inhabitants; 1901-1908, 8.9; 1910-1914, 6.4; the figure was negative during the war: -5.8. Between 1920 and 1939, the figures were abysmally low from 1924 at the latest, coming below replacement level: 1920-24, 3.1; 1925-1929, 1.3; 1930-1934, 1.9; 1935-1939, 1.1.\textsuperscript{150}

During the Civil War, White Gardists (\textit{Mensheviki}) used Estonia as their base, and later as their exile. In addition, many Russian St. Petersburg families who had property in Estonia fled the city at the outbreak of the revolution, while ethnic Estonians returned for the same reason; most of them hoped to return at the earliest opportunity.\textsuperscript{151} In contrast to this, quite a number of Russians fled the country or were exiled by the Soviets: Schlögel refers to some 1 to 2 million Russians who fled in direct conjunction with the 1917 revolution, never to return; Pipes refers to around 400,000 emigrants fleeing to Germany and France each, plus a further 100,000 fleeing to China.\textsuperscript{152}

Many of these refugees became exilees in centres all over the world from Helsinki to Paris and Budapest; in most cases, émigrés or exilees from Soviet Russia could join an already existing community of ethnic Russians who had come to the area much earlier.\textsuperscript{153}

\textsuperscript{149} Tiit (FN 145), p. 1658 and Table 1: ‘Rahvaloendused Eestis: rahvaarv, eestlaste arv, eestlaste % [Population Censuses in Estonia: Figures on the Population, Estonians, Estonian %]’, p. 1659. As opposed to this, Tepp gives a figure of 1,002,738 Estonian speakers, 867,794 or 86.5% of whom lived in the territory of the Estonian province and parts of Livonia, while another 134,944 or 13.5% lived elsewhere in the Tsarist Empire. Cf. Lembit Tepp: ‘Eestlased vähemusrahvusena endises Vene Impeeriumis ja NSV Liidus [Estonians as a National Minority in the Former Russian Empire and in the U.S.S.R.]’, in: \textit{Eesti Statistika} (12), 1993, pp. 22-34, at p. 23, with further details on the spatial distribution and settlement structures of Estonians in the Tsarist Empire. Henceforth as Tepp, \textit{National Minority}. Also cf. Table: ‘Tallinna elanike arv 1360 -1940 (sõjaväeta) [The Number of Inhabitants in Tallinn (without military personnel)]’, in: \textit{Eesti A & O} (FN 84), p. 99.

\textsuperscript{150} Tiit (FN 145), Table 4, ‘Sündimus- ja suremuskordajad ning loomulik iive [Birth and Death Coefficients and Natural Increase]’, p. 1665.


\textsuperscript{152} Schlögel suggests that between 1921 and 1923 many an important personality from politics, literature and the arts, as well as scholars, were exiled, creating a Baltic Russian culture. Cf. ibid. (FN 151), pp. 142-143, and passim. Also cf. Karl Schlögel: ‘Einführung’, in: idem (Ed.): \textit{Der große Exodus: die russische Emigration und ihre Zentren 1917 bis 1941}, München: Beck, 1994, pp. 9-20, at p. 9. Pipes (FN 53), p. 139 for the figures; their plight, pp. 139-140.

\textsuperscript{153} This represents in increase in the share from 8.6% to 14.9%; in 1897, the share was only 8.4%. Most migration went to the East. Cf. Simon, \textit{Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities}, p. 119. Schlögel (FN 153), p. 12, gives a figure of between 1 and 3 million Russians, opting for 1½ million as a likely figure, who after the revolution became stateless refugees dispersed all over the world, including Egypt as much as Norway, Germany as much as Turkey or even Uruguay. A highly interesting chronological differentiation of the many different directions the
Although there are no precise figures known for Russian in-migration into Estonia from Soviet Russia at that time, the general figure usually mentioned in this connection was around 18,000 Russians who came after 1917.¹⁵⁴ Some of the former soldiers of the Civil War remained in Estonia, and the same applies to members of the Yudenich opposition government, with many more of the Russian elite joining. A noteworthy increase in the population of ethnic Russians in the territory of Estonia occurred because of its territorial gains from the Tartu Peace Treaty – some 67,000 in all.¹⁵⁵ Although between 1926 and 1939, the number of Russians outside the RSFSR rose rapidly, from 5.1 million to 9.3 million, it is not clear how many may have arrived in Estonia. Clearly, though, at a time when the Great Purge and the Red Terror, dekulakisation and famine reeked devastation and claimed large numbers of lives, the Estonian Republic saved a part of Russian microcosm from the destruction it suffered in the Soviet Union,¹⁵⁶ not least because of the existence of the Tartu Treaty and its guarantees.

However, there was not only migration into Estonia. Because the focus of most works dealing with migration in Estonia is on in-migration, it is a comparatively little-known fact that migrant Estonians moved both within the Tsarist Empire and to destinations totally outside the Empire: according to the 1897 census, not only did 64,116 ethnic Estonians live in the St. Petersburg province, with 12,238 in the city itself, and 25,458 in Pskov (Pihkva) province¹⁵⁷ but in all, some 120,000 Estonians lived outside the Estonian ‘ethnic borders’ at the turn of the century.

The major emigration periods, pre-independence, appear to have been in the 1860s and after the 1905 revolution, one reason being that from 1863 passports were more

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¹⁵⁵ Note that in post-Soviet times the recalculated figures for 1922 and 1934 based on the present and former ESSR territory serve very well to actually dramatise the increase in non-Estonians in-migration after 1945, a year whose base of a ‘97% Estonian’ population serves the same purpose, i.e. to gain political capital, in the process of which some Estonians have adopted a certain vindictive role of having been victimised. There can be no doubt whatever that the Stalin leadership did Estonia more harm than any good. The question here is only the mileage gained for political purposes after 1991.


easily obtainable and restrictions of movement for the Estonian peasantry decreased. Demand for emigration was high; Carl Robert Jacobsen argued that mostly rural poverty was to blame for the movement, as well as poor schooling and overemphasis of Orthodox religion linked to promises of ‘warm land’ which started in the 1840s. Further reasons for leaving the Estonian province were political repression, deportation to Siberia (some 2,000 Estonians and Latvians were deported after 1905), or hunger for land which was more readily available outside the province; chain migrants followed first explorers.\(^{158}\)

At the onset of the October Revolution, slightly under 200,000 Estonian may have lived all over the Russian Empire outside the traditional Estonian areas, moving to Samara, Tver and Vitebsk provinces, the Crimea (Kherson), as well as St. Petersburg and Pskov provinces mentioned above. Pskov, Vitebsk and St. Petersburg provinces were closest to home, then came Novgorod and Tver provinces. In 1914, there were also around 10,000 Estonians in Riga, and Valga, still part of Livonia at that time, saw a rise in the Estonian share from 21% in 1897 to 51% in 1912. In Petrograd in 1917, some 50,000 Estonians may have lived. Note that St. Petersburg already in 1897 was a city of 1.4 million, while Riga at that time had a population of 282,230 and was the third largest city after Moscow. By comparison, Tallinn’s population was only some 64,500, and the total urban population of Estonia not even reached 150,000. It was not only for their obvious attractiveness as metropolises that Estonians went to either St. Petersburg or Riga: for many of the intelligentsia it was easier to obtain work in the capital than in their province where mostly Germans held the important positions in administration and controlled urban life.

Still, as most arable land was in the possession of a few German noblemen, the majority of emigrants were landless peasants, thus denoting one of the most pressing problems of the late 19\(^{th}\) and early 20\(^{th}\) century – land hunger. As there was not much of a chance to obtain any land in the Estonian and Livonian provinces, many went into the cities. By 1914, urbanisation had further increased, and both Tallinn and Riga had doubled their population; St. Petersburg grew by half. In Tallinn, the average increase by migration only was 11,000 between 1912 and 1916; especially during the war, Tallinn experienced a strong increase in Russian and other non-Estonian labour boosting the city’s population, on account of which the Estonian share in the population sank from 73% down to 58% between 1913 and 1917 only. The overall ethnic distribution of the urban population was 69.2% Estonians, 11.9% Russians, and 11.2% Germans.\(^{159}\)

After the war, some 40,000 or roughly 20% of the total ethnic Estonian population in Soviet Russia decided to return under the Tartu Peace Treaty return option in 1920-1922.\(^{160}\) Another group of ethnic Estonians returned after the Second World War,

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\(^{158}\) Pistohlkors, Inversion of Ethnic Group Status, p. . Raun, Estonian Emigration, p. 357, quotes Jacobsen as suggesting that maybe were young women well educated in religion, but certainly had no idea of geography and ‘…thought that the Caucasus was just on the other side of Narva.’

\(^{159}\) Raun, Estonian Emigration, pp. 354, 355; 358, 359, 360; Raun, Estonia and the Estonians, pp. 90-91. Tepp, National Minorities (FN 149), p. 23, gives a more conservative estimate of 150,000 Estonians outside the ESSR; ibid.

\(^{160}\) Tiit (FN 145), p. 1661. Tepp, National Minorities (FN 149), p. 23, gives the figure of 37,578 individuals born in Estonia, the great majority of which had migrated or was resettled in the previous decade. 93.5% of return migrants were Estonians.
when Stalin sent these Russianised Estonians together with mostly Russian personnel to push the system’s octroi through and give it some credence. It is highly likely that many of these Russianised Estonians had previously been living in cities, for as late as 1926, 88.4% of the 156,000 Estonians living in Soviet Russia gave Estonian as their first language – but only 68.3% of Estonians in the urban areas would do so, compared to 94.4% in rural areas.\footnote{Raun, \textit{Estonian Emigration}, p. 360. Tepp, \textit{National Minorities} (FN 149), p. 23 gives further details; most of the 155,963 Estonians counted in the 1926 census lived in rural areas: 119,626 or 76.7%. Interestingly, 1,297 Estonians of the total also had Estonian citizenship. Ibid.}

In terms of trans-continental migration, the first Estonians to come to the USA were seamen; in the last decade of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, destinations were mostly large North American cities such as New York, San Francisco, Boston, Philadelphia and Chicago. However, rural farming areas in both the USA and Canada were also a destination, and while in 1892 the first Estonians arrived in South Dakota, the first decade of the following century saw the first Estonians arriving in Alberta Province.\footnote{Pajur (FN 90) p. 155.} Alas, for both 19\textsuperscript{th} century and interwar Estonia, there is only relatively little information available that reaches beyond the pure figures on emigration. On interwar Estonia, some writers suggest that some 17,000 people left the country until the end of 1925. In that year, 2,646 emigrants were reported to have left Estonia mostly for Brazil and Australia in search of a better life.\footnote{Tiit (FN 145), \textit{Eesti rahvastik ja selle probleemid}, Part 2, Table 6, pp. 1669-1670; the quote is from p. 1662: ‘Siit ei räänetud ära, ka ei meelitanud Eesti Vabariik ligi immigrante.’} However, beyond the number of 39,219 emigrations and a migration balance of -3,225 that Tiit gives, there is unfortunately not much that can be offered in terms of either detailed directions or reasons for emigration at this stage. Tiit rather somewhat too simply suggests, ‘You did not emigrate from here, but neither did the Estonian Republic attract immigration.’\footnote{Meissner, \textit{Baltic States} (FN 52), p. 334.}

In the rather different circumstances of 1939-1945 this changed; most of the Baltic Germans were relocated to Germany following the Secret Protocols between the German Reich and the Soviet Union from 28 September and the Estonian-German agreement to this effect from 15 October 1939; these people lost their Baltic citizenships and were made German citizens by the ‘Dictated Option.’\footnote{Meissner, \textit{Baltic States} (FN 52), p. 334.} A letter from an Estonian Home Office official, Deputy Director O. Angelus, dated 20 May 1940, gives fairly precise figures on Baltic German emigration: in a first wave, 12,129 resettlers as well as 1,210 individuals with an alien’s passport relocated, totalling 13,339 individuals. Since this included around 1,000 spouses, and some 1,000 ‘eesti päritolu inimest’, i.e. individuals hailing from Estonia, Angelus estimates that some 3,000 Germans have remained in Estonia, which would also reflect the German embassy’s figures. The Estonian foreign ministry estimated 2,500 remaining Germans, of which over 1,000 would be over 60 years of age.\footnote{Oskar Angelus: ‘Siseministeeriumi üldosakonna abidirektori kiri siseministriile [Letter From the Vice Director of the General Department of the Home Office to the Minister],’ 20 May 1940, ERA. F. 14. N. 2. S. 727, L. 149, reprinted in Matsulevit? (FN 144), p. 91.} Most of these were relocated in another Soviet-German resettlement agreement from 10 January 1941.\footnote{Meissner, \textit{Baltic States} (FN 52), p. 334.
The Swedes were called ‘Swedes of the shore’ in Estonian (Rannarootslased), or in Swedish, aibofolket, island people. After they had to evacuate Pakri, Nais and Osmu islands in 1940, the remainder fled Estonia in 1944 – some 7,900 people in all. Together with the redrawing of the Estonian borders in 1944, the German and Swedish emigrations constituted the major reasons for the reduction in the country’s non-Estonian population; in addition, probably some 70,000 Estonians emigrated together with the Swedes.\textsuperscript{168} Direct war losses and the deportations of 1940-41 further reduced the population. Unfortunately neither more precise nor more reliable information on the migrations of the 1940-45 period is available.\textsuperscript{169} The following table sums up the available data both on the natural increase and the migration balance to provide an overview of the population development in interwar Estonia. Although much effort was put into finding and presenting the most accurate data, inexplicable differences between the different tables still remain.

Table 2.1: Demographic Developments in Interwar Estonia, 1920-1939

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Natural Increase</th>
<th>Migration</th>
<th>Total Population Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Births</td>
<td>Deaths</td>
<td>Balance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>19,625</td>
<td>21,363</td>
<td>-1,738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>22,067</td>
<td>17,143</td>
<td>4,924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>22,255</td>
<td>18,401</td>
<td>3,854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>22,347</td>
<td>16,630</td>
<td>5,717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>19,977</td>
<td>18,047</td>
<td>1,930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>19,705</td>
<td>19,356</td>
<td>349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>20,064</td>
<td>17,785</td>
<td>2,279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>19,110</td>
<td>20,178</td>
<td>-1,068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>19,471</td>
<td>16,610</td>
<td>2,861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>19,509</td>
<td>18,077</td>
<td>1,432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>19,742</td>
<td>16,641</td>
<td>3,101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>18,208</td>
<td>16,472</td>
<td>1,736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>17,305</td>
<td>15,853</td>
<td>1,452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>17,891</td>
<td>16,854</td>
<td>1,037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>18,222</td>
<td>17,594</td>
<td>628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>18,190</td>
<td>16,614</td>
<td>1,576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>18,453</td>
<td>16,496</td>
<td>1,957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>18,450</td>
<td>16,940</td>
<td>1,510</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data from Table: 'Rahvastiku dünaamika 1919-39', in: Eesti A & O, p. 97. Figures in italics for 1922, 1934 and 1939 denote census years; italics added. In addition, the 1924 figures were recomputed to fit the Estonian-Latvian border realignments (-1,887 persons). 1939 includes the figures for the German resettlers moving under the dictated option to Germany (-11,763 persons). Ibid. Note: Tiit p. 1663 invariably confirms this data – except for 1939, where she gives 18,475 births, 17,101 deaths, and a total balance of 1,374.

\textsuperscript{168} Kurs/Berg (FN 144), p. 266.

\textsuperscript{169} Eesti Statistika (9), 1994, p. 18. Also cf. the following chapters on the Molotov-Ribbentrop-Pact and the relevant section on migration in the chapter on the Stalin era.
Figure 2.2: Demographic Developments in Interwar Estonia, 1920-1939: Births and Deaths

Source: Author’s own calculations.

Figure 2.3: Migration (Border-Crossings) in the Interwar Republic, 1920-1939: In- and Out-Migration

Source: Author’s own calculations.
2.2.1.2 Urbanisation and Settlement Structures

Industrialisation in the early 20th Century brought about an increase in urbanisation, partly caused by Russian labour migration to Narva and Tallinn, especially prior to and during the First World War: data for Tallinn suggest a quick rise in the town’s population between 1897 and 1917 which over only twenty years increased by over 100,000 people; from under 60,000 pre-1900, the figure reached 91,538 on 1 Jan. 1910, and 96,219 in 1911; by 1 Jan. 1914, it stood at 131,125 already. In 1916 Tallinn’s population had reached 149,071, only to peak on 1 Jan. 1917 at 159,193. During the war with Russia, the population figures decreased markedly; its low was reached in 1919 with 102,860, after which it slowly increased again. Still, by the 1922 census, Tallinn’s population had doubled on the 1897 census figures: from 64,572 to 122,419; the distribution according to sex, however, shows the impact of the war: when in 1897 the ratio was 52% male, 48% female population, it was 45% to 55% in 1922.\footnote{The Number of Estonians in the All-Russia Census of 1897}, in: Eesti A & O (FN 84), p. 109; also cf. Table: ‘Tallinna elanike arv’ (FN 149).

In the same 1922 census, ethnic distribution, which was not the same as distribution according to citizenship, showed that 969,976 or 87.6% of a total population of 1,107,059 were Estonians. The 51 established ethnic groups living in the country thus made up only 12.4%. At the time of the following census, 1934, the total population was 1,126,413,\footnote{Electronic Data including urban population figures for 1922 at URL: www.stat.ee/wwwstat/content/E_R_AJ_922/1.html, 12 Jan. 2000; for 1934, at URL: www.stat.ee/wwwstat/content/E_R_AJ_934/1.html, 12 Jan. 2000.} of whom 992,500 or 88.1% were Estonians. Within the ethnic mi-
nority groups, Russians, whose relative share in the population remained stable throughout the interwar republic, had the biggest share in the population with some 92,700 or 8.2% in 1934; then came Germans (16,300, or 1.5%), Swedes (7,600, or 0.7%), Latvians (5,400 or 0.5%), and Jews (4,400 or 0.4%), in 1934.\(^{172}\) Being an ethnically fairly homogenous state, even with around 10% non-Estonian population, having a clear preponderance in the demographic picture accorded the Estonians for the first time in their history full access to the political, social and economic hierarchies of the state,\(^ {173}\) which neither under the Tsar nor later in the Soviet era would be the case. Therefore, the size of the ethnic minority population never really was a problem in interwar Estonia.

Table 2.2: The Interwar Population of Estonia (With Recalculations for ESSR Area)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census Group</th>
<th>1922 abs.</th>
<th>% ESSR</th>
<th>1934 abs.</th>
<th>% ESSR</th>
<th>1939 abs.</th>
<th>% ESSR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonians a</td>
<td>969,976</td>
<td>87.6</td>
<td>992,520</td>
<td>88.1</td>
<td>1,000,360</td>
<td>88.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians b</td>
<td>91,109</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>92,656</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>93,250</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>18,319</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>16,346</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>16,345</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swedes</td>
<td>7,850</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>7,641</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>7,690</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvians c</td>
<td>4,428</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>5,435</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>5,470</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>4,566</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>4,434</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>4,435</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>14,392</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>13,781</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>6,040</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Area</td>
<td>1,107,059</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1,126,413</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1,133,940</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>821,438</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>845,799</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>835,700</td>
<td>75.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>285,621</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>280,614</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>300,040</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{a}\) There is a miscalculation in some of the sources; mostly, 91.1% is given for Estonians, yet if the absolute figures are to be believed, the Estonians have only a share of 87.6% in the 1922 population. The mistake is carried in almost all works on this period.

\(^{b}\) Includes Byelorussians; \(^{c}\) Data for 1922 on Latvians in Estonia is from Pajur (FN 90), p. 150, who uses the data for the area of Estonia as defined by the Tartu Treaty.


\(^{172}\) Data is rounded to the nearest 100. Cf. ‘Eestis Elavate Rahvustest’, in: Matsulevitš (FN 166), pp. 47-48, at p. 47. Cf. Rauch, Baltic States (FN 53), pp. 82-83. The percentages as well as the date of the census, 28 Dec. 1922, are given in Pajur (FN 90), p. 150.


\(^{174}\) The 1934 data is calculated from the total on the base of the relative shares in the population. The 1939 data for rural/urban brackets is for 1940; the total population was, 1,054,400. Cf. Eesti A & O (FN 84), p. 94. Unfortunately, Ruutsoo, Vene rahvusvähemus (FN 154), p. 185, gives yet other figures for the 1934 census, quoting H. Reiman, ‘Rahvused Eestis [Peoples in Estonia]’, in: Eesti Statistika, 6(164), 1935, p. 354, as follows: Total Estonian population, 1,117,361, of which 984,695 Estonians and 91,946 Russians; compared to a total average of 28.9% of the urban population (31.3% including market towns or villages, alevid), Estonians comprised 28.2% (30.4% incl.), Russians 24.3% (28.9% incl.). In the Counties, Estonians represented 69.8%, Russians 71.2% compared to a total average of 68.7%. Hasselblatt gives the figures based on the Estonian territory as delineated by the Tartu Treaty.
Throughout the interwar years, the settlement structure and society were predominantly rural, with only moderate increase in urban population from 25.0% (or 25.8%) to 32.8% (or 33.6%) in the period between 1922 and 1939. The urban population on average was some 85.5% Estonian, and 84% of all industries were also Estonian-owned. The level of urban commercial transactions was mostly Estonian, too: 59%. After 1939/40 this would change substantially.

The urban population in 1934 was spread as follows, giving absolute figures and relative shares of Estonians in brackets: Tallinn, 137,792 (85.6%); Tartu, 58,876 (87.6%); Narva, 23,512 (64.8%); Pärnu, 20,334 (90.7%); Viljandi, 11,788 (93.3%); Valga, 10,842 (82.3%); Rakvere, 10,027 (90.9%); Võru, 5,332 (91.1%); Haapsalu, 4,649 (88.3%); Kuressaare, 4,478 (88.0%); Paide, 3,285 (93.5%); Tapa, 3,751 (93.7%); Paldiski, 851 (94.0%).

The largest ethnic minority, the Russians, mostly lived in compact settlements; as a comparison of the figures calculated for both the Estonian interwar territory and Soviet Estonia (ESSR) in the table above demonstrates, the territorial increase effected by the Tartu treaty led to a strong increase in the Russian population. In 1922, some 70% or around 63,400 of the 91,100 Russians lived in the country, only close to 30% lived in the towns (21,300) and villages (5,200). Rural areas with a predominantly Russian population were in the North-Eastern part east of the Narva River, and in the South-Eastern part, in Petseri Province (Petserimaa), situated south and east of the Lake Pskov. Of the 38,200 ethnic Russians in Petserimaa, 32,000 to 33,000 lived in areas with a predominantly Russian population.

In the towns and villages, Russians were predominant in all four towns east of the Narva river, in six out of eleven towns in Petseri Province (Petserimaa), and in two towns in Tartu Province (Tartumaa). Two towns or settlements on Lake Peipsi, Kallaste and Mostvee, also had a Russian majority with 88% and 62.8% of the population in 1934, respectively. The town of Petseri, which now belongs as Pechory to the Russian Federation, in 1922 had a population of 2,013 inhabitants, of whom 1,273 or 68.2% were Russian. Within twelve years, the population doubled to a total of 4,274, with the share of ethnic Russians dropping to 40.9% in 1934. Narva in 1922 had some 7,927 Russian inhabitants or 28.2% of the total, which in 1934 reached 29.7% of a total population of 26,912 and 23,512 [sic!], respectively. Interestingly even the relative share in the Russian population involves a net loss in absolute figures of the entire Narvan population; the absolute figure for Russians in 1934 was thus only

berniya, as well as Estonians outside this area, cf. Eesti A & O (FN 84), p. 109. Tiit (FN 145) makes some of the above data problematic: apparently the 1922 census and its figures were mixed up, since Tiit shows that there were three bases for calculating the size of the overall population and the share of the Estonians: according to the current territory, on the basis of the Tartu Peace Treaty, the total would have to be 1,107,059, with 969,976 or 87.6% [sic!] Estonians; on the base of the ESSR and post-Soviet Estonian Republic’s territory, the figure for the total is, 1,044,000, with 91.1% (!) Estonians; only compared to the 1881 census and the then territory of Estonia, a share of 92.4 % Estonians in the population is possible. Cf. Tiit (FN 145), Table 1, p. 1659.

Raun, Independence redefined (FN 57), p. 409. Eesti A & O (FN 84), p. 94, gives 28.5% for 1922 and 33.6% for 1940.

Figures according to Kala (FN 124), Table 5, at p. 534.

Figures according to Kala (FN 124), Table 5, at p. 534. Slightly different relative figures are given in the table, ‘Rahvuslik koostis 1881-1934’, in: Eesti A & O, p. 95.
Their main occupations were in agriculture (51.0%) and bricklaying in rural communities, in urban communities also in industry (25.8%) and trade (6.0%). In their social structure, they consequently came closest to the Estonians who had similar shares of occupational distribution, although the Russians had a lower rate of economically active persons than the country’s average: 35.7% vs. 42.4%.179

Swedes, like the Germans, had arrived rather early in the area – in fact, first migration started from Sweden and southern Finland as early as the 13th century. In the 16th century their settlement area extended furthest, after which the Estonians shifted back into these areas.180 They came to be the third largest minority in independent Estonia, and settled mainly and mostly in the western parts of Estonia, both on the mainland and islands. Swedes represented the majority population in places such as Ruhnu (98.2%), Vormsi (95.2%), and the already mentioned Pakri, Naiss and Osmu islands. During the Second World War, they too had to flee the country, with only few remaining. In post-Soviet Estonia, many other minorities will be bigger in size than the Swedish ever were – even though the number of Ukrainians and Byelorussians in pre-Soviet Estonia was virtually nil. Again, this is a development of Soviet times that will be examined in the following chapters.

2.2.2 Minorities and Minorities Policy
Since the Estonian state had only been founded as an autonomous, sovereign entity, membership in this state was granted across the board on a non-ethnic base by way of bestowing citizenship upon all permanent lawful inhabitants residing in the territory on 24 February 1918. This decision was taken on 26 November 1918 by the then government, the Maapäev.181 In its §1, the regulation was as follows:

§1. Every person answering the following three conditions, regardless of ethnicity or religious belief, [shall have] the rights of the citizen of the Estonian Democratic Republic: 1) who lives within the borders of the Estonian Democratic Republic, 2) who until the 24th day of the month of February in the year 1918 was a citizen of the former Russian Empire, and 3) hailed from the part of the Estonian Democratic Republic or was registered in the local register of inhabitants, which were retained


179 Ruutsoo, Herausbildung (FN 154), pp. 554, 556-557; idem, Vene rahvusvähemus (FN 154), p. 185; also cf. Kurs/Berg (FN 144), p. 262. Around 1,000 are unaccounted for. Note that this distribution of the Russian population will be altered from the start of the incorporation into the Soviet Union, not due to a resettlement of the Russians in question at this stage, but due to the massive in-migration of additional ‘Russians’ into urban areas.


on the part of offices of the former Russian state in this country or on behalf of that country (Russian Compendium of Laws, Vol. IX, Class [Estate] Laws, 1889 edition, § 858).\textsuperscript{182}

As there were non-Estonian population groups, these ethnic minorities nevertheless had the option to elect for, and on exercising this option became, Estonian citizens with full rights under the Estonian Constitution. All citizens were equal before the law, regardless of their birth, faith, sex, estate (position, social standing) or ethnic origin. Any advantage or disadvantage resulting from any of the said traits was disallowed.\textsuperscript{183} In connection with the citizenship regulations of the 1918 decree, national minorities were created thus; this group has to be understood in the sense of citizens with an ethnicity different from the titular ethnic group which usually represents the majority, but having all the same rights as ethnic Estonians.\textsuperscript{184} All other people entering the Estonian Republic after the date stipulated above or not meeting other criteria had to naturalise, the process of which required a knowledge of the Estonian language as stipulated in the Law on Citizenship’s §8.\textsuperscript{185}

The Estonian rules and regulations towards the ethnic minorities were very advanced – indeed, Estonia had the first Law on Cultural Autonomy in the world. Again as early as in the ‘Manifesto to All Peoples of Estonia,’ with which the Estonian Republic was declared on 24 February 1918, a provision granting cultural autonomy to the minorities had been established:

\[...\] 2) \textit{The ethnic Russian, German, Swedish, Jewish and other minorities living within the borders of the Republic are guaranteed their cultural autonomy rights.}\textsuperscript{186}


\textsuperscript{184} Cf. Hasselblatt, p. 32 with further references on the liberal citizenship option.

\textsuperscript{185} Hasselblatt, p. 44.

This manifesto was written by the Maapäev’s Council of Elders, which was important in that it showed an early commitment on the part of the Estonians to safeguard minority rights at a time when the Republic had yet to be built. Also, the rather violent time and the fairly sudden proclamation of independence created a trauma at least in some of the ethnic Russians living in Estonia; particularly those who felt themselves as only temporary residents in the area as representatives of the (Tsarist) central authorities had difficulties in attuning to the new situation.\textsuperscript{187} The programmatic promise seems to have been translated into minority peoples’ ministries in the first government in February 1918 and from November 1918 to May 1919. There were three ministries, one each for the Russian, German, and Swedish minority. In June 1919, these ministries were transformed into Secretariats within the Ministry of Education, thus embodying the only official representation of the minorities within the government.\textsuperscript{188}

The subsequently promulgated Constitution of 15 June 1920 took those first politico-judicial steps and put the decrees safeguarding the minorities on a fully constitutional footing. In it, §20 guaranteed every Estonian citizen to choose freely his ethnic group.\textsuperscript{189} §21 gives members of the national minorities the right to establish autonomous institutions to represent their interests, so long as they do not contradict the state’s interests.\textsuperscript{190} §22 allowed those national minorities who formed the majority of the population in a given area to use their language in local self government in addition to the state language. However, the state language had to be used in all local self-government dealings regarding state matters, or in dealings with other minority local self-governments which did not employ the same language.\textsuperscript{191} The latter point will especially matter to the Swedish and Russian Estonians, who have lived in compact settlements, but would obviously also have to deal with the state authorities or neighbouring local governments not using the same language. §23, finally, allowed the Swedish, Russian, and German Estonians to use their respective languages in written addresses to the central state authorities.\textsuperscript{192}

\textsuperscript{187} Ruutsoo, \textit{Vene rahvusvähemus} (FN 154), p. 183.
\textsuperscript{188} Hasselblatt, p. 31.
\textsuperscript{189} ‘§20. Iga Eesti Kodanik on vaba oma rahvuse määramises. Juhtumistel, mis isiklik määramine mitte võimalik ei ole, sünnib see seadus ettenähtud korras.’ In: \textit{RT 1920, 113/114}, pp. 897-898, reprinted in Matsulevitš (FN 166), p. 39. Note that ‘ethnic group’ and ethnicity could, and will, be used according to the Central European understanding which is synonymous with ‘nationality.’ ‘Nationality’ thus means ‘ethnic group’ or ‘ethnicity’ throughout this monograph, it does \textit{not at any time} mean, ‘citizenship’, as this would be a misunderstanding in the entire region.
On 2 February 1925, the Riigikogu passed a Law on Cultural Autonomy\textsuperscript{193} on the basis of §21 of the Estonian Constitution. The new law followed the idea of strictly discriminating between politics and culture, as the main content of the cultural autonomy was self-government and administration of cultural and connected financial matters.\textsuperscript{194} It applied to Russians, who were the biggest ethnic group, and to Swedes and Germans directly; according to §8 it applied also to any ethnic group more than 3,000 strong (this being the Jews and Latvians).\textsuperscript{195} Therefore, the Law on Cultural Autonomy would apply to only five of the fifty-one ethnic groups established by the 1934 census; the next largest group, the Poles only had some 1,600 members. At least forty-five ethnic groups did not qualify for minority status under the Law on Cultural Autonomy.

Still, this law was based on the personality principle and was therefore extraterritorial: it did not stipulate that the ethnic group live in a compact settlement at a given place.\textsuperscript{196} They only had to register in the national register of minorities, which was introduced together with the 1925 law.\textsuperscript{197} In exercising their optional right, they became a recognised minority if they met the above conditions, and consequently became a subject before the law. The law was quite probably based on, or at least influenced by, the arguments put forward by the Austro-Marxists Bauer and Renner from before the turn of the century. Their position of putting the weight on the number of the minority in a given state rather than on the territory they occupy, as Lenin and Stalin would have it, surely gives the personality principle its original base.\textsuperscript{198}

While the Russian and the Swedish minority did live in compact settlements, as mentioned above, and thus did not really need any additional bodies under the Law on Cultural Autonomy, the German minority elected its Cultural Council during the period 3-5 October 1925. Its first-ever meeting on 1 November 1925 was at the same time the first-ever meeting of such a group in the history of minority rights’ law. The Jews constituted their cultural self-governing body on 6 June 1926. These bodies could now promulgate decrees and even raise public taxes to help fund their particular duties, among which were the building, administration and supervision of their schools.\textsuperscript{199} Generally, too, the law in its construction guarded against any administrative arbitrariness. Furthermore, on account of an overall right to vote, the minorities were able to send their representatives into the parliament, which numbered between five and eight in all. Their work took place within a Russian and a German-Swedish parliamentary block. However, the

\textsuperscript{194} Cf. Thiele (FN 86), p. 83, with a detailed analysis on pp. 82-84.
\textsuperscript{196} On the law in detail Hasselblatt, ch. 2.4, pp. 47-59, also Raun, Independence redefined (FN 57), p. 409.
\textsuperscript{197} The national minority registers were managed by their own minority leaders. Cf. Hasselblatt (FN 111), p. 25.
\textsuperscript{198} Rauch, Baltic States (FN 53), p. 141.
\textsuperscript{199} A. Schmidt, Geschichte des Baltikums, pp. 270-271; Rauch, Baltic States (FN 53), p. 141.
minority population at large, especially the somewhat uneducated Russian peasants who lived in the eastern borderlands, did not appear to have much of an interest in politics.\footnote{Taagepera, \textit{Return to Independence}, p. 51.}

The most important duty for the minorities that the law stipulated was their duty to be loyal to the Estonian state.\footnote{Garleff (FN 195), p. 93.} This duty, however, was easily, and quite happily, fulfilled by the minority population, which in their plurality fully supported the Estonian state and the state-building process by actively participating in it and fully integrating into the Estonian society without giving up their cultural traits. On the contrary, many a Russian exile would benefit from the liberal climate and helped the interwar culture develop into something special, with a specific Russian Baltic culture.\footnote{Garleff (FN 195), p. 87. Pachmuss (FN 151), p. 143; idem., \textit{Russian Culture} (FN 151), p. 385.}

Overall, those people who in that time fretted about the Baltic states possibly going down the road of ‘tribalism and ruin’ rather than ‘racial tolerance and prosperity’ were proved wrong. Surely with regard to Estonia, the law, adequately reflecting the actual state of affairs, was regarded as a model of its kind.\footnote{Hiden (FN 113), p. 4.} This was demonstrated not least by the international acclaim the Estonian Law on Cultural Autonomy received. Indeed, it was regarded as Estonia’s prestigious entry ticket to the League of Nations and the international community.\footnote{On the League of Nations and Estonia’s entry, cf. Hasselblatt, pp. 32-34. Indeed, the LON Secretariat sent the law round to the members of the LON as a model law.} On the other hand, during the \textit{Silent Age}, the overtly positive situation of minorities was somewhat affected. Linking it to the overall increase in chauvinism in Central and Eastern Europe, Ruutsoo points out that some of this trait can also be seen in Estonia during the mid-1930s, although much milder, \textit{viz.}, in the form of an Estonianisation of names or the formation of nationalistic political organisations whose purported goal was the consolidation of the Estonian people.\footnote{Ruutsoo, \textit{Vähemusrahvuste Kultuurielu} (FN 144), p. 13.} The campaign of Estonianisation was started as of 1 January 1935. It was preceded by introducing some legal instruments to effect the change, such as the directive from 10 October 1934, according to which henceforth only Estonian names were allowed in using postal services. It appears that this campaign was geared mainly against Baltic Germans, but it also hit the Swedish and Finnish minorities.

Shortly before the start of the Estonianisation campaign, on 29 October 1934 a language law\footnote{EV Government: \textit{Keeleseadus. Riigivanema Dekreet, 29. Oct. 1934, [Language Law]}, RT 1934, 93, pp. 1615-1617, reprinted in: Matsulevitš (FN 166), pp. 48-52. On the language laws as well as on rights of the non-Estonian population, cf. Dietrich André Loeber: ‘Language Rights in Independent Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, 1918-1940’, in: Vilfan, Sergij: \textit{Ethnic Groups and Language Rights}, Aldershot, Hants: Dartmouth, 1993, pp. 221-249.} was passed. This finally regulated the use of languages in court, in contact with public administrative bodies, local government and within the autonomous institutions of the ethnic minorities, fulfilling the 1922 Constitution’s §23.\footnote{Cf. supra FN 192.} A decree on the use of language of 3 January 1935 contained detailed regulations on the use of labels for produce, brochures, tickets, and other ‘public’ writings, which had to be in Estonian. The Estonianisation campaign resulted in considerable change: whereas between 1920 and 1934 only 820 names were Estonianised, 1935 alone saw some 34,000 names changed, and by 1940 some 200,000 names changed from e.g. German to Estonian.
Thus, Karl Einbund became Karel Eenpalu.\(^{208}\) In education, other measures along the Estonianisation lines applied; especially for the Swedish and Finnish schools, the new rule that the school director had to be an Estonian citizen produced some headaches, as such directors could not be ‘imported’ anymore from those countries \(^{209}\) as they were ‘un-Estonian’.

The 1937 Constitution saw a blurring of some of the definitions, regulations or stipulations relevant to ethnic minorities compared to the 1922 Constitution e.g., §19 now only entitled each citizen to retain the membership in his ethnic group, whereas the 1922 version in §20 had expressly stated that ethnicity was a matter of choice of each individual; this followed a decree of 29 October 1934 on the definition of a person’s ethnic origin. The 1934 decree\(^ {210}\) was an extra law going beyond the Constitution which had hitherto been the sole base for ethnic or national questions. It basically abandoned the individuals’ freedom of choice in defining their ethnicity. Instead, the authorities would now determine the ethnicity on the basis of historical and sociological criteria, and using the old Tsarist Empire’s lists. Only the incorporation of the 1934 decree into the 1937 Constitution made it judicially sound; its position during the intermediate period was based on the fact that Päts ruled by decree, one of which was this October 1934 decree. Nevertheless, in the final analysis the remaining regulations safeguarding the minorities in the 1922 Constitution (§§21-23) were only slightly revised in the 1937 Constitution, but not significantly changed.\(^ {211}\) Thus Ruutsoo could state that until 1940 Estonia remained true to the minority policy which it had proclaimed in 1918.\(^ {212}\)

This may be demonstrated by the fact that at no time did the largest ethnic group, the Russians, appear to have any problem in pursuing their cultural and other interests; at various ‘Russian Days’ this culture would be celebrated. Significantly, from 16 to 19 June 1937 a large Russian festival took place in Narva, where even the participating Estonian ministers and officials gave their speeches in Russian and high Russian church officials praised the government for being able to live in peace and prosperity.\(^ {213}\) Although during the Tsarist era they had been part of the imperialist elite, they did not have a problem in adapting and integrating into the Estonian interwar society, becoming a loyal minority. Indeed this was the first time that Russians had become one among many rather than primus inter pares. In this time, too, they developed into Baltic Russians with particular traits, traditions and mentalities peculiar to them alone.\(^ {214}\) This new identity emphasised the contrast between them and the Russians from outside the Baltic area and is one of the major traits which will set this group of ethnic Russians apart from those that will come under the Soviet system.

\(^{208}\) Pajur (FN 90), p. 170.
\(^{209}\) Hasselblatt, p. 69; Ruutsoo, Vähemusrahvuste Kultuurielu (FN 144), ibid.
\(^{210}\) Original: RT 1934, 93, 745. German text in OE 9, 1933/34, pp. 176-177.
\(^{211}\) Thiele (FN 86), p. 82, referring to Karl Aun: Der völkerrechtliche Schutz nationaler Minderheiten in Estland von 1917-1940, Diss., Hamburg, 1934, p. 134.
\(^{212}\) Ruutsoo, Vähemusrahvuste Kultuurielu (FN 144), p. 13, emphasis added.
\(^{213}\) Pachmuss (FN 151), p. 146.
\(^{214}\) Ruutsoo, Herausbildung, p. 573.
2.2.3 Education and the Language Question

All ethnic groups under the law were allowed to have their own governing bodies dealing with their schooling and other cultural matters directly affecting them. While it was entirely the minorities’ chore to organise, administrate and supervise school instruction in their mother tongue, subject to overall government supervision, it was nevertheless state-funded.\(^{215}\) Even in the Silent Age, the time of authoritarian rule by Päts, the cultural autonomy of the minorities was still safeguarded and not significantly encroached.

Most laws relevant to minorities beyond those mentioned related to school (educational) and church questions; in the latter respect, the German and Swedish minorities were of the same religion as the Estonian majority and thus did not have any problems; neither have any problems been reported for the Russian Orthodoxy. As the Russian, German, and Swedish minorities were the strongest ethnic minorities in Estonia, they also had the most minority schools (cf. the table below). The laws in question were the 1920 Law on Primary Schools and the 1922 Law on Secondary (Middle) Schools.\(^ {216}\)

In regard to minority education, §12 of the Constitution guaranteed the tuition in the pupil’s mother tongue.\(^ {217}\) §5 of the Primary Schools Law stipulated that every local community had to introduce and fund a special class if 20 or more pupils were of a different ethnic group or not of Estonian nationality.\(^ {218}\) Germans and Jews could use their rights under the Law on Cultural Autonomy to establish school authorities and educational systems, subject only to confirmation by the Estonian governmental authorities. Because of their compact settlement structures, Russians and Swedes could use their local self-governing structures and did not quite need to claim their rights under the Cultural Autonomy Law. Anyway, during the 1920s, the Russians did not quite seem organisationally ready to make use of the autonomy law, in addition to which roughly half of the urban Russians (18,200) did not have Estonian citizenship and thus could not register.\(^ {219}\)

The school system until 1934 was two-track; after this, it became three-track. The first track was the six-year primary school, followed by a five-year secondary school track, which could be further diversified by specialisation: humanities and arts, science, commerce and other specialised vocational schools, such as agricultural schools, the police academy, and others. School education was mandatory from the age of 8 for the duration of the primary school, but not above the age of 16.\(^ {220}\) There were over 100 Russian\(^ {221}\) primary schools, 19 German and 18 Swedish primary schools. Further, Russian schools included an evening school (Polytechnical School) and the Russian National


\(^{216}\) In Estonian, these are Algkool and Keskkool, respectively; the latter terms follows the old German term, Mittelschule.


\(^{218}\) Hasselblatt, pp. 44-46, at p. 45, with most information pertaining to the ethnic Germans’ schools.

\(^{219}\) Ruutsoo, Vähemusrahvuste Kultuurielu (FN 144), p. 12.

\(^{220}\) L. Õispuu, Hariduselu, p. 184.

\(^{221}\) A list of all Russian primary and secondary schools in 1922, including Jewish schools using Russian as language of instruction, according to towns and hamlets is provided in Eesti Vabariigis töötavate vene õppekeelega koolide nimestik’. ERA. F. 1108. N. 2. S. 108. L. 199-200. Ärakiri, reprinted in Matsulevitš (FN 166), pp. 123-126. Most Russian-language primary schools were in Virumaa (34) and Pärnumaa (58); in Tartumaa there were 12; interestingly, in Tallinn there were only 3 primary schools, including 1 Jewish extra school (eraalgkool). Ibid.
School, both based in Tallinn.\textsuperscript{222} The Minister of Education already in 1918 decreed that from the fourth class of primary school, and from the first class of middle school (\textit{Keskkooll}, German: \textit{Mittelschule}), all minority-governed schools would have to teach four hours of Estonian in every class.\textsuperscript{223} Other than that, not much was required of the minority schools but to keep to the Estonian-wide general standards.

**Table 2.3: Ethnic Minority Schools and Participation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Number of Schools, 1933/34</th>
<th>Ethnic Composition of Students in % of ethnic group, 1933</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swedish</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1\textsuperscript{a}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finnish</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvian</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonians</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a}This was the Swedish \textit{Gymnasium} in Haapsalu, opened on 28 Aug. 1931. Cf. Pajur (FN 90), p. 162.


From 1934, things changed slightly, requiring more teaching of Estonian in minority schools. However, the introduced changes affected mainly the overall school system; the three-track system now included for the first track a four-year primary school (class 1-4), followed by a five-year secondary middle school (classes 5-9). The second track included a six-year primary school and a three-year secondary \textit{reaalkool}. The third track, finally, was a three-year \textit{gümnaasium} (classes 10-12) with a specialisation in either humanitarian or science tracks, or alternatively a vocational school.\textsuperscript{224} Education at university level was provided from 1919, when Tartu University was reopened. Teaching resumed with Baltic German, Russian, and other professors, who represented the vast majority of teachers. During the next fifteen years, a gradual switch to Estonian took place, and by 1934 some 85\% of lectures took place in Estonian. Student numbers rose very rapidly: from 347 in 1919 to 4,651 in 1926, and in relation to the overall population were among the highest in Europe.\textsuperscript{225} By 1939, 5,689 students

\textsuperscript{222} Pachmuss, \textit{Russian Culture} (FN 151), p. 385.

\textsuperscript{223} ‘[...]' Keskkooli esimesest klassist ja algkooli neljandast õppeaastast peale on igas mitte-estikeelse kooli klassis neli sundustikku Eesti keele tundi nädalas. [...]’, RT 1918, 9, pp. 1-2, 17 Dec. 1918, reprinted in Matsulevitš (FN 166), p. 32.

\textsuperscript{224} Leo Õispuu, \textit{Hariduselu} (FN 217), pp. 186-187.

\textsuperscript{225} A table of Tartu University’s 4,525 students in 1925, according to academic discipline and ethnic groups, is provided by Matsulevitš (FN 166), p. 46: ‘Tartu Ülikõõluskonna Rahvuslik Koosesis [The Ethnic Distribution of the Tartu Students]’. The vast majority of students were Estonians with 3,691 students; 309 students were ethnic Germans, and 233 ethnic Russians. The faculties most frequented were Jurisprudence, Economy, Medicine, and Philosophy. Cf. ibid.
had graduated from Tartu University, although from 1934 steps were undertaken to reduce the number of graduates of both schools and universities.226

2.3 THE MOLOTOV-RIBBENTROP PACT (MRP) AND THE UNDOING OF THE BALTIC STATES’ INDEPENDENCE, 1939-40

The period of independence of the Baltic states as a whole was forcefully ended in 1940. The prelude to their annexation by the Soviet Union was sounded by the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (MRP) on 23 August 1939, in whose additional secret protocols Germany and the Soviet Union under Hitler and Stalin, respectively, divided Eastern Europe into their respective spheres of interest.227 A document of great power bartering, the first secret protocol to the so-called ‘Non-Aggression Pact’ allotted Estonia and Latvia on 23 August 1939 to the Soviet sphere of interest and influence.228 Lynch quite rightly suggests that this pact was in fact aggressive. Article One of the secret protocol from 23 August 1939 reads:

In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement (pereustroistva) in the areas belonging to the Baltic States (Finland [sic!], Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern


boundary of Lithuania shall represent the boundary of the spheres of influence of Germany and the USSR. 229

The Nazi-Soviet Treaty on Borders and Friendship and its secret protocol were signed on 28 September 1939. 230 Another protocol was signed on 10 January 1941, the last one allotting another small piece of Lithuanian territory, which was first part of the Nazi German sphere, to the Soviet sphere of influence. The three secret protocols in effect were a case of two states’ ‘imperial collaboration’ (Lynch), whose direct result was that all three Baltic states could be incorporated into the USSR without Nazi German opposition.

This happened above the heads of the concerned Baltic governments, without their being consulted, which clearly violated the then current international law, its respected principles as well as existing treaty obligations at that time. By disrespecting the affected states’ sovereignty, the Molotov-Ribbentrop-Pact (MRP) violated the principle of the independence of states as laid down in Article 10 of the League of Nations Charter. Although the Third Reich had already left the League of Nations before the Pact was concluded, the principle of the independence of states was nevertheless respected and international law current at the time bound both the Third Reich and the Soviet Union. 231 Most importantly for any assessment of the period, the pact resulted in a trauma that the Estonians and other Balts would not forget – even if it took until 1988 for the first time to be commemorated openly, it would shape their views on the system and its representatives. In some part, it also influenced their relation with the post-war immigrants, the outbreak of the Second World War on 1 September 1939, and on the basis of the Molotov-Ribbentrop-Pact, the Soviet Union, during September and October 1939, took steps which resulted in its taking over power in the Baltic states. 232 Although the Soviet Union ‘invited’ the Baltic states to conclude treaties of ‘mutual assistance,’ it threatened military action against them if they failed to accede to the treaties. 233 Against a pseudo-legal and pseudo-voluntary background, these treaties in effect were thus forced upon the Baltic States against their will, since they did not have the


231 Thiele (FN 86), p. 9. The Soviet Union was excluded from the League of Nations only after it had started the 1939-40 Finnish winter war.


233 Hough (FN 89) p. 371 gives the details how this happened: on 27 Sep. 1940 the Estonian foreign minister, Karl Selter, went to Moscow and was presented with the Soviet ‘proposal’ of the pact of ‘mutual assistance;’ he had until the evening only to solicit an answer from his government which had to be unequivocally ‘yes’ or ‘no.’ The treaty was signed the next morning by Selter and Molotov, and in the presence of Stalin. Pact of Mutual Assistance, Sept. 28, 1939, Estonia U.S.S.R., 198 L.N.T.S. 227. Cf. Hough (FN 89), FN 255, p. 371.
power to resist any Soviet military aggression.  

The pacts with the Baltic States in no way imply the intrusion of the Soviet Union into the internal affairs of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania... These pacts are inspired by mutual respect for the political, social, and economic structure of the contracting parties and are designed to strengthen the basis for good neighborly cooperation between our peoples. [...] We stand for scrupulous and punctilious observance of pacts on a basis of complete reciprocity, and we declare that all nonsense about sovietizing the Baltic countries is only to the interest of our common enemies and of all anti-Soviet provocateurs.  

As a result of these treaties, the Baltic states had to accept the stationing of ismassive Soviet land, air and sea-based troops with their military bases; on the basis of its treaty with the USSR of 28 September 1939, Estonia had to put up with 25,000 Soviet troops at once. Although the treaties on paper guaranteed their independence, the Baltic states did not have much of a real chance of making any free decision henceforth. In June and July 1940, they were finally and fully occupied behind a façade of legality and integrated into the Soviet Union. This may have to do with Hitler’s unexpectedly quick ‘success’ at the French front: the Molotov-Ribbentrop-Pact had given Hitler the possibility to leave but few troops on the eastern borders, and the defeat of the French troops alerted the Soviet government to Hitler’s increased strength which had to be countered by further securing the Soviet position.  

On 16 June 1940, the Soviet government sent the Estonian government a note protesting against the latter’s alleged breaking of the mutual assistance treaty. It demanded that a new government be established which would respect this treaty and fulfil its obligations. In addition, the USSR demanded that unlimited Soviet troops enter into Estonia to safeguard the already stationed troops against ‘provocations’ and to guarantee the effective working of the mutual assistance treaty. In the eyes of some historians, the then
president, Päts, surrendered too quickly in accepting the Soviet demands.\footnote{Taagepera, *Estonia’s Constitutional Assembly* (FN 101), p. 212.} Yet since the Estonian side again had less than half a day to react to the note (8 ½ hours only), and as both no answer or a negative answer would result in the Soviet use of force against Estonia, it did not have a choice. The note had all qualities of an ultimatum: it demanded that specific actions be taken, and in a certain period of time; failure of compliance with the demand would result in a specific sanction, i.e. the use of force against Estonia. According to international law in force at the time, this ultimatum and its demands were illegal.\footnote{Thiele (FN 86), p. 14.} Yet neither the time nor the military situation were conducive to Estonia’s chances of withstanding the Soviet pressure, or of undoing the treaties and changes it was illegally forced into, considering the number of Soviet troops: in June 1940, the Estonian regular armed forces were some 15,000 strong, the defence league some 43,000. Some additional 62,000 men were only reservists.\footnote{Andrus Park: ‘Fighting for the Mini-State: Four Scenarios’, in: *Nationalities Papers, 23*(1), 1995, pp. 67-77, at p. 69. The Estonian-USSR power ratio becomes clear from the details provided in the League of Nations’ official *Armaments Year-Book* from June 1940. Cf. League of Nations: *Armaments Year-Book, General and Statistical Information, Fifteenth Year*, Geneva: [League of Nations], 1940; Official No.: C.228. M.155. 1939 IX; SLoNP: IX. DISARMAMENT 1940. IX. 1. URL: www.library.nwu.edu/govpub/collections/league/arms-yrbook/1939-40/n- con2.html, 02 Aug. 1999. The article on Estonia appears on pp. 119-122, that on the USSR on pp. 345-351. Raun, *Independence redefined* (FN 57), p. 410.} They were opposed to some 115,000 Soviet troops in Estonia alone; this was double the number of the Estonian active troops. Therefore, the Estonians were set between a rock and a hard place; they had to comply. On 17 June the occupation began.\footnote{Tepp (FN 236), p. 19.}

The final pseudo-legal step in preparation for swallowing up the Baltic states were the compulsory ‘elections’ for ‘Peoples Assemblies’ of 14 and 15 July 1940 which took place under the ‘protective’ influence of overwhelming Soviet troops. There was only one pre-selected list of candidates voted upon; it was entered by the ‘Working People’s Union’ of 22 organisations and parties led by the Communist Party. Already in the run-up to the event, the old Estonian election laws which would theoretically have been still in force were flagrantly violated. Because of further rigging at the polls, these ‘elections’ were turned into a complete farce. However, their predetermined result stood – the ‘Working People’s Union’ received 92.8%\footnote{Cf. Hough (FN 89), FN 285, p. 383, where Hough also notes that the election results had been reported by a Soviet agency and published in a London newspaper hours before the actual polls had closed. Also cf. the *NY Times* articles Hough refers to from 14 July 1940, p. 26, col. 1; 15 July 1940, p. 1, col. 7; Tolischus: ‘Baltic States Pick Red Parliaments’. The way in which the ‘elections’ were organised to bring Communists to power was a copy-book takeover later reapplied to the states of Central and Eastern Europe, albeit with some slight modification: cf. the description by Hosking, pp. 318-319.} with 84.1% of the electorate participating.\footnote{These figures were given by Pajur (FN 90), p. 180; Thiele (FN 86), p. 14, quotes a Soviet source confirming these figures. Ibid., FN 62.} The new parliament began its work on 21 July 1940 by declaring the Estonian Republic a Soviet Socialist Republic and a day later, it proclaimed a declaration on accession to the Soviet Union in the presence of Zhdanov. It then applied for ‘acceptance into the Soviet Union’, which on 6 August 1940 was ‘granted.’ After the annexation, ever-increasing numbers of Soviet troops were sent into the Baltic states; in the spring of
1941 the troop contingent had already reached 250,000; by the early summer it stood at 650,000.\textsuperscript{245} To facilitate a quick and secure establishment of Soviet power, these measures were accompanied by the decapitation of the old Estonian elite by way of arresting and detaining their main members. Like other potential leaders of an opposition, the last president, Päts, was deported to Ufa, on 30 July 1940,\textsuperscript{246} where he is supposed to have died in 1956. In the deportation of 1940-41, the family heads were sent off first, in the second wave in June 1941 followed the rest of the family.\textsuperscript{247}

On the international level, the attributes of statehood already began to vanish. The Baltic diplomatic missions abroad were closed on 11 August 1940 and the respective governments were informed that as the Baltic states had joined the Soviet Union, it would henceforth be representing the Balts, too.\textsuperscript{248} Internationally Estonia may thus have ceased to exist \textit{de facto}. The above however makes a case for the position that as a subject of international law it continued to exist \textit{de jure}.\textsuperscript{249} However, nothing much more happened by way of helping the Baltic States out of their predicament; for neither would even the combined forces of the Baltic states have had any chance against Stalin’s armies, nor would any international condemnation or action by the League of Nations change one \textit{iota} of the situation, even if Soviet Russia was in contravention of Article 10 of the League of Nations Covenant.\textsuperscript{250} Since the Abyssinia affair of Mussolini and Japan’s walking out and subsequent cessation of membership because of the Manchuria question, it was relatively clear that the League did not have the teeth nor the clout which might compel any one aggressor to keep to the international norms or be forced to comply: Mussolini had already demonstrated there was nothing to fear beyond verbal recriminations and some half-hearted economic sanctions circumvented by other, friendly states, which would continue otherwise sanctioned supplies. This may quite clearly have made the Stalinist approach considerably easier. Any argument based on article 5 of the 1939 ‘treaty’ on ‘mutual assistance’, where the Soviet Union had given assurances that it neither intended to compromise Estonian sovereignty, nor would the political or economic systems be impaired in any way, would henceforth be brushed aside by referring to the ‘voluntary application’ for incorporation and the total ‘legality’ under which the process took place.\textsuperscript{251}

Yet clearly, Estonia was incorporated into the Soviet Union as the result of an outwardly legal, but nevertheless completely stage-managed process.\textsuperscript{252} Even though the

\textsuperscript{245} Tepp (FN 236), p. 19 asserts that the numbers of troops sent into Estonia 1939-41 is not known.

\textsuperscript{246} Rauch, \textit{Baltic States} (FN 53), p. 226.

\textsuperscript{247} Tepp (FN 236), p. 19.

\textsuperscript{248} Rauch, \textit{Baltic States} (FN 53), p. 228.


\textsuperscript{250} Article 10 reads: ‘The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.’

\textsuperscript{251} Cf. Hough (FN 89), p. 371.

\textsuperscript{252} Compare however the tone of the editorial article printed in the \textit{New York Times} from 20 July 1940, entitled, ‘Democracy, Russian Style’, reprinted in Hough (FN 89), Appendix III, p 495: ‘Suppose that our voters next November were to be offered a single ticket on their ballots. Sup-
‘application’ for incorporation theoretically could suggest that Estonia ‘voluntarily
joined’ the Soviet Union, as has been the Soviet position throughout,253 the above
should have made it exceedingly clear that the entire process especially prior to the
application was fraudulent at best, and in fact pre-determined and put into place by
force majeur, hence too the inclusion was completely illegal under international law,
and even under Soviet law: clearly, no free will was involved in the Estonian, Latvian or
Lithuanian applications for inclusion; not many of the roughly six million people swal-
lowed by the large USSR wanted their state to join it, least of all did they actually vote
for the parliament which in their name applied. The ‘voluntary request’ by the ‘elected’
Parliament could not actually have had any validity, for the ‘election’ results only re-
ferred to the lower chamber; under the 1937 Constitution, however, Estonia had a two-
chamber parliament, consisting of the Chamber of Deputies and the National Council.
Nothing the lower body did could have any legal validity; least of all could the lower
chamber change the constitution of the republic. Therefore, the request for ‘voluntary’
accession to the Soviet Union must be considered null and void, and the incorporation
an illegal annexation which was neither the will of the rightful government, nor of the
rightful parliament, nor of the majority of the people of Estonia, as has been shown
above.254 Least of all will the Estonians have rejoiced at being given Soviet citizenship,
as happened on 9 September 1940, or at the nationalisation of 387 of the biggest trading
companies on 23 September 1940.255

Still, the occupation and subsequent incorporation of the Baltic states in general, and
Estonia in particular, was a fact only reversed some fifty years later. During the interme-
diate time, Estonia was made the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic. The following
chapter outlines the octroi of the system and its consequences. The changes to the po-
itical, economic, and social makeup to be detailed shortly were so extensive that even if
‘what if’-futurology is not applied, it is relatively safe to suggest that a continuously inde-
dependent Estonia would have clearly had a totally different position in Europe today.
Since living memory kept the interwar republic alive, the imposition of the Soviet system
from 1940-41 was never really accepted, nor could it ever gain the Baltic people’s loy-
alties and genuine allegiance.256

Also, the harbingers and executors of change, ‘the Russians’, who migrated into the
Baltic states from 1944-45, would come to be associated with the Soviet system. Its

251 Cf. the Soviet legal literature quoted by Thiele (FN 86), p. 15.
254 Hough at FN 285, p. 383.
256 Cf. Romuald J. Misiunas: ‘National Identity and Foreign Policy in the Baltic States’, in: S. Fre-
derick Starr (Ed.): The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, Armonk, N.Y.
& London, UK: M.E. Sharpe (The International Politics of Eurasia, Karen Dawisha / Bruce
rejection meant the rejection of the migrants, and of their very in-migration, which was going to be perceived as eventually threatening the Estonians’ very existence. The period 1944-45 to 1991, following in the next four chapters, is therefore essential to the understanding of any post-Soviet Estonian policy, for the legacy of the Soviet past determines Estonia’s post-Soviet future.
3 The Stalin Era, 1940-1953: Octroi of the Soviet System and Onset of Non-Estonian In-Migration

The incorporation of the Estonian Republic, which had been started in 1939-40 and was interrupted by the Second World War and the German onslaught on the USSR, was continued with the re-occupation of the Estonian territory from 1944. The transformation into a constituent if unwilling part of the Soviet Union had begun with the Estonian ‘parliament’s’ declaration of a Soviet Republic in Estonia in 1940. In 1944, the transformation was continued and the octroi of the Soviet system was fully implemented by 1953. In the final analysis, according to Brunner, Stalinism was a one-man dictatorship using mass terror and based on four pillars of power: the state security systems; the army; the party apparatus; and the state’s apparatus. According to Zamascikov, the control system was on four levels: political, economical, demographic, and socio-cultural.

- **Political control** was exerted by the strict implementation of the Soviet system; the extraterritoriality principle for army recruits being stationed far away from their home republics; the KGB and the CP mutually controlling each other; and Soviet / Russian watchdogs positioned in every position of importance, especially as the Second Party Secretary or in the Ministerial Council; and in Estonia, the use of the more trustworthy ‘Yestonians’.

- **Economic control** was exerted by the central planning system; the subordination of most of the industry under central control; rapid industrialisation and establishment of large-scale heavy industries as well as the collectivisation of agriculture. The labour market policies connected with this policy entailed a large influx of non-natives, serving thus the aim to bind the ESSR into the USSR also on the demographic level.

- **Demographic control** was exerted by very high in-migration of non-natives, and because of political/ideological and economic reasons; between 1959 and 1989 the relative share of the native (Estonian) population sank from 75.6% to 61.5%; [compare this to D, GB, US and other countries: AUT, CH, NOR some big, some small states in Europe]. This too was used to strengthen the ties to the Union.

- **Cultural control** was exerted by the nationalities policy also based on the ideological reasons mentioned above; the Russification policy, found in the language and education policies of the Union, was started in 1961 by Khrushchev (‘second mother tongue’ concept) and reinforced under Brezhnev from 1978 onwards, which saw another aggressive promotion of the Russian language.

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Whatever the positions of other authors, the importance of the Stalin era for Estonian history lies in the octroi of the Soviet system and its consequences in politics, in the economy, and in social affairs. Politically, the ESSR was made subordinate to the central government and authorities in Moscow; the economy was transformed into a command economy and made part of the Soviet economic system of planning; socially, the formerly Western society was made a socialist society, with new socialist ideals, a new socialist culture, and, most importantly, with many in-migrants which over time had quite heavy an impact on the ESSR’s demography. Along these lines this chapter will be structured. At first, the political and economic impact of the Stalin years will be examined, as they form the framework for the subsequent subchapter on migration. This will detail both deportations from Estonia and new in-migration: the former was a major means to establish against the Estonian population’s resistance the Soviet system; so too was the latter, as in-migration brought both labour, including forced labour, and political administrators to oversee the changes. (then follows a subchapter on cultural matters ?). In Estonian eyes this was but a consequence of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact; the Stalin era deepened the trauma of independence lost. As control was almost paramount, people withdrew into the private sphere and built up a public appearance. Privately, living memory would convey images of the time of independence, which was increasingly glorified. As opposed to this, everything Soviet was directly or indirectly rejected, extending to and including all non-Estonians who came into the ESSR.

3.1 POLITICS AND ECONOMY
The annexation of Estonia and the imposition of the Soviet system involved wide-sweeping changes in the state structures: from politics via administration to the economy, from population via culture and education to society, there was hardly an area left untouched, even territorial changes took place. The effect of Stalin’s changes forced upon Estonia was to sanitise it of most anti-Soviet germs, establish a basically powerless government heading a yes-men ‘parliament’ and enacting executive laws based on and derived from Soviet law previously decreed by the central authorities in Moscow. Several waves of deportations ‘supported’ the further incorporation of the Estonian political and economic system into the Soviet Union’s centrally planned economic network and policies, including collectivisation and heavy industrialisation.

3.1.1 Forming the ESSR
Within the ‘Federation’ of states which had ‘voluntarily’ joined the Soviet Union, a clear order of importance was established: the Centre led, the republics followed. There, it was the CPSU that was the prime mover in any important matter. Consequently, from November 1944 onwards, M. A. Suslov, the head of the only recently created CPSU Central Committee’s office for the Baltic states, took direct charge of implementing Socialisation. Indeed, before any state authority was restored in the ESSR, communist party organs and structures were set up first. Their initial orders pertained to the mobilisation of all men born during the period 1911-26 for the Red Army to support the war effort. Also communist trade unions as well as an Estonian komsomol, the communist
youth league, were set up. The first Estonian post-war government was confirmed by the Estonian Communist Party, ECP, on 18 November 1944.²⁶⁰

3.1.1.1 Imposing the Political System
The state organs of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic were established along the same lines of any one of the other republics. The parliament, now called Supreme Soviet, had 285 members; its Presidium, consisting of a chairman and his two deputies, a secretary and a further eight members, was formally the head of state. It had a Council of Ministers with 26 members, 13 committee chairmen and some chairmen of administrative organs. It also had a supreme court, yet, again these seemingly existing and functioning parts of a sovereign state suggested a state of affairs that did not exist. Indeed, like with any other republic of the Soviet Union, the sovereignty of the republic was always stressed by the central organs in Moscow. In actual fact this sovereignty existed only on paper: the republic’s state organs were clearly second in command to the central organs in Moscow, where all matters of importance were dealt with. This scheme was apparent in any form of law, in the ESSR codices on civil and criminal law, or in those codices dealing with family and marriage or labour, to name but a few. In effect, these acts are thus nothing more than executive orders, but not genuinely original laws drawn up in and enacted by the relevant republics. By extension, the constitutionally ‘sovereign’ republics were nothing more than administrative units of the Soviet Union; this system of near-complete central control also came under the heading, ‘democratic centralism’.

Central control also played into the party structures in the various republics. Even if the party structure was ‘ethnicised,’ i.e. an ethnic Estonian was the First Secretary of the ECP, for most of the time no native Estonian held the post, but Russian Estonians who came to the ESSR either in 1941 or after the war. These people were imported from the Russian Federation where they had either stayed for several decades or were born there as descendants of Estonians who had left the province still in Tsarist times or during the interwar republic. Having usually grown up in the RSFSR they were thoroughly Russianised in language, culture and thinking. After the war, perhaps 47,000 of these Russian Estonians came to the ESSR.²⁶¹ This was the case with the new ‘First’, Ivan Kebin, who had left Estonia as a child, as well as with Müürisepp and Päll. Their Russian accents earned them the nickname of ‘Yestonians’ which is a play on words stemming from the typically Russian mispronunciation of the of the ‘e’-sound as ‘ye’ in est.,

²⁶⁰ Sic!, it was the party which confirmed the government. Cf. Uibopuu II, p. 110-11.
²⁶¹ According to Tiit, some 77,000 Russian Estonians came to the ESSR. Cf. Ene Tiit: ‘Eesti rahvastik ja selle probleemid [The Estonian Population and its Problems]’, Part I, in: Akadeemia 5(8), 1993, pp. 1654-1679; Part II, in: Akadeemia 5(9), 1993, pp. 1847-1866; Part III, in: Akadeemia 5(10), 1993, pp. 2112-2132, at pp. 1847, 1854. This figure is highly problematic if one compares it with the ESA data provided in Table 1: ‘Number of Estonians Living Outside Estonia, According to Population Census in the U.S.S.R.’, in Eesti Statistika, 12(24), 1993, pp. 26-30, esp. p. 26: comparing the 1939 and 1959 census data of Estonians living outside the ESSR result in a difference of 47,626 below the 1939 figure of 143,589. The difference of around 30,000 between these two figures might be explained by the fact that Tiit does not include any return migration from the ESSR. At any rate is this another example of rather a difficult data situation.
some of the Russian Estonians managed to readapt themselves to the Estonian conditions, but not all: trying to win the hearts of the native Estonians at least to some degree, Kebin / Käbin later re-Estonianised his first name Ivan to Jaan, but neither this nor his efforts at improving his Estonian would make his strong Russian traits wither away completely.263

The Second Secretary of the Communist Party in any given republic was Head of Ideology; more importantly, he was also used as a means to check and control the First Secretary. Moreover, he was in charge of the personnel questions and head of the local KGB, making the person holding this position the actual centre of power in any republic. In other words, Second Republic Secretaries were watchdogs sent from the centre; they were almost always ethic Russians.264 Further especially trustworthy ‘Yestonians’ were sent to the republic to keep up appearances, while in reality they were presumed to further the Soviet cause. Loyalty to the Soviet state and system was therefore the most important qualification these people had to have.265

After the CPSU CC had severely criticised the ‘mistakes and shortcomings’ of the ECP’s CC in February 1950, the party was purged for not enough fighting ‘bourgeois nationalists’ – a Union-wide campaign which started from 1948. Starting from the Eight ECP Plenum in March 1950 through the Sixth ECP Congress in April 1951, native Communists, which were very few indeed to start with, were pushed out and partially replaced by Russian Estonians (‘Yestonians’). The number of home-grown party members decreased considerably (while especially the number of middle- and low-ranking Estonians sentenced to hard labour in Siberia increased). The first person to fill the post of First Secretary to the ECP Central Committee from 1944, Nikolai Khartoum, was replaced in 1950 by Ivan Kebin; the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet and its Presidium Eduard Päll, who in 1946 had replaced the suddenly deceased Johannes Vares, was replaced himself; his successor was the writer, August Jakobson. Arnold Veimar, who headed the ESSR’s Council of Ministers from 1944, was replaced in 1951 by Aleksander Mürisepp.266

In 1952, of those 26 members of the Council of Ministers, 17 were Russian Estonians and 9 ethnic Russians, leaving not one native Estonian in a position of power in the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic: Stalin had a deep mistrust for any communist who had lived outside the USSR and who had not been thoroughly Russianised. Although ethnic Estonians also joined the ECP, the few that did never attained very high positions until the Gorbachev era. In fact, the party would for a long time be perceived as foreign, due in no small way to the high proportion of non-Estonians, mainly ethnic Russians, in its ranks: in the post-Stalin era, their share was 56% in 1953, at its lowest it was 48% in

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262 Surely the fact that the ‘Yes-tonians’ were very supportive if not representatives of the Soviet system only by coincidence also figures in this English play on words.


265 Cf. Zamascikov (FN 258), at p. 222.

the 1970s.\footnote{Raun, \textit{Independence Redefined} (FN 5), p. 410.} This was due to the fact that every CPSU member was automatically transferred to the local party when taking up a position in a different republic. It did not mean that Estonians readily accepted the party or vice versa, as here too Russianised ethnic Estonians would ethnically belong to the titular, but ideologically very much to the Soviet-Russian group which was thus in a majority.

Not only were party-political changes made, but also administrative and territorial. At the beginning of 1945, Suslov oversaw Stalin’s direct order to transfer Estonian territory to the Russian Federation: these were the entire district east of the Narva river and three quarters of the Petseri district in Estonia.\footnote{The Estonian losses comprised 2,449 sq.km. and a population of between 60,000 and 63,000, although the estimates vary. Cf. Rauch, Baltic States, p. 227; Raun, \textit{Estonia and the Estonians} p. 181 quotes Parming who suggests a figure of 71,500. Also cf. ibid., p. 169. On the border question in detail cf. Edgar Anderson: ‘How Narva, Petseri, and Abrene came to be in the RSFSR’, in: \textit{JBS} 19(3), 1988, pp. 197-214. The most voluminous work on this topic is by Edgar Mattisen: \textit{Eesti-Vene Piir}, Tallinn: Ilo, 1993, engl.: idem: \textit{Searching for a Dignified Compromise. The Estonian-Russian Border. 1000 Years}, Tallinn: Ilo Kirjastus, 1996. The decree of 23 August 1944 is reprinted in Appendix 17, p. 141, ibid., with the then ECP’s leadership protest letter of 19 Oct 1944 to Stalin in Appendix 18, pp. 142-144. On the transfer of the large Abrene / Pytalovo district of Latvia, cf. e.g., Dietrich A. Loeber: ‘Rußland und Lettland im Territorialkonflikt um Abrene. Ein Vermächtnis aus den Zeiten sowjetischer Herrschaft’, in: \textit{AB} 34, 1996, pp. 9-28.} As has been outlined above, these districts had been ceded by Soviet Russia in 1920 to Estonia.\footnote{Some 45 years later, after these two states regained their independence, these districts became one of the major problems in their relations with Russia in that it very much touched questions of the border between the Estonia, Latvia and Russia. On this dispute cf. the literature mentioned in FN 268 above.} To these remaining ten districts three more were added at the end of the 1940s: Jõgeva, Jõhvi and Hiiumaa Districts (\textit{Jõgevamaa}, \textit{Jõhvimaa}, and \textit{Hiiumaa}). Further changes came in 1950, when the Soviet authorities proceeded to change the administrative makeup of Estonia by introducing \textit{rayons} along the Soviet standards instead of the Estonian districts which were considered too large; also, 637 village \textit{soviets} replaced the old municipalities or townships to strengthen the local communist structures. The five largest cities were placed under direct control of the ESSR Council of Ministers. The administrative changes involved internal boundary changes as well as in 1952 the renaming of the island of Saaremaa and its capital, Kuressaare, which were both named after the Estonian communist, Kingisepp. The measures were clearly designed to break with the ‘bourgeois’ past, even though during the entire Stalin era, resistance against the system persevered.\footnote{Raun, \textit{Estonia and the Estonians}, p. 169-170.}  

\subsection*{3.1.1.2 Anti-Soviet Resistance}
Estonians did not readily accept their inclusion into the Soviet Union. A part of them was even willing to try and wage a prolonged guerrilla war well into ‘peace time’ against the new central government in Moscow and its Estonian bridgehead in Tallinn. This sheds doubt on any Soviet sources asserting that Estonia had ‘voluntarily joined’ the Union. The ‘forest brethren’ (\textit{metsavennad}) continued to resist the Soviet occupation until at least 1952-53, not least because peaceful dissent or resistance under Stalin was
more or less impossible. They received their name from their habit of using the large and thick forests of Estonia, which they used to hide after operations against Soviet military personnel and institutions. The duration this movement was able to hold out against Soviet power and espionage is ample evidence that against all odds hope to break free persisted for a long time, in tandem with hope for the promised help from the West. Another major reason for this was the strong backing the resistance had in the population: this author has heard of people who took the risk of nightly walks into the deep forests in the Estonian-Latvian border area in the south-east and to bring food to the partisans despite the knowledge of at the time committing a capital offence.

The resistance movement numbered between 10,000 and 15,000. Their opposition was motivated by the wish to retain Estonian independence, yet in addition to such clearly patriotic motifs, many members also joined the resistance because of their former engagement in German army units during the Second World War. No matter whether conscripted or voluntary member, the veterans had to fear arrest, and probably even summary execution. A final group comprised those who had joined for various other reasons, e.g. ‘seeking to avoid deportation or other forms of repression’. The movement consisted of usually small groups which not always were linked to each other, indeed operated mostly alone. Regionally, the strongest groups operated in the thick forests and swampy marsh areas of Viru, Pärnu and Võru Counties (Virumaa, Pärnumaa and Võrumaa). In the early post-war years they actually managed to hold effective control in some districts of Estonia; their high point was in 1946-1948.

Probably as a result of the continued resistance the ECP could not contain, during 1949-1952 Stalin purged Estonia. The mass deportations which took place in Estonia, but also in Latvia, were of a systematic kind not only would the political level be

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275 Raun, Independence Redefined (FN 271), p. 411. The question of deportations as means of introducing and securing the Soviet system will be discussed below in chapter 3.1.1.2.

purged of those who could not manage to implement the system or were still too much ‘Estonian-minded’; the terror the authorities instigated in the population was designed to crush and suppress any opposition to the imposition of the Soviet system. This meant that universities as well as schools, including the libraries, the intelligentsia in general, were purged.277 Teachers, writers, and academics were arrested and artists’ work made impossible (already in 1946, the important writer and novelist Jaan Kross had been arrested and deported).278 In particular, the purge was targeted against the partisan movement; both collectivisation and deportations indeed seem to have dealt the decisive blow against them.279 ‘During the Soviet rule the elimination of opposition and the re-shaping of the Baltic economies were two sides of the same coin. Deportations became a key instrument...’ to impose the Soviet system, another one being industrialisation and large-scale in-migration, which will be discussed below. A system of fear pervaded the entire Stalin era; terror and purges varied in intensity, but were a condition of life, defying logic.

The opposition movement was eventually crushed. Having managed to hold out against the Soviet regime for some eight years, and in the vein hope that Western pressure would force the Soviet Union to withdraw, as Western propaganda had promised, the forest brethren had to give up eventually. Both sympathisers and family members of the forest brethren would be included in the merciless fight against them. Western help did not emerge, and the 1949 deportations seem to have dealt the movement an almost mortal blow after which only a few groups were left. From 1952-53 most gave up: physical as well as psychological exhaustion were as much a reason as an amnesty in 1955. The Estonian community had to finally somehow contend with living with the seemingly unavoidable,280 not least because of a large army and navy presence that apart from its military role was clearly used in a policing role. Its overall effect was a further step in the array of measures to impose and cement Soviet rule.281 The political and administrative measures ran parallel to those in the economy, where agriculture was collectivised and Soviet industrialisation started. These represent the conditions under which migration into and from the ESSR, discussed in ch. 3.2 below, took place.

277 This started already in 1940-1941. Cf. Hosking (FN 280), p. 252.
278 Note that in this time, even highly regarded ‘Soviet’ Russian composers such as Shostakovitch or Prokofiev fell from grace and were severely criticised. Kross returned after Stalin’s death in 1954. In detail cf. Mardi Valgemäe: ‘The Antic Disposition of a Finno-Ugric Poet’, in: JBS 24(4), 1993, pp. 389-394.
279 Simon, Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities, p. 217.
281 Still, the annexation of the Baltic states did not lead to an automatic recognition by the international community of the de-facto state of affairs; both the UK and the USA continued to support Baltic governments in exile. Most importantly, thousands of Balts having been dispersed during the war would not be regarded as Soviet citizens, and consequently not returned to the Soviet Union as the latter demanded at Yalta and Potsdam. Thus, only those people claiming Soviet (rather than Baltic) citizenship were repatriated to the Soviet Union under the 1945 Repatriation Agreement. Cf. Hough III, pp. 403-405.
3.1.2 Integrating Agriculture and Industry

From the moment of their annexation, the Baltic states were integrated into the economic system of the Soviet Union. The fourth Soviet five-year plan (FYP) for the period from 1946 to 1950 was the first for the ESSR. While all sections of the economy were scheduled to grow, the focus remained on heavy industry. Consumer goods, housing and agriculture received significantly less investment, reflecting its considerably lower importance to the planners. The share of investment between producers’ goods on the one hand and the light and food production sector on Union level was 87.9% to 12.1%. Consequently, rapid industrialisation started in the ESSR on a par with the overall rebuilding and extension of the heavy industry in the entire USSR, although here the emphasis was on oil-shale mining and power generation to provide energy to the Baltic and Leningrad regions. What trade there had been was either outright nationalised if the firm had been large enough, or forced out of business by murderous rents and taxes by 1941 already – a technique repeated later in agriculture to ‘convince’ farmers to collectivise. The re-shaping of the Estonian economy, like that of the other Baltic states, was total.

Increased tensions on the international level and a growing East-West divide not only led to a certain isolation of the USSR and its satellites from the West; it also made the internal development and growth of strategically important industries as well as achieving autarchy from the West in economic production all the more crucial. The post-war trends and developments determined the next decades general path: winning over the West was to become one of the mainstays of Khrushchev’s ideologically based economic policy and its loudly trumpeted aims.

3.1.2.1 The Collectivisation of Agriculture

In agriculture, it resulted in the forced centralisation and collectivisation of the rural economy, accompanied by political repression, to push this goal through; a decision to collectivise the Baltic republics was taken on 21 May 1947. Since at the beginning collectivisation was ‘voluntary’, and only helped by massive propagandistic efforts, this did not lead to large numbers of farmers joining the fold, even though increasingly hard taxes were levied against private farmers. In fact, with the historic background of the inter-war years and the prosperity gained through the thriving privately organised agricultural sector, the collectivisation efforts met with strong resistance in the population. The consequence was that the screws were tightened ever more. After one and a half years of little success in persuading the farmers followed a change of tack. Clearly the

Footnotes:
wave of deportations from 23-28 March 1949 was much more persuasive than the previous propaganda effort. Consequently, a veritable stampede to join ensued and led to a sudden rise in kolkhoz memberships: when until 20 March 1949 only 8.2% of farms had been collectivised, on 5 April already 28%, and on 9 April 48% of farms had joined a kolkhoz [sic!], the number of which rose from 641 to 2,079. By 1 October 1949, some 78% of farms had joined. Collectivisation was accomplished by 1 July 1952, when around 97% of all farms had joined kolkhozes; however, here mostly the women of the formerly private farms joined, while men either joined Sovkhozes or gave up farming altogether and went into forestry: 78% of 132,000 Kolkhozniks were female in 1951, but 84,000 individuals had left agriculture since 1947. Kolkhozes became the major form of agricultural activity like everywhere else in the Soviet Union, cultivating around 75% of the land in 1950, and 83% in 1955. Private plots went down from 18% to 8% in the same period. Down went especially the crop yield in the FYP following the start of collectivisation, i.e. during 1951-1955: by a quarter or more in grain, potatoes, or vegetables, not least because of the very low prices the kolkhozes received from the state, which would not even cover production costs. Many of those who did not want to become a kolkhoznik gave up their land and joined the fold of rural-urban migrants seeking work in industry.

Fisheries were especially hit by the post-war isolation of the Soviet Union. As an outlying post, the country was closed to the outside world, especially to the West. Almost the entire northern and north-western coast became a no-go area. Any form of sea transport was stopped and should only be reopened under Khrushchev. Whatever had not fallen victim to the destruction of the Second World War was destroyed by force: In the north-eastern part of Estonia, in Ida-Virumaa, both the harbour facilities at Sillamäe and Narva-Jõesuu ‘were simply blown up.’ Also most of the other small landing places of the interwar years were destroyed, as was in consequence the once-thriving coastal fishing industry by the isolation the Soviet Union imposed on their westernmost region.

3.1.2.2 The Nationalisation and Integration of Industry

The integration of the industrial sector into the Soviet Union’s economic planning and network proceeded quicker than in agriculture, which in Stalin’s economic view was nowhere near as important as grandiose, large-scale construction projects in heavy industry. With this preference for bridges, dams, refineries and power generating plants, the fourth and fifth FYP for 1946-1950 and 1951-1955 returned to the rather outdated
ideas of pre-war FYPs whose development strategy was on the whole one-dimensionally set since 1917.\textsuperscript{288} Now the ESSR became part of it.

Immediately after re-occupation by the Soviet forces, reconstruction of the war-damaged industrial sites began in the ESSR. Formerly private firms in Tallinn or other towns were nationalised. Old firms were renovated and enlarged, at first in the oil-shale industry, later in mechanical engineering and the metal industry. In mechanical engineering (masinaehitus), old firms around the capital such as the Tallinn Machine Building Works (Tallinna Masinaehitustehas), or ‘Ilmarine’, which also built machinery, and ‘Volta’, which built electric devices, were the first targets.\textsuperscript{289} Further key institutions such as the main rail terminal or the Estonia Theatre in Tallinn were also renovated.\textsuperscript{290}

Next to Tallinn, the two provinces in north-central and north-eastern Estonia, West Viru County (Lääne-Virumaa) and East Viru County (Ida-Virumaa), were developed into the country’s heavy-industry and energy production base. Together the two counties form an area which today roughly stretches from Rakvere in the west to Narva in the east, with other towns of importance being Kohtla-Järve and Sillamäe. Although its development had started already in the interwar period, where especially the oil-shale mining had commenced, light industries like textiles and foodstuffs still dominated the economy of the 1930s.\textsuperscript{291} The area, scope and output of heavy industry based in Ida-Virumaa were massively enlarged: in terms of investment capital, fuel and chemical industries took 29.7\% of the share, followed by machines and metallurgy industries which took 16.8\%. Light industry and foodstuffs received 15.5\% and 13.4\% of investment capital, respectively. Lumber, paper and pulp received only 9.6\%, although this industry branch had suffered the greatest war damages.\textsuperscript{292} Especially the energy producing sector was pushed, expanding almost permanently until the 1970s. It is this extensive industrial development and its concentration mainly in the north-east that laid the base for large in-migration and settlement of non-Estonians which have formed a large part of the minority question after 1991.

In June 1945 the USSR State Defence Committee issued an Order (määrus) which demarcated East Viru County (Ida-Virumaa) as the oil-shale region (põlevkivirajoon) and industrialisation efforts during the first five postwar years were concentrated on this industry and region. Already in 1946 the oil-shale industry had been restored; by 1948 a gas pipeline from an oil-shale gasification plant at Kohtla-Järve supplied Leningrad, and four years later, Tallinn was also connected.\textsuperscript{293} Excavation was strongly extended at

\textsuperscript{288} Cf. Rauch, p. 502.
\textsuperscript{290} Raun, Estonian and the Estonians (FN 286), p. 175.
\textsuperscript{291} On the interwar economy, cf. chapter 2.2.1.2.
\textsuperscript{292} Raun, Estonian and the Estonians (FN 286), pp. 175, 176. Also cf. Purre, Estlands Wirtschaft (FN 289), on textiles, pp. 53-54; timber and industry, pp.61-64.
old sites and new mines were opened; old plants were renovated and their production capacity enlarged; finally, chemical processing plants were established. The direct aim of the increase in oil-shale production at that time was to supply Leningrad with gas, as well as the Baltic Fleet with fuel oil, both of which can be produced from oil-shale.

For this, extended power supplies were needed. Indeed, power production was to be the oil-shale production’s main use, which explains both its strategic importance and the high capital investment put into it during rebuilding; also, other forms of energy production were introduced, as the north-west of the RSFSR and the industries being rebuilt or settled there had an almost insatiable energy demand, resulting in corresponding plan figures and efforts to fulfill the requirements. On a Union-wide scale, the fourth FYP foresaw an increase in electricity production from 43,200 million kwhs in 1945 to almost twice that much, 82,000 million kwhs in 1950. Official data suggest an actual increase in the production to way beyond the required figure, namely to 91,200 million kwhs. In the ESSR, almost continuous construction of one or more power plants also centred in Ida-Virumaa took place, lasting well into the 1970s: a thermal power plant was built at Kohtla-Järve as well as another power plant at Ahtme, both finished by 1949 and 1951, respectively. During 1950-57 a massive hydroelectric power plant with a capacity of 125 MW was built on the Narva River at Jaanilinn / Ivangoord.

The most secretive works to be built directly after the war had far-reaching consequences for a large stretch of the north-eastern coast, probably also affecting the above-mentioned fisheries communities of the area: a secret uranium plant and town was built at Sillamäe, mostly by labour battalions, and it was going to be almost exclusively staffed by non-Estonians. The Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union declared a resolution which made an area of this coastal zone under special order: by consequence, even inhabitants could not enter a 10-km zone along the coast from Narva to Moonsund without special license. As the above shows, industrial building projects had absolute priority, reflecting the same status of industry vis-à-vis human interests: neither communal or ‘private’ housing, nor consumer interests were of any importance whatever.

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294 Kala (FN 289), pp. 511-512.
296 Capacity: 56 MW and 72.5 MW, respectively; cf. Sillaste/Purga (FN 23), p. 4.
297 Jaanilinn is the Estonian name of the Russian Ivangoorod. This town is situated on the river Narva opposite the Estonian town by the same name; according to the Tartu treaty it would belong to Estonia.
298 Vseviov, Sillamäe, (p. x), quoting Partarhiv, Collection (C) 1, Roll (R) 5, Document (D) 24, p. 1 [this is deposited in the Estonian State Archive, AD.].
3.2 DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES

In January 1945, the total population of Estonia had fallen from 1,136,000 in October 1939 to 854,000 in January 1945. As has been mentioned above, Stalin assigned the territory east of the Narva river and a large part of Petserimaa to the RSFSR; at the same time, he also assigned a population of 60,000 to a different territorial unit, some 52,500 of whom were mainly ethnic Russians; the remaining 7,500 or so were ethnic Estonians, mostly Setu, and some 500 Latvians. From 1946 to 1950 alone, the ESSR grew by some 250,000 people, including some 70,000 returnees who had been either ‘evacuated’ in the summer of 1941 or mobilised into the Soviet army. Since the natural population increase in this period comprised only 8,700 persons, a remainder of 171,000 or so migrants came from all over the USSR into the ESSR. Even though such huge migration flows as in the direct aftermath of the war would not occur again, they nevertheless were the forbearers of a continuous migration flow of non-Estonians from almost all over the Union, earning the term ‘migrant’ a bad connotation in Estonian.

The population gain was offset by forced migration which Stalin also used to effect the octroi of the Soviet system. Between 60,000 and 80,000 people were deported in 1949, mostly Estonians. In addition, before or during the war some 76,000 Estonian citizens had fled to the West, consisting of 65,000 Estonians, 7,000 Swedes, and 4,000 Latvians. Further losses in the population are due to general war losses and can only be

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300 Cf. Vello A. Pettai: ‘Shifting Relations, Shifting Identities: The Russian Minority in Estonia After Independence’, in: Nationalities Papers 23(2), 1995, pp. 405-411, at FN 2, p. 411. January 1945 is the point that a number of authors, use for comparison: ignoring the thousands of individuals who arrived in the territory already in 1944, it may well be surmised that the ESSR was 97% ethnic Estonian for a short period of time – as does Pettai in the article above. However, this tertium comparationis is not a very good and satisfying one, as it leaves a stale taste of Estonian propaganda; to show that very many non-Estonians in-migrated into the area during the Soviet era, and that this lowered the share of Estonians in their own republics to a very large degree, it fully suffices to take the 1922/1934 censuses for comparison. 97% is a rather unrealistic figure, at any rate hardly anything other than educated guesswork, as exact figures are missing. A drop from 88% to 62% should be clear enough. Also cf. Tõnu Parming (FN 299), p. 23, although he at least is honest enough to admit to leaving both the Russian and Estonian in-migrants of 1944 out.

301 Arnold Purre: ‘Ethnischer Bestand und Strukture der Bevölkerung Sowjetestlands im Jahr 1970’, in: Acta Baltica 11, 1971, pp. 41-60, at p. 45 suggests that the total population was 60,000, but 52,500 were Russians. Tepp suggests that the total number was 67,500, i.e. 60,000 Russians, plus 7,500 Estonians and Latvians. Lembit Tepp: Rahvastikuränne Eestisse ja Eestist välja [Population Migration into and out of Estonia], in: Eesti Statistika (9), 1994, pp. 18-27, at p. 20. Tiit (FN 261) p. 1678 stresses that it is not clear how many people exactly lived in this area; she gives an area of 2235 sqkm, with c. 56,000 including some 19,000 Estonians. This would be the lowest number of any data available.

302 Kala (FN 289), p. 511. Also in detail cf. Tiit, Eesti rahvaprobleemid (FN 261), pp. 1662-1678. Simon, Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities, p. 218, mentions some 180,000 in-migrants; for comparison, note that the Latvian SSR received some 500,000 in-migrants, 80% of whom were Russians. Ibid. According to Tepp (FN 302), p. 20, some 90,000 USSR citizens were on ESSR territory at the end of the war. For official data recording external urban in-migration, cf. Table 4: ‘External Migration Between Estonian Towns and Other States (General Data)’, Eesti Statistika (9), 1994, pp. 32-33. This table gives a figure of 152,445 for urban gross in-migration; the actual balance for the 1946-50 period in this table is, 71,907, as 80,538 persons left. No reasons are given, nor is a precise map available for sending and receiving areas.
estimated. According to official figures the ESSR in 1950 had a population of 1,104,000: this was still some 30,000 less than the 1,133,940 that were reported on 1 Jan. 1939.303

3.2.1 The Deportations of 1940-41 and 1949
Apart from suffering the effects of the Second World War, the Estonian population during the second half of the 1940s was decimated mostly by brutal deportations. Already in 1939, General J. Serov had issued the orders for the ‘Deportation of anti-Soviet elements from Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.’304 The deportations took place in two phases, one directly after the occupation in 1940, the other between 1944-45 and 1949, interrupted by the German war occupation and continued after their troops had left the area in retreat.305 There were criteria and categories for those people who were to be deported, although it is very likely that the lists drawn up on the basis of the criteria were but imprecise and haphazard.306 In August 1940, Serov, then deputy head of Soviet Security, and Malenkov came to Riga, ‘identifying’ and listing class enemies, not least by interrogation.

Reports of the infamous 14 June 1941 speak of a day on which more than 10,000 mostly elderly people, women and children were deported and sent to Siberia in cattle cars. The massacres that accompanied the deportations were probably the most grueling point in Soviet politics towards the annexed Baltic states.307 In the first year of Soviet domination only, Estonia lost 60,000, or 4% of its population308; those people most likely to oppose the new regime were ‘...simply removed.’309 These were ‘...teachers, intellectuals, the wealthy, anyone who might influence public opinion...’310 Another report speaks of 50,000 people lost during 1940-1941, 40,000 of whom were conscripted into the Soviet army; the report confirms the 10,000 deported mentioned above.311 The homes and work places of those deported were occupied by ethnic Russians sent in by the regime.312

306 Misiumas/Taagepera, p. 41.
308 Latvia and Lithuania each lost roughly 35,000 or 1.5% - 2%. Cf. Misiumas/Taagepera, p. 42.
309 Hosking (FN 280), p. 252.
310 Hough, FN 284, p. 382.
311 Kukk (FN 6), p. 369. Simon, Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities, p. 179, by and large confirms this figure; he mentions 11,000; Hough at FN 284, p. 382, mentions an estimate
The 1949 deportations were part of the effort to impose the Soviet system. Disappearances, deportations and massacres took place in the whole of the Soviet Union as a ‘normal’ policy instrument to crush opposition, usually with fabricated allegations or ‘proof’: between 1941 and 1944 more than three million people were deported. In the ESSR, this wave took place between 23 and 28 May 1949 with the aim to break the ‘Forest Brethren’s’ Backbone and finally effect collectivisation. NKVD, together with Soviet military and local activists, came into thousands of homes, arresting and detaining the people who had two hours to pack their cases. 19 trains deported 20,722 individuals to Siberia, most of whom appeared to have been women and children. Consequently Estonia lost at least 2% of its population in one day. A large number of alleged kulaks were deported, after having been evicted from their farms, to labour camps in Siberia: the total number for 1944-52 is estimated at 124,000 for Estonia. In all, estimates range up to 80,000 individuals lost in this deportation.

Although the deportations were also geared towards intimidating the remaining population, it did not quite force them into full submission. Neither did fear of the terror in any way help increase the acceptance of the regime; on the contrary, the deportation waves of 1941 and 1949 which in total lost Estonia 10% of its population, would instil a rather deep hatred even in those who would have stayed neutral. At the same time while the population was decimated by war and Stalinist terror, non-Estonian in-migration took place. This was even rationalised by having to replace Estonian specialists who ‘had left’ during the war.

3.2.2 The First Phase of In-Migration

After the Soviet troops re-occupied the area in 1944, several groups of migrants came into ESSR: administrative officials, party functionaries, labour migrants including labour battalions, and school leavers; in addition, although generally there was no such thing as freedom of movement under Stalin, the immediate post-war period nevertheless saw some spontaneous and irregular migration such as the ‘bag men’ (kotimehed). While this group is not included, or at any rate neither validated nor exhibited in the available figures, official data records on urban in-migration from outside the ESSR are available. From 1946 up to and including 1953, gross in-migration was 243,540; gross out-

that in 1941, ‘...about 50,940 persons...’ were deported; another 50,000 are estimated for 1949. Ibid.

312 Hosking (FN 280), p. 252.
314 Estimates vary, however: according to Raun p. 179, Parming and Järvesoo have suggested in 1978 that some 80,000 were deported, while other figures were as low as 30,000. In detail on the 1949 deportations cf. Rahi (FN 276). A list of all those who were deported in 1949 from Tallinn, Nõmme (now a part of Tallinn) and Harju County (Harjumaa) is provided in Aadu Must / Aigi Rahi (Eds.): 1949. aasta küüditamine Eestis. Tallinn. Nõmme. Harjumaa. I Vihik, Special Edition No. 1 of Kleio, Ajaloo Ajakiri, Tartu: Tartu University, 1992.
315 Parming, p. 23; Kivimäe (FN 272), p. 596. On the deportations in conjunction with the collectivi-
316 Misiunas/Taagepera, p. 43.
migration was 143,184, resulting in a net migration balance of 100,356 for ESSR urban areas.

3.2.2.1 Main Types and Backgrounds of Migrants

The most influential group of migrants was that of the administrative officials. They followed hot on the heels of the army troops and could be divided into four groups according to their tasks: to hunt collaborators; to (re)construct the Party apparatus; to ‘re-educate’ the population in the previously German occupied territories; finally those, whose task it was to support the Stalinist transformation to a socialist republic, directing and supervising the socio-economic changes at all levels: ‘[...] In 1945 alone, 376 high-level party functionaries arrived in Estonia.’ Administrators, party functionaries as well as commissars were introduced into every plant and institution to push the Communist Party’s goals, as the native population, unsurprisingly, did not appear too loyal to their cause and consequently did not have the regime’s confidence. Therefore, ‘ideological work with the masses’ was necessary to ‘re-educate’ the population at large; failing that, the special NKVD troops hunted down all real or imaginary collaborators who were either killed on the spot or banished.318

In addition to this came the huge labour migration and the subsequent family and chain migration.319 In labour affairs, wartime regulations, especially labour legislation, continued well into ‘peace time’, at least until 1956. Not only could the workforce be mobilised for whatever work and sent to whatever place the planners deemed necessary, but were draconian penalties meted out to anyone caught for absenteeism, drunkenness or being late at work.320 In view of the fact that the Estonian industrial workforce had been reduced to 52% of its pre-war strength and the very short time frame within which the first post-war FYP’s huge industrialisation targets had to be accomplished, the remaining local labour pool could hardly suffice, even though ‘...local artisans, women and youths were pressed into “social production”...' and agricultural collectivisation, forcing many people off the land, provided a further labour supply.321 An import of labour remained necessary. The Soviet government had established appropriate means for the redistribution of labour long before the Estonia had been incorporated;

317 Raun, Estonia and the Estonians, p. 171.
318 Simon, Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities, p. 203.
319 Tiit, Eesti Rahvusprobleemid (FN 261), p. 1853, makes this interesting difference: The administrators and party elites were transferred to get the system under control and actually push the octroi through. The labour migrants were brought in to push the economic goals through in expanding the use of the natural resources of oil shale, uranium, et c: ‘Lisaks sellele toodi sisse ka töötöödu, et hakata intensiivselt aredama Eesti tööstust, sh. kaevandama maavarasid (põlevkivi, uraanumaak jm.)’.
formal programmes with fixed labour balances would be carried out by two Union-wide organisations: the All-Union Resettlement Committee and the Administration for Organised Recruitment (Orgnabor).\textsuperscript{322}

Most of the migrants arriving in Estonia in the late 1940s were therefore administratively transferred: they were brought into the area in an organised fashion, e.g. to staff the building organisations in the construction industry as well as the oil-shale production sites. The building industry must have been regarded a relatively good place to work in: ‘A building job entailed a place to live, maybe even a flat, which in the general after-war chaos was not an unimportant motive for migration.’\textsuperscript{323} Others came of their own volition, or were prompted to join their relatives or friends who had arrived previously to find work.\textsuperscript{324} Yet other migrants like the so-called ‘bag men’ were only short-term visitors; this phenomenon stopped in 1948. They came in large numbers from the RSFSR to the Baltic area during the first three post-war years, mainly in search of food.\textsuperscript{325} The ESSR area closest to the war-torn city of Leningrad was Ida-Virumaa, East Viru County:

Ida-Virumaa ... received graduates of vocational schools, technical schools and universities, demobilized soldiers and officers, former convicts under the so-called 101 km rule..., and inhabitants from neighbouring Russian areas, who according to modern terminology could be regarded as economic refugees.\textsuperscript{326}

Accordingly, in the first years of post-war chaos there were three types of migration present: mainly organised labour migration, with some spontaneous migration; family or chain migration; and ‘economic’ migration, which was also largely due to the terrible conditions in the war’s aftermath. As a general rule under Stalin, however, nothing was spontaneous, as mentioned above.

The main task was that of pushing the industrialisation targets through, and the migrants coming to fill the gap in labour supply proved to come from all walks of life. In the first years, evacuees, demobilised military, or prisoners of war were also used – as were civilian prisoners from Russia, Poland, and, from 1948, Czechoslovakia, who were sent to Estonia.\textsuperscript{327} Some 20,000 POWs were housed in camps No 289, 279, 135, situated in East Viru County (Ida-Virumaa) in April 1947.\textsuperscript{328} The number of all war prisoners in Estonia at that time surpassed 40,000; they were used in the oil-shale producing region or in Tallinn, where among others the railroad station was rebuilt. The Sillamäe plant was probably the biggest building site in the post-war ESSR: around


\textsuperscript{324} Kala (FN 289), p. 514.

\textsuperscript{325} Misiunas/Taagepera, p. 109.

\textsuperscript{326} Under the ‘101 km rule’, a person released from prison or exile could not settle nearer than 100 km from Leningrad (or other big cities). Cf. Hallik / Vseviov, p. 5.

\textsuperscript{327} Cf. Misiunas/Taagepera, p. 110, who refer to the official publication on ‘Estonian History’ from the year 1971 (Eesti NSV ajalugu, 1971); Vseviov, quoting Partarhiv, C 1, R 5, D 40, p. 71, 76, 96; Vseviov, Sillamäe, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{328} On 13 April 1946, the USSR Council of Ministers decided that all Baltic POW be moved to their home areas. Cf. Vseviov, Sillamäe, p. 4.
18,000 people including Estonian POWs worked on the project.\textsuperscript{329} Forced labour, as well as regular military, have long since been extensively used in construction and other development works, as civil labour would oftentimes not suffice to supply the massive numbers of workers required.\textsuperscript{330}

Apart from the high-ranking party-officials mentioned further above, qualified labour was also sent to Estonia, such as engineers and technicians, but also (medical) doctors, or teachers.\textsuperscript{331} For example, the decision to build the Sillamäe secret uranium plant mentioned above resulted in July 1947 in the creation of a special recruitment office in Leningrad, whence most of the engineers and technical personnel were to come; also, representatives of the plant were situated in both Moscow and Leningrad until 1948.\textsuperscript{332} The secrecy of the works apparently needed especially trustworthy staff not to be found among Estonians. Bearing in mind that Estonian resistance fought the octroi of the system, the reluctance to use Estonian workers is almost understandable. The first workers prior to the recruitment exercise mentioned above had been transferred from other plants in the Union.

However, the numerically largest contingent brought into the Baltic states was unskilled or low-qualified labour,\textsuperscript{333} many of whom appear to have been actively recruited under the wartime legislation mentioned above, and destined mainly for use in the heavy industry, which was the main drafting industry of the time. The number of industrial workers rose during 1945-50 from 43,000 to 86,700; the number of building workers from 8,700 to 13,600. Most importantly, the share of non-Estonians also rose: by 1950, a third of industrial and two thirds of building workers were Russians, including a large number of school leavers from vocational schools.\textsuperscript{334} Part of the education process in the Soviet Union was that a workplace was guaranteed for three years after graduation.\textsuperscript{335}

Students from neighbouring RSFSR oblasts came to study at the vocational schools in Ida-Virumaa, staying from half a year to two years at school and then joining the workforce of the county. As these vocational schools would at times be part of a specific factory or plant, the students would receive specific education needed to obtain the skills to fill the posts in these enterprises. Some of those students were said to have been orphans, whose high numbers in the north-western and central regions of the RSFSR

\textsuperscript{329} Vseviov, \textit{Sillamäe}, p. 4, points out that contrary to statements suggesting that all industrial objects were built by [non-Estonian] ‘migrants’, Estonian POWs were also included in the workforce: ‘According to the resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union from July 27, 1946 all Estonian prisoners of war of call up age were handed over to the command of Plant No 7, echelons with Estonian prisoners of war arriving from all examination and filtration camps to [sic!] Narva (Partarhiv, C 1, R 5, D 51, p. 78. Also cf. Erich Kaup: ‘Kuhu viivad rohtunud rajad’, in: \textit{Eesti Sõnumid}, 18 May 1994.). According to Purre, \textit{Ethnischer Bestand}, pp. 45-46, there were some 16,000 Estonian POWs who as part of the retreating German army were left behind and after their capture by Red Army troops were sent to hard labour camps as ‘traitors’. Another 20,000 were accused of ‘collaboration with fascists’ and also sent to labour camps.

\textsuperscript{330} Schroeder (FN 322), p. 11.

\textsuperscript{331} Kala (FN 289), p. 514.

\textsuperscript{332} Vseviov, \textit{Sillamäe}, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{333} Misiunas/Taagepera, p. 111. This is confirmed by the details provided by Kala (FN 289), p. 514.

\textsuperscript{334} Kivimäe (FN 272), p. 595.

\textsuperscript{335} Tepp, \textit{In- and Out-Migration of Estonia, ESA (9), 1994}, p. 23.
were largely war-related\(^{336}\); presumably, this was regarded as a relatively safe bet to increase the ESSR’s demographic ties with the USSR, as these orphans were not too closely linked to the area whence they came because of a missing family, but still too much Russian not to keep their links to the ‘motherland’ and thus orientate themselves mainly towards the Leningrad or Moscow regions. Also, ‘ordinary’ school leavers were sent to the ESSR; again, the old systems in place since the 1930s were used and incorporated the ESSR into their works. These graduates may have come from vocational schools, *tehninkumi*, or other institutions of higher learning. Their placement was effected by administrative order, and the assignment, which could be anywhere in the Union, was compulsory for three years.\(^{337}\) For example, in mid-1948

...about 800 people were directed to Sillamäe by a central administrative board after graduating from vocational schools F30. In August about 100 more people arrived from the vocational schools in Moscow, Gorkij, Bereznjaki and Gubaha. (Silmet, C 1, R 1c, D 10, p.224, 230, 242, 243, 249, 250, 252.) According to the central administrative board 32 young specialists with higher education and 49 people with vocational education were also sent to the factory in the same year. (Silmet, C 1, R 1c, D 10, p.211.)

In 1995 the Russian Sociologist Yelena Nikiforova conducted a series of interviews with inhabitants of Sillamäe. The following interviewee was a 65-year old pensioner who had had vocational training and told of the diversity of the groups sent to the ESSR. Comparing him to the other interviewees, he must have arrived in the republic about 1950. In his example, he was part of a larger group of mainly blue-collar workers with vocational training answering specific needs in the republic including their professions, but also ‘all sorts of officials.’ Ethnically, they were predominantly Russians and Ukrainians from all over the Soviet Union:

> Well, I don’t know exactly; in the main there are probably Russians and Ukrainians here. Primarily from vocational schools, [they] came in the early years. Well, for example, about a hundred people came from our school [alone], because [workers with] different vocations were needed: assemblers, lab workers, turners, electricians, all sorts of officials. So we got ourselves a family here, as everywhere [happened], like on newly broken land [like in the Virgin Lands Campaign under Khrushchev (?)], so with us here, too. The girls and boys were from different places, well, like from Dzerzhinsk or from the Gorki region, they came from everywhere, from the Tambov vocational school and from some other vocational schools.\(^{339}\)

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\(^{337}\) Schroeder (FN 322), p. 10.

\(^{338}\) Vseviov, *Sillamäe*, p. 4. Apparently vocational school F30 was situated in the Ida-Virumaa oil-shale basin. Cf. ibid., p. 5.

Tambov is south-east of Moscow; the oblast belongs to the RSFSR’s Central Black Soil Region, which also includes Kursk and Voronezh. The entire region had a balance of roughly 4,000 migrants in 1945-55, representing 43.3% of the entire balance for 1945-90. Of those 4,000, fully one third or 1,328 alone came from the Tambov oblast. Gorki is situated east of Moscow, Dzerzhinsk is part of the Gorki oblast, situated west of Gorki. As the example shows, many of the people potentially remained in the ESSR, and those who settled often started a family.340 Like the interviewee above, mostly young school-leavers were administratively transferred to a place of work which they had secure for the following three years. An example for those ‘actively recruited’ but rather unwilling to come, is a 65-year old pensioner, also from the town of Sillamäe:

But we came in 1949. Or rather [It would be more correct to say], they dragged us here [together] with the soldiers [by force?]. We somehow didn’t want, we cried – not only myself, but our entire [school] class. It would have been better for us to remain there, why they brought us here I do not understand, it would have really been possible to remain there, we’d have worked there, we’d live there until today.341

Another person seems to echo such sentiments, clearly showing that at that time labourers were manoeuvred like a soulless mechanical mass to wherever they were needed according to plan figures and goals. The following example is symptomatic for Soviet planning and especially its organisation in building new industry sites in the middle of nowhere. A 64-year old pensioner said:

Nobody at all asked us whether we wanted to come here or not – they simply brought us here and that was that. Mud up to the knees, up to the ears, as they say – and nowhere to go to. Nothing at all was here, only those round barrack houses, called ‘solikamskis.’342

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341 Original: Aga meie tulime 49ndal aastal. Õigem oleks öelda, et meid tassiti siia väevõimuga. Meie kuulagi ei tahtnud, nutsime – mitte üksik mina, kogu meie lend. Oleks võinud meid parem sinna jätta, milks meid siia toodi – aru ei saa, oleks täitsa võinud sinna jätta, oleksime seal tööd teinud, elaksime siilamaani seal. Nikiforova, pp. 51-56, at p. 52. As the interviewer-researcher came from St. Petersburg, the texts reprinted in this work will have been translated from Russian into Estonian; this author’s English translations provided below the Estonian quotes will therefore be only an approximation of the actual interview’s content, as they would be the second translation. Still, the illustrative character of this and other examples would warrant another translation. (Aksel Kirch reprints this and other interviews in a somewhat different translation, and with cuts. Cf. ‘Interview no.2’, Aksel Kirch, ‘2. Socio-Demographic Changes During 1945-1995 and Their Causes’, in: Aksel Kirch (Ed.): The Integration of Non-Estonians into Estonian Society: History, Problems, Trends, Tallinn: Estonian Akademy Publishers, 1997, pp. 16-24, at p. 19).

342 Original: ‘Ega ju keegi meie käest ei käsinud, kas me tahame siia või mitte – lihtsalt toodi ja köök. Muda põlvini, kõrvuni, nagu õeldakse – astuda pole kuhugi. Siin polnud ju üldse mitte midagi, ainult sellised ringkujulised kasarmud, kutsuti neid ‘solikamskiteks.’’ Quote reprinted in: Nikiforova, at p. 51. In a conversation with the present author on 1 and 4 Dec. 1999, Mrs Lilia Tenhagen, M.A., pointed out that Solikamsk was a labour camp on the Urals, where among others her German parents had been taken. The camp was run by the speż komandatura of the USSR Ministry of Interior and housed by POWs as well as work battalions (trud armiya). The camp, whose name was kombinat stroi detaili (plant for building parts), was the single producer of ready-made parts to a certain type of barrack houses made from wood, c. 4-5 meters in diameter and 2 meters with a supporting pole and an oven in the middle. As all inhabitants of such camps were fed centrally in a canteen, these barrack houses were used only for sleeping some 15 to 18 workers. At the camp, the houses received the nickname of yurti, from the Central Asian and Siberian nomad’s tent, yurt, because of their round shape. They were produced
One of the largest factories of the light industry bracket was the Kreenholm Manufac-
tory which produced textiles. Although the main accent was on heavy industry, this fac-
tory received special attention, as on 19 June 1945, the USSR Council of People’s
Commissars decided on its being made into the biggest textile factory of the Soviet Un-
ion. Consequently, organised labour was sent there by a special state department, 
Organabor, both to reconstruct the plant and to put it into operation. In 1946 alone,
over 1,600 workers were recruited for Kreenholm, who at the beginning came in part
from Estonian villages: in the fourth quarter 1946, 232 out of 669 recruited personnel.
During the early 1950s, however, this stopped and workers were recruited almost to-
tally from the RSFSR, stemming in 1950 and 1951 mainly from the Ivanovo and Yaro-
slavl districts (oblasts), of the RSFSR’s Central Region, which was one of the three
main sending areas of the time. Still, Organabor had first been launched as organisation
to assist in relocating rural labour to work in urban industries, and the rural-urban migra-
tion mentioned above in connection with the forced collectivisation would surely have
provided labour for the industrial process, some of which may also have reached
Kreenholm.

Compared to the first few post-war years, in-migration during the 1950s decreased,
reaching a balance of only 53,500 from 1951 through 1960. At the same time, the
type of migrants changed, as the first half of the 1950s saw a steep increase in predomi-
nantly labour migration into the Baltic republics. Together with the deportation waves,
this in-migration changed the population ratio considerably: according to Misi-
unas/Taagepera, by 1953, Estonians only had a share of 72% in the overall ethnic
makeup. This is equivalent to a drop of 22% within 8 years (!).

3.2.2.2 Origins and Urbanisation of Migrants in Figures
Sending started from the nearest areas of the RSFSR like the North-Western Region
which included Leningrad and Pskov oblasts nearest to the ESSR and during 1946-
1955 sent some 106,500 people; from the Central Region around Moscow came
44,500 migrants, which is more than the entire number of migrants from the Ukrainian
and Byelorussians SSRs put together (22,902 and 13,239, respectively); the Northern

for, and used in, work camps all over the Soviet Union, and the contention here is that the pen-
sioner from Estonia’s East Viru County refers to the place of production which gave those
‘round barrack houses’ their name, solikamskis.

343 Hallik/Vseviov (FN 326), p. 4.
344 Hallik/Vseviov (FN 326), p. 5.
345 Kala (FN 289), p. 513.
346 Luule Sakkeus: ‘Post-War Migration Trends in Estonia’, Paper presented to the second Esto-
nian-Finnish Demographic Seminar, Helsinki, 27-29 August, 1991. Ms., p. 3. Also cf. Luule Sak-
to the conference ‘Mass Migration in Europe: Implications in East and West’, IAS, IIASA, IF,
347 Cf. Misiunas/Taagepera, p. 112. Official ESA data shows the percentage for 1959’s first post-
war census to be still at some 74.6%; yet even a drop of 20% over 8 years is large enough to
have an impact. It should be noted, however, that the pre-war figures of 1939 mention a share of
88.2% Estonians in the population.
348 Includes City and Region of Leningrad, as well as Novgorod and Pskov Regions (Oblast).
349 Includes City and Region of Moscow, also Bryansk, Ivanovo, Yaroslavl, Smolensk and Tver
Regions (Oblast).
Region\textsuperscript{350} around Arkhangelsk, sending around 16,100 people, was the third largest sending region of the RSFSR. Together, these three regions sent 70.4% of the RSFSR total, and 55.9% of the grand total of in-migrants into the ESSR which during the 1946-1955 period reached 298,900 gross. Note that the in-migrants of this period were balanced by around 193,800 out-migrants, resulting in a migration balance of some 105,100. This represents an annual average of 10,509 persons for 1946-55.\textsuperscript{351}

Looking specifically at this migration balance for the three regions mentioned above in the context of all-Union migration with the ESSR, 85,400 of the 105,100 migrants of the 1946-55 period arrived from the RSFSR, the most important regions of which in the context of migration were the North-Western and Central Regions. Around 32,900 or 38.5% came from the former, but only a trickle of those came from the city of Leningrad: 912. From the \textit{district (oblast)} of Leningrad, however, 11,550 came, only to be surpassed by the Pskov district (oblast), whence almost 14,800 migrants came. A large part of Pskov district had been transferred to the RSFSR in 1944 and is directly adjacent to the ESSR’s south-eastern border. Interestingly, of those 17,200 migrants from the Central Region, most came from Yaroslavl \textit{oblast} with 3,700 and from the Tver \textit{oblast} with 4,800 migrants. From the Moscow \textit{oblast}, only 1,800 migrants arrived, which was on a par with the Smolensk \textit{oblast}’s figure of 1,900. With the city of Moscow, however, the balance is in favour of the USSR capital, where 1,700 migrants arrived from the ESSR.\textsuperscript{352}

Another striking example of change can be seen in analysing urbanisation rates. Interwar Estonia had been a predominantly rural country. Compared to the interwar years, however, urbanisation went up from ‘...31.3% in 1945 to 52.5% in 1953, a trend which was enhanced by the Estonian fear of continued rural deportations in these years.’\textsuperscript{353} In other words, urbanisation was not only a result of in-migrants settling mostly in the towns which, as shown above, was one of the major reasons. Apart from this, urbanisation was also a consequence of the terror instigated in conjunction with the collectivisation campaign and the Soviet authorities’ fight against the mainly rural resistance.

The available numbers support this trend. In 1945-1947, the number of Tallinn’s inhabitants rose by 56,400 alone and almost doubled in the first post-war decade: from an estimated 134,000 in 1944 to around 261,000 in 1955.\textsuperscript{354} Narva, which developed into the second largest industrial city in the ESSR, experienced a population increase from 2,900 in 1944 to around 13,900 in 1950.\textsuperscript{355} Note however that Narva in 1934 had a population of some 23,500, which was 65% Estonian at that. In the war, especially in 1944, the town was utterly destroyed by the Soviet army, so that remaining

\textsuperscript{350} Includes Arkhangelsk and Murmansk Regions (\textit{Oblast}s) and the Karelian and Komi ASSRs.

\textsuperscript{351} This data adapted and calculated from ‘Table 3. External Migration between Estonia and Other States (General Data)’, in: \textit{Eesti Statistika, (9(33))}, 1994, pp. 30-31; ‘Table 4. External Migration between Estonian Towns and Other States (General Data)’ in: \textit{Eesti Statistika, (9(33))}, 1994, pp. 32-33; ‘Table 5. External Migration between Rural Areas Estonia and Other States (General Data)’ in: \textit{Eesti Statistika, (9(33))}, 1994, pp. 34-35. Also cf. Lembit Tepp: ‘Ravastiku välisrände lähte- ja sihtkohad’, in: \textit{Eesti Statistika (10)}, 1994, pp. 11-18.


\textsuperscript{353} Raun, \textit{Independence Redefined} (FN 5), p. 412.


\textsuperscript{355} Hallik/Vseviov (FN 326), p. 5.
usable housing must have been rather scarce. In addition, the former population was not allowed to return to the town; its post-war development was thus almost entirely determined by in-migration.\footnote{Estonians say that ‘almost only one cat and two people had remained’ (‘vist üks kass ja kaks inimest jää’)} In the entire ESSR, the figure of urban dwellers more than doubled during 1945-50, from 267,000 to 548,000,\footnote{Kala (FN 289), p. 512.} while the available urban per capita living space went down to 9.3 m\(^2\) in 1950 and reached 8.8 m\(^2\) in 1955.

The major reason for this sharp increase in urbanisation was that most of the in-migrants needed to support the industrialisation process settled in towns and cities: for example, some 6,000 of the roughly 13,000 inhabitants of Jaanilinn/Ivangorod in 1950 worked just across the river either at the Kreenholm Manufacture or at a building company in the neighbouring town to Narva.\footnote{Hallik/Vseviov (FN 326), p. 5.} Also, some villages received town status after having grown sufficiently. Another reason for the growth of towns was that the collectivisation pushed many agricultural workers to leave the countryside and move into urban areas.\footnote{Misiunas/Taagepera, p. 112.} A final reason, albeit one having only a small impact, was that some of the forest brethren would come out of the forests and start a new life in a town or city with forged papers so as to escape severe punishment if not death.

In the final analysis, most of the ESSR’s in-migration and the consequent immense increase in urbanisation in the Stalin era were consequences of decisions made centrally in Moscow. Apart from Tallinn, the area of East Viru County, Ida-Virumaa, was most severely affected by both the consequences of the central economic planning in terms of industrialisation and building stock and the resultant in-migration which was rather welcome as it provided another level of cementing the USSR’s ties with the ESSR. In addition, Narva and Sillamäe had become special areas, in that the former town was mainly used to house ethnic Russians from the RSFSR, while the native Estonian population of pre-war times was not permitted to return. Sillamäe and the surrounding area in turn became a ‘closed town’, as the uranium plant built there was a secret part of the military-industrial complex.

3.3 SOCIO-CULTURAL LIFE AND INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS UNDER STALIN

Interethnic relations, if any, of the post-war ESSR were clearly influenced by the war, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the occupation and annexation consequent upon it. Everything Soviet or those representing Soviet power, which were Russians in the main, were rejected, the more so, since Stalin had brought his famous toast on the Russians. In addition, both main groups arriving in the Stalin era, officials and blue collar workers, were prone to follow the official ideology more than anyone else. Consequently, a part of every migrant’s mental makeup of the time may well have been the idea that ethnic Russians, the ‘Russian nation’, were the first \textit{ethnie} of the entire Soviet Union, the ‘elder brother,’ as Comrade Stalin has been indicating already since the late 1930s and during the war. Since then, there were not one hundred peoples anymore, but ‘...one people and ninety-nine others.’\footnote{Simon, \textit{Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities}, p. 158.} During the war, ‘the Soviets’ became synonymous with ‘the
Russians’ fighting ‘the Germans’ and the ‘Fascists’, so that ‘Soviet patriotism’ equalled and extended Russian patriotism and vice versa. After the war, Stalin in his famous toast called the Russians the ‘most distinguished people’, the ‘leading nation’ of the Union which had earned this supreme position by their heroic war effort. According to his view, their main characteristics were ‘clarity of mind’, ‘firmness of character’, and ‘patience’.\(^{361}\) Generally not only was everything Soviet or Russian superior to everything else, but did everything ‘truly progressive’ emerge from Russia (and by extension, ‘the Russians’). This included the Russian language, which in 1950 Stalin decided to be the only one ‘...worthy of being the ultimate proletarian language.’\(^{362}\) As opposed to this, ‘Fascists’ became a term with which Estonians were derided for a large part of Soviet history – e.g., for not speaking Russian. Anyway it was clear that all non-Russian cultures had low to lowest levels of prestige, except for Ukrainians and Byelorussians, which belonged to the fold.\(^{363}\)

Consequently, Estonians withdrew into private life, building up a double identity for the outside: the octroi of an alien system with the attending terror hardly left a choice. Also, firms and plants in Tallinn and Ida-Virumaa (East Viru County) were not only ‘nationalised’, i.e., subordinated to the Moscow central government. Very quickly, too, many firms adopted Russian as the main working language instead of the former parallel use of both Estonian and Russian: thus all newly arriving non-Estonian speakers neither in large towns nor indeed in the industrial centres which many of them built and staffed, would have any language or communication problems. Conversely, however, this started to distress the Estonians in these areas, as they could not cope any more without knowing or learning Russian.\(^{364}\) In addition, while they suffered housing problems, new arrivals in the northern counties would have state-of-the-art housing built by the firms and their Moscow ministries; also, such houses as were in good condition were provided in Narva, a town almost flattened by Soviet Army during the war.\(^{365}\) By consequence, many Estonians moved to other areas; as for Narva, they were simply not let back.

For a long time, both ethnic groups lived their separate lives in Estonia with as little contact as possible; also, as noted above there was still guerrilla resistance until about 1953. Not least for this reason Estonians very likely did not wish for any contact to those they regarded as arrogant, uncouth, and instruments of the Soviet state – in short, ‘occupiers’ (okupandid); besides, not that many people knew Russian at the time, as pointed out above. On the other hand, many of the in-coming migrants would only know Russian, and would certainly not see any reason to learn an ‘unimportant’ language or


\(^{362}\) Hough III, pp. 308, 306.


\(^{364}\) Kala (FN 289), p. 515.

\(^{365}\) Personal communication to the author from a number of Estonians. Cf. Vseviov, *Sillamäe.*
have any more contacts than necessary to the native population whom they would expect if not require to speak Russian.

By the end of Stalin’s reign, the Soviet Union was ‘a true empire’ (Carrère d’Encausse), where the dominance of the Russians was justified by their superior culture. This culture signified progress and, accordingly, the direction in which the peoples of the Union had to be led.\textsuperscript{366} Sovietisation had been accomplished in Estonia in the political, economic, social and cultural spheres, although rather through attrition and grudging acceptance of the inevitable than persuasion: as no help was forthcoming from the West\textsuperscript{367}, people had to try and live as best they could under the alien system. With the re-writing of the ESSR constitution on 14 January 1953 the building of Socialism was deleted as a state goal on the assertion that it had now been fulfilled.

The importance of this period for the post-Soviet situation is based on the fact that to Estonians, both the kind of system and who was sent to enforce it were alien and clearly regarded as symbols or instruments of domination, countered at first by resistance and hopes of Western help and finally only by living memory which kept the interwar republic alive. Another fact which makes this period important is that here the foundation was laid for the huge number of in-migrants that was to enlarge the population of the ESSR by more than a half by 1989-91; it is clear beyond doubt that the ESSR was treated as an integral part of the Soviet Union, and such was also the planning of the economy and workforce needed on its territory.

\textsuperscript{366} Carrère d’Encausse (FN 361), p. 39.

4 The Khrushchev Era, 1953-1964

Political developments at the centre nearly always had an impact on and in the Union republics. Conversely, foreign and domestic policy areas were intertwined; the domestic area was the more secluded and internal policy the more stringent, the more international tensions between the superpowers and their respective blocks developed or decreased. After Khrushchev had taken over part of the reigns after Stalin’s death in March 1953, he needed détente and improvement of external relations to push his domestic economic reforms through. Indeed, foreign policy saw successes and failures, keywords of which may be détente and nuclear deterrence, the Korean War; GDR 1953 and Polish and Hungarian uprisings 1956; the Yugoslav ‘special way’ and the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962, had as much to do with Khrushchev’s domestic and, especially, economic policy as internal power struggles, a central piece of which was his ‘Secret Speech’ at the 20th CPSU Party Congress.368

In foreign affairs, after the charm offensive of the ‘Thaw’, from around 1958 the world slid down an ever-increasing icy stretch of a decline in superpower relations whose lowest point was reached in the Cuban missile crisis and which only by the slightest of margins avoided the outbreak of a nuclear war in 1962.369 The nuclear arms race and huge development and production costs have clearly had an attributable effect on both industrial policy and military policy: more high tech production surely pleased the military-industrial complex (MIC), quite a number of whose plants were situated in the ESSR. However, Khrushchev on the other hand also rationalised severe troop reductions which would not be necessary anymore, which made him enemies in the army.370 Not only in foreign policy, but internally, too, the Khrushchev era was probably as close to a roller-coaster in political as well as socio-economic terms as could get; much of this centred on Khrushchev’s increasingly secure position from 1957-58 onwards, which marks a watershed in the present era. As he could not wield as much power as Stalin, and was fighting opponents in his claim for power from 1953, Khrushchev needed all the support he could obtain. His were rather popular measures when he wooed the general public or the support of the republics, or that of the military; after 1957-58, it appears that he gradually tightened the screws again the more secure he felt in his power base. When therefore much political and economic power appeared to be devolved to the republics in the first period, and they were allowed to claim increasingly more decision-making autonomy, this was revoked in the second and accusations of ‘bourgeois tendencies’ levelled against them. Interestingly, while the first period was dubbed the ‘Thaw’,371 the second after 1957-59 saw a cooling down of the internal climate, possi-

368 According to Service, p. 341, the London Observer managed to obtain a copy of the speech which it printed in full.
370 Note that because of the super power competition the Soviet Union’s military-industrial complex (MIC) had been working in top gear since 1945, which hardly went without loss to other branches of the economy, demanding still more resources.
371 This period received its name from the novel by Ilya Ehrenburg, ‘The Thaw’.
bly leading to another ice age from 1961 – which fairly precisely mirrors Soviet foreign policy as well as global international developments.

Much of what happened in the political and economic fields was a question of power which the centre and those who ruled from it, would keep at all cost. If the traditional explication of migration into the ESSR is correct, and ‘colonisation’ was the aim, its background must be ‘control’. This too is a question of power, and as was indicated in the previous chapter, Estonians had by now resigned themselves to the fairly inevitable continuance of the Soviet system dominating events and developments in the republic.

4.1 POLITICS AND ECONOMY

Both in politics and in the economy Khrushchev’s measures seemed rather spontaneous at best, and haphazard and erratic at worst: as one of Khrushchev’s special aims was to fight corruption and inefficiency in the economy, the measures introduced to combat the problems would rattle many an aparanhik, whose wealth depended mostly on his position of power. The sovnarkhozy concept of regional economic councils with consequent power devolution was a case in point, as it cut away the high bureaucracy’s base. It is hardly surprising that many of the bureaucrats were against both a reform of the system and its originator, Khrushchev. This may well be one of the main reasons for the failure of Khrushchev’s economic reform efforts. He also made exaggerated promises of far-reaching improvements in living standards which however failed to materialise – not least because an increase in consumer goods production, as envisaged, would stifle funding for the military-industrial complex (MIC), which this powerful body would not allow.

In terms of the general public, Khrushchev made some efforts at re-invigorating an apathetic and cowed population and gaining its support, possibly even mobilising it into participating in the political process. For this, he had to replace the terror and fear that Stalin had instigated in the population. Whatever else the Khrushchev era had left to the Union and to the ESSR, by abolishing the Stalinist terror as a means of controlling society he set an example behind which no USSR leadership could go back. Not that dissent would have started to be tolerated, but the measures to counter it were different. Khrushchev and his successors used demotion or exile rather than death sentences to push opponents aside, as evidenced by his treatment of the ‘anti-Party group’. His legal reforms led to a much better protection of the population at large, although a law-governed state in the Western sense of the word clearly did not emerge. Still, as Soviet custom and law took over as means of guaranteeing social cohesion, the Khrushchev era was consequently seen as a clear improvement on life under Stalin, not least because it also introduced a modicum of social security which previously had been missing completely.

To put this into perspective, Misiunas / Taagepera liken the difference between the Stalin and Khrushchev eras as one of an improvement from ‘suffocation’ to breathing

372 Hosking, p. 347.
374 Hosking, pp. 353.
foul air’. The rigidities of the Stalin were replaced by Khrushchev’s very own brand of rigidities. Even though a new improved relationship between party and people as well as government and governed may have been the main aim, surely the leadership had no intention of giving up control – neither internally nor externally; improvements were incremental. In terms of the long-term development until the dawn of the Gorbachev era, however, Khrushchev’s ending of the terror appears to have resulted in starting a very gradual and slow improvement in the overall political and socio-cultural climate in the Soviet Union.

As noted above, the Khrushchev era can thus be divided into two phases: the first, in which he gradually assumed power by enlisting the republics’ support through devolving the state’s central economic and even jurisdictional powers to them; this was the period of the ‘Thaw’. The second phase saw his power firmly established after his ousting of his main rivals; he then proceeded to renounce and abolish most of the changes he had previously introduced and to recentralise the Union as he felt increasingly secure.

4.1.1 The ‘Thaw’: 1953-1957

The period of transition and uncertainty in 1953-56/57 resulted in a certain relaxation in the political climate and a parallel careful reassertion of the republics’ positions and wishes vis-à-vis the centre, although within the overall Soviet system and even with Khrushchev’s prompting. At that time, Khrushchev still must have been wooing support to establish his position, both with the nationalities, thus also the republics, and the satellite countries which he toured excessively, even putting in a few visits to the West in what very much appears to have formed part of a charm offensive after the accident of the Polish and Hungarian uprisings. With regard to the Union’s republican leaderships, Khrushchev appears to have used their wishes for an extension of powers in both functions and privileges to further his own ends of assuming power – not dissimilar to Stalin’s example from the 1920s, when the latter promised almost complete autonomy for some time and not only abandoned this position but performed a complete volte-face afterwards condemning just that autonomy he had previously championed. Indeed, Khrushchev seemed at first to return to the 1920s nationalities policy in this period.

The apparently strongly conciliatory gestures towards the nationalities have to be divided into juridico-political, economic and administrative measures on the one hand, and quasi-’pure’ nationalities policies in terms of cultural, education and language policies on the other. This section will deal with the first part, as this forms the framework for migration into the ESSR and in which changes and conversions took place. Indeed, from 1954 Khrushchev had more and more powers devolved to the republics in an apparent bid to decentralise the Soviet Union. Many ministries were either converted into new Union-Republican ministries, or abolished altogether. The Ministry of Higher

Misiunas/Taagepera, p. 156.


Misiunas/Taagepera, p. 131.

Simon, Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities, p. 245.
Education was decentralised by a Supreme Soviet decree in December 1954; also, the dissolution of the USSR Ministry of Justice in May 1956 and the devolution of its powers to the republics’ respective ministries seemed to suggest a start in giving the republics greater influence in dealing with their own affairs, as the rationale for doing so was expressly to eliminate ‘unnecessary centralism’. Between 1957–63 even the republics’ justice ministries were abandoned and their powers given to the respective supreme courts as well as to newly created Judicial Commissions in the republics. Based on a decision by the Supreme Soviet on 11 Feb. 1957, the right for republics to draw up their own legal codes within the overall USSR framework resulted especially in the criminal codes in marked differences among the various republics; the civil codes did not change that much. By consequence, this upgraded the political importance of the republics and its nationalities which in turn raised expectation among the general populace.

One of the major causes for optimism was the 20th CPSU Party Congress in 1956, where Khrushchev held his ‘Secret Speech’ and with which he managed to create a major shake-up by his severe criticism of Stalin. Although he enumerated a large number of Stalin’s misdeeds, in the centre of which stood Stalin’s ‘cult of the individual’, Khrushchev still stopped short of a full condemnation of all events before 1934, in effect condoning the Civil War, NEP, the First FYP, as well as the Collectivisation campaign with all deportations and deaths. Also, although Khrushchev did everything to discredit Stalin, at the same time going back to Lenin, his single aim was to secure his position fully. The speech had an enormous influence on political conditions in the USSR and on people’s attitudes both in the USSR and Eastern Europe. The anti-Stalinist rhetoric led to anticipations of greater freedom of expression and choice; especially the youth seemed to be rather impatient for the relatively far-reaching change that appeared to be on the agenda. After all, Stalin was dubbed a mass murderer, his deeds criminal – consequently, the implication of the speech severely eroded Stalin’s position, making especially the legality of his decisions more than questionable. For the Baltic peoples this clearly led to renewed hopes as their incorporation was effected under Stalin’s pressure. Most importantly, it had a Union-wide effect on the population: ‘It was the greatest single factor in breaking down the mixture of fear, fanaticism, naivety and ‘doublethink’ with which everyone, according to temperament, intelligence and status, had reacted to Communist rule.’ Some of the hopes were expressed by the events in Poland and Hungary in 1956, whose uprisings responded to Khrushchev’s speech; however, the brutal crushing of the Hungarian uprising clearly showed that Khrushchev had not seen the speech as any licence to move to complete freedom from Soviet influence, or that he had any intention to relinquish power or control – on the contrary, the speech was a

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380 Simon, Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities, pp. 235; 237.
381 In detail cf. Service (FN 373), pp. 338-341; Rauch, SU History, pp. 508-512, esp. on the East European consequences of that speech.
382 Service (FN 373), p. 340; Hosking, pp. 336-337. The reason was that he and most other members of the current party leadership were implicated in most of the events criticised.
383 Misiunas/Taagepera, pp. 131, 133, 136.
385 Cf. e.g. Service, pp. 342-343.
means to establish his very own power against his party opponents and to impose control over the Union and its system.

In this same vein, Khrushchev wooed for support of the republics. He could combine this with his drive to cut into bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption when he followed the path of apparent devolution of power as noted above and introduced the concept of regional economic councils, sovnarkhozy. This too appeared to devolve powers from the centre to the republican ‘peripheries’. After all, there were some 200,000 factories producing industrial goods and around 100,000 construction sites Union-wide; the official position at the time was that this would be impossible to administer and plan centrally, thus a decentralisation would be necessary. On 10 May 1957 a law was passed which replaced ministerial and central authorities with these sovnarkhozy; the Baltic SSRs each formed a single regional economic council. In consequence, 10 all-Union and 15 Union-Republican ministries were abolished. Thousands of top- and middle-ranking positions were reshuffled and given to indigenous officials. This may also have been a cause for migration from Moscow to the republics, as central authorities such as Union-Republic ministries were transformed into branches of local sovnarkhozy where they must have sent parts of their staff – even the old ministers, too.

Consequently, the new model of economic planning would appear to favour the republics. For the ESSR this meant that around 80% of the country’s industrial production would be subordinated to the Estonian sovnarkhoz and allow for much more autonomous decision-making within a much looser plan, in that Gosplan only outlined a framework within which each sovnarkhoz would work autonomously. The mere suggestion of a measure of autonomy being returned to the Union’s republics raised the Estonians’ expectations, as the early 1940s and the post-war era were only too fresh in the minds of the population. The republican leaderships in turn tried to increase their popularity by putting their new-found decision-making powers to good use and try to tackle some of the most burning issues. In the ESSR one of these issues was the question of in-migration of huge numbers of non-Estonian workers and others. Also, inefficiency in the production was a factor which had to be tackled if productivity was to be increased. Again, the ESSR sovnarkhoz managed to improve production and productivity by reorganisations in the processes which freed up labour. This in turn could be used to argue against further in-migration, but by 1965 the potential was exhausted.

A major setback of this scheme was that with the abolition of ministries a break in the chain occurred: the Estonian sovnarkhoz was one of 105, and the other 104 had little or no contact to each other, so that when they previously knew what to produce because the centre relayed the relevant data, this would now be missing, and contacts would have to be established otherwise. On the other hand, the central allocation of key commodities was kept. In addition, the Central plan, even in the new form of providing just a framework within which sovnarkhozy would decide, was still essentially unaltered – and especially the new seven-year plan 1958-1965 quickly showed huge problems in

386 Simon, Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities, p. 238.
387 Simon, Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities, pp. 229; 238-239.
fulfilling the targets. For the individual sovnarkhozy planners now allocated raw materials, resources, and capital investments predominantly to their own sovnarkhoz to fulfil local needs. At the same time, supply lines which had reached all over the Union were broken. Therefore increasingly a recentralisation by stealth took place which took the decision-making more and more away even from those republics which had been working more productively by themselves.

4.1.2 Control Reinforced, 1958/59-64

After Khrushchev had managed to oust the ‘anti party group’ in July 1957, a hardening of attitudes and measures by the centre towards the periphery set in. Khrushchev had pushed out competitors for power such as Malenkov, who was the one in the triumvirate collective leadership with the most progressive ideas with regard to the nationalities policies, and the wooing of the nationalities stopped. When republican policy-makers seemed to have been taking the power into their hands too much by developing ‘national Communism’, the charge of ‘bourgeois nationalism’ was levelled against the nativisation campaign and the establishment of ‘national Communism’.

The republics, which had become rather self-confident because of Khrushchev’s previous measures, were even more seriously jolted by what followed. After Khrushchev in March 1958 had replaced Bulganin as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and thus also became head of government next to his Party post, the wave of purges in several republics during 1958-61, not least in the neighbouring Latvian SSR, clearly indicated that the time of concessions was over. Political control over the Union and thus over republics’ matters was increased again from the 21st Party Congress in 1959 at the latest, and reinvigorated after the 22nd Party Congress in 1961 with the new CPSU party programme and accusations of ‘bourgeois nationalism’.

From 1959 first signs, and from late 1962 clear recentralisation attempts could be observed, as from 1962 newly created regional sovnarkhozy held the reigns in a supra-republican combination of ‘Union-republican’ ministries. As these ministries had now the ‘joint’ authority over the economic planning and decision-making, this was but a disguise of the fact that in the final outcome, not much at all had changed in the distribution of power: the centre led, the republics followed. At any rate, such was the relation between the Union ministries based in Moscow and the republican counterparts based in Tallinn and elsewhere that Tallinn in effect would only mirror the decisions taken in Moscow: this took away autonomous decision-making. In the ESSR, the process began by subordinating the Baltic power generation plants, construction and fisheries under this supra-republican regional sovnarkhoz. The number of State Committees began to grow again; when before 1962 only 12 of them existed for industrial questions, there were 30 by the end of the year and they received operative powers which made them similar to the branch ministries that existed before 1957. Gosstroi, the State Committee for Construction, now received far-reaching powers, including the financing of construction


890 Misiunas/Taagepera, p. 136f.

891 Service (FN 373), p. 347; Simon, Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities, pp. 251-254.
work, the distribution of materials and skilled labour as well as the mechanisation of work.\textsuperscript{392}

Recentralisation under Khrushchev reached its peak with the creation on 13 March 1963 of a USSR Supreme Economic Council, the highest organ in the Union with the task of coordinating the work of Gosstroi, Gosplan, the regional economic councils and to decide all important questions in current and long-term planning in industry and construction. For the ESSR, this meant the unification into a ‘Baltic Economic Area’ together with Kaliningrad and the Lithuanian and Latvian SSRs. In this sense, it was only logical that under Brezhnev and Kossygin in 1965 the sovnarkhozy were completely abolished and the economy re-centralised under the old branch system which had a ministry for almost all aspects of the production processes – one ministry for fertilisers, one for machine tools, another one for medium machine building, reaching several hundred in the entire Union.\textsuperscript{393}

The above took place on the background of renewed attacks on Stalin, which were probably as much geared to keeping old Stalinists in check as re-invigorating Khrushchev’s reform drive in the economy. Not only was Stalin’s ‘Short Course’ in Communism replaced by a new text book which was clearly confident of Communist victory, but also was a new CPSU Programme developed and published at the 22\textsuperscript{nd} Party Congress in 1961.\textsuperscript{394} For the population at large, the developments in space technology, first moon rockets and later manned space flights may on the one hand have given short moments of pride. Yet they were part of the race to come on a par with the USA, whom Khrushchev promised boastfully to overtake by 1970 in production output. The general situation, but even more so the distribution of foodstuffs as well as of consumer goods, was in the doldrums. Agricultural yields had been increased somewhat in the first years of Khrushchev’s Virgin Lands, Maize, and Cotton Mono Culture Campaigns which he had started; yet together with his other measures, such as the agrocities concentration of the rural population who lived in homesteads into blocks of flats and his efforts at abolishing private plots which stood for a half to two thirds of agricultural produce sold to the population at large, the 1960s saw one catastrophe after another, and the food situation degenerated.\textsuperscript{395}

When Khrushchev therefore made promises of increasing consumer goods production, of achieving US living standards by 1970, this accomplished only little by way of


\textsuperscript{393} Misiunas/Taagepera, p. 150; Taagepera, Return to Independence, pp. 93-95; Zamascikov pp. 227-8; Schultz (FN 388), p. 109.

\textsuperscript{394} Rauch, SU History, pp. 519-523.

pulling the population back on his side. Nobody may have travelled the Union as much as Khrushchev, but once he had left the province, he was no longer celebrated but fawned upon, and life continued as before, including the ineliminable custom of fudging output figures on industry and agriculture as they thought best. Neither the 6th FYP nor the shortly following seven-year plan for 1958-1965 really seemed to work, and a twenty-year plan announced shortly after the last one had only commenced, seemed completely fanciful. Worse, in terms of his power base, he alienated the champions of heavy industry, to whom he had promised further development in 1955, by this renewed change of tack. When in late 1962 the idea was proposed to give greater decision-making autonomy to plant managements regarding production, sales and labour usage, this again seemed to cut Gosplan influence which clearly was more interested in the continuation of recentralisation outlined above – Khrushchev himself had grown up in the Stalin era and could not seriously believe in anything but command-administrative directives from above. Consequently, the alarm caused with the workers who had to come up with increased productivity, as much as that of the general public who faced yet more work as a result of the new Khrushchevian demands, is only a trifle compared to that sort of opposition building up.396

By 1963, Khrushchev had managed to alienate all major political groups with his possibly well-meant, but ill-conceived, and badly executed, policies and ideas. The Partocracy wanted peace and certainties, but were constantly rattled and disturbed. Besides, Khrushchev had antagonised almost every important group in the Union: ‘...the party, the economic ministries, the generals, the diplomatic service, the intelligentsia, the managers and the security police.’397 Even though in foreign affairs, the Soviet Union may have had some successes, such as the rapprochement with Yugoslavia or the Austrian treaty of 1955398, what counted against Khrushchev were the catastrophes such as the 1956 Polish and Hungarian revolts; the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 to keep people from running to the ‘despised’ West whose economic as well as political inferiority had been trumpeted time and again; or the Cuban Missile Crisis, where Khrushchev had to back down to avert a nuclear war. Together with the domestic problems of failing economic reforms and erratic policy initiatives, this led to his removal by Brezhnev in 1964.

Khrushchev’s balance sheet may have been largely tinged by grand promises and grander failures, yet for the population he introduced a measure of freedom which had previously been impossible, including the freedom of movement and of changing workplaces in industry. Rather lopsided and erratic developments of increased and decreased control, of success and failure in economic reforms, were a reflection of the complex political scene of the day; they could be interpreted as a consequence of the abolition of the Stalinist terror to which the leadership could not return and a host of different measures designed to still maintain the control over the outer republics in conjunction with Khrushchev’s efforts at reforming the country, especially the economy, in the light of stiff opposition.

Under Khrushchev the first cracks in the ‘monolithic’ empire called Soviet Union became visible (a monolith it could not be for the diversity of populations it harboured;

396 Service (FN 373), pp. 371; 363; 373.
397 Service (FN 373), p. 375.
politically, more and more analysts demonstrate that even there much more detail, much more differences were there than the idea of a totalitarian monolith would allow for). There were changes of, or improvements within, the system, that shed total control by stopping terror and fear pervading the entire population – but those were hard to see in view of the public posture the Soviet government took and especially in ideology. The abolition of terror thus appears as a bold step whose dimensions and consequences were not envisaged in the quest for power in which it was taken.

4.2 DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENTS

Demographic data on natural population development is finally available from 1958, and the first post-war census in 1959 also finally provides a base to compare the demographic developments that had taken place between the last Estonian census of 1934 and the first ESSR census of 1959. When in the former census, Estonians had a share of some 9 in 10 in the population, by the latter the ratio was only 3 in 4: from 91% down to 75%. Still, their share had improved again not least because of return migration of Estonians who had been in the Siberian labour camps; as noted above, in 1953, Estonians only had a share of 72%.

Generally, matters migratory under Khrushchev were far from clear-cut, and thus they would remain henceforth. The main reasons were Khrushchev’s stopping the terror and his erratic reform efforts which may have resulted in just as erratically emerging population movements all over the Soviet Union: the continued promotion of heavy industry had been confirmed by the CPSU CC in January 1955, with the consequent impact on labour supply, settlement structures and demography; campaigns such as sudden reductions and consequent out-migration of some of the military; or the transfer of hundreds of thousands of komsomol members to 'shock projects' all over the Union, e.g. the Virgin Lands campaign around 1954. Moreover, two further developments in this period are of considerable importance, as they too were a consequence of Khrushchev’s struggle to establish his power base by abolishing Stalinist rigidities in both politics and the economy: from 1956, workers were free to leave their jobs and move to a different area of the Union. Consequently, spontaneous labour migration began, although the passport system would still limit the in-migration into certain areas such as

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399 Data according to Tiit, *Eesti rahvastik ja selle probleemid*; Järvesoo Table 2, p. 26, gives his own calculations on the basis of various data sources. This chapter follows, unless noted otherwise, Tiit and ESA data. On the overall USSR developments, cf. Carrère d’Encausse, ch. 2, pp. 51-98.

400 Cf. Misiunas/Taagepera, p. 112. Official ESA data shows the percentage for 1959’s first post-war census to be still at some 74.6%; yet even a drop of 20% over 8 years is large enough to have an impact. It should be noted, however, that the pre-war figures of 1939 mention a share of 88.2% Estonians in the population.

401 Rauch, *SU History*, pp. 504-505. This was also part of a plot to unseat Khrushchev’s opponent Malenkov, who had tried to put more weight on consumer goods. Trade minister Mikojan, who supported this course of action, also had to go.

402 See above, FN 395, and ch. 4.1.2.

Moscow or Leningrad. At the same time, some of the forced-labour camps were closed and people returned home or migrated to other areas after their release and rehabilitation. All this made economic planning more difficult, but the planning principle remained, hence plan fulfilment needed special measures that soon started and became rampant under Brezhnev: labour shortages occurred in a vicious circle of economic incentives to entice people to certain areas and inefficient labour usage either because of low automation of auxiliary services, or because pre-products would not arrive on time for a continuous production so that idle time had to be compensated for by producing twice as much and as fast as would have been necessary if logistics had worked.

4.2.1 Natural Development, Ethnic Distribution and the 1959 Population Census
Data on natural increase is finally available from 1958, which makes matters somewhat more easy to judge. The years 1941-1950 had an abysmally low birth rate because of the Second World War, its aftermath, and population losses in the First World War causing secondary losses in the ESSR in particular and in the USSR in general. Estimates are of course highly problematic, but Tiit mentions an approximation from 1991 according to which some 200,000 persons remained unborn because of the two wars and other losses inflicted on the population. Before discussing ethnic distribution and the population census, an overview of natural population development follows.

4.2.1.1 Natural Development
For 1945-59 Ene Tiit gives for the ESSR a summary natural increase of 14,140; for the period 1960-1964 the net natural increase was 10,811, most of which was carried by the non-Estonian parts of the population: rates reach between 74.4% in 1958 and 63.4% in 1964. These rates reflect high birth rates which were in large part attributable to the age differences between in-migrants and Estonians: while in 1959 some 48% of non-Estonians were between 20 and 44 years of age, Estonians only had a share of 33% in this age group. As has already been indicated in the previous section, non-Estonian in-migrants were rather young and consequently had a much higher reproduction rate; the above figures from 1959 confirm this. Parming shows that natural growth with Estonians was clearly very low indeed: in 1958, his data show that per 1,000 Estonian population, 14.6 births were opposed by 12.4 deaths, leaving a natural increase of 2.2 only; for non-Estonians the figures were 21.4 vs. 6.2, the net increase thus 15.2! Averaging this for the ESSR level, this meant 16.5 births were offset by 10.9 deaths, and an increase of 5.6 net, most of which was carried by non-Estonians. By comparison, in 1960 the ESSR birth rate was 16.6, while the USSR average was 24.9.

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Apart from having traditionally low birth rates which the chapter on the interwar republic showed, cramped housing conditions mainly in towns may be another reason next to age difference which may be responsible for low Estonian birth rates. Although house building received much more political support and consequently very much more housing was built in this period\textsuperscript{407}, all building activities in the ESSR apparently could not satisfy the demand placed upon the various towns and cities. In-migrants such as officers, re-enlistees, and workers in the building and construction material industries, received priority in urban housing allotment, due to which Estonians lost out: any Estonian who would live in old Estonian housing and had 3 m\textsuperscript{2} (later: 6 m\textsuperscript{2}) to him- or herself, would not stand a chance of receiving his or her own quarters.\textsuperscript{408} Consequently, many young people married early to overcome the regulations, but still may not have had more than one room in one of the \textit{kommunalki} mentioned above — a large flat with several rooms which housed almost as many couples or even families, and where kitchen and bath had to be shared by all. This too led to increased internal migration in the ESSR, as moving from several towns in the \textit{hinterland} of such towns and cities as held a higher status might lead to obtaining better quarters.\textsuperscript{409} Also, the Soviet tradition of plants building their own \textit{mikrorayons} (areas with public housing and, theoretically, further utilities such as shops and schools) which housed their employees led to preferring plant employees over local inhabitants, no matter how cramped their living conditions.

4.2.1.2 Ethnic Distribution and Settlement Structures

The census for 1959 allows for a first comparison between pre- and post-war population developments. The balance sheet does not look in favour of Estonians. The total ESSR population stood at 1,196,791. Of those, 892,653 or 74.6\% of the population were Estonians; 240,227 or 20.1\% were Russians, and 15,769 or 1.3\% were Ukrainians. Finns had a slightly higher share with 16,699 or 1.4\%. Byelorussians, who like Ukrainians were practically non-existent in the interwar republic, had risen to 10,930 or 0.9\% of the population.\textsuperscript{410} By comparison, in the interwar republic, re-calculated for the present ESSR territory, Estonians in 1934 had a share of 972,750 or 91.7\% of the total of 1,061,313; with Russians (50,080 or 4.7\%) and Germans (16,190 or 1.5\%) making up the largest non-Estonian population groups.\textsuperscript{411} Looking at the differences, the entire population between 1934 and 1959 had experienced a net growth of some 135,500 only, the reasons for which have been elaborated in the Stalin subchapter. However, Estonians were still 80,097 short of their 1934 figure, hence the area must have grown

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\textsuperscript{407} According to Lane, pp. 346-347, the 6\textsuperscript{th} FYP of 1956-60 rose capital investment in housing to 23\% of the total, up from 8\% only under Stalin’s 3\textsuperscript{rd} FYP for 1937-42. In this planning period, too, some 474 million square metres were built, although the average dwelling size still only reached 8.9 m\textsuperscript{2}, and the housing shortage remained (most housing was public, i.e. built either by the local Soviets or by the local enterprises, who in turn preferred their own employees for allocation — in detail on the housing in the Gorbachev era, cf. Lane, pp. 348-351).

\textsuperscript{408} Tepp, \textit{In- and Out-Migration of Estonia, ESA (9)}, 1994, p. 23.

\textsuperscript{409} Parming, p. 39.


\textsuperscript{411} The data is taken and calculated from ‘Table 1: Ethnical[sic!] Composition of the Population of Estonia, 1934 and 1989’, in: \textit{Eesti Statistika (9)} 1994, p. 28.
by some 215,600 non-Estonians by now, the largest group being Russians with a growth of at least 190,000 over 1934 figures. Ukrainians had practically not existed in pre-war Estonia.

Particularly noteworthy is the fact that exceptionally high in-migration together with similarly high rural-urban migration during the Stalin and Khrushchev eras led to a huge increase in the urban population, which almost doubled from some 349,800 in 1934 to 675,500 in 1959, while the rural population decreased by a third from around 767,500 to some 521,300 in the same time. In relative terms, this population decreased from 68.8% to 43.6%, while the urban share went up from 31.1% to 56.4% in the population. In addition, Estonians made up only 61.9% of the urban population of 675,500 in 1959; as the Estonian share in the urban population of 349,800 in 1934 made up 85.3%, this is ample proof for in-migration in the first place, and secondly in-migration which mostly targeted (or was sent into) urban areas. 412 Finally, this double migration phenomenon took place in conjunction with strong industrialisation, so that settlement structures and industrialisation were interrelated. Indeed, in 1959-60, some 160,700 persons were occupied in industry, while 158,500 worked in agriculture, almost exactly replicating the switch from a predominantly rural and agricultural to a predominantly urban and industrialised area. Industrialisation was clearly carried mostly by in-migrants, supplanted by rural-urban migration which continued because of the abysmal conditions in the rural areas which were exacerbated by Khrushchev ‘reform’ efforts which more often than not proved completely counter-productive. 413 Even Pärnu, a town on the south-west coast in a predominantly rural area, doubled its population between 1934 and 1959 from 20,334 to 41,029, most of which is probably attributable to rural-urban migration spurred by the conditions outlined above. Some small industries did exist there, after all (mainly textiles). Both trends of increasing industrialisation and urbanisation continued far into the 1970s. Most industrialisation-urbanisation was concentrated in Tallinn and in North-East Estonia (Ida-Virumaa). In 1959, the total population of Ida-Virumaa numbered some 132,700, with only 38.0% Estonians; however, the urban population was 107,300 or 80.9% of the total, and Estonians made up slightly less than 29,800 or 27.7% of the urban population, while in the remaining rural population of 25,400 or so they represented 20,720 or 81.6%. 414 As has been indicated in the previ-

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ous chapter and will be discussed in the following subsection on migration, Ida-Virumaa was the industrial power house of the ESSR.

**Figure 4.5: Rural and Urban Population, 1955-1965**

![Rural and Urban Population Chart](chart.png)


4.2.2 Migration and Demographic Changes, 1955-1965

As a general trend for this period, in-migration decreased. However, this is more true for the gross figures than for the net balance, which shows a rather more varied picture. Indeed, the 1956-60 net in-migration figures represent a large drop from the immediate post-war decade, which had an annual net average of 10,500 in-migrants; the figures for 1956-60 decreased to an average of only 6,100 net in-migrants annually. Still, in comparison to the other periods, this can hardly be called a ‘marked change’ in the demographic pattern because in-migration ‘largely ceased’\(^{415}\), as it patently did not. The figures still represent 58\% of the 1945-55 average level. Moreover, they also represent only 75\% of the 1961-65 average, meaning that in the following five-year periods, there was a renewed increase in the balance of migration. The following tables provide the available data on overall external migration with the ESSR, ESSR urban areas, and ESSR rural areas.

\(^{415}\) Misiunas/Taagepera, p. 139.
### Table 4.4: Annual External Migration With ESSR, 1956-1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Gross Arrivals From Urban</th>
<th>Gross Departures From Rural</th>
<th>Net Balance From/To Rural</th>
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<td>21475</td>
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<td>64,051</td>
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<td>22275</td>
<td>13598</td>
<td>8383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-1965</td>
<td>111,560</td>
<td>89,746</td>
<td>21,814</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4.5: Annual External Migration With ESSR Urban Areas, 1956-1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>URBAN Year</th>
<th>Total Gross Arrivals From Urban</th>
<th>Gross Departures From Rural</th>
<th>Net Balance From/To Rural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>29712</td>
<td>16830</td>
<td>11073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>22840</td>
<td>13006</td>
<td>8996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>20277</td>
<td>11820</td>
<td>7982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>18267</td>
<td>11136</td>
<td>6638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>19215</td>
<td>11259</td>
<td>7474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-1960</td>
<td>110,318</td>
<td>64,051</td>
<td>42,163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>18035</td>
<td>10280</td>
<td>7538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>17486</td>
<td>10305</td>
<td>7011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>17834</td>
<td>10350</td>
<td>7270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>17831</td>
<td>11181</td>
<td>6431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>18560</td>
<td>12083</td>
<td>6257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-1965</td>
<td>89,746</td>
<td>54,199</td>
<td>35,547</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

416 Adapted and calculated from 'Table 3. External Migration between Estonia and Other States (General Data)', in: Eesti Statistika, (9(33)), 1994, pp. 30-31. Also cf. Lembit Tepp: 'Ravastiku välisrände lähte- ja sihtkohad', in: Eesti Statistika, (9(33)), 1994, pp. 11-18. Interestingly, the available data from the USSR State Committee on Statistics give higher saldo figures for all covered periods from 1961-1990, the total of which is, according to the figures provided by Perevedentsev, 197,500. For this period, the data is as follows: 1961-1965: 43,200 (average: 8,640/a); 1966-1970: 48,000 (9,600); 1971-1975: 32,900 (6,580); 1976-1980: 27,500 (5,500); 1981-1985: 27,900 (5,580); 1986-1990: 18,000 (3,600); compared to the figures from ESA, whose total for 1961-1990 is 178,814, there is a difference between the two grand totals of 18,686. Also, while until 1975 the USSR Goskomstat data are higher than the Estonian, from 1976 to 1985 the difference decreases; however, for the 1986-1990 period the difference is especially high: 10,490. Unfortunately, these differences can only be recorded, as there is no precise information available conducive to explaining it. Cf. Perevedentsev, Viktor: 'Migration in the Soviet Union before and after 1991', in: RSSBS, 1(4), August 1993, pp. 2-26, 'Table 16: Balance of inter-republic migration', at p.12.
Table 4.6: Annual External Migration With ESSR Rural Areas, 1956-1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>RURAL Gross Arrivals</th>
<th>RURAL Gross Departures</th>
<th>Net Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total In From Urban</td>
<td>From Rural To Urban</td>
<td>To Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>10752 4645 5129</td>
<td>4498 2628 1664</td>
<td>6254 2017 3465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>9538   3214 5769</td>
<td>4575 2662 1607</td>
<td>4963 552 4162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>8467   2725 5583</td>
<td>3752 2073 1519</td>
<td>4715 652 4064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>6137   2584 3211</td>
<td>3778 2200 1329</td>
<td>2359 384 1884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>4152   1615 2337</td>
<td>4427 3021 1168</td>
<td>-275 -1406 1169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-1960</td>
<td>39046 14783 22029</td>
<td>21030 12584 7287</td>
<td>18016 2199 14742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>4597   1713 2639</td>
<td>2441 1342 996</td>
<td>2156 371 1643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>4801   1705 3025</td>
<td>2726 1157 1507</td>
<td>2075 548 1518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>4187   1517 2618</td>
<td>2247 1121 1093</td>
<td>1940 396 1525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>4515   1639 2791</td>
<td>2198 1053 1045</td>
<td>2316 586 1746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>3715   1515 2126</td>
<td>2235 1189 979</td>
<td>1480 326 1147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-1965</td>
<td>21814 8089 13199 11847</td>
<td>5862 5629 9967</td>
<td>2227 7579</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ESA Statistics. (Eesti Statistika (9), 1994, ‘Table 5: External Migration Between Rural Areas of Estonia and Other States (General Data)’ pp.34-35.)

For 1956-60 the main sending areas were the neighbouring oblasts of the RSFSR, Leningrad and Pskov, but also Novosibirsk, Tver and Kaliningrad oblasts and Krasnoyarsk krai, which were in part areas where Estonians had been deported. Further sending areas were in the Ukraine SSR, Crimea and Donetsk oblasts, and Minsk in the Byelorussian SSR. In the following period, 1961-1965, the migration from the RSFSR decreased, and picked up from the Ukrainian SSR. Still, from the RSFSR, the main sending areas largely remained the same, while from the Ukrainian SSR in-migrants from Dnipropetrovsk oblast increased. As for the relative shares in the gross in-migration, the RSFSR made up 75.3% and 73.2% of all in-migrants in 1956-60 and 1961-65, respectively; 6.9% and 7.3% came from its Northern, 23.8% and 29.4% from its North-Western Region, respectively; 10.2% and 11.4% came from the Central region. In 1956-60 only, 9.2% and 7.3% came from the West Siberian and East Siberian Regions, respectively: this is clearly caused by the return migration of formerly deported Estonians; in the following period, these regions only represented 3.4% and 2.3% of the total gross in-migration, a share they were holding more or less during the following decades. This migration marks an important date in Soviet Estonian history, and will be discussed in more detail below.\(^{417}\)

Some further peculiarities or novelties of this migration period should be noted, although unfortunately there is no information available which may help to identify the causes, or details which may further enlighten the process, and an educated guess will have to suffice at this stage:

1. Some out-migration of young Estonian komsomol members may have taken place during the early to mid-1950s, in connection with Khrushchev’s ‘Virgin Lands’ campaign, but most migrants in that area of Kazakhstan were supposed

\(^{417}\) Cf. Tepp, in ESA (10), 1994, pp. 13-14; in detail for sending areas cf. Table 1: ‘The Number of Immigrants by Place of Origin’, ibid, pp. 20-26; Table 3: ‘Balance of External Migration’, pp. 34-40; Table 5: ‘Distribution of In-Migrants by the Former Place of Residence, ‰’, pp. 45-46.
to have come from Ukraine, and there is only scant evidence and further research would be necessary to confirm this point.\textsuperscript{418}

2. Also, only in this period, the Ukrainian SSR received 3,049 registered migrants from the ESSR: during the entire Soviet era, Ukraine was a net exporter to the ESSR. Of these 3,049, two thirds or 1,975 moved to the Don-Dnepr Region; only one sixth moved to Kiev.\textsuperscript{419} Although this cannot be proven, the slashing of numbers of military men in active service by Khrushchev might be one reason for this; the Don-Dnepr region was one of the most industrialised regions of Ukraine, hence dismounted soldiers may have taken to trying to find work there, taking their families with them. Not many of these, however, will have had sufficient a reason to overcome the in-migration barriers that major cities had and which the propiska system helped to perpetuate; this may explain the relatively low number of migrants entering Kiev, the Ukrainian SSR’s capital. Although fairly unlikely, migration could also have been aimed at replacing those who now worked in Kazakhstan in the Virgin Lands.

3. The peak in the migration balance from 1958 may again have a political background. It may be another part of returning deportees whose re-migration may have taken place during 1956-1959. It may also have to do with the establishment of the Estonian sovnarkhoz in May 1957: the process of abolishing central ministries and authorities such as Gosplan as well as devolving powers to the republics must have had a sizeable effect on migration, as the decentralised organs were basically split up and their personnel sent to the peripheries to work locally in the respective Union republics or ASSRs.\textsuperscript{420}

4. Further, both Soviet internal tourism and retirement migration took off. As the Baltic SSRs were an attractive area with rather moderate climates and both good infrastructure and good living conditions compared to the Union level, both types of migrants had similar reasons to enter. However, while tourists were short-term migrants, they may indeed have driven up migration events (i.e., combined in- and out-migration figures). On the other hand, they usually never stayed as long as to necessitate inscription, i.e., obtaining a propiska, as this was necessary usually only from 1½ months’ sojourn or settlement. Having said that, increasing numbers of retiring military personnel would have to do just that on taking up residency in the Baltic republics which next to e.g. the Crimea were popular destinations in retirement migration, lest they had a special inland passport which gave them total freedom of movement.\textsuperscript{421} Unfortunately, there is no data available on either type of migration at this point in time, but note that it is this type of retirement migrant which would become a hot topic in Estonian-Russian bilateral relations after 1991.\textsuperscript{422}

\textsuperscript{418} However, Namsons (FN 410) does point out that at least 80,000 youth have been sent to areas far from the Baltic republics since 1954. Cf. ibid, p. 603.
\textsuperscript{419} \textit{Eesti Statistika} (10), 1994, Table 3, pp. 34-40, at p. 36, 37.
\textsuperscript{420} Simon, \textit{Nationalism and Policy...}, pp. 238-239.
\textsuperscript{422} For the emerging types of migrants in the Baltic, cf. Service p. 366 and Misiunas/Taagepera, p. 172.
In the following subsections, labour migration will be discussed first, followed by other forms of migration: in particular, the return of former deportees following the closure of some prison camps as well as ‘special’ (usually military) migration.

4.2.2.1 Labour Migration and its Economic Background
During Khrushchev’s first years in office, economic planning was not changed substantially. Neither the sixth FYP nor the 1958-65 seven-year plan allowed for any structural improvements; in industrial policy heavy industry prevailed. Mostly heavy industry projects were long-term projects which continued to require large numbers of labourers over long periods of time, both in building the plants and the auxiliary buildings and in staffing them. The relevant ukaz was issued in 1955. As a precondition for these building projects, the energy sector needed to grow further, again needing labour. For example, in the ESSR, the building of the Baltic Thermal Power Plant near the Narva reservoir started in 1956 and was completed ten years thence, only to be succeeded by the construction of yet another power plant. In the 1960s two major oil-shale based power stations, the ‘Estonian Power Station’ and the ‘Baltic Power Station’, were linked into the USSR’s north-western energy grid, and more than half of the produced energy went to the Leningrad and Pskov districts, as well as to Riga. Construction of such plants was traditionally carried out by the relevant ministries’ own building brigades. While much of the building works was not finished on time, the second part of the Baltic thermal energy plant was finished ahead of time in 1961. For finishing the high voltage power line to Riga over 130 engineers and workers even received medals – among them, four Estonian names occurred.

Other large plants built during the late 1950s and 1960s produced a variety of different goods, but it appears that much was geared towards producing for the military-industrial complex (MIC). Around Tallinn, the former engine and rail car servicing plant ‘Kalinin’ was made into a plant to produce mercury rectifiers (Elavhõbealaldajate tehaseks); the radio production unit ‘Red RET’ (Punane RET) was enlarged both in scope and production volume; further, the electronics plant ‘H. Pöögellmnann’ was built. In Tartu, another plant producing control instruments (aparaaditehas) was built, and in Võru a gas analyser plant (gaasianalüsaatoritehas). Although under the sovmarkhozy concept a large share of the industrial goods was produced under republican management, those firms and plants which were deemed to be of all-Union importance, i.e. those of the rather secretive military-industrial complex (MIC), would still be run from Moscow. On them, rather less is known, except that they did not come under republic control; some further of these plants were Dvigatel in Tallinn, the Baltijets power plant in Narva, and others such as the control instruments factory in Tartu. An outstanding

423 Rauch, SU History, pp. 504-505. This was also part of a plot to unseat Khrushchev’s opponent Malenkov, who had tried to put more weight on consumer goods. Trade minister Mikojan, who had supported Malenkov’s plans, also had to go.
424 Sillaste/Purga (FN 23), p. 4.
425 Kala, p. 515.
427 Kala, pp. 515-516.
example for which some sketchy material has recently become available is the town introduced in the previous subchapter, Sillamäe. It was extra-territorial within the ESSR, was under total control from Moscow, with no rights of interference in the territory for the republic, and the secrecy involved in this project resulted in economic data not even being included in the ESSR statistics. Since the settlement and its growth was directly linked to the plant, and the town was closed to Estonians, most of the population were non-Estonian, consisting of the workers and their families. The population living in this ‘letter box’, as such secret places were commonly called, numbered around 8,400 in 1959 and would continue to increase.

Corresponding to the continued building activities of large enterprises of the time, both in extending power-generating and metal and mechanical engineering branches of heavy industry, the construction industry and its supply industries had to expand, too. For in addition to the growth of all industry with its corresponding building activities, urban housing was strongly expanded, too. In the ESSR industry, from the late 1950s, the large-scale cement plant Punane Kunda, ‘Red Kunda’, based at Kunda, as well as the Stilikaat plant and the Männiku plant for building materials were reconstructed and extended. In addition, further such plants were built anew at Narva and Ahtme in the North-East, as well as house building combines (kombinaadid) in Tallinn and Tartu. For the financial year 1959, 103 million roubles were earmarked for this industry, 44 million alone for the Kunda plant, whose first part was to be finished and producing cement by 1960, after building in 1958 did not proceed quickly enough. Having been declared the second most important building project in the ESSR’s 1959 financial year, it appears that even in 1959 and 1960 building speed was still not satisfactory, so more labour was later import by declaring it a ‘shock-project’. This was one of the preferred measures of the time not only to build rapidly some industrial complexes, or achieve huge project goals like in the virgin-land campaign, but also to satisfy the large labour demands of the respective projects by concentrating migrants from all over the Soviet Union:

In Virumaa such a status was granted to the Baltic Thermal Power Plant in 1958, the Punane Kunda Cement Plant in 1960 and the Estonian Thermal Power Plant in 1967. By the beginning of 1961 over 2500 people from outside Estonia had come to build

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430 Between 1946 and 1990, roughly 25 million square meters of living quarters were built, 19.3 million or 77.4% of which were state-built. Cf. Tepp, Eesti Statistika (11), 1994, p. 17.

431 Kala, p. 516.


433 Weiss (FN 432), p. 192.
As Khrushchev had pledged to improve living conditions and especially provide new housing, building activities in the private sector were also rather heavy. When from 1955 to 1959 state and cooperative housing in the Union more than doubled, private housing had trebled already by 1958. Even though now much more privacy was available, as the komunalka co-operatives were phased out in favour of private apartments, the cities and towns of the USSR were still rather inhospitable, and living space would be cramped for some time to come: the promise from the early 1960s of ‘...sufficient apartments and houses to meet the demand by 1980’ is rather telling in this respect. Also, the fact that a given plan was fulfilled did by no means suggest that this would happen to any high standard; indeed, the quality of the housing came in for much criticism due to the abysmal standards of both heating and plumbing.

It is not particularly surprising that the newly built blocks of flats soon gained a different nickname: khrushchoby – slums. Whatever the quality of housing, the plan still required large amounts of living space to be built, and again, the labour needed for such high increases in labour demand could only be supported by in-migration, as both available local labour and the natural increase in the population was too low to provide such large numbers of workers as both the huge industrialisation and housing construction projects would demand.

The consequent in-migration had an impact on the ethnic distribution of workers at the workplace, especially in industrial production. Among industrial workers, the share of Estonians fell from around 88% in the time of the interwar republic to 69% in 1948, reaching 61.5% in 1957. Over the same time, the absolute number of workers rose from around 60,000 in 1939 to 86,700 in 1950, reaching 132,700 by 1960, and rising further. The rise of 46,000 between 1950 and 1960 can be further qualified; further data suggests that the number of ‘Russians’ would have risen in the same period from around 26,800 to around 51,100 – a near doubling. Within 10 years, the average increase in industrial workers was therefore around 2,500. Their share in the increase represents c. 54% of the total rise in industry. As noted before, the total net average increase in overall in-migration was 6,100 annually, hence c. 40% of all in-migrants may have been workers in construction and industry. In addition, other areas such as transport or communication also became more and more dominated by in-migrants. Kala points out that up to two thirds of the increase in workers’ figures in industry, building and railroad sectors were supplied by incoming migrants.

There were, consequently, several factors which led to increased migration during the Khrushchev era, the most important of which was continued industrialisation. As noted

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439 Kala p. 521; table 2 parts A to D, pp. 522-525; also cf. table 3, pp. 527-529, parts A-C, pp. 527-528. Schultz (FN 388) p. 100 quotes the Fifty-Years-Jubilee publication Strana sovetov za 50 let, Moscow 1967, p. 220, according to which workers and employees numbered 179,000 in 1945.
in the previous sections, plants continued to be enlarged to fit Union needs, or newly built for the same purpose. The superpower rivalry made it necessary to be as independent from outside sources as at all possible; especially with regard to fossil fuels, this meant that the increased energy consumption both of plants and private homes had to be met – in this order. Consequently, more oil shale excavation took place in the ESSR, and oil shale treatment plants were built as well as huge power plants of various descriptions, which served not only industrial plants in the ESSR, but which were also linked to the North-Eastern energy grid supplying the surrounding regions. In the Soviet economy’s ‘burden sharing’, this appears to have been the ESSR’s main duty, the second part of which was harbouring a large number of plants that came under the orders of the Ministries for Medium Machine Building, the Ministry for General Machine Building, or other Ministries which belonged to the military-industrial complex (MIC). This complex had enormous economic and political power, most of which it wielded completely independently from the republics that might be affected. In 1955, defence took 21.6% of the total expenditure of the USSR; since 1948, its share had risen from 66,000 million roubles to 162,000 million. It also was highly secretive, which makes employment data, indeed any data linked to it, difficult to obtain, and only fairly recently the first documents have been published. Therefore, the direct connection between immigration and its distribution within the ESSR cannot be pursued down to the exact location whence a migrant came and where he or she was employed; for the reasons outlined in the introduction, this would be mostly impossible at the best of times but much more so in this case. The fact remains, however, that industrial production was expanded in every shape, which in turn necessitated labour to staff these plants, as well as construction workers to build new or expand older ones. Incidentally, as workers in the building and construction material industries were preferred in housing allocation, this as an apparently Union-wide phenomenon in turn may have driven many people into these industries. Also they were among the most highly paid, quite apart from their material well-being.


441 Rauch, SU History, p. 511. Just recently documents were published on the development of which incidentally quite clearly showed Gosplan’s involvement in instigating new developments and acquisitions in the military-industrial complex (MIC). Cf. Matthias Uhl: ‘Die Rolle von Gosplan bei der Entwicklung der sowjetischen Raketenindustrie. Ausgewählte Dokumente aus dem Russischen Staatsarchiv für Wirtschaft’, in: OE 50(5), 2000, pp. A175-A189. Uhl points out that the Second Department and middle-ranking officials of Gosplan took charge of this question, which is highly interesting in relation to later cappings by Khrushchev of the high ranks of most governmental bureaucracy: the individual which occurs as the main planner in the documents published worked there between 1948 and 1965 (!) – Uhl even suggests that the Red Army leadership did not show too much interest or initiative in this question, as Gosplan time and again had to ask for specification of data: again, this might indicate the increasingly powerful role of Gosplan in developing the military-industrial complex (MIC) whose main driving force it may have eventually become. This however shows a second power in the state which had its very own interests and which neither the Party nor its bureaucrats, who usually doubled every bureaucracy in the state sector, could eventually control because of missing competence.

Counter to the conventional wisdom of total stability in the Soviet leadership, the Khrushchev era showed a certain instability in almost every sector, no matter whether political, economic, or social, following the abolition of many of Stalin’s rigidities. From 1956 even Soviet migration patterns began to change for a reason which must have gone strongly against the Central planners’ wishes: in this year, the 1940 labour regulations, which forbade a change of workplace and foresaw stiff punishments for being late at work, were lifted. Consequently, from now on, freedom of movement was partially possible and the workers in industry and construction were at liberty to chose their workplace. Suddenly they would be able ‘…to quit merely by giving two weeks’ notice.’

Schroeder points out that now that labour migration was largely free, the state had to devise new measures to keep tabs on workers’ movements, for even though much administrative transfers of labour would continue, there would be increasing labour shortages (!) which in a planned economy is a contradiction in terms. In most planners’ eyes, a person was still more regarded as a means of production – a mere human robot. Perevedentsev appears to put it in a nutshell:

A person was regarded as a means of achieving particular goals set by the state. The primary goal was to provide the national [i.e., Soviet] economy in different parts of the country [i.e., in the republics or even lower administrative bodies of the USSR] with manpower that maintained a certain balance between the distribution of labour resources and the need for them.

Consequently, either the need for manpower or the distribution of labour had to be regulated or controlled. As stringent punishments and compulsive work at a certain workplace were abolished, the freedom of movement all of a sudden made normal planning impossible: workers would now start to decide to migrate more frequently based on their personal preferences, which may involve housing, pay, or general living conditions such as the supply of everyday goods and produce. The fact that the average per capita income in the ESSR was much higher than the USSR average (129:100 in 1960) may have helped to avoid immediate shortfalls, but the old purely mechanistic approach could no longer apply in terms of transferring people by administrative order where they were needed and thus belonged. Indeed, the annual turnover of workers on a Union level soon reached some 20%, which amply demonstrates problems of lacking job satisfaction, as ‘…official invocations to stay at one’s enterprise for one’s working life were despised.’ Apparently under Khrushchev both increasing migration and consequent labour shortages induced more and more plants to offer financial deals to employees and workers to dissuade them from leaving, which, although illegal, became necessary. Otherwise the economy would have ground to a halt.


\[444\] Schroeder (FN 443), passim, but esp. pp. 4-15.


\[446\] Simon, Nationalism and Policy Towards the Nationalities, Table 9.4, p. 301.

\[447\] Service, p. 359.
an effect on labour migration in the Soviet Union: migrants could begin to become choosy.

On 30 March 1957, Khrushchev issued his theses on the decentralisation of the administration of industry and construction, which were seen as the most fundamental change in the Soviet Union’s domestic makeup since 1929; starting in effect the sov-narkhozy programme, the envisaged decentralisation would cut the high level state bureaucracy’s clout in favour of the medium level. These were two major strikes against the governmental bureaucracy and the ‘managers of technology’ (Meissner), which he antagonised; after his anti-Stalin speech in 1956, this was the second major powerful group of which he made himself an enemy, although he could eliminate his opponents in the CPSU Central Committee for the time being.\(^{448}\) It was also the second factor which may have strongly influenced migration.

Another factor combined educational and labour migration. Individuals who wanted to have job prospects, in manufacturing as in academia, had to move outside the ESSR at least for some time, if indeed they were not administratively transferred anyway. In a sense, labour migration was thus forced unnecessarily; as was shown in the previous chapter, many people with higher or specialised secondary education were assigned to workplaces within the ESSR. Roughly the same is true for academics; a Ph.D. from Moscow or Leningrad was about as important as Party Membership, if anything by way of professional progress was to be achieved. This may even be linked to migration figures, although documentary evidence is not available and migrants could well have been returning administrative officials not included in the ‘special migration’ group: for example, during 1956-60, the external migration balance for the RSFSR was 30,450 migrants who arrived in the ESSR; 4,602 of those came from the Northern Region, 2,805 arrived from the North-Western Region, and 1,255 came from the Central Region. However, the balance for the city of Leningrad is negative, i.e. people from the ESSR went there at a rate of -3,349. This is even higher than the total balance of migration with the North-Western Region to which Leningrad belongs. The same applies to Moscow and the Central Region: to the USSR capital, -1,807 migrants went. This tendency remained highly visible until the 1970-75 period, after which it petered out somewhat, without however entirely abating.\(^{449}\) One reason for the negative balance with Leningrad and Moscow may be the indirect necessity to continue, or indeed begin to study at either city’s university which was of considerable prestige and importance. In addition, complaints were raised in the various republics that students on completing their studies would not be sent back to their home republics but elsewhere. In this regard, the three-year rule which guaranteed a workplace after school or university, but whose transfer and work there were compulsory at first, would be the background, although later even this rule was reportedly circumvented.

It may however be the case that the above migration figures tally with a public complaint made as early as 1956 by the then Chairman of the ESSR Council of Ministers, Aleksei Müürisepp. He, who, after all, as a Russian Estonian was supposed to be extremely loyal to the Centre’s cause, and who was the head of the ESSR government, felt it necessary to go public about this problem. In an article in the All-Union Izvestija

\(^{448}\) Rauch, *SU History*, p. 513.

\(^{449}\) This data from the ESA Statistical Monthly, *Eesti Statistika (10), 1994*, Table 3, ‘Balance of External Migration’, pp. 34-40, at p. 34.
newspaper in September 1956, he listed several problems of the ESSR, one of which was that Estonian specialists were dispersed all over the Soviet Union while at the same time Russian and other non-Estonian specialists were sent to Estonia to replace them. This dichotomy, as it were, was then explained away by an article in the journal Kommunist Estonii, an ECP organ, which appeared several months later. This basically stated that the in-migration of non-Estonians would be necessary to cover the war-related brain drain where many specialists would have left the republic. The above parts of the work open this point to some serious doubt; more likely the 1949 deportations were to blame for the serious gaps in local labour supply which during 1950-53 had to be replenished by in-migration.

4.2.2.2 Other Migration

Leaving the general trends mentioned in the introduction aside, the picture becomes much more diverse if the data is presented for each year: table 4.1 above shows 149,364 arriving migrants gross for the entire 1956-60 period, the average of which was 29,873 per annum; this did represent a decrease from the previous decade. At the peak in 1956, however, the figure stood at 40,471 and fell to 23,367 in 1960. Of the above total, 112,454, or 75.3% came from the RSFSR. From its Western Siberian Region, 13,676 migrants came to the ESSR, over half of whom, 7,653, came only from the Novosibirsk district. As the following table shows, this figure represents almost a third of all migrants who arrived from this region for the entire 1946-1990 period: 32.0%. From the Eastern Siberian Region, another 10,970 came, 70.3% or 7,709 of whom came from the Krasnoyarsk krai only; again, this represents around a third of all in-migrants from this area over the entire Soviet period.

Table 4.7: Gross External Migration, ESSR with RSFSR Regions, 1956-1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ESSR Arrivals (Gross Period)</th>
<th>RSFSR</th>
<th>Ukrainian SSR</th>
<th>Bielorusss. SSR</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>N. Western Region</td>
<td>Central Region</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-1965</td>
<td>81,631</td>
<td>8,184</td>
<td>32,823</td>
<td>12,699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-1990</td>
<td>785,113</td>
<td>67,781</td>
<td>290,302</td>
<td>130,639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual average</td>
<td>17,447</td>
<td>1,506</td>
<td>6,451</td>
<td>2,903</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a.* Includes Arkhangelsk and Murmansk Oblasts and the Karelian and Komi ASSRs.

*b.* Includes City and Oblast of Leningrad, as well as Novgorod and Pskov Oblasts.

*c.* Includes City and Region of Moscow, also Bryansk, Ivanovo, Yaroslavl, Smolensk and Tver Regions (Oblasts)

*d.* Includes City and Region of Kiev, also Lvov and Zhitomir Regions.

Source: Estonian Statistical Office / Eesti Statistikaamet, ESA.

450 Müürisepp wrote an article to this effect in the Izvestiia of 22 Sep. 1956. In mid-1957, an article entitled ‘V bratskoi seme sovetskikh narodov’ appeared in Kommunist Estonii (7) 1957, p. 10, with the claim mentioned above; apparently this was a reply to Müürisepp. Cf. Misiunas / Taa-gepera, p. 134.


452 *Eesti Statistika* (10), 1994, Table 1: ‘The Number of Immigrants by place of origin’, pp. 20-26, at p. 22.
Looking at net in-migration, in 1956 there still was a peak with a balance of 11,612, surpassing even the high average of the previous decade (1946-1955) and certainly the annual balance of 6,100 net for this period (1956-60); in 1958, another peak went up to a balance of 6,882 migrants – only to fall down to 1,491 by 1960.\textsuperscript{453} The first peak, which both in gross and net figures is rather substantial, is very probably linked to the political situation and Khrushchev’s attempts to garner the population’s support and use this in buttressing his position in the Politbureau, where Khrushchev was battling against some opponents between 1953 and 1957. A number of survivors from the Stalinist deportations were freed and returned to their homes, or at least home republics, one of whom was the former Vice Chairman of the ESSR Council of Ministers (1943-1950), Hendrik Allik.\textsuperscript{454} It is likely that the main return migration happened directly around and after the speech at the 20\textsuperscript{th} Party Congress, especially during 1956-1958; first rehabilitations took place in 1955, with a glut of 8 to 9 million rehabilitations following thence. Taking a closer look at the total balance of Soviet era in-migration, the above means that one eight (12.4\%) of all migrants who came to Soviet Estonia from Siberia arrived in the period between 1956 and 1958 alone (!). Put differently, almost two thirds (64.9\%) of the total of 30,500 migrants who arrived from the RSFSR between 1956-1960 came from Siberia. Looking at the distribution of the sending areas within Siberia, it is intriguing to note that 6,853 individuals or 22.5\% of the 1956-60 total alone came from the West Siberian district of Novosibirsk; 6,627 or 21.7\% arrived from Krasnoyarsk krai; both districts were the place of numerous prison or labour camps.\textsuperscript{455} This rather well corresponds to a number of around 25,000 who were sent to hard-labour camps in 1944-1953, about 11,000 of whom are said to have died. This leaves a balance of some 14,000 possible returnees, which is fairly close to the total of 13,480 resulting from the two above figures.\textsuperscript{456}

In terms of the target areas, the Estonian rural areas in this period experienced rather high in-migration. Even though this may go against the general migration trend into Estonia, which mostly targeted urban agglomerations, this trend is more true for the non-Estonian migration into the ESSR. Note that most of the returnees were Estonians whose background may explain their rural target areas: as mentioned in the chapter on the Stalinist deportations above, a large number of people had been deported in 1940/41 and 1949 to push the Stalinist system through, which hit the rural population especially hard. In addition, former prisoners were usually barred from living in large cities or towns.\textsuperscript{457} For 1956 and 1957 external migration into Estonian urban areas had a net balance of 4,907 and 702, respectively. Rural areas, however, had a net balance of 6,254 and 4,963, respectively. This shows a clear preponderance for net migration in

\textsuperscript{453} Tepp, Eesti Statistika (10), 1994, p. 13; also Eesti Statistika (9), 1994, p. 22. Cf. table 4.2 above

\textsuperscript{454} Misiunas/Taagepera, p. 143. Between 1965 and 1973 he actually held his old job again. Cf. ibid.

\textsuperscript{455} This data from Table 3, Eesti Statistika (10), 1994, pp. 34-40, at p. 36.


1957 targeting rural areas, where 87.6% of all incoming migrants went. Even in 1956, however, 56.0% of all remaining migrants stayed in the country, not in urban areas.\footnote{Calculated from tables 3, 4, and 5 on general, urban, and rural migration data in \textit{Eesti Statistika} (9), 1994, pp. 30-35. Misiunas/Taagepera, p. 139, actually suggest that most of the returnees would have stayed in the cities, simultaneously reducing much-needed space. The available figures do not bear this out. In addition, they themselves suggest on p. 192 that thousands of formerly deported farmers would return and actually for a brief time stop the trend of absolute decline in the rural population!}

Table 4.8: ESSR Migration Balance with USSR and Western and Eastern Siberia, 1956-1960, by year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sending Region</th>
<th>Entire</th>
<th>Western Siberia</th>
<th>Eastern Siberia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>W. / E. Siberia</td>
<td>Novosibirsk District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Balance</td>
<td>Balance</td>
<td>% Balance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>11,161</td>
<td>4,966</td>
<td>54.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>5,668</td>
<td>6,148</td>
<td>108.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>6,882</td>
<td>4,967</td>
<td>72.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>5,308</td>
<td>3,191</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1,491</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>52.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-1960</td>
<td>30,502</td>
<td>20,052</td>
<td>64.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-1990</td>
<td>314,408</td>
<td>38,865</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Although there is no documentary proof available for this connection between political developments and in-migration, the above table may give some clues lending support to this theory, keeping in mind that most deportees were indeed sent to prison camps in Siberia. Further, more precise area analysis would be needed, but is impossible due to lack of data. Still, the theory may well be taken for granted on the basis of available data and political evidence.

It is one of the sadder ironies of Soviet politics and migration that one leader had tens of thousands of people deported because they were deemed to be against the system and thus threatening to Stalin’s power; and that those who had the opportunity to return in or after 1956 could do so because his successor in the leadership wielded a new broom and was working the system to garner support to establish himself against opposition by followers of the old leader. Consequently, much has to be attributed to the power politics taking place in Moscow, which made this return migration possible – at roughly the same time, incidentally, that Konrad Adenauer, the German chancellor, visited Moscow and achieved the return of the remaining German POWs, as a return for taking up diplomatic and trade relations with the Soviet Union. Just shortly after this had happened, the ethnic Germans living in the Soviet Union on 13 Nov. 1955 were released from forced settlement.\footnote{This took place in 1955. Cf. Simon, \textit{Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities}, p. 241. Also cf. Auswärtiges Amt (Ed.): \textit{Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Dokumente von 1949 bis 1994}, Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1995, Documents 31-33, pp. 223-228.} In both cases, Khrushchev wooed for support: with the Soviet population at large, and with the outside world, too, both of whom he needed for support of his plans.
A very special link to power politics may be found in the following group of migrants. Apparently there are also some figures available on special migration, mostly military, which is by its very nature somewhat outside the ordinary migration processes and usually secret or at least unpublished; on the other hand, as noted above, especially the officer corps would take their families with them when starting at a new service job, while the conscripts would normally remain single and return to their place of origin after their tour of service. It is therefore not completely clear what exact delineations between ordinary family migration and the families of service personnel, especially officers, are made and where they are registered: would officers be registered as special migrants, no matter whether on a komandirovka or being transferred, while their families would be classed as ‘ordinary’ migrants?

At any rate, the consequences of Khrushchev’s campaigns to slim down the army will have also been felt in the migration balance. The army, used to being promoted and pampered, all of a sudden had to swallow a force reduction from 5.8 million to 3.7 million troops.\footnote{Service (FN 373), pp. 371-372.} On account of this campaign, a part of the officer corps and the re-enlistees (üleajateenijaid) left the ESSR with their families.\footnote{Tepp, \textit{In- and Out-Migration (in Estonian)}, p. 22.} In addition, the fact that the system seemed to be firmly established around 1953 made redundant part of the large numbers of military and security personnel which had swamped the Baltic republics in the immediate post-war period. Carrère d’Encausse points out that under Khrushchev the number of representatives of the Central organs decreased; as this may well have included KGB or other services, it would afford another possibility to explain the special out-migration.\footnote{Carrère d’Encausse, p. 44. Also cf. Misiunas/Taagepera, pp. 132-133.} Consequently, not only was this type of migrant steadily decreasing: over the five-year period 1956-60 alone, gross ‘special’ in-migration was 36,201, offset by a total of 47,953 departures. Also, available data on this erimigratsioon for 1956-64\footnote{ESA: Data File ERI5691.XLS, provided by Ms. Anne Herm in electronic format via e-mail, 1 Feb. 2000. The support by the ESA and especially Ms. Herm in clearing up many of the unanswered question in regard to ESSR migration is gratefully acknowledged.} suggests that there was a substantial peak in the out-migration from the ESSR during 1957-1959, involving over 93% of some 11,800 individuals for the 1956-1960 period; another peak occurred during 1961-1962, where another 2,550 or so people left the ESSR.

The following table gives a breakdown of ‘special migration’ to and from the ESSR as well as its rural and urban areas. However, neither is information on military units nor on their barracks presently available. Therefore, there is no further detailing of the rural/urban special migration possible, other than to point out that military units were spread all over the ESSR. Neither the share of convicts nor conscripts would be available, either, although both groups may be contained in the data.\footnote{The migration by service personnel appears to have been grouped together with prisoners’ migration in connection with their sentence into the category of ‘special’ or ‘separate migration’. Further details on the rate of e.g., officers and conscripts as opposed to convicts is not available. Still, the data gives at least some hint what tendencies are involved. E-mail letter from Ms. Anne Herm of ESA, Tallinn, of 1 Feb. 2000.} For example, since conscription in the USSR lasted two years, there may be a relation between the in-migration figure of 10,033 in 1956 and the out-migration figure of 12,735 in 1958; however, the
balance of around -2,700 cannot be explained on the basis of available evidence: they may be convicts, officers, or yet another group of migrants. Unfortunately, presently available information does not give more hints with regard to the exact background for the above figures. There needs much research to be done to elucidate the context of this particular form of migration. One of the major problems which may well hinder this is that either documents will be classified and not available, for this is military territory; or the documents pertaining to this migration are irretrievably lost. It was still necessary to mention this particular type; however, as for the next decades until the end of the Soviet era, the number of ‘special migrants’ constantly declined and net balances remained negative year-on-year, the next chapters will not continue this point.

Table 4.9: ESSR Special Migration with USSR 1956-1965, by year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Special Migration</th>
<th>Arrivals</th>
<th>Departures</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year *</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>10,033</td>
<td>7,327</td>
<td>2,706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>6,758</td>
<td>4,869</td>
<td>1,889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>6,775</td>
<td>4,790</td>
<td>1,985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>6,045</td>
<td>4,552</td>
<td>1,493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>6,590</td>
<td>5,060</td>
<td>1,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-1960</td>
<td>36,201</td>
<td>26,598</td>
<td>9,603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>3,545</td>
<td>2,632</td>
<td>913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>5,964</td>
<td>4,294</td>
<td>1,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>6,678</td>
<td>5,212</td>
<td>1,466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>7,259</td>
<td>5,375</td>
<td>1,884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>7,028</td>
<td>5,044</td>
<td>1,984</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table starts from earliest year available.

Source: Electronic Data File ERIS691.XLS provided by Ms. Anne Herm of ESA, Tallinn, 1. Feb. 2000, via e-mail.

4.3 NATIONALITIES POLICY, SOCIETY, AND INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS

Politics and Economics have largely provided the framework within which migration took place; in demography, natural population development as the balance of births and deaths and migration are the two major factors influencing the overall makeup of a population in a given territory. Very much change in the demographic makeup of the ESSR resulted from in-migration, in addition to which internal rural-urban migration took place. Following the framework and its migratory outcome, this will now be used to assess the influence on the interethnic relationship in the ESSR and place it into the general context of Soviet nationalities policy. Yet in socio-cultural questions the picture is more uneven than in demography, as it affected and was itself affected by many varied fields of culture, including the nationalities policy. Conversely, this resulted in a certain roller-coaster effect for the ‘cultural workers’ of the day. By drawing together all previously examined factors and outcomes, Soviet nationalities policy with regard to its effects in and on the ESSR may be assessed. As there is no hard documentary evidence

465 Misiunas/Taagepera, p. 176.
available, the balance of probabilities will have to decide, pending further and final clarifications.

4.3.1 Nationalities, Education, and Language Policies
As was indicated before, the Khrushchev period saw a certain dichotomy in the leader’s policies in almost every sector, a softer approach before he felt his position secure, a harder approach afterwards. This was also true in the Centre’s nationalities policy and those areas that may be linked to it, such as language and education, but also general culture politics; because of their ideological character, these areas have a certain salience for the present work. The previous parts on politics and economics as well as on migration have shown that there were many more interest groups than common wisdom on the ‘monolithic’ character Soviet Union would suggest. Most certainly the abolition of Stalinist terror during the Thaw led to a certain loss of Central control over the lives and decisions of the population at large: ‘Men in contrast to shirt fronts have a will’ (Nove) – and the titular population of the ESSR and also of other republics more and more tended to pursue their own interests and assert their own wishes, even if the difference was developing only incrementally. By consequence, not only in the economy was there a certain necessity to follow events rather than lead them; this was also true for the rather ideological area under review now. However, it is not that easy to determine the exact point of time where the ‘soft’ period turned back into ‘hard’ again, for if the sov-narkhozy concept were included in the nationalities policy and be considered part of Khrushchev’s wooing them, the soft period would go at least until 1961. On the other hand, attacks on ‘bourgeois nationalism’ started much earlier, and as early as 1958 the change in the education laws on language teaching would seem to indicate an earlier hardening. The changeover was therefore even more erratic than in other areas. The complexity of the problem is increased by the various and varying positions in the leadership which make a full assessment of all components of Soviet nationalities policy a theme of its own which will not be pursued in this volume. Clearly however Khrushchev gave the nationalities at first more room to develop their own cultures. It is this area that will be given prominence here as it features both an important component of Estonian culture and the terrain on which many of the Soviet and post-Soviet era problems would develop.

4.3.1.1 The Thaw
In the titular population’s cultural development, a certain independence existed. Even though, here too were political frames within which had to be operated. As open resistance to the Soviet system was hardly possible, Estonians withdrew into the private sphere and became ‘conservationists’ (Raun), turning to their own cultural heritage and making sure that it would not disappear into oblivion: ‘...they quietly and in their own way sought to preserve Estonian national identity, integrity, and inherited cultural tradition.’\(^{466}\) In a sense, this meant that those areas that were still relatively free from outside influence, or where the system could be pacified by introducing a few token gestures, became even more important than Estonians would have taken it anyhow. They were

\(^{466}\) Raun, Independence Redefined, p. 411.
niches where it was still possible to retreat to and where occasional retrograde shots over the bow could not reap too much havoc, even if it appeared on the Estonian day of independence on 24 February 1961.467

Another form of quiet resistance was choice of the art form in which Estonians expressed themselves; in this day and age, it boiled down to the dichotomy between the Western modernism and the Soviet cultural orthodoxy.468 The former was preferred not only because aesthetically it may have been much more pleasing, but because it made a statement against the Soviets. As Soviet culture was identified with Russian culture, accepting the Soviet culture would therefore have been tantamount to accepting Russification. Literature, graphics, the arts in general, and music were strongly Estonian-centred; the most visible were probably the Estonian song festivals which took place every five years. Their music, especially their Estonian language folk song tradition, or their dances, held a high place in Estonian culture. As the representatives of the Soviet system regarded these traits as somewhat quaint, they could fairly well develop, while on the other hand they were some of the mainstays of asserting the distinctiveness of the Estonians.469 It is exactly because of this strong concentration on themselves and their unique culture that forced Russification of the Estonians would not work. Finally, publications in the Estonian language included not only many more examples from Western literature than existed in Russian, but also could some slightly ‘problematic’ Russian language works be published long before it was possible in the RSFSR, for example, Dostoevski.470

Indeed, from 1953 the belles lettres were the key to the state of Estonian culture; 1955-56 many expelled authors were reinstated into Union of Writers and could thus publish; Jaan Kross (b. 1920) returned from eight years of deportation in 1954. This was a marked change over the early Käbin era (1950-78), which under Stalin did not leave for much room for manoeuvre. Some time after Kross’ return to Estonia, however, he started the publication of historical novels471 which explored his country’s situation. This must have been possible in no small amount by the new Khrushchev reign and the softening in the Thaw period, and it set a flourishing of cultures in motion that, again because of the impossibility to return to Stalinist methods, could not be contained to the desired degree. Even if there was only fairly limited contact with the outside world, non-Soviet foreign literature translated into Estonian held first place.

Some contact with the outside, Western world would, however, be allowed – which very likely was part of Khrushchev’s charm offensive with the West. An interest in foreign countries was no longer dangerous, and some few people could even travel to the West, even if they were very carefully selected.472 Estonia had its ties with Finland re-
stored, which resulted in a flourishing black market and aided the upkeep of good living standards when most other parts of the Union had to suffer much worse standards. In September 1958, a book fair on Finnish books was organised in Tallinn.\(^473\) From the mid-1950s, it was even possible for inhabitants of north-western Estonia to watch Finnish TV, thanks to the relaxation of regulations. The inhabitants of this region thus had a prime luxury in the Soviet Union at hand: first-hand information on and from the West, with access to the Western culture of which Estonians have always regarded themselves a part. By contrast, the official Ostankino news programme was little more than an ‘...almost unvarying diet of champion milkmaids and heroic shock-workers marching forward to a fully communist society in contrast to the unemployment, poverty and hopelessness of the capitalist West.’\(^474\) The official version of events, of the economic and political situation presented in the Soviet media until the early 1980s can be safely assumed to have been somewhat at variance with either individual Estonians’ experience, friends’ and relatives’ experiences, or the ‘truth’ as shown on Finnish TV or reported on the airwaves.\(^475\)

There is a certain possibility that this may have contributed further to the increasing frustration of the population with their living conditions and with the system in general, which did not entice the population to increase its loyalty to the state. For even if the living standards in the ESSR may have been among the best in the entire Soviet Union, they will not have reached the Finnish living standards already in purely economic terms, much less in social and political terms, that would come across the Gulf of Finland. In addition, as pointed out before, the economic situation in the Union as a whole was anything but ideal. So even if cultural matters, including the languages question, may have experienced a respite during the time Khrushchev was wooing the nationalities for support, this was no more than a lull which the leaders of the ESSR and other republics used to re-establish some of their previously suppressed cultures, and thus re-establish cultural differences. There was much more separation of lives between the ethnic/linguistic groups than would appear to follow from official nationalities policy. Since Lenin, Central policy always aimed at suppressing ethnic differences by various, and changing means – and yet invariably the differences were indirectly enforced, certainly in the Baltic: as each ethnic group would react differently to pressure from Moscow, Estonians became ‘conservationists’. During 1953–1957 therefore the battle for power in the leadership between he new ‘First’ and other contenders provided new hope on the ground in the ESSR. The 21\(^{st}\) Party Congress, after all, had not only condemned Stalin’s deportations or his ‘cult of the individual’, but also rehabilitated many groups; this indeed seemed to suggest the sowing of seeds for improvements. In mid-1957, still in the years of Kübin’s ‘national communism,’ and in line with the policy following the apparent return to the 1920s policy and talk of the ‘flourishing of nations’ from 1953\(^476\), there were even demands that the Russophones be obliged to learn Estonian:

The party organisations have to deal more seriously with teaching the Estonian language to those comrades who do not speak it, and more resolutely to require it from

\(^{473}\) Weiss (FN 432), at p. 194.


\(^{475}\) According to White, p. 76, some 50% of the Soviet population could listen to the BBC by the 1970s.

\(^{476}\) Simon, Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities, p. 229.
responsible workers who have lived for many years in the country and whose success in learning it is insignificant.\textsuperscript{477}

Not much afterwards, from 1957-1959 and Khrushchev’s increasing change of tack, this developed into no more than sour grapes.\textsuperscript{478}

4.3.1.2 After the Thaw

The return to more pro-active nationalities policy started around 1957; its main events were the 1958 education act, the purges in Latvia and other unruly republics, as well as both the 1959 and 1961 Party Congresses. The main offences were ‘propaganda by hostile elements abroad’ (mainly exiles), ‘undue fascination with the West’ and ‘bourgeois nationalism’.\textsuperscript{479}

After Khrushchev had managed to secure himself by ousting his arch rivals, he had no need anymore to woo the nationalities as he had done before to outbid the others. From 1957, the Soviet Union was presented as a great melting pot ‘...in which the national [i.e., ethnic] groups were “freely” abandoning their identities to blend into a homogeneous Soviet people with the coming of Communism...’\textsuperscript{480} Education, especially languages, was a prime area to prepare that road to Communism. On 16 Nov. 1958 the CPSU CC and the USSR Council of Ministers issued some ‘theses’ representing the first attempts at some wide-ranging school reforms; these were started then in December 1958. The November theses were entitled, ‘On Stabilising the Connections Between School and Life’\textsuperscript{481}, which indicated Khrushchev’s intention to bridge the gap between manual and non-manual (‘intelligentsia’) workers and prepare more youth for work in industry.\textsuperscript{482} Apart from the more technical side of extending the period of attending school for pupils so that they would gain work experience whilst still in school rather than learn only abstract matter, the most important point in terms of nationalities policy was the question of language teaching. Since the days of Stalin, increasing numbers of Russian language schools had been established in the non-Slavic republics. Consequently, in the ESSR, there were Estonian-based, Russian-based, and mixed schools in that they taught in both languages.

Estonian and Russian schools existed in parallel from the kindergarten to the various forms of secondary schools, and not only did they teach in different languages, they were also different structurally, in that the Estonian schools would run a year longer than the Russian schools. Not much is known about non-titular schools not based on the


\textsuperscript{478} Cf. Simon, Nationalism and Policy Towards the Nationalities, p. 241.

\textsuperscript{479} Cf. Simon, Nationalism and Policy Towards the Nationalities, p. 248, 253; Misiunas/Taagepera, p. 136. It is of course somewhat disingenuous to accuse the population of ‘undue fascination with the West’ when Khrushchev himself started his maize campaigns on his return from the US – against better information and in many areas that were not suited to this crop, just because he himself had been strongly impressed by the US Midwest’s maize fields.

\textsuperscript{480} Misiunas/Taagepera, pp. 138, 140; Simon, Nationalism and Policy Towards the Nationalities, p. 241.

\textsuperscript{481} Simon, Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities, p. 246; Service, p. 367; Carrère d’Encausse, pp. 45, 48, 49.

\textsuperscript{482} Rauch, SU History, p. 516.
Russian language, such as Ukrainian or Latvian – if there were any such schools at all, which is open to doubt. Chances are, however, that most of the non-Estonian non-Russian pupils will have been taught and socialised in Russian, which is somewhat peculiar: if ever there was an intention to mix the different peoples, and especially to Russify non-Russian peoples, the Russian socialisation that Slavic migrants in the ESSR or in other republics experienced would lead to their Russification, while Estonians would usually keep to themselves. Still, between 1953 and 1965 the number of pupils in general day schools rose from 143,800 to 182,500; those pupils who were taught on the basis of the Estonian language rose from 114,400 to 121,200, while those taught in Russian rose from 29,350 to 61,300. As a result, the share of pupils taught in Estonian went down from 78.1% to 66.4%; especially from 1959 onwards a certain jump in the ‘Russian’ pupils occurred – a fairly clear indication of the effect of the new thesis promoting teaching of, and in, Russian.

The 1958 Education Act guaranteed all parents to choice of language in which their children should be educated, but that sounds more liberal than it would prove to be – indeed it even strengthened the two parallel worlds that were being created in which Estonians and non-Estonians were living largely apart: Ukrainians and others would send their children to Russians school, except that in the ESSR this meant that they were much more socialised on the basis of Russian than on their own Ukrainian language base. The closeness of the two languages, Ukrainian and Russian, even increased the tendency to speak and use Russian in favour of the native language. For either group, Estonian was made an optional subject only, and as Estonian is fairly difficult, many ‘Russians’ simply dropped it. On the other hand, even though Estonians too could chose what language they would prefer, dropping Russian for them would have been tantamount to abandoning freely any career prospect – for Russian was depicted as ‘must knowledge’ for any job advancement. Indeed the situation was such that in many plants there was no advancement whatever possible without fluent Russian. As Russian was the lingua franca of officialdom as well as in most workplaces, indeed, the only official language of the Soviet Union, Khrushchev was apparently ‘...determined to make Russian even more dominant in education than before.’

The official theses and the reform mentioned above were preceded by newspaper articles in August 1958 lambasting ‘national particularities’ and returning to the old themes of the ‘rapprochement of nationalities’ and their future ‘merger’. A former Tadz-

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hik party head, Gafurow, even suggested the establishment of Russian as the ‘...second native tongue of all nations in the land of socialism.” For the next years, official propaganda would not let go of this topic, extolling its virtues well into the early 1960s.

In the light of the prevailing nationalities and language policies under both Stalin and Khrushchev which would declare a language such as Estonian as ‘unimportant’, hardly any one Russian, or Ukrainian, would feel any responsibility or need to make an effort at learning a language not spoken by more than roughly one million people, compared to which the 145 million Russians and tens of millions more spoke Russian, the only language of true ‘internationalism’. Consequently, this was the groundwork not only for the socialisation of many millions of people who would lose their own native language in favour of Russian; but conversely, as the tendency of ever-increasing numbers of people speaking Russian as their second, if not their first language, took hold, ethnic Russians became both arrogant and lazy: there was no incentive to learn another language, when everyone would have to learn a ‘human’ language such as Russian. At roughly the same time that bilingualism was promoted, most Russophone workers coming to the Estonian SSR demonstrated a complete ignorance of the local language for years on end. This arrogance had enough time to take deep roots, and bilingualism over the entire Union proved to be generally that of the local population, not that of any Russian.

‘Local patriotism (mestnichesvo)’ was singled out by CC in June 1959, and in the Pravda of 18 July 1960, an article by the CPSU main ideologue, Suslov, appeared, going in the same direction and largely condemning feelings of national distinctiveness and supporting an identification with the Union as a whole. This led to the 1961 Party Congress at which not only a second tirade was launched against Stalin and his erstwhile followers. Also, the concept of merging the nations (re-)appeared, in tandem with a renewed glorification of all things Russian disguised by the parole of ‘internationalism.’ A dichotomy of huge proportions emerged between the virtues of egalitarianism and unity achieved on the road to Communism which according to Khrushchev was only twenty years away and the actual known order of nationalities. This was headed by the Russian people, around whose primacy and dominance the other nationalities, peoples, ethnies, would gather: the elder brother. The mantra of unity and equality of peoples started from here, although it was clearly a ludicrous suggestion, since the Russians were held to be, and made to be, more equal than all others, and the key principle of equality violated throughout – surely this was one of the inspirations for George Orwell’s Animal Farm. The real background for this appears to be that Khrushchev had to reinforce his counter measures against the republics’, and thus main nationalities’, demands for more autonomy. This rather suggested a drifting apart, not a further unification of the various nationalities, and the more they were secure within their own cultures, the less any Russifying influence would be successful. The Estonians were a prime example of this.

Thus, from the 1961 Party Congress, a new ‘anti-bourgeois’, ‘anti-nationalist’ campaign, together with the concept of the ‘merger’ of the nationalities and the ensuing re-

487 Simon, Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities, p. 246.
488 Misiunas/Taagepera, p. 172.
newed attempt at Russification, emerged. The new CPSU programme, which followed this Congress, assured the continued ‘sovereignty’ of nationalities, although it suggested at the same time that the borders of the Union republics were increasingly losing their importance. The Russian language was described as practically the only common means of communication between all peoples of the Union, a unifying element of the Soviet society. In addition, the leadership ‘…proclaimed that this national intermingling was simply a sign of socialist internationalism at work; but they were being disingenuous. In reality they were pumping the Russians into the other republics as a means of holding together the vast multi-national state.’ Curiously enough, at this 22\textsuperscript{nd} CPSU Congress, the USSR suddenly became the ‘state of all people’ with a new society, a Communist society in which cultural differences would fade away – and for which even a new Constitution would be developed.\textsuperscript{491} However, from roughly the same time that the new Constitution was developed, around 1962, there was a distinct downgrading of the ‘growing together’ theme, which only recently had been the mainstay of ideology in nationalities policy and which resulted in a renewed assertion of the national cultures.\textsuperscript{492} Thus, it was also possible to create a cultural rebirth during the 1960s, in a way aided and abetted by the Käbin drift towards ‘national communism’, although he was careful not to go against the official line as dispensed by the centre.\textsuperscript{493} It had become clear by now that Khrushchev did not have any intention of letting any republic off the hook.

4.3.2 ESSR Population Developments, Politics, and Inter-Ethnic Relations

In the ESSR’s socio-cultural development, the increase in the non-Estonian population continuing from the Stalin era, did not necessarily lead to increased contacts between the settled titular and the in-migrating population. Neither a mixing, nor even much mingling of speakers of Estonian and Russian would take place. On the contrary, the linguistic groups of Estonian- and Russian-speakers tended to stay separate, not only because of language barriers and settlement structures, but also because there did not seem to exist a desire on either group’s part for contact with the others: Estonians kept to Estonians, ‘Russians’ largely kept to ‘Russians’.

This sort of separation was aided and abetted by the structures that were introduced and curiously largely kept during the Soviet era: a certain geographical separation of the two groups evolved over the decades, which, as was shown above, was due to the industrialisation-urbanisation process. Moreover, there would also evolve two complete infrastructures in the cultural and education systems which ran along different lines. For example, apart from Estonian-based and Russian-based theatres, newspapers such as Rahva Hääl (Voice of the People, the Estonian State newspaper), Edasi (Forward) or Sovetskaia Estonia (Soviet Estonia, in Russian), had their own respective readerships, which again led to further compartmentalisation. Even the administrative structures in part contributed to the continued separation of the ethnic groups by reinforcing their awareness of their distinctiveness: the Fifth Point in the Soviet domestic passport once and for all ascribed a nationality to its holder; as opposed to the Yugoslav example,

\textsuperscript{492} Misiunas/Taagepera, p. 150.
\textsuperscript{493} Raun, \textit{Independence Redefined}, p. 410, p. 412.
which did allow for children of mixed couples to choose a ‘Yugoslav’ ethnicity, thus
avoiding being either, e.g., ‘Croat’ or ‘Albanian’ if the parents held those nationalities.
The Soviet Union did not have such a category. In the light of the various promotions of
‘growing together’ and even creating ‘Soviet man’ this is a most peculiar non-
development and its absence most noteworthy: as the Soviet leadership certainly knew
what happened inside Yugoslavia, did such a category not appear most useful in their
stated aims? Whatever the developments in other Union republics, in Estonia they would
not have had much success.

As noted in the section on migration, a considerable number if not the majority of in-
migrants settled mainly in the north-eastern province of Ida-Virumaa as well as in Tal-
linn or the surrounding province, Harjumaa. As noted too, urbanisation went hand in
hand with industrialisation, and many new in-migrants were provided with housing be-
longing to their workplace. As Estonians usually had problems in obtaining new housing
for themselves, not much mixing would take place for geographical reasons. Yet not
only did the linguistic groups of ‘Estonians’ and ‘Russians’ stay largely apart because of
linguistic, occupational, and geographical reasons but the numbers of interethnic mar-
riages, which may be seen as an indicator of such contact as there might have developed
between the two groups, or even of their ‘admixture’, stayed way below the theoreti-
cally possible levels: for example, if for the 1958-60 period a theoretical level of 18.7%
of mixed couples would have been possible in the ESSR, the actual intermarriage level
was only 5.2%. For the 1961-68 period, the respective figures were 20.6% theoreti-
cally possible and 5.4% actual intermarriages. Neither was everyday life any more
conducive to much more than such contact as was absolutely unavoidable, as by and
large two completely separate infrastructures which largely compartmentalised both
‘Estonian’ and ‘Russians’ developed where either group led its own life.

The separation of the two groups was also a consequence of the Soviet system and
its octroi. Estonians had come to regard more or less all non-Estonian in-migrants as
representatives of the system. ‘The Russians’ were non-Estonians who either denigrated
or ignored the Estonians’ culture and heritage, and whose language for Russians and
other in-migrants was uninteresting to learn, as Russian was their lingua franca and the
basis on which they would be socialised. Probably the most important factor in the
Estonians’ identity however was their language. Not only did it irk them that it became
increasingly necessary to use Russian in public; they also encountered some hefty Great
Russian chauvinism which may have led to situations in which a native Estonian would
be barked at not to speak that ‘dogs’ language’ of his, i.e. Estonian, but a ‘human’ one,
i.e. Russian – this being their own republic and country. The attitude towards the Es-
tonian language therefore increasingly determined the view the Estonians would take of
their counterparts, guests, or whoever they would meet. The consequence in many a
case was that the Estonians felt rejected by those coming into what they regarded as
their own republic that was under illegal occupation, but what most in-migrants regarded
as a constituent part of the Soviet Union which happened to have yet another titular area

494 Tiit, pp. 1859-1860.
495 On the language question and the ensuing post-Soviet problems cf. ch. XXX.
496 This attitude seemed to be rather widespread; in an interview with a Latvian who told of his
tries to ask a tram driver for directions, exactly that sort of reaction was related to the pre-
sent author in September 1995 in Riga.
language but at least working and living conditions were better. Both the illegal system and the people who justly or unjustly were now identified with it were resented, a feeling that had a long time to grow. In the very tense yet continuously non-violent periods of 1989-91 and 1991-94, this resentment would play a large role in the interethnic relations and the much lamented disenfranchisement of non-Estonians, largely ignoring the historical implications. In turn, the views of the ethnic Russians and other largely Slavic in-migrants who came to and stayed in the ESSR may be partially understood by taking the ideology of the day into account and the mind-set it created. It should be remembered that the Soviet Union had its own way of writing and interpreting history; the messianism it included had all peoples and nationalities subordinated to and centred on Moscow and the Russians on account of which the attitudes of non-Estonian in-migrants are at least partially understandable, although they could hardly be condoned.

Under Brezhnev most of the changes introduced by Khrushchev were revoked. Most importantly, this affected economic self-rule as envisaged in the sovnarkhozy concept. The relative autonomy in decision-making that the Union republics had enjoyed was cut and the decision-making process recentralised. By the mid-1960s, a fairly stable, conservative and hierarchically structured USSR had emerged, where every city, town or village, every enterprise, simply everything and everyone had a place. The status of either an enterprise or a city may have been a political decision but in a politicised state and society, this had far-reaching repercussions going much beyond Western standards: the relative status of a state or firm determined the allotment of consumer goods, food supplies, and living conditions in general, as this status also determined the entire socio-cultural infrastructure available to the population.\textsuperscript{497} By extension, the makeup of the Soviet system also clearly influenced migration decisions – at least since the early 1960s. As the regime with the advancing age of the leadership became increasingly lacklustre towards the mid-1970s, gradually losing both its touch with and grip on the country and the population at large, it reacted all the more brutally to any challenge of power. For the individual, the question was to remain within the system and get by, even if seriously disenchanted, or put oneself at risk by dissenting openly. Domestically the period became known as the standstill, \textit{sastoi}. The key words in foreign affairs are the Prague Spring and the Brezhnev doctrine; détente; Helsinki and the CSCE; Afghanistan and the resulting second Cold War.\textsuperscript{498} As in the chapter on the Khrushchev era, the superpower struggle which also included the ‘Third World’ will not be considered, although its costs had a worsening impact on the overall catastrophic finances of the Union, e.g. because of the explosive increase in the use of naval power abroad. Only because of the increasing foreign trade in natural reserves, especially oil and gas, could the economy survive without substantial reform; the two oil crises in effect helped avert any such reform as it brought more money into the USSR’s coffers.

In migration, the picture became further entangled, not least as a result of the slackening control which more and more allowed unrestrained migration. The social trends continued to be heavily influenced by the interaction between birth rates and immigration. Both factors ‘…continued in 1968-80 to be of far-reaching importance for the social, political and cultural processes in the Baltic republics.’\textsuperscript{499} The types of migrants either changed or became more clearly defined as a certain process of differentiation set it. In the 1940s, 1950s, and perhaps in the early 1960s, migrants may have been sent to both Latvia and Estonia to fulfil the Centre’s aim and bind these republics more strongly into the Union. Simultaneously, from the 1960s migration happened out of the interest to better one’s life. In view of growing labour shortages all over the Union and increasing competition between firms for labour, people in the 1970s went unashamedly where


\textsuperscript{499} Misiunas/Taagepera, p. 214.
overall conditions were best. This very much ran counter to any planning possibilities, in addition to which not West-East and South-North migration occurred, as the planners would wish for, but exactly vice-versa. Indeed, for most of the 1970s and 1980s even migration experts admitted to not being able to forecast with any certainty either size or direction of migration, despite protestations that it would be planned ‘scientifically’.\textsuperscript{500} Still, as the ESSR and the Baltic republics in general had the best living conditions, even in times of economic decline, they remained the target of continuing if decreasing immigration which changed from predominantly labour-type migration to include voluntary family and economic betterment migration. Although most migrants now came of their own accord, to Estonians they seemed to fit the official CPSU’s agenda of creating the Soviet person in a society living in ‘developed Socialism.’ Hence, immigrants continued to be seen as representing the Centre’s interests in continued Russification and were resented. The same applied to non-settling in-migrants, typically young Russian males, who were only interested in making ‘a long rouble’, i.e. quick and easy money.\textsuperscript{501} Nobody took ideology very seriously anymore, the longer the Brezhnev era went, the less. Ideology and reality increasingly parted their ways, with the Centre going one way and the population another. The inclusion in the new 1977 Constitution of the CPSU’s ‘leading role’ in the state must have been seen as exquisitely missing reality by a wide margin. Indeed, ideology was so despised that ridicule and boredom led to unprecedented meticulousness in going through the routine motions. On the whole, not only nationalities policy became passive under Brezhnev, ideology as a whole was, if anything, reactive to trends and retrospectively justifying developments – a leading role was wishful thinking.\textsuperscript{502} Clearly, this, too, had an effect on Soviet society.

\section*{5.1 Politics and Economy}

Three phases in politics will be examined; these subdivided the Brezhnev era from 1964 to 1968; from 1969 to 1977-1979; and from 1979 to 1982.\textsuperscript{503} The double interlude of Andropov and Chernenko will be considered afterwards. Following this, the economic framework will be considered, to examine, as in politics, the conditions under which migration into the ESSR may have taken place.


\textsuperscript{501} According to Misiunas/Taagepera, p. 215, there was a high fluctuation ratio which by 1980 ‘…could stand at more than 90 departures for every 100 arrivals.’ Unfortunately, available ESA figures bear this out only for 1988-89; before that, this ‘fluctuation level’ [AD] stood at 60-70, which is still very high.


5.1.1 Politics
As before in the Khrushchev era, the new leadership again felt its way into office, and again, the first phase of a new era initially had another collective leadership at the start. Khrushchev had been removed from power in a cold putsch at a specially convened CC meeting on 14 October 1964. He voluntarily left office, with hardly any casualties, few sackings, and no deaths, signifying the continuation of the trend started by Khrushchev himself, which let him continue his life in obscurity at a private dacha. At the same meeting in October 1964, the CC predictably forbade holding double office in state and government. In the new duumvirate leadership, Leonid Brezhnev became head of the CPSU and of the Central Committee’s Secretariat. He busied himself mainly with consolidating his political power and dealt with party affairs for hours on end. His other interests were in agriculture, as he had been instrumental as the local party boss in pushing through Khrushchev’s Virgin Land experiment. The former head of Gosplan, Aleksei Kosygin became head of the Council of Ministers; his main aim was to reform economic policy. 504

5.1.1.1 Restoration, Stability and Standstill, 1964-82
Strong restorative tendencies not only removed most of Khrushchev’s reforms, especially in agriculture, education, in economic administration and in the party apparatus, but also included efforts at deepening the politico-administrative control both inside the Soviet Union and outside in the client states. Khrushchev had rattled the middle- and high-ranking CPSU party officials too much with his erratic style and constant replacements. Brezhnev decreed that both ‘stability of cadres’ and ‘trust in cadres’ would be the new doctrines, which was exactly what the apparatus wanted to hear. Also, the gesture which renamed the ‘First’ into ‘General’ Party Secretary was significant in that it symbolised a certain return to the Stalin era in which most of the CC members had joined the party.

Consequently, as few, if any, changes in the leadership introduced fresh blood, the party leadership aged markedly: three-quarters of the Central Committee had joined the party before 1950; 44% of those who had worked in it in 1966 were still in place in 1981. A good half of the CPSU CC had at one time or another worked in the military-industrial complex, increasing its power. 505 The average age of the CC rose from 56 to 63 and in the Council of Ministers from 58 to 65 over the period 1966-1982. On average a full CC member would hold his mandate for 13 years. Those who left the CC or its Politbureau had crossed Brezhnev or threatened his power, which he slowly but steadily built. In 1975 he became Head of the Defence Council and in 1977 he became both Head of the Party and Head of the Supreme Soviet. Although by then his health was failing, Brezhnev over a period of 13 years assembled a position with a similar if not greater power-base than that for which Khrushchev had been admonished, a discrepancy not lost on the population. ‘So the “identikit” Central Committee member was an

elderly male Russian who had risen in the world and had extensive experience of government and/or party leadership as well as some experience of the “military industrial complex”.  

In the Centre, the power of the governmental ministries had serious influence on the Party and its decisions. The number of ministries grew to over 100 [sic!] – this too was a consequence of Brezhnev’s ‘stability of the cadres’, which continued to grow in strength (interestingly ‘cadre’ is a military term aptly reflecting the intended centralised and hierarchical command in both politics and economy from the centre down to the last village soviet). Yet at the same time the CPSU apparatus could apparently not manage to control the government apparatus in its highly fragmented administration of several tens of ministries as the primary party organisations (PPOs) within this apparatus lacked coordination. By extension, the ‘…government bureaucracy was able to exert an enormous influence over industrial development. The result was that cities and regions were dominated, not by the interests and plans of the party, but by those of the ministries in Moscow…’

Military questions and MIC interests thus obtained priority over economy and even ideology, which did not serve any more as a prescriptive guideline for, but as a postscriptive justification of action. During the last Brezhnev years, the military-industrial complex practically got out of control. It internally increased its power further as a consequence of which surging costs on weapons development and procurement were no problem. In view of the parity achieved with the US, costly military and space programmes continued as a matter of course in the superpower rivalry. They bled the ailing economy even further – such as the development of the SS20 medium range nuclear missiles and their deployment. Neither was it however something completely new: the defence budget in the 6th FYP for 1956-60 had required 21.6% of total investments, in the 8th, 9th, and 10th FYPs military spending cost even more, although since Khrushchev this figure was top secret. When in 1989 the first ever figures were published, they revealed a defence spending equalling 15% of the entire state budget – by comparison, the USA’s share was 7%. At the same time, all efforts to increase consumer production got stuck in the governmental works.

The Brezhnev era also saw an unashamedly strong preference for all matters Russian or Slav belying the purportedly ‘internationalist’ character of the Union. 86% of the CC

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506 Hosking, pp. 367, 377, 378; quote is at p. 378; Rauch pp. 586-587.

507 Udgaard points out that of some 90 ministries in the mid-1970s, three-quarters were economic ministries with a narrowly defined brief; only 14 were non-economic, e.g. the foreign ministry or the interior ministry. Cf. Nils Morten Udgaard: Der ratlose Riese. Alltag in der Sowjetunion, Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1979, p. 44.

508 Lane / Ross, p. 21; italics added.

509 Rauch, SU History, pp. 553-555, at p. 553. Also Hosking, p. 374.


512 White, p. 89, also Lane, p. 9. Valentin Falin in his autobiography even asserts the figure was rather 20% of the entire budget. Since Khrushchev, however, this figure was top secret and only known to ‘God and the Minister of Finance’; not even the members of the Politbureau were informed. Cf. Valentin Falin: Politische Erinnerungen, München: Droemer Knauer, 1993, p. 462.
members were Slavs, i.e. Russians, Ukrainians or Byelorussians; 67% were Russians. This clearly demonstrated the hierarchy of ethnic groups within the Soviet Union: Russians first, Slavs next, then Europeans, and at the end, Central Asians. Of the Baltic republics only the Latvian Pēre ever made it into the highest echelons of power. This shows that in the Soviet Union, ethnicity not only was a trait which may encompass culture, language, skin pigmentation or other secondary characteristics in a person. Nor was it only a question of active self- or group-identification. It was also a question of having or not having power as far as running the country was concerned. The Estonians and most other non-Slavs were the ‘have-nots’ with a large share in the rubber-stamp assemblies in their home republics and other assorted token gestures. Consequently, they increasingly regarded the Centre as completely alien and power-hungry.

In 1968, Brezhnev rather brutally demonstrated his power in the events in the CSSR and with the ensuing Brezhnev Doctrine, which had wide domestic repercussions. The events of the Prague spring in 1968 clearly showed the leadership’s position in questions of power which it saw threatened and reacted with brutal force as it did not even contemplate accepting a loss of control. During this phase, the external and internal repercussions from the Soviet intervention manifested themselves during 1969-77, where renewed control attempts in both areas were based on a siege mentality in the leadership stemming from the events in the CSSR and a purely military view of security. In continuation of an ongoing trend since Khrushchev, the party leadership developed a deep distrust of intellectuals in the humanities and social sciences, as well as towards economic reformers.

Externally, despite all Western criticism, the Czechoslovak affair did not stop a further development of détente — on the contrary: at least during 1968-73 in the context of Ostpolitik and détente the Soviet foreign policy did have considerable successes also expressed in the superpower negotiations on Nuclear Non-Proliferation, which led to the signing of the (NPT-) treaty in 1969. In the same year, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) were started and successfully concluded in 1972. Further developments in East-West relations proved rather successful during the 1970s, as Europe-wide preparatory talks in a series of conferences led to the establishment of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, CSCE, whose landmark Final Act was signed in Helsinki in 1975. The Soviet Union signed, too, and as a consequence of this the Soviet leadership were to find that despite increased activity by the ‘state organs’ from 1972 against dissidents, those ‘other-thinkers’ of the intelligentsia now increasingly referred to the rights they had under this Final Act. Internally, the phase of ‘developed Socialism’ was declared but the population failed to be impressed.

The third phase from 1977-1979 saw a leader who was but a shadow of his former self. To the end of this era and until Gorbachev took power, a group of power-hungry pensioners (in the USSR, males usually retired at age 60) at the helm plunged the second Super Power into the Afghanistan affair. They thus burdened the Union with huge costs regardless of the effects which they apparently failed to either see or understand. Moreover, this finally wrecked renewed efforts at détente and arms control which in spite of the Czech events took partial fruit in East-West relations and which had been particularly successful in 1973-1977, around the main phase of the Conference on Se-

513 In detail cf. Lane, pp. 204-208.
curity and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which took place in 1975 in Helsinki. Another cooling of East-West relations ensued. It was to last until the advent of Gorbachev, as despite efforts to the contrary, Andropov could not improve relations in the light of the developments in Poland from 1980-1981 continuing well into his leadership and the shooting down of the Korean Jumbo Jet, KAL007 in 1983, which happened in his own leadership time. By 1979, however, Brezhnev was seriously ill and had hardly the capacity actually to function properly. His position was more of a puppet on a string directed by the power-geriatrics whose views were formed under Stalin and who did not see fit to allow any political or economic reform which may have endangered their positions. This explains the worsening of the domestic situation in both political and economic terms and its effect on the population. With the deaths in 1982 of both Brezhnev and the éminence grise, Suslov, the CPSU’s Second Secretary, the third phase of the Brezhnev era ended, while the economic stagnation continued through 1985. During the interludes of Andropov and Chernenko, neither leader could really make his mark and little or nothing changed until the advent of Gorbachev in power. The economy rumbled on, and from the mid-1970s at the latest, the population at large was dissatisfied with their lives.

Internally the USSR’s signature under the CSCE’s Final Act came to haunt the Soviet authorities in that from 1977 a Moscow-based Helsinki group, followed by other groups all over the Union, would criticise human rights violations clearly referring to the USSR’s acceptance of the Final Act’s ‘Third Basket’ dealing with the Human Dimension. No matter how many people would be imprisoned, sent to the Gulag, or indeed incarcerated in a lunatic asylum, the population increasingly protested openly from the 1960s. On a Union-wide scale, the population was fairly disenchanted with their lives and with the party-state apparatus. The intellectuals took a leading role in attacking this, hence certain exposed individuals like Solzhenitsyn or Sakharov would make their public mark by criticising the leadership from their standpoints. The criminalisation of having a different standpoint from the regime’s from the mid-1960s onwards, with a further deep plunge on the occasion of septuagenarian Suslov calling for an ‘ideological war’ in 1971, led to increasing self-publication (samizdat) of material which would not be allowed publication by the state. In effect, the state leadership tried to increase control in

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516 The CSCE Final Act from 1975 envisaged three ‘baskets’ or problem areas which were negotiated: arms control, economic matters, and the basket on human rights and fundamental freedoms, also called the ‘human dimension’. It was the first basket that was important to the Soviet Union internationally, while it had to swallow the third basket in return. The general aim of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, CSCE, was to act as a negotiating body and establish the basic principles governing the behaviour of States towards their citizens and each other in a series of meetings and conferences setting norms and commitments and periodically reviewing their implementation.
a state of siege mentality which had been caused by the Prague spring and the reaction to it.

Even though the population at large would not join in dissident activity but largely concern itself with getting their daily business done, a generation had grown up which did not only not know the terror and fear that pervaded the entire population under Stalin. It also grew increasingly despondent at the yawning gap between ideological promises, ever-increasing demands and their very real lives. In addition, Stalin had been condemned for the suppression or falsification of facts, and by the 1960s the population had come to expect the contrary: recognising and publishing the facts. Protests had been increasing since the early 1960s all over the union, for a few main reasons: shortages in food supply, poor housing, excessive work demands, or low pay.\textsuperscript{517} During the 1970s, these problems got worse. During 1975-79 the goods supply became so bad that even some of Riga’s inhabitants found it necessary to travel to Tallinn. For the ESSR as a whole, available evidence points to food shortages in 1973, 1978, 1979, and 1982, where meat, sausages, butter, eggs and sugar became scarce. Bad weather in 1978 affected, among other things, potato and milk production. In 1982, milk and bread continued in supply, but meat and meat products, including ham and sausages, as well as butter and cream were scarce.\textsuperscript{518} However, the Estonian consumption pattern traditionally included high levels of meat, milk and potato intake. If a product was in short supply in the state shops, recourse would have to be made to the kolkhoz markets whose products were usually more expensive and thus available only to the higher earning population. Although the ESSR population was generally better off than the Union average, this still cut a sizeable chunk out of the disposable income. As early as 1968, some 62\% of the income had to be spent on food, a further 21\% went towards paying for clothing.\textsuperscript{519}

In sum, both politically and economically no major change of direction occurred, owing to a certain lethargy from the leadership down to the last member of the public: this gave the period its bad name: \textit{sastoi}, lit., standstill – stagnation. As opposed to the high quality of military goods, consumer goods were rare, expensive, and of poor quality.\textsuperscript{520} This was a politically based decision within the USSR’s system whose performance caused widespread dissatisfaction in the people; indeed, it can be argued that the masses were in fact alienated by the system.\textsuperscript{521}

5.1.1.2 The Double Interlude: Andropov and Chernenko, 1982-1985

Brezhnev died on 10 November 1982, but enough evidence suggests that he was barely capable of carrying out his duties from 1977-1979 onwards. In his stead, the Second Secretary, Konstantin Chernenko, together with Foreign Minister Gromyko and others,

\textsuperscript{517} Cf. in more detail Hosking, pp. 415-416; pp. 389-90.
\textsuperscript{519} Cf. Bohnet/Penkaitus, p. 39; Misiunas/Taagepera, pp. 221-222.
\textsuperscript{520} Take for example the example of an elderly lady complaining she had spent all her savings on two TV sets that functioned only briefly and now was broke, alone, and with nothing to do (WHITE!!)
ran the country; Brezhnev was no more than a figurehead at that time. Following
Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov became General Secretary from 12 November 1982, yet less
than a year later, from August 1983, he was not seen in public any more and died on 9
February 1984. Only four days later, the already ill, 72-year old Konstantin Chernenko
was elected General Secretary, because Ustinov and Tikhonov, then Defence and
Prime Minister, respectively, reportedly thought him easier to deal with than Gorbachev,
whom Andropov had clearly seen as his successor. From the 1970s, a class of power-
geriatrics ran the country. 44% of those ‘elected’ into the Politbureau in 1966 were still
in office in 1981.\footnote{On the Politbureau cf. in detail, John Löwenhardt: \textit{The Soviet Politburo. Pol’itbyuro kak rabo-
Andropov and Chernenko’, pp. 33-41, both in: BIOst (Ed.): \textit{The Soviet Union 1984/85. Events,

Although Yuri Andropov, the next party leader, tried to introduce some economic
reforms and enforce discipline in the workforce, he had too little time to effect some
meaningful change before he died. This even more applies to Konstantin Chernenko,
who was the oldest Politbureau member ever to accede to that position, and who was
hardly ever seen in public, let alone have any effect on the political scene, before he
followed Andropov’s fate. Already, a year before Chernenko’s election, aides had
warned against giving him any post, hopelessly ill and incapable of working, as he
was.\footnote{Arbatov, p. 316.} Still, like Andropov, he also quickly became chairman of the Defence Council
and Party Leader, concentrating the main elements of power in his person. Chernenko
was characterised as an average professional office clerk who should never have come
any further than heading the department for agitation and propaganda. Yet because of
his illness, nothing at all was expected from him; he was seen as a transitional figure who
thankfully would not have any time to change anything. The order of the day was for the
inner circle to sit tight and wait for him to die, which would be the best to do for the time
being.\footnote{Arbatov, p. 317.} Indeed, Chernenko’s tenure was even shorter than that of Andropov: failing to
turn up in public from December 1984, barely ten months after assuming office, he died
on 10 March 1985. Only a day later the new, and much younger General Secretary,
was elected: Michael S. Gorbachev.\footnote{For dates, see White, pp. 4-8. White relays an anecdote which Archie Brown had told him, and
which is well worth repeating: \textit{What support does Gorbachev have in the Kremlin? – None, he
walks unaided.} White, p. 8.} In all, his two predecessors failed to make very
much of an impact, with Andropov at any rate starting a campaign of discipline in the
society, at the workplace, and especially to eradicate widespread alcoholism which
since the 1970s had been a recurring theme.\footnote{In 1972, the ‘Ilmarine’ plant in Tallinn proudly declared to have broken up ‘group drinking’. It
probably did not quite manage to stop drinking outside work or absenteeism following from
Penkaitis, p. 39. On the Soviet Union as a whole, whose sales in alcoholic beverages increased
by 77% over the 1970s, cf. Hosking, pp. 400-401.}

\footnote{522 On the Politbureau cf. in detail, John Löwenhardt: \textit{The Soviet Politburo. Pol’itbyuro kak rabo-
Andropov and Chernenko’, pp. 33-41, both in: BIOst (Ed.): \textit{The Soviet Union 1984/85. Events,

\footnote{523 Arbatov, p. 316.}

\footnote{524 Arbatov, p. 317.}

\footnote{525 For dates, see White, pp. 4-8. White relays an anecdote which Archie Brown had told him, and
which is well worth repeating: \textit{What support does Gorbachev have in the Kremlin? – None, he
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\footnote{526 In 1972, the ‘Ilmarine’ plant in Tallinn proudly declared to have broken up ‘group drinking’. It
probably did not quite manage to stop drinking outside work or absenteeism following from
Penkaitis, p. 39. On the Soviet Union as a whole, whose sales in alcoholic beverages increased
by 77% over the 1970s, cf. Hosking, pp. 400-401.}
5.1.2 The Economy

From 1965, Brezhnev endeavoured to improve substantially the agriculture’s general situation, especially by releasing it from the purely tributary role which it had had under both Stalin and Khrushchev. Investment was increased and especially chemical products such as fertilizers as well as increased mechanisation would be geared towards achieving these aims (in the ESSR, this led to the push in increased phosphate mining and fertilizer production in the combines at Maardu during the late 1960s).\footnote{Rauch, SU History, p. 540.} These were however conditional upon reforms in the industrial production sector, as otherwise simply the hardware for mechanisation would be missing. Agriculture indeed experienced improvements, but bad harvests made grain procurements in both Canada and the US necessary.

The main economic decision of the transition period between 1964 and 1968 affecting the ESSR was the abolition of the sovnarkhozy which meant a clear loss of power for republican organs. In marked contrast to the decentralisation this concept had envisaged in principle, the USSR economy was recentralised. Indeed, as more stability came to the political and thus economic sphere, the ‘...restoration of habitual lines of command, [and] the end of extremes of “campaigning” so characteristic of the Khrushchev period...’ did seem at first to benefit both the agricultural and industrial sectors.\footnote{Rauch, SU History, p. 539; Service, p. 379; Nove, Economic History, p. 368. In detail cf. Paul R. Gregory: ‘The Institutional Background of the Soviet Enterprise: The Planning Apparatus and the Ministries. With a comment by Lázlo Csaba’, in: BIOst-Report (22), 1989.} This area of general economic policy was under the direction of Alexei Kosygin.

5.1.2.1 Overview

Kosygin had been head of Gosplan and probably knew fairly well where the problem areas in the Soviet economy were. He cautiously initiated the reconsideration of suggestions by the economist Yevsei Liberman from 1962, who had advocated greater freedom and decision-making powers for plant managers. As this however threatened a reduction of the powers of Gosplan, which could direct and interfere into most if not all plants in the entire Union, the managers of power smelled a rat. Especially suspicious it made them, too, that he was advocating improvements in the consumer goods which would require that investments be redirected from the production sector. The suggestion that economic-branch departments in the CC Secretariat were to accept a reduction of their authority was just as much rejected as the reduction of power vested in the central bureaucracy of Gosplan and the economic ministries. Kosygin’s reforms, presented in 1965, died a slow death during the 8th FYP between 1966 and 1970, as Brezhnev rather hindered their progress than supported them.\footnote{Nove, Economic History, p. 369.}

Thus, the main trend of the Brezhnev era, from the 8th to the 11th FYP (quinquennium) was that although at first there was a fairly good economic performance, which during 9th and 10th FYPs in the 1970s got progressively worse for a number of reasons, the economy took a deep plunge in 1979 from which it would not recover substantially. The 11th FYP was the culmination of a development that had started long before: an
increasing gap between plan figures and reality, which resulted in almost permanent corrections in the plan figures even during their period of currency. The fact that something must have been going amiss for quite some time may be gleaned from the fact that Brezhnev found it necessary to declare the 1976-1980 FYP one of ‘Efficiency and Quality’, but nothing came out of this, on the contrary: this plan saw a plunge in almost every sector of the economy, including especially the question of labour productivity which reached new lows. Yet neither were there material incentives to increase productivity. As Alec Nove put it, in the ‘ordinary’ economy the development was one from ‘stability to immobility’, into what Gorbachev later called a ‘pre-crisis situation’. This was true for both the economic and the political level.

At the level of the Soviet population, the society at large, increases in social spending and wage rises would not be overly appreciated in view of the fact that living standards which comprised more than just remuneration for work would not improve to any substantial degree. Most importantly, consumer demands would not be met while those of the military-industrial complex (MIC) however were met throughout: for example, despite Kosygin’s reform efforts which included pushing the consumer goods sector, an extension of naval power and atomic weapons programmes was granted during the 8th FYP, resulting in a particularly high increase of military hardware production. The ESSR harboured three wharfs belonging to this complex, and its ports accommodated a small part of the Soviet Baltic fleet, even if other parts were stationed in Latvian and Lithuanian harbours as well as in Leningrad and Kaliningrad. In addition, a number of plants in the ESSR also belonged to the MIC, as the military sector comprised the best pieces of the machine building, engineering, and electronics industries. Theirs was a rather privileged place in the Soviet hierarchy, and as their products were of all-Union importance, they could obtain priority in their material requirements – or labour: the famous 1965 report of the economist Aganbegyan quite clearly stated that too many people worked in defence-related industries, making up 30%-40% of the total workforce.531

In the 9th FYP, a larger share of investment was supposed to be channelled into the consumer industry or Group B, thus cutting into the production sector or Group A. However, Group A was the domain of the military-industrial complex (MIC), which managed to keep its share of the budget.532 That of Group B, which would have been in the population’s interest, was not increased. It appears that most of the gerontocracy in the party-state leadership had not only touch with the population, but also any interest in maintaining such contacts. Overall low morale and low productivity in the working population were the consequence of this, hence it is not particularly surprising if productivity reached new depths in the following 10th FYP. Although wages may have risen

531 Hosking, p. 363.
532 The 9th plan foresaw a gross production increase in Sector A of 46.3% and in Sector B of 48.6%; the official figures for the actual increase give 46.0% and 37.0%, respectively. Whereas on an annual base increases were planned to be 7.9% and 8.3% for Sectors A and B, respectively, the official actual figures give 7.9% and 6.5%. So much for going against the state economic ministries’ interests. Cf. Brunner (FN 515), p. 28.
during this era, the availability of consumer durables appears to have sunk and shortages increased. The following section will explore some of the key factors responsible for this, concentrating on the Union labour market, its handling by the Central authorities, and the problems these had in view of the socio-economic and socio-demographic developments in the population at large.

5.1.2.2 Economy, Labour Market, and Socio-Economic Problems
Despite some tinkering with the general economic policy, all efforts to achieve a more effective and efficient performance were to no avail. A combination of negative factors led consequently to the slowing down of industrial production during the 1970s, among which were ‘…hoarding, over-application for material allocations, production and construction delays.’ The economy of the Brezhnev era was marked by inefficiency, waste, and poor coordination. Bottlenecks in the supply both of raw materials and of pre-products occurred either because of plants or railway transport not delivering on time. The unreliability of supplies led at different production venues further down the line to ordering more than was needed and holding back parts of their own production output so as to not overshoot targets. Forced periods of idleness were used by staff for running errands on company time, going shopping for hours on end, turning up late and having extensive tea breaks. As production targets had to be met, the last third or quarter of the month, and the last quarter in the year, were the scene of hectic production activity around the clock with compulsory overtime – the so-called sturmovshchinas. In these periods the quantitative output targets would be hit as well as possible, but at the expense of quality. Some of these targets were cast in ridiculously inept measures: fauteuils were produced by weight, not number, which resulted in gigantic blocks of one-seaters to fulfil the plan figures. Other indicators of ‘successful’ production plans were rouble value of various goods or square metres of housing. This had little or nothing to do with the requirements of the customers, neither in industry, nor in the population at large. The continuous resolutions from the top demanding ‘greater attention’ to their requirements became a waste of time and paper.

Not only would material be hoarded, the same applied to the human factor on which much of the production depended. Since much idle time wasted proper production time, resulting in low productivity, all the more hands were needed still to come up with the relevant production figures, not least because the plant directors’ bonuses depended on them. As the bonus itself was allocated on the base of staff numbers and plan fulfilment, the plant leadership had double reason to hoard labour, too. Thirdly, absenteeism and the generally high labour turnover made it advisable to have extra workers to meet the shortfall caused by this. Fourthly, people were simply kept on because dismissals occurred but for the most blatant neglect and flagrant disregard by an individual for his or her job. The process of dismissal was cumbersome and involved compulsorily finding this person another job, as the state did not approve of visible unemployment which it said was only a problem in the West. At the same time, investment policy in the USSR had been geared towards mechanising the main production processes, but completely

533 Nove, Economic History, p.368.
534 For an almost classic example of Soviet economic organisation, cf. on the oil trade Stephen White: After Gorbachev, Cambridge etc.: CUP, 1993, p. 181.
neglected the auxiliary functions – hence loaders, assemblers, sorters, packers, and other manual labour jobs are engaged in loading or unloading work, or in intra-plant transportation. The productivity was comparatively low: in comparison with Western plants, 30% to 50% more workers were employed, and imported manufacturing units were operated by 150% of operating personnel, 350% technical, engineering and administrative staff, and 800% auxiliary staff compared to Western staff levels for the same units.

The consequent wastage of much labour thus led to bottlenecks at other plants, as net reproduction of the USSR population could not supply the labour demanded in the Western parts of the Soviet economy. Job vacancies, not to say labour shortages, occurred in the Siberian areas that were extensively developed during the 1970s; the hoarding of labour deepened this problem. At the same time, the Central Asian republics experienced huge population increases while not being very prone to migrating to areas with higher job vacancies. Therefore plants started to compete with each other for workers with each other. As forced-draft labour had been abandoned in 1956 and people were not only constitutionally guaranteed a job but could also migrate wherever they pleased, unless they would not get a propiska in the relevant town, they became more choosy. By the 1970s, the Soviet society had become highly mobile as a result of the structure of the economy. According to theory, the state set the wage level and increments for a certain job, whose remuneration would therefore have to be the same everywhere in the Union. In daily life, this was not the case. There were also regional differences – extra allowances or special supplies for certain areas so as to entice people to work in otherwise uninhabitable areas such as the Northern Region of the USSR, e.g. in Siberia, where many large projects involved massive investments to exploit the natural resources such as timber, oil or gas, or commodities such as gold, but which were experiencing high labour fluctuation and shortfalls.

Regional and sectorial labour shortages caused actual competition between ministries and plants for labour. Wage levels and salaries fixed by the state had to be topped up by other incentives to circumvent this problem. Hence newspaper ads or even radio and TV announced job vacancies together with attractive promises of perks: this was the most common way of plants contracting labour, as only the smallest of shares were still administratively transferred. In addition to the remuneration package, which was not decisive by itself, other factors were important at the workplace, such as general dissatisfaction with overall work conditions including shift work and running excess overtime as well as missing chances for promotion and further job training: from the mid-1960s, the education system provided too many highly trained technical staff which made the white-collar ranks full to overflowing; consequently progressively many specialists had to work in lower-

\[ \text{\textsuperscript{535}} \text{ Cf. Schroeder, pp. 6-7.} \]
\[ \text{\textsuperscript{536}} \text{ Lane, p. 32-33.} \]
\[ \text{\textsuperscript{537}} \text{ In more detail cf. Hermann Clement: 'Siberia: Resource or Burden', in: BIOst (Ed.): The Soviet Union 1984/85. Events, Problems, Perspectives, Boulder and London: Westview, 1986, pp. 169-178. To give one perspective, Siberia is territorially about as large as fifty times the old FRG was before 1989, extending up to 4,000 km north-south and 6,000 east-west. Also in detail, cf. Uldgaard, ch. 4: 'Kola und Sibirien: Jagd auf die Ressourcen', in: idem (FN 507), pp. 77-101.} \]
\[ \text{\textsuperscript{538}} \text{ Nove, Sowjetisches Wirtschaftssystem, p. 245; Schroeder, pp. 6-7; Höhmann / Seidenstecher, p. 93.} \]
ranking blue-collar work for which they were overqualified.\(^{539}\) Clearly this did not increase job satisfaction. General conditions such as housing allotment and long distances that workers would have to commute also gave rise to disenchantment. In places such as the towns in Siberia, fruit was a luxury, as was quality housing against the cold. Together with family reasons such as marriage or child birth, these were the major reasons for potential migrants to move on. During 1968-1972 some 176 million working days were lost annually because of individuals leaving their workplace and searching for a new one. One in five changed workplace with a loss to the economy of around 30 working days per person or the equivalent of some 1.7 million employees per year.\(^{540}\)

While a certain fluctuation of labour would be welcomed, especially in the North and Far East of the USSR where new labour was badly needed to get the huge development projects going, such functional migration which was usually based on socioeconomic grounds and incentives would be more in the interests of the economy and thus of the planning authorities. However, migration, especially labour migration, happened increasingly spontaneously and included further decision-making factors, including extra-economic ones such as the quality of life which also comprises the geographical climate or the distance to cultural and social amenities. Therefore, west-east and south-north migration would be in the interests of the planners; what happened was east-west and north-south migration. The central planning authorities during 1976-80 made strenuous efforts aimed at reducing the number of labour migrants moving from those places in the areas of the Soviet Union which experienced severe shortages. As the RSFSR’s production sector was especially hard hit, this began to affect the economic development of the Union which had never run smoothly at the best of times.\(^{541}\)

The actual reasons given above do not fit with what the planners identified as main problem of labour force planning: balances would have to be calculated more ‘scientifically’; also they were to be prepared on annual and quinquennial bases at all levels from Gosplan down to the local authorities. Again, this ignored the fact that not mistakes, shortcomings and malfunctions would have to be the eliminated so as to improve the system’s working which basically functioned well – on the contrary, it was the system itself that was responsible for all these shortcomings, with a planning apparatus whose ‘plan’ comprised too many indexes in too complex and complicated a world as still to be operable in a Soviet economy gone out of proportion. Most importantly, it ignored the fact that individuals ‘in contrast to shirt fronts’ (Nove) had a will, and individual interests for which the plan did not care. It appears that neither did the individuals care any more for the plan, or ‘the system’ at large from which they were alienated.\(^{542}\)

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\(^{539}\) Cf. Hosking, p. 402. Education was no longer the ‘golden passport’ to success but its precondition; by the 1970s a secondary education was commonplace, with 58.8% and 70.5% of the working population in 1970 and 1979, respectively, having attained such a diploma; 6.5% and 10%, respectively, had a higher education.


\(^{541}\) Tepp, Eesti Statistika (10), 1994, p. 16; on the efforts at controlling labour migration, cf. Höhmann / Seidenstecher, pp. 67-69.

5.2 Migration and Demographic Developments

Two censuses are available for this period; the first was held in 1970, the second in 1979. The 1970 census counted 91 nationalities, 22 of whom were bigger than 1 million and represented 96% of the USSR’s population. The number of ethnic groups that were distinguishable in 1970 were more than 180. This census was the first which included language capabilities other than the native language. For the first time, too, survey data is available from 1970, 1975, and 1989 on the reasons for migration. Both factors will be examined in some detail to follow as closely as possible demographic developments.

Between the 1970 and 1979 censuses, the actual ESSR population increased from a total of 1,356,079 to 1,465,799, or by 8.1%; the resident population increased from 1,354,613 to 1,464,476 by the same rate. In the ESSR, it was the urban population which carried most of the entire ESSR’s natural increase; surely this was one effect of the by now notoriously large number of migrants settling in urban rather than rural areas, as well as that of their comparative youth as opposed to the relatively higher age of the Estonian titular population. By consequence, this in-migrating population had both a higher degree of economic activity and a higher reproduction rate than the titular population. As indicated before, Estonians did not welcome ever-increasing numbers of immigrants. Together with their steady reproduction rates which would usually be below replacement level, a feeling of impending doom and the dying out of the Estonian people set in. Examples from both Kazakhstan and Latvia where the titular population either was or was close to becoming a minority in their own country, would deepen this feeling. Clearly the incoming migrants would be made responsible for that, as they were still the representatives of Moscow, of the Centre with which they would identify the most. The majority of them still were Russians, but from the 1970s it is commonly acknowledged that they had a new quality which expressed itself in even more demands with regard to jobs, housing, and living conditions. Adding insult to injury, they were mostly even less willing to even contemplate integrating into the society by learning Estonian. Even though the population at large became increasingly settled, these migrants were part of a new type which came up during the 1970s and proved to be highly restless, using several stops to achieve their main aim – betterment. As this meant frequent changes in job and residence, this gave the Estonian word ‘migrant’ a distinctly negative connotation. It added to the fairly low esteem in which these migrandid were held by the Estonian society at large.

On a Union level, the annual share in population growth between 1959 and 1970 decreased from 1.68% p.a. to 0.94% p.a., while at the same time overageing of the population increased.

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As a result, the planners of the Union-wide 1970 population census counted some 10 million people less than the expected number of more than 250 million people inhabiting the Soviet Union. Unsurprisingly, no amount of – frankly ridiculous – orders and medals would entice the population to increase what might be termed their reproductive work (‘Heroic Mother’, ‘Glory of Motherhood’): this was more the case in the Central Asian republics where in addition no incentive was needed. Again on a Union-wide scale, urban population would not reproduce itself from the 1960s, so migration was the responsible agent for the continued growth in urban populations. Indeed, the USSR’s population appears to have been at its most mobile during the 1970s.

The example of urban areas in the ESSR which actually contributed the most to the natural increase runs against this general trend, but this was connected to the already noted higher reproductive activity which migrants had and who represented the major reason for urban population growth in the first place.

However, overall migration into the ESSR decreased, although it certainly did not cease; therefore, some internal migration must have taken place, most of which will have been rural-urban: for at the same time that the total ESSR population grew by 8.1% between 1970 and 1979, its urban population grew by a full 16% from 881,168 to 1,022,258. Simultaneously, the rural population decreased by 31,370 or 6.6% on the 1970 total; but only 6,815 individuals were due to natural loss. The remainder of 24,555 individuals lost to the urban population are very probably rural-urban migrants. The 1970-1979 urban population increase of 141,090 must consequently have been carried by a total of three factors: in-migration from outside the ESSR (42.6%); rural-urban migration inside the ESSR (24,555 or 17.4%), and natural increase (56,383 or 40.0%). This is reflected to a large degree on the Union level, where net migration had a higher share than natural population growth in the urban population increase during 1959-69 and 1970-1978: of the 36 million and 27.6 million, by which it grew, 45.6% and 48.9% of the rise, respectively, were caused by net migration; 40.6% and 43.5%, respectively, were caused by natural increase. The remaining increase was caused by administrative reorganisations, such as the redrawing of territorial boundaries or upgrading the status of villages to towns and/or their inclusion into city boundaries.

As there is hardly any more evidence of administrative transfers to the ESSR for work or otherwise, first surveys show that private and family reasons carry much more weight than work for a migrant to come to the ESSR. This increased the prevailing trend in ESSR migration of migrants becoming increasingly settled while on a Union-wide scale, migration was a rather common phenomenon: according to certain estimates, some 15 million individuals changed their place of residence at the turn of the 1970s. Apparently the discrepancies and contradictions between ideology and actual fact also include matters migratory. ‘Private’ reasons for migration may well have hidden the actual job-seeking character of the relevant interviewees who may have come to the Baltic because it was regarded a part of the entire Union labour market like any other area,
except that living conditions were better. Increasingly two factor groups of socio-
-economic and geographic-climatic reasons for migration may consequently be dis-
cerned. Indeed, on a Union-wide level, great shock projects still held sway, and the
huge Baikal-Amur-Railway (BAM) or the power station built at Bratsk in the Urals
pulled in large numbers of komsomol youth as well as ‘ordinary’ workers. While the
former however still had some idealism to join these projects, the latter had to be en-
ticed to come to these and other places with much better housing and general living
conditions, including higher pay and earlier retirement; turnover in these Siberian places
in the almost literal middle-of-nowhere of the Russian Federation’s High North was
extremely high. Thus, migrants coming to the ESSR and remaining there will have there-
fore been voluntary migrants in search of betterment.

5.2.1 Natural Population Increase
During 1965-1985, the natural population increase was comparatively low. The ‘me-
chanical’ increase, i.e. migration, was responsible for the largest part in the ESSR’s
population growth. Over the entire period, only the urban population balance increased;
as opposed to this, the respective figures for the rural population were constantly nega-
tive.552 As Estonians were much more rural a population than were the predominantly
urbanised non-Estonians, and as a native population also older as the generally younger
in-migrants, this had a profound impact on the overall development: births with Estonian
mothers experienced a drop by 80% during 1971-75 and only little recovered until the
end of Chernenko’s reign. As opposed to this, the birth rate with non-Estonian mothers
remained constantly above 4,000 with relatively little swing. As will be shown below,
the 1970s and 1980s saw hardly any population increase among Estonians, while the
non-Estonian population grew both naturally and by in-migration.

The total fertility rate (TFR), data of which are only available from 1970, reflects the
low birth rate above. The demographic minimum rate for a sustained population level,
also called the replacement level, is 2.1. Between 1970 and 1985 the ESSR’s TFR
hovered around this figure: from 2.16 in 1970, the next year brought a ‘peak’ in the
development with a rate of 2.19; after this, the rate went down to 2.07 in 1974 and
2.01 in 1979. After a low of 2.02 in 1980 the rate increased again, if only a slightly as
the above decrease had been; it reached 2.07 in 1981, 2.16 in 1983 and 2.17 in 1984.
The following year saw a brief decline to 2.12. By consequence, this means that the
natural population growth remained barely at replacement level. Reformulated as the
gross reproduction rate, this trend can be shown as a value above or below 1, indicating
a natural decline or rise in the population, respectively. Over the entire period in ques-
tion, the rate went slightly below 1 in 1975 and during 1978-80, but never reached
higher than 1.07 at all other times.553

552 Cf. in detail: ESA 1992, Table: ‘Natural Increase’, p. 34.
fertility rate, gross reproduction rate, mean age of mother at childbirth and proportion of live
Figure 5.6: ESSR Natural Population Increase in Urban and Rural Areas, 1970-85

Absolute figures for births by Estonian mothers remained in a band of between 12,642 in 1965 and 14,504 in 1971, after this, figures remained in the 13,000s until 1982; deaths remained between 11,324 in 1965 and 12,435 in 1969, from 1975 until 1985 they remained rather high. At the same time, deaths among Estonians remained almost at equally high levels. Consequently, the balance resulting from this for Estonians is a rather low 1,179, reaching 2,412 as the highest number in 1971; after this, the natural increase went down in leaps: 1,572 in 1972; already 1,137 in 1973. The short counter-move to 1,522 in 1974 reversed even more in 1975 and led to a plunge down to 477 and 117 in the following year. During 1978-81 the natural population growth was actually negative. A short increase to 638 and 727 in 1982 and 1983 was followed by another plunge to 157 in 1984 and -152 in 1985.

Net increase data on a year-on-year base are presently also available only from 1970. From 1965, levels appear to have increased somewhat, reaching 6,366 in 1970: the urban and rural figures are 6,977 and -611, respectively. A peak ensued in the following year, reaching a net increase of 7,080 (7,353 urban and -273 rural) in the population, after which it declined. From 1970 until and including 1978, the population increased by a total of 49,568; the urban figure of 56,383 was reduced to some degree by the loss of 6,815 in the rural population. Especially during the second half of the 1970s was the loss in the rural population rather pronounced: figures remained con-

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554 Data from ESA 1992, p. 34.
stantly higher than -1000, reaching -1356 in 1979. In 1977 the death rate slightly improved, but still did not sink below -900. The high death rate in the rural population is indicative of both overageing and the economic situation of the time; it was in this period that food supplies dwindled and living conditions got harder. In addition, the labour participation rate of women in the Soviet economy was among the highest in the world. They consequently not only had to work to make available a second disposable income for the family but also had to run the entire household which Soviet men did not regard as part of their duty. This included everything from shopping to cleaning the house – and taking care of the children.

Although it is not clear if and how far death rates were influenced by this event, note that from December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and sent large numbers of troops there. It may be that conscripts cohorts born in the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s may have been adversely affected by the number of deaths that clearly occurred; also there may be secondary losses to the population. At this stage, it is however impossible to relate any of those unfortunate deaths to the ESSR or USSR population figures. Both were severely hit.

Table 5.10: ESSR Natural Net Increase, 1970-85

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Balance</th>
<th>Urban % of total</th>
<th>Rural % of total</th>
<th>Estonians % of total</th>
<th>Non-Estonians % of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>6,366</td>
<td>6,977 109.6</td>
<td>-611 n.a.</td>
<td>2,073 32.6</td>
<td>4,293 67.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>7,080</td>
<td>7,353 103.9</td>
<td>-273 n.a.</td>
<td>2,412 34.1</td>
<td>4,668 65.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>6,237</td>
<td>6,920 111.0</td>
<td>-683 n.a.</td>
<td>1,572 25.2</td>
<td>4,665 74.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>5,666</td>
<td>6,296 111.1</td>
<td>-630 n.a.</td>
<td>1,137 20.1</td>
<td>4,529 79.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>6,068</td>
<td>6,573 108.3</td>
<td>-505 n.a.</td>
<td>1,522 25.1</td>
<td>4,546 74.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>4,788</td>
<td>5,694 118.9</td>
<td>-906 n.a.</td>
<td>477 10.0</td>
<td>4,311 90.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>4,450</td>
<td>5,517 124.0</td>
<td>-1,067 n.a.</td>
<td>117 2.6</td>
<td>4,333 97.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>4,883</td>
<td>5,821 119.2</td>
<td>-938 n.a.</td>
<td>525 10.8</td>
<td>4,358 89.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>4,030</td>
<td>5,232 129.8</td>
<td>-1,202 n.a.</td>
<td>86 n.a.</td>
<td>4,116 102.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>3,817</td>
<td>5,173 135.5</td>
<td>-1,354 n.a.</td>
<td>247 n.a.</td>
<td>4,064 106.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>4,005</td>
<td>5,005 100.0</td>
<td>-1,000 n.a.</td>
<td>190 n.a.</td>
<td>4,195 104.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>4,588</td>
<td>5,495 119.8</td>
<td>-907 n.a.</td>
<td>61 n.a.</td>
<td>4,749 103.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>2,535</td>
<td>5,692 108.7</td>
<td>-457 n.a.</td>
<td>638 12.2</td>
<td>4,608 88.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>5,965</td>
<td>6,405 107.4</td>
<td>-440 n.a.</td>
<td>727 12.2</td>
<td>5,246 87.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>5,148</td>
<td>5,698 110.7</td>
<td>-550 n.a.</td>
<td>157 3.0</td>
<td>5,004 97.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>4,287</td>
<td>5,041 117.6</td>
<td>-754 n.a.</td>
<td>152 n.a.</td>
<td>4,439 103.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Discrepancy due to different totals for 1982-1984 rural/urban and Estonian/Non-Estonian figures: 5,235 is given in table on natural increase; e.g. for 1982, figures for ethnic distribution add up to 5,246. The error was not corrected in the original source tables. The difference is however only between 8 and 13 persons.

Source: ESA 1992, Tables ‘Natural Increase’ and ‘Natural Increase by Sex and Nationality’, pp. 34, 35. Relative shares are by author’s own calculations.

The main reason for a relatively large natural increase in the non-Estonian as opposed to the native Estonian population is the age difference: Estonians were generally older than the usually younger in-coming migrants who, as pointed out before, had a higher rate of reproduction in addition. Consequently, Estonian death rates were higher. As indicated in the chapter on the economy, living conditions in the 1970s became desperately problemactic, as even the official figures on the 1976-1980 FYP showed. Not only did divorce rates or alcohol consumption rise. It was fairly commonplace for a woman to have several abortions, at times up to a dozen. This was the main means of birth control.
as most ‘western’ forms of contraceptives were not available.\footnote{Misiunas/Taagepera, p. 224.} Additional problems were missing kindergarten places as well as unfulfilled material wishes which both may have contributed to very low birth rates during the 1970s.\footnote{Carrère d’Encausse, p. 62, pointed this out already for the 1959-1979 period.} Among the reasons for the relative high death rates and actually negative natural growth among Estonians there are two groups: natural causes such as old age; most of deaths occurred indeed with elderly Estonians. In addition, unnatural causes may have added significantly to the problematically high number of deaths which resulted in actually negative natural growth with the Estonians. The 1970s were exceptionally hard on the population which in part may explain the high rate of drink related incidents as well as very high numbers of suicides – unfortunately Estonians have ranged with Fins and Hungarians at the top in Europe. In 1980, the suicide rate was 33.7 per 100,000 inhabitants; in 1985, it stood at 30.6 per 100,000 inhabitants, which e.g. compared to German figures is rather high. According to some estimates, in 1985 every inhabitant consumed 13 litres of pure alcohol per year. As noted above, drink was therefore a serious social problem, with consumption patterns some 12% above USSR average. Yet both drink and suicides were forbidden topics for discussion.\footnote{Tiit, p. 1864 and table ibid. Also ESA 1992, p. 33. For comparison: In Germany in 1985 and 1992, the suicide rates were 21 and 17 per 100,000, respectively. Cf. Statistisches Bundesamt (Ed.): Datenreport 1987, Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 1987, p. 173, and Table 2, p. 35; author’s own calculations; Statistisches Bundesamt (Ed.): Datenreport 1994, Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, corrected and updated reprint, 1995, p. 180.}

Figure 5.7: ESSR Population Natural Net Increase, Estonians / Non-Estonians, 1970-85

Source: ESA 1992, p. 34.
5.2.2 Intra-Soviet Migration with ESSR, 1966-1985

As in the previous sections on migration, this section too will follow the traditional quinquennial periods of the FYPs, covering the 8th through 11th FYPs from 1966-1985. As in politics and economic questions, the interlude of Andropov’s and Chernenko’s short reigns will be included. From the high of 1966-70, the main trend was a continued decrease of gross migration to the ESSR in the 1970s and 1980s; on the other hand, again there were peaks in several years standing out on a year-on-year base, e.g. in 1975. Over the entire period under observation in this subchapter, a long-term decrease in net in-migration could be observed; even though the RSFSR’s share in the migration figures sank in both net and relative terms, it still remained the main sending republic for the ESSR. Also, while more outlying parts of the RSFSR and USSR would start to send migrants, the major sending regions still remained those mentioned before: Leningrad, Pskov and Tver districts, also Krasnodar Krai, and Murmansk, Moscow, and Arkhangelsk districts.  

The migration balance for the five-year periods between 1966 and 1985 looked as follows: 1966-70, 42,493; 1971-75, 31,760; 1976-1980, 28,398, and 1981-85, 28,152. Thus, looking at the resulting average annual growth there is a clear trend towards a decreasing balance of migration into the ESSR: 8,498 in 1966-70; 6,352 in 1971-75; 5,680 in 1976-80; and 5,630 in 1981-85. Urbanisation increased further, from 65% to 70% during 1970-1979; it had been 56% in 1959.

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561 Tepp, ESA (10), 1994, p. 16.
Table 5.11: Annual External Migration With ESSR, 1966-1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total In</th>
<th>From Urban</th>
<th>From Rural</th>
<th>Total Out</th>
<th>To Urban</th>
<th>To Rural</th>
<th>Total Net</th>
<th>From/To Urban</th>
<th>From/To Rural</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>23112</td>
<td>14212</td>
<td>8664</td>
<td>16712</td>
<td>12103</td>
<td>4380</td>
<td>6404</td>
<td>2109</td>
<td>4284</td>
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<td>1967</td>
<td>21903</td>
<td>13789</td>
<td>7888</td>
<td>18261</td>
<td>12734</td>
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<td>1968</td>
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<td>10829</td>
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<td>1969</td>
<td>31936</td>
<td>19898</td>
<td>11251</td>
<td>20318</td>
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<td>13631</td>
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<td>50252</td>
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<td>44950</td>
<td>98629</td>
<td>70414</td>
<td>19983</td>
<td>31760</td>
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<td>12810</td>
<td>3597</td>
<td>5762</td>
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<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>22088</td>
<td>15095</td>
<td>6608</td>
<td>17189</td>
<td>12541</td>
<td>3791</td>
<td>4899</td>
<td>2554</td>
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<td>14447</td>
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<td>3461</td>
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<td>77149</td>
<td>35112</td>
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<td>61719</td>
<td>17496</td>
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<td>5733</td>
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<td>3901</td>
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<td>10498</td>
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<td>13633</td>
<td>10443</td>
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<td>12619</td>
<td>9432</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981-1985</td>
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<td>23400</td>
<td>67073</td>
<td>12718</td>
<td>3716</td>
<td>28152</td>
<td>16636</td>
<td>10682</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Totals include ‘unknown’ figures for sending and receiving areas.

Source: Adapted and recalculated from ESA data, ‘Table 3. External Migration between Estonia and Other States (General Data)’, in: *Eesti Statistika*, (9(33)), 1994, pp. 30-31; ‘Table 4. External Migration between Estonian Towns and Other States (General Data)’ in: *Eesti Statistika*, (9(33)), 1994, pp. 32-33; ‘Table 5. External Migration between Rural Areas Estonia and Other States (General Data)’ in: *Eesti Statistika*, (9(33)), 1994, pp. 34-55;...  

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564 Also cf. Lembit Tepp: ‘Ravastiku välisrände lähte- ja sihtkohad’, in: *Eesti Statistika* (10), 1994, pp. 11-18. Interestingly, the available data from the USSR State Committee on Statistics give higher saldo figures for all covered periods from 1961-1990, the total of which is, according to the figures provided by Perevedentsiev (FN 548), 197,500. For this period, the data is as follows: 1961-1965: 43,200 (average: 8,640/a); 1966-1970: 48,000 (9,600); 1971-1975: 32,900 (6,580); 1976-1980: 27,500 (5,500); 1981-1985: 27,900 (5,580); 1986-1990: 18,000 (3,600); compared to the figures from ESA, whose total for 1961-1990 is 178,814, there is a difference between the two grand totals of 18,686. Also, while until 1975 the USSR Goskomstat data are higher than the Estonian, from 1976 to 1985 the differences decrease; however, for the 1986-1990 period the difference is especially high: 10,490. Unfortunately, these differences can only be recorded, as there is no precise information available conducive to explaining it. Cf. Perevedentsiev (FN 548), ‘Table 16: Balance of inter-republic migration’, at p.12.
5.2.2.1 Sending Areas and Changing Composition of Migrants

In terms of the sending areas, the composition changed, and the share of migrants from the RSFSR generally decreased, although erratically. Over the above period of time, other sending republics could increase their share vis-à-vis the RSFSR share. These were especially Central Asian republics; however, the main reason for this appears to have been the migration of Volga Germans who had been deported to these areas and were now free to move to other republics. Many of them chose the Baltic republics where not only existed better living conditions, but apparently also better conditions for emigration to the West. In 1968, some 1,200 migrants arrived from the Tadzhik SSR; around the same figures arrived in the following two years from Kazakh SSR. From 1971 the figures declined. Other senders were the Kirgise and Uzbek SSRs. \(^{565}\)

Consistent with the migration of Volga Germans to the Baltic republics, a sudden rise in gross in-migration figures occurred in 1968, lasting until 1970, where it peaked, and declined from 1971 onwards. Since however out-migration during 1968-70 did not rise correspondingly, the annual balance rose above 11,000 in 1970. After this, only moderate short outbursts from the continuing decrease in both gross and net in-migration occurred. The main reason for this migration was that from 1964 the Germans were freed from forced settlement and rehabilitated; as most of them waited for their turn to complete their emigration papers, many found proceedings in the Baltic states easier to complete. \(^{566}\) This included the downsizing of migration from Central Asia, including Volga Germans. Short-term migration was noted for the first time with regard to this period; a large number of seasonal workers from Ukraine came to work in the ESSR forest and wood industry. \(^{567}\)


\(^{566}\) Kurs / Berg, p. 269.

The RSFSR share in the gross and net in-migration differed between the various periods, the latter being considerably higher than the former: 64.4% of the gross total in-migration were ethnic Russians, as opposed to 69.0% of the net in-migration for the 1966-1970 period. After this, the figure went up to 68.2% (84.2%) in 1971-75, only to decrease again to 66.0% (81.9%) and 61.3% (60.1%) in the following two periods. This means that migrants from this republic, usually but not exclusively ethnic Russians, tend to remain in the ESSR at a higher rate than their actual share in the gross in-migration figures. Other ethnic groups, therefore, are more prone to move on than those ethnic Russians appear to be. Ethnic Germans and Jews who came to the Baltic may well have come to emigrate. Others are more likely to use the Baltic republics as launch pads to other cities.

The administrative measures introduced in the 1976-80 period and continued into the next five-year period, 1981-85, seem indeed to have resulted in a reduction of labour migration, and indeed net overall migration from the RSFSR into the ESSR; while the decrease in the first period was not quite as strong, it grew in the second period. Note however that the overall balance of migration with other USSR republics remained about the same, i.e. 28,398 in the first period, 28,152 in the second. For the RSFSR, the absolute figures for these periods were 23,259 and 16,925, respectively. As the Ukrainian SSR’s absolute figures almost remained at almost the same level in the first period and even markedly rose in the second, the relative Ukrainian share in migration rose while the RSFSR’s share consequently sank: from 15.5% to 17.9% for the former, and from 81.9% down to 60.1% of the total for the RSFSR.  

Table 5.12: Gross Migration into Estonian SSR from the RSFSR, Ukrainian SSR, Byelorussian SSR, 1966-1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ESSR Arrivals</th>
<th>RSFSR</th>
<th>Ukrainian SSR</th>
<th>Byelorussian SSR</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Period</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Northern Region</td>
<td>N. Western Region</td>
<td>Central Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-1970</td>
<td>87,577.00</td>
<td>9,652.00</td>
<td>31,398.00</td>
<td>14,030.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-1975</td>
<td>88,882.00</td>
<td>9,044.00</td>
<td>29,642.00</td>
<td>15,280.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-1980</td>
<td>75,402.00</td>
<td>6,369.00</td>
<td>23,837.00</td>
<td>12,395.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-1985</td>
<td>58,420.00</td>
<td>4,512.00</td>
<td>17,071.00</td>
<td>9,947.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-1985</td>
<td>310,281.00</td>
<td>29,577.00</td>
<td>101,948.00</td>
<td>51,652.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-1990</td>
<td>785,113.00</td>
<td>67,781.00</td>
<td>290,302.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Annual average</td>
<td>310,281.00</td>
<td>29,577.00</td>
<td>101,948.00</td>
<td>51,652.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total</td>
<td>70.99</td>
<td>6.13</td>
<td>26.25</td>
<td>11.81</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| a | Includes Arkhangelsk and Murmansk Oblasts and the Karelian and Komi ASSRs. |
| b | Includes City and Oblast of Leningrad, as well as Novgorod and Pskov Oblasts, et al. |
| c | Includes City and Oblast of Moscow, also Bryansk, Ivanovo, Yaroslavl, Smolensk and Tver Oblasts, et al. |
| d | Includes City and Oblast of Kiev, also Lvov and Zhitomir Oblasts. |


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568 This will be discussed further in the final chapter, with particular reference to the place of birth of all non-Estonian in-migrants as displayed by the 1989 census figures. As people oftentimes moved more than once, people may be of a different ethnic origin than the republic whence they arrive from in the ESSR.


570 Tepp, Eesti Statistika (10), 1994, p. 16.
As for the reasons migrants came to the ESSR, two surveys are available for this period: one for 1970, another one for 1975.571 These are among the first sociological investigations in the population, for ‘social sciences’ were a largely taboo area and indeed mostly secret. Times being what they were, they may have been prone to falsification; still, since there are only few surveys of this kind, they will have to be given the benefit of the doubt. Although common wisdom would have it that migrants usually came for work, that they were blue-collar workers only (implying that they were also both badly educated and low paid), and that most migrants were single males, most of whom were administratively transferred, this interpretation with its implication of completely sinister motives behind a total Russification policy steered and controlled from a single Centre in Moscow, does not stand up to the survey results, whatever their worth, nor indeed to most of the results shown in the previous chapter and further below. Indeed, since decreasing job satisfaction and worsening living conditions across the Union lead to increasing East-West migration in search of betterment, it would appear that migration went largely out of control. However, this is not to suggest that the actual migration trends would have been totally counter to the Central interests; in the Baltic republics they tied in quite nicely as far as keeping the Union together by sending Russians and Ukrainians to the peripheries and securing them the most important, decision-making jobs. Yet rather than transfers purely administered by the Centre, people increasingly decided by themselves – as the Constitution gave everyone the right to a job, and dismissed workers had to be found a job by the dismissing plant, the powers of the workers increased with the increasing scarcity of available labour. Consequently, several important large projects in other areas of the Union, such as the Baikal-Amur Railway (BAM), the Kamaz project and Togliattigrad had huge problems in finding workers, and again Komsomol youth were ‘invited’.572

Far from the idea that only workers would come to Estonia, it is clear that most of the in-migrants of this period moved for family or personal reasons: In 1970, 30.6% migrated to join their family, 40.3% gave ‘personal reasons’; five years later, these figure were 45.6% and 22.6%, respectively, therefore family migration seems to have increased markedly. Another indicator for increased family migration is the share of male and female migrants giving this reason, although it must not be forgotten that many more women worked in the COMECON economies than in the West. Still, the 1970 rate of migrants giving ‘personal reasons’ is higher among males than among females: 35.7% and 45.5%, respectively. Those migrants giving ‘to join the family’ as their reason were only 21.5% of male, but 41.2% of female migrants. If the above aggregate figure of 30.6% of the total is now disaggregated by rural/urban family migration, there is a clear


preponderance of rural migration over urban: 44.1% and 26.1%, respectively. Again, more women than men migrated to join their families, with the highest share among rural migrants: 56.0% of women, but only 33.2% of men had this reason. Thus, in 1970 over half of female migrants from outside the ESSR moving to rural areas within the republic have been family or chain migrants, while in the cities, this was only little more than a third: 36.1%.\(^{573}\)

By 1975, only 18.6% gave ‘Coming to work’ as a reason. ‘Economic’ migrants were even fewer: only 10.1% admitted to have come to the ESSR to improve their living conditions. For those coming to work, as shown in the 1975 survey, about half or 9.2% did come on assignment to the ESSR, having graduated from a vocational school; only 3.2% and 3.1%, respectively, came because of an interesting job or better pay. From the 1975 group of chain or family migrants, 19.1% came to the ESSR together with the family head; 11.0% came for reasons of marriage or divorce; 9.0% came to join the family, the parents or the migrants’ children. This clearly demonstrates the existence of established migration channels. As opposed to 1970, where 6.7% came to study, five years later less than half of respondents came: only 3.2%. In 1975, almost a quarter of respondents, 22.6%, had unspecified ‘personal reasons’, although this group comprises 12.6% of respondents who came in search of a better life, disappointed of their former place of abode. The majority of the migrants who came to Estonia in this time did not settle. Those who did tended to remain at their first place of abode and not to move again.\(^{574}\)

5.2.2.2 Labour Migration, Urbanisation and Ethnic Distribution

For a long time in both USSR and ESSR history, the labour supply question did not appear to weigh heavily upon the minds of the planners, on the contrary: even the ESSR apparatus involved in this question, such as the ESSR Planning Committee, industry or plant directors appear to have been largely oblivious to the consequences of apparently permanent labour shortages and consequential ever-increasing labour imports from outside the ESSR. That too may have been an effect of the time: the decision-makers had become used to the idea and concept of a huge economic area, the USSR, one economic zone of which was the Western zone, part of which was the ESSR. All those parts were interlinked; decisions were taken in Moscow; and so the relevant persons were simply used to the idea that if more workers were needed, more could and would be supplied – from Moscow.\(^{575}\) From the late 1960s on and especially during the 1970s, however, an increasingly free labour market which encompassed the entire Union became less and less controllable, as people migrated where offers and conditions of both living and work were best.

Between 1959 and 1975 the entire ESSR workforce grew by 70% through migration, only 30% were supplied by natural growth.\(^{576}\) When in 1960 the number of workers (tööstustööliste (töötajate) arv) stood at 132,700, around 52,000 of them were

\(^{573}\) Table 11.41, pp. 295-297; for comparison with overall migration cf. Table 11.37.

\(^{574}\) For the 1970 census, cf. FN 571; For the 1975 data, cf. Tepp, Õesti Statistika (11), 1994, pp. 16-17, and English summary, pp. 21-22, at p. 22.

\(^{575}\) Kala, p. 517.

\(^{576}\) Kala, pp. 520, 519; also, Figure 3, p. 521.
non-Estonians. Around the middle of the 1960s, the increase in the number of industrial workers slowed down. Still, during the 1970s the share of workers in the population continued to increase, reaching 60%. Of those, the vast majority were employed in the productive sectors of the economy, mainly in the industry, building, and transport sectors, equalling 40.8% of the population and 68% of workers. From the figure of 182,100 in 1970 the number of workers in the ESSR economy rose to 208,200 persons in only seven years, with 80,700 and 113,500 non-Estonians participating in 1970 and 1977, respectively. The 1977 workforce thus represents an increase of one-and-a-half times the 1950 figure, with a share of non-Estonian workers up from 31% in 1948 to 54.5% in 1977. Note that as opposed to this, the non-Estonian shares in the ordinary populations never represented more than 35% by 1979 at the utmost. Unsurprisingly, as a result of further in-migration the share of Estonians and non-Estonians in the economy as a whole changed considerably, too: the Estonian share decreased from 67.7% in 1967 to 64.3% in 1973, reaching 62.1% and 60.5% in 1977 and 1983, respectively; the non-Estonian share thus rose from 22.3% to 29.5% over the whole Brezhnev era.577

It is instructive to find out about the further reasons of labour migrants and their distribution in the economy by looking at the wage levels of this period; the main point here is that those jobs that are politically-ideologically important will have better salaries than other, less important jobs – in ideological terms. Certain jobs were especially attractive; many of them were to be found among blue-collar workers in the production sector, especially in heavy industry and in the construction industry, as well as in transport. The wage levels of these jobs were higher than e.g. in services or in agriculture, although there were unwanted distortions during the 1970s as plants vied for workers by offering higher wages, perks, and other benefits.578 Thus, a welder may have earned more than a school teacher, but a welder at one plant may still have earned more than at a different one. Nevertheless, it was these ‘non-productive’ jobs, apart from rural jobs, that had the highest share of non-Estonians in the workplaces, as available figures for 1967-1983 show.

577 Kala p. 521; table 2 parts A to D, pp. 522-525; also cf. table 3, pp. 527-529, parts A-C, pp. 527-528.
Table 5.13: The Ethnic Composition of Workers in the ESSR Economy, 1967-1987 (%)

<table>
<thead>
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<td>70.7</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
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<td>32.0</td>
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<td>70.6</td>
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<td>67.4</td>
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<td>27.0</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>73.6</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>26.9</td>
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<tr>
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<td>87.2</td>
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<td>81.7</td>
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<td>12.8</td>
<td>18.7</td>
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<td>16.0</td>
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<td>Science / Academia</td>
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<td>70.2</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit and Insurance Offices</td>
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<td>60.6</td>
<td>69.7</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership Apparatus in State and Economy, Cooperatives and Public (Communal) Organisations, Courts and Law Establishments</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>76.3</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>23.7</td>
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<td>Total Economy</td>
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<td>62.1</td>
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<td>32.3</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>39.5</td>
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</table>


Traditionally, agriculture and sovkhoz workers were almost exclusively Estonian: the lowest share was 85%, although Estonians had an even higher share in forestry with over 90%; jobs in agriculture however were far from ideal and had suffered greatly from the strain put on them under both Stalin and Khrushchev. Further ‘non-productive’ jobs in the service sector such as health and sports (75% Estonian in 1967, 65% in 1983), education (c. 74% Estonian throughout), the cultural sector, arts (90.3% down to 81.7% 1967-83), trade (78.7% down to 71.1%) and leadership positions in administration and justice (77.9% down to 70.5%), were not only usually reserved to a greater or lesser degree for Estonians, but also for women: as these had a high labour participation rate in the economy, the above were typically ‘female’ jobs. They also were typi-

579 For a review of the developments in this area, cf. Elmar Järvesoo: ‘Die estnische Landwirtschaft während der Sowjetperiode 1945-1972’, in: Acta Baltica, 13, 1973, pp. 134-154. Under Brezhnev the situation improved markedly; and salaries were above the Union average: for 1970, this was 1,590 roubles net; in the ESSR, the salary was 2,730 – the highest after the Kazakh SSR with 3,670 roubles and the Turkmen SSR with 2,730 roubles in 1970. Cf. Järvesoo, p. 152.
cally at the lower end of the economy’s pay scale. During 1966-75 these jobs grew by some 44%, while the total of workers and employees grew by some 33%.\textsuperscript{580}

The higher paid jobs were in industry and construction; as opposed to this, jobs in communication were relatively low paid. In industry, the Estonian share was down to 56.8% in 1967 already, seven years later it stood at 51.4% and fell to 45.6% in 1983; as pointed out before, it was in this area that large numbers of non-Estonians would work. The above figures show their clear preponderance in this sector. In construction, Estonians had managed to maintain a higher share, so that 1967 some 66.4% would work in this area; by 1983, they were down to 59.9%. Communications maintained a fairly high share of Estonians, but even there their share decreased: 74.5% down to 67.9%.\textsuperscript{581} While the average salary in 1960 and 1965 was 81.9 and 99.9 roubles per month, it reached 140.3 roubles in 1971 – a rise of 65%. By comparison, the situation in agriculture improved dramatically, reaching salary levels of 62.8, 80.5, and 140.7 roubles per month in 1960, 1965, and 1971 – an increase of 100%. The construction industry had a better start, as their average monthly salary in 1960 had already been above average: 93.7 roubles. It jumped to 120.4 roubles in 1965 and reached 176.8 roubles by 1971, which, even though the rise was only 80% from 1960, was still much above average earnings. Communications in the sense of postal, telegraph and telephone services had an abysmally low rise between 1960 and 1971 – only 59%, which, given their low salary in 1960 of 62.1 roubles per month, resulted in a much below average salary of 102.4 roubles in 1971.\textsuperscript{582} In industry, the salaries were also above average: 93.1 roubles in 1960 and 110.4 roubles in 1966. Some 20-25% of employees and workers are low paid, with a salary of only 60 roubles in 1968; another 200,000 or so were workers who received 60 to 80 roubles.\textsuperscript{583} There was no area that did not have a share of non-Estonians, which given the historical developments until the Brezhnev era is hardly surprising. Yet as the short comparison above may have suggested, Estonians to a large degree had such jobs as were not particularly well paid, while non-Estonians usually worked in the high-pay industries. Certainly a select few Estonians will have worked in high-pay sectors, too. Yet some 450,000 out of 520,000 individuals who were in employment worked at between 70 and 100 roubles; another 50,000 already belonged to the elite, receiving twice the average salary at 185 roubles.\textsuperscript{584}


\textsuperscript{582} Järvesoo (FN 579), Table 5: ‘Vergleichendes Einkommen von Arbeitern und Angestellten in Estland in Rubel je Monat’, p. 151.

\textsuperscript{583} On the link between this low-paid work and the propiska system, cf. René Ahlberg: ‘Das sowjetische Passsystem. Ein Instrument bürokratischer Herrschaft’, in: OE 41(8), 1991, pp. 802-817, at p. 811. Apart from the construction industry, such branches as had underprivileged workers were also the textile, automotive, chemical, and metal industries.

\textsuperscript{584} This data from Elmar Järvesoo: ‘Die Wirtschaft Estlands und deren strukturelle Veränderungen’, in: Acta Baltica 9, 1969, pp. 9-45, at p. 30. For more details on the various branches of the ESSR economy cf. Arnold Purre: ‘Estlands Wirtschaft unter sowjetischer Herrschaft’, in: Acta Baltica 9, 1969, pp. 47-79. Purre also discusses living standards, food supplies and cost, as well as the problem of low-paid jobs; if the two highest paying groups with some 30,000 individuals earning more than 1,000 roubles per month are left out, the average monthly wage falls from 150 to a more realistic 92 roubles per month. Cf. Purre, ibid, pp. 77-78.
As indicated above, there were several areas whose workforce was almost exclusively non-Estonian. In transport, including rail and water transport, there was almost parity in 1967, after which non-Estonians dominated the field. Such areas or plants as would reach parity in their ethnic distribution of Estonian and non-Estonian workers and/or employees would increasingly be deserted by Estonians who generally disliked this sort of environment, not least because of their being forced to use Russian as a means of communication.\(^{585}\) in a survey conducted in 1986, whose general tendencies will have applied already in the 1960s and 1970s, 80% of Estonian interviewees would prefer to work with Estonian colleagues. 79% of them would prefer to live in a predominantly Estonian environment, and 82% would prefer Estonians as their neighbours.\(^{586}\)

Looking more closely at the industry sector, energy production, the oil shale industry, the machine building and metal working industries, the building supplies industries, as well as the light industry, already in 1967 were close to parity or were dominated by non-Estonians. Especially the oil shale industry had a share of non-Estonians of 69.8% in 1967, and 81.6% in 1983. In the machine building and metal working industries their share rose from 50.1% to 65.2% over the same period; the building suppliers saw a similar rise. All in all, the Estonians’ share in industry fell from 56.5% down to 41.6% over the 1967-1983 period, as the following figure and table show. Even though there is no clear and unequivocal link of in-migration numbers and their sending areas with their distribution within the ESSR, this is as close a link as can be provided at this point in time and as much proof as possible. The next table gives the share of non-Estonians in selected industrial plants, several of which may be part of the military-industrial complex (MIC). Over the available period of time, this shows that there is a concentration of non-Estonian in certain sectors of industry which generally have a higher status and consequently higher pay.

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Table 5.14: The Ethnic Composition of Workers in ESSR Manufacturing, 1967-1987 (%)

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<td>Electric Energy Production</td>
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<td>80.7</td>
<td>84.7</td>
<td>83.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Manufacturing</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>39.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Kulno Kala (as above), parts A to E of Table 3: ‘Eesti tööstustöötajate rahvuslik ja sooline koosseis aastail 1967-1987 (protsentides)’, pp. 537-529.

Figure 5.9: Share of Estonians in Total Workforce, 1948/50-1987

Source: Adapted from Kulno Kala (as above), Figure 3: ‘Toööstustöötajate arv ja eestlaste osaühitsus aastail 1948-1987’, p. 521.
Most importantly for the post-Soviet period is the concentration of non-Estonians in the North-Eastern and Tallinn’s industries which has to be seen in the light of and as a consequence of Soviet industrial production processes. As noted above, Soviet production was characterised by overstaffing, underutilisation of workers, bad logistics and poor organisation within plants. Consequently it is small wonder that many more people came to the ESSR than would be necessary in a Western economy: this was the Soviet one, in whose system both hoarding of workers and labour shortages were a constant. Their immigration to the ESSR was consequently an inherent part of the failure of the economic system, and necessary to staff the plants so they would function; it should be kept in mind that as bad as working conditions and as low as job satisfaction in the Soviet Union may have been, labour participation rates were among the highest in the world and at least on paper, full employment was the norm. In the late 1960s about 2/3 of the entire industrial labour force was employed in the towns of Narva and Kohtla-Järve, and Tallinn.\(^587\)

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\(^587\) Raun, Estonia and the Estonians, p. 198.

### Table 5.15: The Non-Estonian Workforce Composition of Selected Large-Scale Plants in the ESSR, 1973-1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Non-</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Non-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Estonian %</td>
<td>Estonian %</td>
<td>Estonian %</td>
<td>Estonian %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic Ferroconcrete Parts and Construction Works, Narva</td>
<td>1,259</td>
<td>97.0</td>
<td>1,004</td>
<td>98.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian Power Plant Building Department, Narva</td>
<td>727</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>718</td>
<td>82.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Põhjala’, Rubber Products Plant, Tallinn</td>
<td>2,011</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>2,027</td>
<td>62.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiviõli Oil Shale Chemical Factory</td>
<td>4,501</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>4,415</td>
<td>79.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Eesti Põlevkivi’ Oil Shale Mines (karjäärid?)</td>
<td>11,425</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>13,799</td>
<td>77.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Eesti Kaabel’ Estonian Cable, Tallinn</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>48.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronic Plant ‘Kalinin’, Tallinn</td>
<td>2678</td>
<td>87.9</td>
<td>2,717</td>
<td>83.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronic Plant ‘Pöögelmann’, Tallinn</td>
<td>3,195</td>
<td>63.1</td>
<td>3,192</td>
<td>66.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Volta’ Electric Devices Plant, Tallinn</td>
<td>2678</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>2,717</td>
<td>76.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tallinn Plant for Mechanical Engineering</td>
<td>1,980</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>2,019</td>
<td>68.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Talleks’ Excavators and other machinery, Tallinn</td>
<td>1,696</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>1,686</td>
<td>55.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Ilmarine’, Machine Building, Tallinn</td>
<td>935</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Estoplast’, Plastic Products, Tallinn</td>
<td>1,205</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>1,255</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tallinn Jewel Treatment Plant</td>
<td>773</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>796</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Machine Factory ‘Victory’, Tartu</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine Factory, Parnu</td>
<td>713</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>56.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical Plant, Maardu (Phosphate)</td>
<td>2,076</td>
<td>80.2</td>
<td>1,936</td>
<td>79.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^\text{a}\) H. Pöögelmann was a victim of the Great Purge and only posthumously rehabilitated; * indicates known all-Union plant.

For the post-Soviet reconstruction of the Estonian economy during the 1990s with its stringent liberal economic agenda and the painful transition this entailed, it was the area with the highest concentration of industry that was hit hardest by redundancies and consequent unemployment (but note that unemployment rates were even higher in the South, in Võru and its county!). As this area was mainly inhabited by ethnic Russians and other non-Estonians, they bore the brunt of the changes – the locations, staffing and ratios of ethnic participation in the labour forces in tables above clearly show this. Contrary to widespread opinion in the Slavic population at large, job losses were to the greatest degree attributable to the rationalisation process in many a firm and staff were hit because of the generic failures of the old system such as underutilisation and overstaffing which could no longer be supported. This means clearly that no malicious intent on the part of Estonians or the Estonian government was the main reason for their predicament, but the Soviet economy.

In the 1970s, general urban growth rates slowed down in the ESSR, so did industrial expansion. The republic’s urbanisation rates rose from 56% in 1959 to 65% in 1970, and continued to rise to 70% in 1979, although after that, the rise petered out; the high point of urbanisation in 1989 was 72%. By comparison, Union-wide urbanisation rates were permanently lower than in the ESSR: 48% in 1959 and 56% in 1970; by 1979 and 1989, the figures had reached 62% and 66%, respectively. The growth of the resident population in urban areas by both in-migration and natural increase resulted in a further tilting of the balance towards higher urbanisation. However, as shown above, the decline in the rural share of the population was also due to natural loss; between 1965 and 1985, the rate of natural increase in rural areas was constantly negative and population growth was sustained exclusively in urban areas.

The capital Tallinn and its agglomerations still grew, as did Sillamäe and Narva in the North-East and Tartu. Tallinn’s population rose from 362,706 to 415,196 during 1970-79 by 52,490 inhabitants, or by 14.5%. This is an average of around 5,800 persons annually, thus Tallinn would have passed the 400,000 mark by mid-1976. By 1979, over half of the total urban population thus lived in the capital. For the 1970 census, an interesting point is that over half of all migrants who came to Tallinn from outside the ESSR and had lived there for less than two years were between ages 16 and 24: 53.5%; the larger group is that of the 20-24 cohort with 36.0% of the total; note that the working age in the Soviet population started from age 16, with retiring age at 54 for women and 59 for men. Looking at the distribution between migrants from either rural or urban points of departure, this picture becomes more varied: only 47.4% of this age group came from urban areas, which of course is still a substantial figure; however, a full 70% of all migrants represented this age group within migrants from rural areas, with the difference being most pronounced in the 16-19 age band: 13.0% from urban, but 29.7% from rural backgrounds were in this age group. In the following age cohort,

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588 Cf. Perevedentsev (FN 548), Table 7: ‘City dwellers as a proportion of the population of Union republics’, p. 7.
589 ESA 1992, Table: ‘Natural Increase’, p. 34.
34.4% and a huge 40.3% came from urban and rural points of departure, respectively. The following age bands of ages 25-29 and 30-39 have considerably smaller share with 12.9% and 12.5% of the total; here, too, the shares of rural and urban departure points have switched: urban departures were 15.5% for the 25-29 age band, but only 6.0% of the rural share – the following group’s distribution figures are similar: 15.0 and 5.8%, respectively.

For this a number of reasons may be advanced. The passport-cum-propiska system may be at the heart of this for the 16-19 age group; transfer to work after graduation may count for the 20-24 group; and stopover on the way to larger centres such as Riga or Leningrad. A rather large number of the first, younger group may have come to Tallinn to obtain a passport from a town; note that these people reside in Tallinn for less than two years. It was common in the Soviet Union to shoo below-16s to relatives or friends in the next urban centre, or to make them join a tehnikum or a vocational school. Thus rural youth would be provided with the much sought-after passport which rural inhabitants would not get at least until the mid-1970s and were therefore barred from the towns but for the briefest of visits. This may have been one of the reasons why 29.7% of the 16-19 age group came from a rural background, other reasons being of course transfers to school or from school to work. The rather large share of 40.3% in the rural migration to Tallinn may be explained along similar lines; Tallinn may in this case have been a whistle-stop for one of the most mobile age groups on their way to the larger centres. As explained above, everything and everyone had a place in the hierarchy in the Soviet Union according to its importance to the Centre; Moscow held the top echelon in terms of the status of the city, workplace therein, and its inhabitants. Following this were Leningrad and the republican capitals (although Riga will have had a higher status than Tallinn, being at least twice as big), followed by other cities above 500,000 inhabitants, those between 100,000 and 500,000, and so on down to the last village. The lower the city’s or town’s importance to the Union, the less important industry, less plentiful and more qualitatively lower workplaces would be found. Conversely, having all-Union status meant much better conditions in almost every aspect of life. An inhabitant of a rural community was bound to try and make his way up top as early as possible lest he should forfeit his chance for a career and remain forever in a miserable position. Indeed, here too is one of the reasons why few if any returned to their village of origin; most will have clung to their urban passports and made strenuous efforts to find a job in town as soon as their compulsory post-graduation placement was over.

According to data by Sakkeus, 1975 and 1976 saw a sudden rise in in-migration from outside the ESSR, which may well point to a transfer of labour to the republic organised along the lines of the already mentioned Komsomol shock-projects. Although direct evidence is missing, surely some of the population growth in Tallinn and its surrounding County (Harjumaa) may be attributable to the building activities in the ESSR in both the industrial/commercial sector and private housing. This may have been caused by two main factors: part of the 1980 Olympic games were to be staged in the ESSR near Tallinn, especially the water-based sports such as rowing or yachting. An-

591 Hosking, pp. 393-394.
592 Hosking, pp. 374-376.
other was the new industrial harbour terminal built at Muuga on the East side of the Viimsi peninsula, also near Tallinn. Both factors resulted in massive building activities in the north-western ESSR, mainly in Harju County (Harjumaa), which even despite an overall economic downturn and resultant hard times for the population, was maintained. Indeed, the present Tallinn airport’s terminal was built especially for the Olympics. Further building activity connected with this was the Olympic yachting centre at Përita, some 5 km to the east of Tallinn, whose foundation stone was laid on 6 May 1976. A special four-lane highway was built in place of the former Përita road. The present Viru Hotel, situated in the centre of Tallinn, was opened in autumn 1972 and may have been a starting point in the preparations for the 1980 Olympics; the aptly named Hotel ‘Olümpia’ was finished closer to the event. More importantly, as most of the new building sites were in or near Tallinn, the city grew rapidly, and entire new housing districts had to be built: from 1962 to 1973, Mustamäe was built, immediately followed by Vääke-Õismäe, built between 1973 and 1978, while Lasnamäe’s construction started in 1977. Hence, from 1962, Tallinn experienced permanent building activity on a massive scale, for next to living quarters and buildings directly connected to the Olympic games, further construction included representative or administrative buildings such as a new City Hall, a new main Post Office building, and the renovation of the Niguliste Church as a concert venue.594

As mentioned above, among the workforces of bricklayers, miners or in railroad engineering, Slavs dominated. At any rate, the population of Tallinn continued to grow rapidly, reaching 369,583 inhabitants by the 1970 census and 441,800 by the 1979 census – an increase of 72,217 over 9 years, resulting in an average of some 8,000 new inhabitants per year. At the same time, the relative share of Estonians in the ethnic distribution of the capital’s population continued to decrease; in 1970, it was down to 55.7%, reaching 51.3% by 1979. The share would continue to decrease and by 1989, Estonians were in a minority in their capital of very nearly half a million inhabitants.595 Lasnamäe by then housed about a quarter of Tallinn’s population, i.e., over 120,000 people, with up to 60% non-Estonians. The surrounding County of Harju grew between

1970 and 1979 by another 6,000 or so inhabitants: from 82,838 to 88,970, with the town of Keila receiving a large share.

Table 5.16: Urban Non-Estonians in Selected Areas: Virumaa, Harjumaa, Lake Peipsi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>1970 absolute</th>
<th>% Non-Estonian</th>
<th>1979 absolute</th>
<th>% Non-Estonian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Virumaa (East and West)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiviõli (E)</td>
<td>11,153</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>11,050</td>
<td>55.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kohtla-Järve (E)</td>
<td>82,558</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>87,432</td>
<td>73.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loksa (W)</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>63.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narva (E)</td>
<td>61,346</td>
<td>93.1</td>
<td>75,909</td>
<td>95.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narva-Jõesuu (E)</td>
<td></td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td></td>
<td>83.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sillamäe (E)</td>
<td>13,505</td>
<td>95.1</td>
<td>16,157</td>
<td>95.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tapa (W)</td>
<td>10,037</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>10,851</td>
<td>57.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viivikonna (E)</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>88.0</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>90.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harjumaa (around Tallinn)</td>
<td>82,838</td>
<td></td>
<td>88,970</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tallinn</td>
<td>369,583</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>441,800</td>
<td>51.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maardu</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>78.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paldiski</td>
<td>6,907</td>
<td>94.5</td>
<td>7,311</td>
<td>96.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Lake Peipsi)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kallaste (Tartumaa)</td>
<td>1,604</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>1,413</td>
<td>76.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mustvee (Jõgevamaa)</td>
<td>2,227</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>2,087</td>
<td>55.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Italics indicate closed towns which ran a special entry regime (Sillamäe and Paldiski).


The north-eastern region of West and East Viru County (Lääne- and Ida-Virumaa) experienced both growth in the towns and loss in the small villages. Narva grew from 1970 to 1979 from 61,346 inhabitants to 75,909; Sillamäe grew from 13,505 to 16,157 inhabitants. At the same time Kohtla-Järve grew from 82,558 to 87,472. This demonstrates clearly the linkage between urbanisation and industrialisation; with an increase of the latter, the former increases necessarily as a consequence of the compact settlements usually attached to the firms. As opposed to this, the Central, Western, South-Western and South-Eastern regions and districts, even the town of Pärnu, experienced only very little increase or even a decrease in the population. The former was the case with the West County and Hiiu, Jõgeva, Järva, and West Viru County; the latter with Saare, Pärnu, Viljandi, Valga, Tartu, Võru, Põlva, Rapla, and East Viru Counties. In these areas, hardly any industry was settled, save for some light industry such as food production; some MIC industry was also based at Tartu. The second biggest town after Tallinn, Tartu experienced a population increase by almost 14,000: from 90,459 to 104,381.

Taking together in-migration, natural population growth, and the ethnic distribution of the resident urban and rural population, a correlation to industrial concentration can be

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596 These figures from the data as posted on the ESA web pages, ‘Population in Rayons and Towns’ for 1970 and 1979 (FN 590). Much lower figures are given in ESA 1992, Table: ‘Population of the Towns and Districts’, pp. 18-21, at p. 18; the Narvan figures were 57,863 and 69,648, respectively; for Kohtla-Järve, the figures went down from 68,318 to 57,959, although it is unfortunately not clear whether or not there might be a connection, and if so, for what reason. Surprisingly, the 1992 data for Tartu is consistent with the ESA 2000 data. Also cf. the map further below.
shown. In short, it boils down to non-Estonians, of whom most are Slavs, whose overwhelming majority is ethnic Russian, mostly inhabiting urban areas, the main centres of which are Tallinn, Narva and Sillamäe, which at the same time are the industrial centres of the ESSR. Their attractiveness for migrants, who are usually younger than the indigenous population, and thus have higher reproduction rates, results from the fact that these urban centres are mainly heavy industry and ‘high tech’ based, which were the highest paying industries. Over the 1970-86 period, growth in per-capita income increased by 167% Union-wide, and by 159% in the ESSR; however, while in 1986 the Union-wide average per-capita income was 195.6 roubles, in the ESSR it was 221 roubles. Although in-migration continued, the population appears to have become increasingly settled: an increasing share of the population lived at their place of residence for increasingly longer durations, while at the same time the share of migrants in the population decreased. In 1970, 303,095 or 22.4% of the total population lived at their place of residence for 25 years or more. This share increased to 440,997 or 30.1% of the population in 1979 and reached 571,459 or 36.5% by 1989. The share of migrants in the total population in 1979 was 62.3%, a decade later 57.8%. In sum, the Brezhnev era thus saw the following developments in migration into the ESSR: a general slowing down of in-migration; an increased settlement of migrants; the definitive concentration of most non-Estonians in two areas: Tallinn and the surrounding Harju County as well as Viru County, mostly in East Viru County. These areas, geared towards USSR demands and production, were the industrial power house of the ESSR, producing some 70% of total output. Non-Estonians and Estonians lived their parallel lives not only geographically, but also economically, socially, and linguistically. Contact between the two groups was as a general rule limited to day-to-day business and lacked any intensity unless there was an absolute necessity.

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597 Lane, p. 198. In addition to which, Lane suggests using the index of urbanisation as an index of industrialisation. Cf. Lane, p. 196. As the above should have indicated by now, this is rather opposite.

598 Lane, Table 6.5: ‘Earned Income of Manual and Nonmanual Workers’, p. 197.


Table 5.17: The Ethnic Composition of the East Viru County (Ida-Virumaa), 1959-79

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1979</th>
<th>1979/59</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>abs.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>abs.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>132,693</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>185,344</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonians</td>
<td>50,485</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>54,058</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>68,321</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>110,050</td>
<td>59.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>4,422</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byelorussians</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>6,736</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finns</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>4,143</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>13,887</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>5,935</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Urban Population</strong></td>
<td>107,306</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>157,409</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonians</td>
<td>29,765</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>33,116</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>64,845</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>105,093</td>
<td>66.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>4,175</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byelorussians</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>6,350</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finns</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>3,387</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>12,696</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>5,288</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rural Population</strong></td>
<td>25,387</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>37,935</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonians</td>
<td>20,720</td>
<td>81.6</td>
<td>20,942</td>
<td>55.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>3,476</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>4,957</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byelorussians</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finns</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>756</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1,191</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>647</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Map 5.2: ESSR Geographical Distribution of Industry, c. 1965-1970

Source: Järvesoo, p. 18.
Clearly this was observed in the migrants who came to the ESSR, too: because they were influenced by the conditions of their time, they made up an entirely new group of non-Estonians as compared to those who had arrived under Stalin or Khrushchev. They, too, however, kept largely to themselves, in comparison to the early arrivals even much more so. As the chapter on interwar Estonia demonstrated, a third group of non-Estonians lived in the republic and continued to do so during the ESSR’s lifetime. All three groups however had rather differing views, attitudes, and levels of contact from the titular population in the ESSR. In the above order, the second group had the worst, the third had the best and most stable relations with Estonians, which may not be very much surprising but needs to be pointed out to break up the picture of ‘the Russians’ being one homogeneous mass with little or no internal differences.

Indeed, the cluster of incentives for labour migrants to move to the ESSR included its very high income per capita, wage levels, and overall living standards including the supply of items of daily life, food, especially fruit, and housing. These were better than the USSR average even if the economy as a whole suffered. If the USSR per capita income level was 100, the level for ESSR was 129 in 1960, rising to 133 in 1970 and remaining at 127 for 1978. As was indicated before, the high wage level alone was not sufficient to draw people to a given area. However, compared to the other Baltic republics as well as the RFSFR, the ESSR also had substantially higher per capita on social services. The outlays in 1980 in the RFSFR and the ESSR were, respectively, 118.9 and 141.3 roubles for education and culture; 72.8 and 76.2 roubles for health and sports; 193.1 and 239.3 roubles for social assistance and insurance; pensions were 143.4 and 173.6 roubles. The total expenditure on social services in 1980 was 488 and 571 roubles, respectively. All this together indeed was a strong incentive for migrating to the ESSR to take up a job. 

As will be shown in more detail below, the 1970s may have seen quite a change in the type of migrants coming to the ESSR, at any rate if the reasons for migrating there given in two surveys are to be believed; family migration was thus on the increase. All the same, from the 1970s even the Baltic republics experienced a slowdown. Even though the Baltic republics had always been the most prosperous by Soviet standards, so much so that they were called the Soviet ‘West’ or the ‘Soviet abroad’ (Sovetskaya zagranitsa), they nevertheless experienced the Union-wide general economic decline also in their republics.

5.3 Nationalities Policy, Society, and Inter-ethnic Relations

The dissatisfaction in the population with their lot had grown over the Brezhnev era. As noted above, this Union-wide problem was mostly connected to the socio-economic circumstances which increasingly suggested to the population that their interests were clearly not valued by the Centre. The logic of dictating the popular interest from above was inherent in the CPSU’s claim to the leading role in the state and in society in every possible aspect. More than in any other era before, the gap between the interests of the

601 Simon, Nationalism and Policy, Table 9.4, p. 301; Bohnet / Penkaitis, p. 38. The LatSSR and LitSSR had some slightly higher expenditures on education and culture per head; in total, however, their sums were much lower.

602 Zamascikov, p. 225.
individual and that of the party-state leadership opened and became rather visible. Similarly, the discrepancies between those groups in state, party, and society grew which either wanted to turn the clock back to the Stalin era, or wanted to further reform the system towards more appreciation of the people’s interest. Restorative tendencies fought reformist ones, although this did not result in as much of a roller-coaster as under Khrushchev. One of the main problems was the continued praise for state and party for the achievements of developed Socialism, or developing Communism, when especially during the 1970s it was abundantly clear to most ordinary people that the economic situation got progressively worse and daily life a total drag.

When daily life for working women meant to queue for hours on end in shops for goods of dubious quality that in addition were not steadily available and in addition having to cater for the entire family at home, it is not at all surprising that less than 30% of workers were still at work during the last hour of their shift. The same applies to attendance during their shift which ran counter to obtaining any goods for the family – after work everything was gone. Not only the queuing, but also the scarcity of food and consumer goods put a heavy toll on each individual and consequently on family life. The uneven distribution of such goods according to the respective status of city, town, or plant, worsened this in several areas. In consequence, alcoholism, criminality and other rather negative effects rose Union-wide – even in the Baltic states the consumption of alcohol was above the average. However, these were occurrences that were largely taboo even if they were strong markers of social conflict. The general line from the Centre was to make cosmetic changes or demand more attention to Socialist norms. In substance nothing was changed, for the leadership obviously did not see the need for substantial change. As noted above, most of the leadership had their formative years under Stalin, so even the most progressive member did not question the socio-economic command system as such, much less the political system of ‘democratic centralism’, but suggested some improvements in a small detail – this was to become the crunch question under Gorbachev. Even that was too much for hardliners.

The tendency to decry all criticism even of generally known problems as anti-Soviet and the denial of their existence further exacerbated them. Problems cannot be solved by simply declaring them to be solved. Exactly that, however, happened with regard to the nationalities question. If anything, ‘hooliganism’ occurred in public reports when much more was at stake. The above subsection on migration even more than the previous ones on the Stalin and Khrushchev eras will have shown the scope, background and demographic consequences of continued migration into the ESSR. On the part of the authorities, nothing much occurred which would help the ESSR society, even more so the receiving society of Estonians as the titular nation, to cope with so strong an influx. Nor was any effort made at a meaningful cross-cultural contact. In fact, there was a complete second infrastructure for non-Estonians catering for them from cradle, or crèche, to grave. Especially during the 1970s, when Brezhnev had managed to secure his position, his tone with regard to the order of nationalities changed to a clear preference of all matters Russian. In the nationalities question, it was their ‘deep internationalism’ that was applauded most, next to their prime achievements in any sector possible – academic, scientific, technical progress, they were always in the vanguard of developments. Together with a socio-economic atmosphere in which even ‘the Russians’ (who more and more comprised Ukrainians, too) had enough to do to fend for their own,
such attitudinal influences on the part of the Centre clearly did not promote any inter-ethnic contact, much less a mixture. Indeed, low rates of inter-ethnic marriages by Estonians point to very little contact with non-Estonians, in addition to which most children of such marriages would choose Estonian nationality.\footnote{Anderson / Silver even refer to a Soviet report from 1969 which points this out. Cf. Barbara A. Anderson / Brian D. Silver: ‘Estimating Russification of Ethnic Identity Among Non-Russians in the USSR’, in: *Demography*, 20(4), 1983, pp. 461-489, at p. 476.} in 1968, in a total of 15,552 marriages by an Estonian, only 729 or 5% married a Russian partner. Children of mixed marriages who reached adulthood and consequently received their first internal passport, opted for Estonian nationality at a rate of 62% during 1960-1968. However, as noted above, there was a certain tendency in the economy for Estonians and Non-Estonians to concentrate in differing sectors, which may have reduced possibilities for inter-ethnic marriages further. At any rate, the great majority of marriages on a Union level occurred as a contract between two individuals of the same social class, nationality, and educational background.\footnote{Hosking, p. 400; Misiunas/Taagepera, p. 217, FN 15.}

At the same time the Centre pushed ‘Internationalism’ and the Russian language in the society in general and in the schools in particular. Here too Russians were the only heroes, so much so that even history was falsified to support this spurious claim.\footnote{For details, cf. Lewytzkyj, pp. 47-48.} More importantly, the Russian language was continually pushed. The rationale behind this was very probably again for the leadership to develop a strategy in coping with some unplanned event. Here the centralism of the USSR comes severely into play. Demographers counted far fewer people than anticipated during the 1970 and 1979 censuses; already the 1970 census had been a shock. In addition, there was a clear sign that Russian, Slav and Baltic populations had very low birth rates, which since the 1970s were usually below replacement levels, while the Central Asian republics had very high ones.\footnote{Cf. Hosking, p. 399.} In nationality questions, the Central Asian theme therefore dominated the Centre’s efforts. A stronger push in forming the identity of a person could produce more ‘Russians’, so the reasoning must have gone. The means to achieve this was the pushing of the Russian language. Exactly this happened, but with Union-wide repercussions ranging from passive acceptance in some republics via eulogies from Moldova and parts of Central Asia to enraged rejections of a further deepening of Russian influences from Ukraine and the Baltic republics. The consequences were rolling heads and a conference which became almost famous on ‘The Russian Language – the Language of Friendship and Cooperation of the Peoples’. The conference took place in Tashkent in 1979 and led to such eulogies as described above. More importantly, it provided a clear action plan to press increased teaching of Russian which subsequently translated into Central orders. It suggested the extension of teaching in Russian already to pre-school establishments, an increase in the number of hours taught in middle schools, and the improvement of teaching methods. The titular languages were to be pushed out of academia, which was supposed to use the Russian language first and foremost, and be
downgraded to local colloquial languages only. Russian was to become the ‘second native language of the people.’

The basis of these plans had been developing during the 1970s and put together by the CPSU CC in October 1978 – the conference was one of many simply following up CC decisions and enlarging on their specifications. True to the principle of democratic centralism, the Central Committee of the Estonian Communist Party, ECP CC, also in 1978 did the Centre’s bidding and decreed what the Centre wanted. This Committee was headed as of this same year 1978 by a Russian Estonian, an apparatchik by the name of Karl Vaino who was supposedly a better follower of Moscow’s whims and wishes than the previous ‘First’. Käbin was promoted upwards out of harm’s way, probably for being somewhat too Estonian-minded and allowing too much cultural freedoms at the end of his career. Vaino supported the Centre’s drive to reinforce Russification apparently lock, stock and barrel. At the same time, the Tomsk born Kirill Voinov / Karl Vaino was not credited with being a rather accomplished person. He was much resented for his reluctance to speak Estonian despite the fact that he came to the ESSR in 1947. Also, he almost immediately started to rant against the Finnish TV as being anti-Soviet and deceitful, though viewers in Tallinn and the Western regions of the ESSR had been watching it for more than a decade. Under his aegis, the CPE took an increasingly hard stance against dissent, using various forms of repression and arrest, thus replicating the new Central political lines. When the census figures for 1979 showed a fall in the number of Estonians who claimed to be able to speak Russian freely (svobodno) on the figures for 1970, this was interpreted as an indirect protest against the renewed Russification campaign: at a time when the general order of the day were eulogies on the Russian language and increases in every titular population’s Russian capabilities even ‘corrected’ upwards, as happened in Central Asia, a fall from 29.0% to 24.2% could not be reflecting reality. Indeed, those figures more likely than not will have reflected the willingness to situate one’s life in the all-Union context. If the interpretation of the Estonian figures are correct, they were tired of this context and losing their patience.

Among Estonians the Central policy started to be perceived as threatening their identity. In their Estonian-based schools, Russian would be given even more preference than before, and at the expense of Estonian as a means of teaching. The high number of immigrants, the even higher number of temporary resident young Russian and other n-

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609 Misiunas/Taagepera, p. 208; Arjakas in Õispuu, p. 268.

610 Arjakas, p. 268.

grants who were on the move to make a ‘long rouble’ or quick and easy money, has to be taken into account, too. Tallinn threatened to follow Riga in becoming a capital with a minority titular population. The North-East (Ida-Virumaa) was almost completely Russophone. These and other factors led to an outcry of forty leading personalities from all walks of life in 1980: the Letter of Forty.\textsuperscript{612} Nothing was more decried than the renewed Russification campaign which indeed could not help in any shape or form to achieve a greater coherence in society, much less strong inter-ethnic contacts – least of all, the formation of Soviet man. The exact opposite happened; as noted above, Estonians kept all the more to themselves. Anderson / Silver estimated in 1983 a halving time of ethnic identification as ‘Estonian’ of 320 years based on the age 0-38 cohorts in the 1959-1970 censuses.\textsuperscript{613} In other words, Russification attempts were not only largely devoid of any success but met with strong passive resistance that in the late 1970s turned active. Nothing makes the affection for the Estonian language and the Estonians’ attachment to it clearer than a passage from this letter. It sums up the Estonians’ overall feeling most acutely and presents a damning indictment of Soviet nationalities policy as well as the parallel structures of Estonians and Russians which had developed and stabilised by then.

There are certain traits in the Estonian national consciousness which are easily hurt; if this is not respected, grave consequences may follow. That Estonians are overly sensitive with regard to their language can be explained from the centuries of domination by German lords who [flatly refused to learn the language] and even tried to convince Estonians that a culture based on the Estonian language was useless if not detrimental. The Tsarist government remained on this track. [Still, the Estonians created their very own culture based on their language.] Only he who speaks Estonian or at the very least clearly shows some respect for it will have a chance of getting into contact with Estonians. Those who live in Estonia and neither respects the Estonian language nor its culture, intentionally or not, hurt the Estonians’ pride and honour. The relation to the Estonian language is the key question in the development of relations between Estonians and other nationality groups in Estonia.\textsuperscript{614}

As the Brezhnev reign came to an end, Vaino remained. The situation in the ESSR and the population at large got progressively worse. The disciplinarian campaigns of Andropov and their continuance under Chernenko did not result in substantial changes until the advent of Gorbachev in power. Even if Andropov may have produced a ‘minor earthquake’ in the cadres by sackings and replacements, he just did not have the time to continue this work – and Chernenko was a Brezhnevite appointment. Although some improvements in productivity occurred by the efforts to enforce strict discipline at the workplace, they also made the life of the working housewife worse, for it was she who was bound to be absent from work for some time to cater for her family’s needs. This was a Union-wide problem. In the non-Russian republics, the titular populations i-


\textsuperscript{614} Translated from the German version reprinted in Lewytzkyj, pp. 138-143, at pp. 141-142, and cross-checked with Estonian version reprinted in Kiin/Ruutsoo/Tarand, pp. 3-7. Italics added.
creasingly opined against the power-relations between the Centre and themselves and increasingly showed open dissent against their destinies being controlled by outsiders. What however until the early 1980s had been possible, dissenting openly, from 1982 was disallowed again. The lid was firmly put back in place. Gorbachev’s glasnost would therefore be the equivalent to opening Pandora’s box and letting the genie out of the bottle at the same time.
6 The Gorbachev Era

This chapter will examine developments that are as crucial to the developments of the 1990s as those that were described in the chapter on the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. If the latter resulted in the involuntary incorporation of the Baltic states and thus Estonia into the Soviet Union, it is this short but crucial era that unwittingly provided for their regaining independence. This intensely political process could take off only because of the new leader’s efforts at reforming politics and especially economy. The debate on his reform efforts is too huge and positions too varied to incorporate them all in this chapter; this pertains especially to his reform efforts in the economy. However, except for the Stalin era did no other era have more importance to the development of Estonia than the Gorbachev era did, certainly in terms of political manoeuvrings, on which this chapter will therefore concentrate.615 Whereas in 1939-40 the Estonians did not seem to have much of a choice other than being made a part of the Union in the face of brute force, they in this era managed to prise power away from the centre and increasingly do it their own way. Probably only brute force could have stopped these developments in their tracks, but nothing of this sort happened. Also, Gorbachev was on the one hand occupied with reforming and replacing the old cadre structure, apparently going much beyond Khrushchev’s aims and efforts; on the other, his efforts concentrated also on foreign policy matters. To relieve international political pressure and cut outside expenditure, both the return of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan and continued arms reduction talks combined into confidence building measures. This he needed to obtain some leeway to improve the system; what he did though was to permanently manoeuvre between the conservatives and the radical reformers.

The year 1989 marks a watershed in global, European, and also Soviet affairs. Globally, this year saw the end of the Cold War thanks to the efforts of Gorbachev. In European matters, he not only facilitated German unification but also led the former Soviet satellite states in Central and Eastern Europe go their own ways and conduct their affairs according to their wishes.616 For the republics of the Soviet Union, this meant that a certain freedom, e.g. on the base of a true federation, with large-scale autonomy was clearly on the cards for many of the republican leaderships from 1987 onwards, even though full independence they did not expect as yet. On the other hand, developments from 1989 on became increasingly turbulent, with one republic after another declaring its sovereignty as a reaction to Central inflexibility. In the 1991 putsch the conservative forces tried to prise Gorbachev away from power. The known failure of the plot was used by the Baltic republics to re-establish their sovereign states. On 20 August 1991, the Estonian Supreme Council quickly declared Estonia’s complete independence from the Soviet Union which the Russian Federation under Yeltsin recognised on 24 August. By the end of the year, 68 states had recognised Estonia, it had become a member of the UN and signed the Helsinki Final Act, thus also becoming a member of the CSCE.


This makes it very apposite to not only relate the increasingly stormy developments of 1985-1991 but at the same time to review the developments since Estonia’s incorporation in 1939 and show the historical links that have built up during these fifty years. As they to a very large degree determined the action taken during the Gorbachev era, their salience in the post-Soviet era is all the more acute. Moreover, much of what happened after 1988, when the independence movement started to take off, is either based on historical development or a reaction to it. Therefore these eras from 1918 onwards as reviewed in this volume, constitute a vital element in understanding and explaining the post-Soviet era: cutting this would result in cutting a large measure of explanatory power.

In migration and nationalities questions this becomes especially clear. Gorbachev did not effect much of a change. The ‘nationalities question’ was treated with considerable ignorance and for years, Gorbachev merely restated old Brezhnevite policies. This was not only due to the overissue view that ‘everything was solved’, as the Party programme re-stated in 1986, but that much more pressing things needed attention – first and foremost the economy, for whose effective change political conditions had to be established. He did not improve his position in this question by producing serious gaffes by equating the Soviet Union with Russia or mixing up the Baltic republics on his visits, addressing Estonians as ‘dear Latvians’. Most importantly, despite all his will to reform the Union, he remained absolutely opposed to any proposal that challenged the Union’s territorial integrity; in this light, both the new draft Union treaties from late 1990 and spring 1991 and the 1990 nationalities conference must be seen.617 From late 1988 or early 1989 at the latest, however, this integrity was seriously questioned, for the essence of this nationalities question had always been the grossly unequal distribution of power between the Centre which ruled, and the republics, which merely administered their territory.618 The putsch that on 18 August 1991 tried to turn back the clock resulted in the break-up of the Union. By the end of the year, the Soviet Union was no more. With Estonian independence thus renewed, however, those non-Estonian migrants who had come into the Soviet Estonian republic as one part of the large Soviet Union suddenly found themselves in a totally different entity, the reborn Estonian state. For Gorbachev this meant failure in his original efforts, for he never had intended to destroy the Soviet Union with the policies he meant to save it with. For the Soviet-era immigrants this meant a huge effort at trying to cope with the new situation, with perceived or real discrimination and hostility on the part of the Estonians, and having to both re-identify themselves and find a new position in a society with reversed orders. From primus inter pares they fell to one among many.

Consequently, in the first section of this chapter a change of perspective will take place. Although in previous chapters the affairs in the Estonian SSR were always at the heart of examinations, they did not examine in detail the political machinations in the ESSR, as this is not a political history strictu sensu. Also, neither in the Stalin nor in the


Khrushchev era did the republic leadership have much of a choice other than to follow the dictate of the Centre. However, whereas over the Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev periods the Centre determined what happened in the republics, and the republican parliaments were largely rubber-stamping assemblies although on a decreasing scale, from 1989 the Centre appears to have experienced a veritable power vacuum in their dealings with the various republics. This was a void the Estonians managed to quickly fill. In effect, they turned the tables on the Centre and increasingly managed to go their own way without inviting a military response.

On the ESSR level, there were three main issues that started and influenced debate in a thoroughly disenchanted population; managed to galvanise the population into action; determined both the political debate and the formation of political groups along these lines. The first issue was the republic’s ecologic situation which was near or in an environmental crisis, to which the question of Central vs. local decision-making came; the second was the status of the titular language which appeared to be seriously threatened in the light of Central promotion of Russian and degradation of Estonian, to which the high number of non-Estonians unwilling to speak Estonian came; the third was the search for blank spots and opening previously unmentionable taboos, of which the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was first mentioned in 1987. These commemorations commenced a string of anniversary demonstrations from 1988 which reasserted both Estonian history and its previous morally reprehensible forgery. In this period the links to Estonia’s pre-war record as well as their salience for the post-Soviet developments came out into the open. The political processes that took place commenced into the independence period of the 1990s where they clearly dominated domestic politics in general and policy towards the non-Estonian immigrant community in particular, including the foreign policy arena.

At the same time the combined political leadership in the ESSR carefully pursued their way from political protest via political galvanisation into political action leading first to autonomy, then independence demands, they ignored the Centre’s warnings, threats or judicial acts that went against theirs. The watershed was the sitting of the ESSR Supreme Soviet on 16 Nov. 1988. For from late 1988, the development went from

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619 On the environmental degradation in the Soviet Union as a whole, which can only be called catastrophic, cf. Ulrich Weißenburger: ‘Die sowjetische Umweltpolitik unter Gorbatschow’, in: BIOst-Bericht (1), 1990. As this was the basis on which Estonians argued, note the development of the environmental dissidents, the ‘naturalists’ from the 1970s, which had found its way into the literary discussion of the problem.


autonomy to outright independence; a declaration of March 1990 ‘…proclaimed Soviet power in Estonia illegal and announced the beginning of a transition period that would culminate in the restoration of an independent Estonia.’ Shortly before, Lithuania had declared its independence, and all other republics followed this example. Again the political developments determine the outcome ‘on the ground’ going as far as nationalities questions and migration, as it were, for it is from the political level that all problems on the nationalities and migration level were started.

In the ESSR, an increasing differentiation along various political party lines ensued, among them such parties or movements that saw independence looming on the horizon and preferred to keep within a Union context. It would be wrong, however, to suggest that this happened along ethnic lines: for this period, ethnic divisions seem to have evaporated to some degree and the process was much more complex and differentiated. The time from 1988 to 1990 therefore saw not only such political grouping and parties develop which opted for various ways of loosening ties with Moscow, but others which wanted to keep them. The latter were however in a marginal position, and the Supreme Soviet, later renamed Supreme Council, during this time passed laws that increasingly cut the ties with Moscow even though it had been elected under Brezhnevite rules and contained such members as may well have been against this.

The inter-ethnic level was affected too, most visibly by the language law of 1989 which many of those immigrants who had lived in the ESSR for over 20-25 years could not comprehend and those who had only recently arrived saw as outright discrimination. Both may have had some justification to see this law their way, especially in a time of increasing uncertainty and high volatility. At the same time, however, they did not recognise the law for what it also was: another means to cut the ties with Moscow. This was highly symbolic in the light of the sustained efforts during the 1960s and especially 1970s to further increase the use of Russian noted in the above chapters, whose main aim however was to renew the glue to keep the Soviet Union together much more than achieve complete assimilation – the repeated downward corrections of the ideological positions displayed by the centre in the nationalities question and the development of Socialism and Socialist society are evidence to that effect. The main precondition for this development of this convoluted and complex process, though, was nevertheless the advent in power of Gorbachev and his perestroika and glasnost.

6.1 Politics and Economy
Perestroika may have become famous, though its beginnings were in ‘uskoverya’ (acceleration) – at first ‘only’ improvements were to be made and the development of the economy accelerated. Yet quickly a total reconstruction, perestroika, was necessary to help keeping the state ship afloat whose terrible state of the economy threatened to sink

When this too seemed to grind to a halt in the middle and high ranking bureaucracy fearing for their status, prerogatives, and incomes, Gorbachev devised the concept of glasnost, usually translated by ‘openness’. Not only did he intend to win general popular support for his reform efforts by this but he also apparently wanted to fight bureaucratic sleaze and sabotage of his efforts from below. Yet at the same time, he unwittingly opened the flood gates for the population to utter grievances going beyond what he had ultimately intended: not a complete crushing of the entire Soviet state as resulted eventually in 1991 but only support for his reforms was called for. The intermediate period can be subdivided in four phases: the first phase from 1985 to 1987 was during the early phase of perestroika and glasnost which had little or no impact beyond a worsening of the economic situation in the ESSR, as the old Brezhnevite guard still sat tight; the second phase from early 1987 to late 1988 saw the glasnost principle come into action in the ESSR which led to popular mobilisation and politicisation in protest against Central economic decisions which even managed to sweep away the old-guard hardliners; in the third phase from late 1988 to mid-1990 the ESSR, followed by all other Union republics, started and increasingly pursued a severing of ties with the Centre which developed from sovereignty and autonomy within the Soviet Union to claims for complete independence without in an increasingly heated legal battle which paralysed the Centre and at the same time started a change of the system; the fourth phase, finally, saw strenuous efforts by the Centre to keep the Union together from mid- to late 1990 until the putsch of 18-21 August 1991 destroyed any chance of reviving the Union along the lines Gorbachev had wished and during which Estonia declared its complete and full independence.

6.1.1 Central Reform Efforts and Consequences

Gorbachev as much as all other CPSU party bosses before him went back to Lenin to justify his new policies and condemn his predecessor’s policies. Like all new leaders before him, he also had to feel his way into office and conclude alliances in the centre of power. This cost him, and would continue to do so, valuable time, even though he may have tried to obtain results fairly quickly. From 1987 he seemed to be secure in his power; in 1989 a complete economic crisis ensued together with a power vacuum with regard to the Centre-republic relations. This happened because Gorbachev moved the system and himself into a cul-de-sac by destroying the old institutions without replacements. Hence there were no political, legitimate, or even stable, let alone effective institutions with which to further pursue reform. By 1989-1990, the Party was in ruins. The Soviet economy quickly proved unreformable and Gorbachev’s failure to deliver on bread-and-butter issues, quite literally, lost him credibility with the public at large, even though he may have been given credit for his glasnost and new openness. Yet alcoholism remained, even though it was Vodka that was the population’s curse, not the


uprooted 200-year-old vineyards of the Crimea which fell victim to his anti-alcoholism campaign; adequate housing and provisions of food which, almost like under Khrushchev, had been promised but failed to materialise – indeed, queues became even longer, as horizontal economic bonds between the republics had not yet come into existence while the vertical ones were cut; and the nationalities policy in the sense of Centre-republican relations was fatally flawed for at the end of the 1980s, the Centre kept to a ‘federation’ of unions as the main form of state organisation while the furthest any of the republics was prepared to go still was a true confederation, although even this would be abandoned soon. Multiple sovereignties had come into existence, with the weakest apparently at the centre which was least willing to reform the relationship and bridge the chasm. The result was deadlock.

6.1.1.1 Union-wide Developments, 1985-1988
Gorbachev made his ideas first known in his electoral address in February 1985, and in more detail at the CC plenum in April 1985. Even before, though, fragments of his ideas became public, such as economic self-management or the need for more social justice. To him, the scope for further development of the political system and of ‘socialist democracy’ was enormous. The latter was a question of improving both political participation of the public and the work of the local soviets in general; ‘ready-made solution’ would have to be avoided. More openness in party an state life would enhance this. Although of course significant achievements could be claimed, the Soviet state would have to initiate further changes to modernise the economy, extend socialist government and popular self-government so that a ‘qualitatively new state of society’ would emerge. The key to all this would be the acceleration of economic growth. So even the early Gorbachev had quite an idea what measures might be taken to improve and reconstruct state and society whose developments had stood still and became detached, respectively. Still, Gorbachev did not have a ready-made game plan, so the following time was one of trial and error to solve five major problem areas.

1. The economy was in a catastrophic condition far worse than published figures would have shown. This was due to secrecy, massaging the figures, or outright forgery, notwithstanding the fact that 15-20% of GNP was spent on the military and clearly affected the public’s economic well-being;
2. The CPSU could not succeed in fully implementing its programmes and wishes; especially the governmental bureaucracy, which included Gosplan

and other powerful Union-wide authorities, were almost autonomous if not uncontrollable in their decision-making;

3. The population’s belief in and support for the state ideology as well as for the Party was at all-time lows; private life had long since taken precedence over work ethics, where discipline was zero, and economic criminality, corruption and cynicism at all-time highs;

4. The Soviet Union was in the defensive in foreign policy because of Western defence programmes and the Soviet adventure into Afghanistan;

5. Central and Eastern Europe had become a crisis zone, as the developments in Poland and the emergence of Solidarnosc in the early 1980s showed.

Gorbachev therefore had a huge task at hand. As customary after taking office, a reshuffle, demotions, retirements and promotions took place under Gorbachev as with other leaders before, except that this time the changes were much more far-reaching than ever; certainly the stability of the cadres was gone as between 1982 and 1991 the Politbureau average age was slashed from 71 to 55. Yet Gorbachev’s main priority was not really political change, but economic. The importance this area had to him can be assessed by the value he put on economic growth. This to him was the ‘key to all our problems, immediate and long-term, economic and social, political and ideological, domestic and foreign.’ Only from January 1987, he seemed to have accepted the necessity of political reform, too. Indeed, a ‘retarding mechanism’ in the economy originated in the shortcomings of the political system and led to the neglect of the vital interests of ordinary people: housing, food supply, and transport. Therefore the political system needed to be ‘democratised’, for this would guarantee against the repetition of past errors. He even went further and during 1987-1988 put ‘democratisation’ at the heart of economic restructuring to the extent that on its success that of perestroika and socialism as whole was dependent.

Glasnost was the means to effect this. In Gorbachev’s book on his perestroika he rationalised it as a developing process which to him was

a way of accumulating the various diverse views and ideas which reflect the interests of all strata, of all trades and professions in Soviet society [which have been ignored for too long]. We won’t be able to advance if we don’t check how our policy responds to criticism, especially criticism from below.


Apart from the link between the top echelons in politics and ordinary people Gorbachev envisages to support his policies of *perestroika*, or restructuring state and society, the term *glasnost* soon acquired a multitude of facets which were instrumental in bringing about the political mobilisation in the republics, including the ESSR. These were

1. transparency and openness of the decision-making processes as demanded by *glasnost* were a means to counter sleaze and secretiveness in the nomenklatura, in politics, administration and in the economy;
2. freedom of information, of the press, and freedom of opinion, to demonstrate and form political or other bodies freely, as well as
3. freedom of belief and religion were needed to reclaim popular support which in Gorbachev’s own eyes was down to zero – there was no truth anymore, therefore *glasnost* was also an ethical principle to demand and achieve truth which according to him was ‘the main thing’.632

Very soon, however, this principle became footloose. From a means to put pressure on the governmental bureaucracy in addition to his many changes in the personnel of the governmental and party apparatus it developed a dynamic that had been intended only partially. The Sorcerer’s Apprentice would have the greatest difficulties to contain this dynamic and channel it according to his interests. Already the 19th Party Conference in June 1988 discussed the maladies of the Union in an openness previously unheard or unseen.633 By late 1989 the genie was out of the bottle and glasnost had become a danger to the system as a whole, as the Soviet literary journals and literature in general started to brutally castigate Stalin and Lenin, the foundations of the system. The result was that the system fell into greater disrepute as illusions were brutally destroyed; at the same time, an opposition to this new tendencies emerged which by and large favoured a *volte-farce* and a return to the ‘good old days’. For openness castigated the nomenklatura as well. Pushing for more ‘democracy à la Gorbachev (*demokratizatsiia*) led to high people in government being publicly assaulted in the USSR Congress. At the same time, informal groups came up which were out of the ordinary as the only Party allowed still was the CPSU which however faced numerous cancellations of its membership.634 The consequence of this was that unified central control slackened at the Centre during 1989-1990, which the republics’ measures took further advantage of. Therefore, even though policies were called, the Centre increasingly lacked the authority to implement, defend, or even impose them. Indeed, one of the major problems was that *perestroika*

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632 Gorbachev, p. 61: ‘People are becoming increasingly convinced that glasnost is an effective form of public control over the activities of all government bodies, without exception, and a powerful lever in correcting shortcomings.’ – Note that this comes from the head of a party which for 70-odd years had claimed to have all the answers and which could not and would not fail. This order was adapted from Roth (*supra* FN 631), p. 3.


itself helped to break up traditional structures and at times even demolish them completely while not having adequate replacements. Conversely, many of the old elites were still much in place all over the Union. Even though there will hardly be any concrete evidence, circumstantial evidence from Khrushchev to Gorbachev suggests that this nomenklatura fought any change representing a threat to their prerogatives and power with all their might.

The same applies to opening up blank spots in USSR history and giving stereotypes and tired old rhetoric by way of answering searching questions. These blank spots to a great extend were also a shield to cover the position of the nomenklatura, much more so than the customary censorship which under Brezhnev had managed to completely wipe the public’s eyes by presenting a state of the economy which existed only in the realm of fantasy while on the ground everything was going downhill only.  

In this context, the developments taking place in Central and Eastern Europe since 1987 have to be reviewed as they made some hopes that the policy of more openness advocated by Gorbachev was no mere phrase. In Spring 1987, the Politburo under Gorbachev’s leadership had decided to abandon the Brezhnev doctrine, thus removing any threat of pressure on this area in case of an adverse policy being pursued. In April 1987, Yegor Ligachev was in Hungary and quoted as saying, ‘Each country can act independently. In the past Moscow conducted the orchestra and everyone else listed. This is no longer the case.’ In the same month, Michael Gorbachev was in Prague and stated basically the same: ‘No party has a monopoly on the truth.’ This meant that the Soviet Union’s new line in foreign policy was non-intervention, an almost revolutionary policy in an area it had always regarded as its cordon sanitaire against any further surprise attack from the West. This trauma existed ever since Hitler’s attack in 1941 and was followed by iron-fisted measures to secure the right regimes in those countries in Central and Eastern Europe to secure this sort of buffer zone.

Although it was never envisaged that the Communist Parties would seriously lose power, these countries were seen as examples for reform along the lines Gorbachev wanted to put into place in the Soviet Union. Therefore both Hungary and Czechoslovakia were encouraged to proceed on their way, and the GDR, Bulgaria and Romania were very much encouraged to take heed from these examples and ‘seek more popular support’ for their policies. This meant even more, however: not only would the Soviet Union not intervene anymore in case of dissent by the party, but that it would not help the hardliners against more progressive forces, either. In effect, this was the burial of the Brezhnev Doctrine, a seminal step that did not fail to have an impact in the Baltic republics. Indeed, it was the beginning of the end of the Soviet outer empire which disintegrated in 1989 – a development that was if anything even more important for its double impact both Europe-wide and domestically within the Union: for the Soviet population at large realised that the Communist systems as such were reversible and that this collapse was a result of perestroika. At the same time they released the Central and

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635 Service, pp. 478-479.
637 Cf. Steele, pp. 176-178, 182.
638 Motyl, Empire or Stability (FN 618), p. 515.
Eastern European states from the USSR’s dominance, neither Gorbachev nor the Central authorities were prepared to let this happen in the Soviet Union itself.

6.1.1.2 The Politicisation of the Estonian Public, 1987-1988

Clearly the developments in Central and Eastern Europe had been known in the Baltic republics and hopes raised high for similar developments, especially since Stalin’s policies were also brutally castigated. In the same year that Gorbachev abandoned the Brezhnev doctrine of 1987, popular indignation in the ESSR could be ventilated for the first time openly, based on the ideas of glasnost, and without fear of reprisals that had been invariably the case if criticisms went out of step with the Central line. Subjects previously taboo included environmental degradation, administrative Russification and high in-migration of non-Estonians, and politically sensitive aspects of Estonian history such as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact whose existence was denied even until 1989.\(^{639}\) The politicisation of the people in Estonia started from a combined economic-ecologic problem of great magnitude.

The phosphorite mining saga took off when secret plans by the Central Ministry for Fertilisers were made public in 1987 by the journalist Juhan Aare.\(^ {640}\) Previously, a deposit of some 6 million tons of phosphorite had been found in the Pandivere Highlands near Rakvere. The responsible bureaucrats of the USSR Ministry of Fertiliser Industry argued that these were the world’s largest depots of phosphorite and that they had to be mined to provide Soviet agriculture with further means to enhance production in the light of chronic grain shortages.\(^ {641}\) These plans envisaged the establishment of two phosphorite mining combines by 1990: the one, an open-pit mine, at Toolse; the other, mining underground, near Rakvere. The importance of this project rests on the fact that it was part of the overall Gosplan activity in the Soviet economy. Moscow’s central bureaucracy had generally ignored the negative environmental consequences of its planning – it is probably no overstatement to say that while environmental concerns were enshrined in the Soviet Constitution, they were no part of the general economic plan. As a result of this, all parts of the Soviet Union share more or less grave damage to their envi-

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\(^ {639}\) Andrei Gromyko in his memoirs completely denies the existence of this pact, decrying it as a lie and a forgery, for ‘never was such a protocol found anywhere in the world, and it could not be found [for it never existed]’. Andrej Gromyko: Erinnerungen, Düsseldorf/Vienna/New York: Econ, 1989, pp. 64-65. However, on 10 August 1988, the daily Rahva Hääl had already reprinted the Molotov-Ribbentrop-Pact’s Secret Protocol in an Estonian translation - just short of its 49th anniversary. In June 1989, even the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies set up a commission to examine this pact. Meissner, Boris: ‘Die russische Politik gegenüber der baltischen Region als Prüfstein für das Verhältnis zu Europa’, in: Boris Meissner: Die baltischen Staaten im weltpolitischen und völkerrechtlichen Wandel. Beiträge 1954-1994, Cologne: Bibliotheca Baltica, w.Y. [1995?], pp. 273-320, at p. 288. Henceforth as Meissner, Russische Politik.


Indeed, the phosphorite mining project was no exception, and it not only represented Central planning, directing, building with total ignorance of the local peoples’ wishes or needs. It would also have resulted in untold ecological disaster for around a third of the ESSR territory: North-eastern Estonia had already become a heavily polluted and also disfigured area by the extensive oil-shale mining undertaken there and noted in the previous chapters. Yet not only was the mining, but also the energy production from that oil shale taking place in north and north-eastern Estonia. The burning of the oil shale created large amounts of ashes that were dumped onto the environment, creating the double hazard of general environmental degradation and fires by self-ignition of the ash. The worst hazard of all, though, were the fumes and gases produced during the burning of the shale. In addition, the once fashionable northern coastline with its long beaches was so polluted that bathing was forbidden. Drinking water was dangerously polluted.

The area envisaged for mining the phosphorite contained a great number of small and medium-sized springs and sources of brooks. Not only would they have been destroyed or polluted in one way or another, as would the ground water level of the area, which in addition would have sunk, but also would the water supplies for the entire population there have been in danger. Worst of all, this area also had the best arable land in Estonia.

Further, since the 1960s there had been a phosphorite works in Maardu, east of Tallinn, whose production was based on mining stemming from smaller Estonian sites. Additional phosphorite was brought in from the Kola peninsula. The production wastes were rich of uranium, wolfram (tungsten) and cadmium severely endangering the environment. To compare the areas affected in the ESSR, Toivo Miljan has provided a territorial equation for the USA: the area in which oil shale was mined and thus polluted would be relative to the size of the New England states; that which would comprise both oil shale and phosphorite mining areas along the planned lines would be equivalent to the combined size of the States of New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. These were the conditions in which Estonians learned that further disaster was looming and which, most importantly, hardened the resolve that more independence, in fact sovereign control, over the ESSR’s territory and means of production was necessary. In addition to the environmental hazards which clearly threatened the local peoples’ interest, this project would have resulted in the import of several thousands of workers to carry it out – it is not clear which of the two Estonians regarded as the bigger catastrophe.


White, p. 157.

Miljan, Economic Autonomy (FN 652), p. 151, refers to a chemical reaction as a consequence of the mining contaminating rapidly the entire north Estonian ground water reserves with a radioactive by-product. Also cf. Maare Taagepera, Phosphorite Mining, passim, and Diuk/Karatnycky, p. 119.

Cf. in detail Butenschön, pp. 29-36, who quotes a figure of 30,000 workers, which seems rather a politically influenced figure to dramatise events, for other figures suggest rather precisely some 7,500 workers for the excavations near Rakvere and 3,000 at Toolse. Cf. Mare Taagepera: ‘The Ecological and Political Problems of Phosphorite Mining in Estonia’, in: JBS 20(2), 1989, pp. 165-174, at p. 173.
In spring 1987, especially students at Tartu University demonstrated against the central plans,\(^{647}\) activated by the protests of Latvians in 1986 against another project of similar scale, damage to the environment, which in addition was completely useless: the fourth hydroelectric power plant on the Daugava River.\(^{648}\) At any rate the force of the public protest in Estonia was such that it made even the local CPE leadership take the subject up again and revoke their secretly given permission for the mining. This was a dangerous precedent, and although the ministry tried to push its plans through, the schedule for commencing to mine was first postponed to the end of 1989, and later shelved. Eventually the protests resulted in the planners withdrawing the project.\(^{649}\) The outcome of this protest became another precedence in Centre-republican relations. Domestically, it succeeded both in galvanising public opinion and eventually making it a mass movement. Although the ecological impact was taken as a starting point, the real crunch question was seen in yet another Central decision without consultation of either the republic organs or the population in arrogant pursuit of plan figures and directions. Since Gorbachev had already prompted the ‘local Soviets’ for contributions and participation in his economic reform efforts, an economic proposal was formulated which harked back to Khrushchev’s *sovnarkhozy* concept and proposed economic autonomy, the ‘IME’ project.

In reaction to the pleas by Gorbachev on the 27th CPSU Party Conference in early 1986 for the local soviets to search ways to help improve and accelerate the economic development of the Union, four men went public with an economic programme for the ESSR. As Gorbachev on the one hand gave the republics primary responsibility for housing and education, public health and consumer goods, trade and services, public transport and the protection of nature, in short: ‘responsibility for all aspects of life on their territory’, he admonished them on the other for lacking efficiency, initiative, and control. Then again, he recognised the excessive centralisation of the Union which in effect severely curtailed the republics possibilities to tackle these problems. Gorbachev therefore provided the republics with the rationale to take up an improved version of Khrushchev’s *sovnarkhozy* concept with more recent addenda by the Academicians Aganbegyan, Zaslavskaya and Bogomolow. On 26 September 1987, Siim Kallas, Tiit Made, Edgar Savisaar and Mikk Titma published an article in the party newspaper *Edasi* (Forward), the old *Postimees* (Postman), in which they took the bold step to suggest that Estonia be given complete economic autonomy on its territory. In Estonian, this programme of self-management took on a double meaning: called *Isemajandav Eesti*, it could be abbreviated into ‘IME’, which again is an Estonian word in its own

\(^{647}\) Raun, *Independence redefined*, p. 413.

\(^{648}\) In detail cf. Nils R. Muiznieks: ‘The Daugavpils Hydro Station and Glasnost in Latvia’, in: JBS 18(1), 1987, pp. 63-70. Indeed, as the present author has had the chance to discuss with local Latvians himself in 1995, the project, which would have been the fourth (!) dam on the Daugava river, was doomed from the start, with the existing HEP stations already only partially functioning due to their taking away too much water, and thus water pressure, for those further downstream, to function properly. In fact, this dam project was a perfect example of mindless gigan-tomania and fulfilment of plan goals (some x megawatts more) with no sense of reality, or thought for the environment, whatever. It is very questionable how this sort of care for the environment compared with Article 18 of the Soviet Constitution (1977) where wide-ranging eco-logic goals were set out. For the Constitution, cf. Brunner/Meissner.

right and means ‘wonder’ or ‘miracle.’\textsuperscript{650} It quickly became very popular, indeed, for in 1987, Estonians were still very far off from the ‘wonder’ they most wished for: regaining independence. On the other hand, after a protracted decision-making process that has not been disclosed so far, the Centre in November 1989 did allow the ESSR to conduct its own economic affairs autonomously from 1 January 1990 – along the proposed IME lines.

Consequently, from 1987, the ecological problems demonstrated the possibility to take \textit{perestroika} and \textit{glasnost} seriously; public debate was possible and popular power had tangible results despite some hard-line resistance. As a consequence of the industrialisation programme detailed in the previous chapters, Estonia was part of the gigantic network of production sites in the Soviet Union. This also meant that some 90\% of its economy would be run directly from Moscow ministries, thus in effect excluding even the ESSR leadership. Also, Estonia by Union-standards was a comparatively rich republic with generally above-average living standards, as the previous chapter showed.\textsuperscript{651} Nevertheless the population felt that Estonia was a net looser in the Union-wide economic equation, and that Estonia was simply exploited while not even having a say in the decisions that affected the republic. For example, a half to three-quarters of the energy production mentioned above was exported \textit{under price} to the RSFSR: some 60\% of the exports went to Latvia at barely production costs, a further 40\% went to the Leningrad district \textit{under price}.\textsuperscript{652} As a result, demands were made for the devolution of decision-making powers to the republics so that they could decide the affairs that would affect them. What was asked for was a degree of autonomy in economic and political decision-making. As the phosphorite project had been a prime example of Central decision-making with little or no local possibility to exert some influence previously, the success of its shelving also increased the calls for autonomy in economic decision-making – which led to the ‘IME’ project.\textsuperscript{653} Here was one of the major breaking points between the hard and fast \textit{rhetoric} of the \textit{perestroika} language and reality: talking of ‘radical reform’ or ‘revolutionary change’ without any intention whatever to give up one iota of


\textsuperscript{651} Cf. George J. Viksnins: ‘The Latvian Economy: Change under Gorbachev?’, in: \textit{JBS 17}(3), 1986, pp. 238-255, here: FN 2, p. 253-4: ‘On an index-number basis, in 1974 Estonia’s personal income was estimated as 13.4\% above that of the RSFSR, while Latvia’s was 7.6\% and Lithuania’s 2.1\% higher. These income differentials were considerably more pronounced on the collective farm – the incomes of Estonian „kolkhozniki“ were 194.1, the Latvian 158.6, and the Lithuanian 142.9, compared to 100 for the RSFSR...’. In detail also cf. Hans-Herrmann Höhmann, Alec Nove and Heinrich Vogel (eds.): \textit{Economics and Politics in the USSR: Problems of Interdependence}, Boulder, Co.: Westview, 1986. Viksins refers to p. 170 ibid.


\textsuperscript{653} Miljan, \textit{Economic Autonomy} (FN 652), passim.
central power in favour of the republics had to spell disaster. For a long time already, people were dissatisfied with the performance of the system; indeed it can be argued that the masses were in fact alienated by the system. Yet now, with the promotion of more openness and active encouragement of criticism from above, the Estonian society at large was mobilised.

Both the ecological problem and the ‘IME’-proposal served as catalysts to spur the population into action and as a starting point for its politicisation, which therefore was in effect a response to the politico-economic system of the Soviet Union. It is important to note that the process of political differentiation that ensued was not along ethnic fault lines but largely along political interests. Estonian and non-Estonian political groups, usually Russian, appeared on the scene. In the combined movement of emancipation from the central prefabricated policy and utterance of both individual interests and those of the Estonians, the ‘search for truths’ was instrumental. This search became public at roughly the same time as the ecologic movement and the proposal for economic autonomy took off. While these were more on the economic level and had a strong political component, the search for truth in regard to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact went deeper into the intricate politics of the Soviet Union and for the first time ignored a taboo that had existed for almost fifty years. Based on the new openness, demonstrations with increasing popular participation took place on such days as were central to Estonian history, but had been such taboos until then. The process of political differentiation of the population gained thus further momentum.

The first, still rather small demonstration took place on 23 Aug 1987 in Tallinn’s Hirvepark, the day on which the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact had been signed in 1939 and whose secret protocols had been the base for the occupation and annexation of the Baltic states in general and Estonia in particular. On the same day, the first political group, then still a pressure group, was founded: the so-called Group for the Publication of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (Molotov-Ribbentropi Pakti Avaldamise Eesti Grupp, MRP-AEG). Not only was therefore a demonstration allowed, if begrudgingly, that commemorated a taboo topic but also a discussion of it and even the establishment of a group constantly dealing with it – even though at the centre, the politically dangerous discussion was simply denied by denying the Pact’s very existence. Soon afterwards, other movements were founded. During this process, on 2 and 24 February 1988 two further events cardinal to Estonian history could be commemorated in a demonstration: respectively, the Tartu Peace Treaty which provided the final seal to Estonia’s sovereignty and existence as an independent state in 1920, and its very proclamation two years previously. In 1988, therefore, the 70th anniversary of this proclamation was celebrated – and could be celebrated. As opposed to those rather happy memories of a glorified past, the next date, 25 March, commemorated the beginning of the 1949 mass deportations. As the media rather openly reported on these demonstrations, too, they further encouraged popular action. Gorbachev had given the impetus in February 1987 when he lamented the existence of ‘blank sports and forgotten names’ in Soviet history which had been thoroughly distorted. This was the revision of history that

Gorbachev allowed by himself setting the train in motion and which the anniversary demonstrations took as their starting point and point of reference and justification. After all, it now became possible to mention millions of victims to Stalin’s terror and even counter Gorbachev’s position of the ‘glorious achievements of collectivisation and industrialisation’ by pointing to the stark contrast of total catastrophe which the collectivisation had actually reaped in agriculture. As taboo themes were touched that for 40 years had been dangerous untouchables and historical truths were mentioned that had been unmentionables, the lid was off.\footnote{On both the Tartu Peace Treaty and the Proclamation of the Estonian Republic on 2 Feb. 1920 and 24 Feb. 1918, respectively, cf. supra ch. 2. For the mass deportations started on 25 March 1949, cf. supra ch. 3. For the Gorbachev incentive to rewrite Soviet history, cf. Brahm, Glasnost (FN 631), ch. 2, ‘From Spark to Flame’ and ch. 3, ‘Millions of Deaths discredit Stalin and Lenin’, pp. 8-15, esp. pp. 10-11.}

6.1.2 From ESSR to Estonian Republic (EV)

On the state political level, the ESSR Supreme Soviet’s declaration on sovereignty on 16 Nov. 1988 with the ensuing claim to all land and means of production marked a turning point at which the ESSR and the USSR parted company in their respective internal developments.\footnote{Taagepera makes the important qualification that the declaration of 16 November 1988 was about independence, not of independence. Cf. Rein Taagepera: ‘Estonia’s Road to Independence’, in: Problems of Communism Nov-Dec. 1989, repr. in: Sprudzs, Adolf (Ed.): The Baltic Path to Independence. An International Reader of Selected Articles, Buffalo, NY: William Hein, 1994, pp. 45-60, at p. 52; in Estonian, the wording of the headline and of the text is crucial, as the continuance of the interwar republic is implied and sovereignty consequently not declared as such but rather reclaimed.} Afterwards, a series of laws were promulgated by the ESSR Supreme Soviet that may have contravened USSR laws but had moral and political support in the population at large, including a substantial number of non-Estonians. Indeed, broad-based elections to the Supreme Soviet took place which gave the legislators a popular mandate to further pursue the path taken by the old Supreme Soviet that had been elected under the old Brezhnev rules. The developments therefore take place on at least three levels: on a Union level, with the Centre increasingly losing vertical contact and power over all republics; on a bilateral level between the Centre and the ESSR, and finally on the domestic Estonian level. This section will concentrate on the second level and follow the politico-judicial process until 8 May 1990, when the Law on National Symbols was promulgated and the Supreme Soviet not only reinstated the Estonian interwar symbols and flag but also decided to rename the ESSR into the Republic of Estonia. Bit by bit economic, cultural, and finally political self-determination was reclaimed. This is the second phase of the developments that finally led to Central efforts beyond the legislative measures it had tried and failed to keep the Union as a state.\footnote{On the entitlement of Estonians as the carrier of the right to self-determination, cf. Thiele, Selbstbestimmungsrecht, pp. 32-33; on peoples’ rights to self-determination in general, cf. ibid., ch. II A, pp. 23-32. The constitutional conflict is covered in extenso by Brettin, ch. VI: ‘Der Verfassungskonflikt’, pp. 221-366, including many quotations.}

Those measures started during the third phase which is characterised by Gorbachev’s ‘right turn’ in autumn 1990; the two drafts of a new Union Treaty of November 1990 and March 1991; the economic sanctions against Lithuania as well as the local putsch in
both Lithuania and Latvia in January 1991; and the All-Union and local Estonian referenda in March 1991.

As the first two levels mentioned above are fairly closely intertwined, an examination of developments on the third, the grass-roots, as it were, will precede to make the central results of the politicisation clear which form the background to and the obvious connections and interdependencies with the other two levels. The first major political grouping to emerge was founded during a regular TV transmission of the programme, ‘Let’s Think Again’ (mõtleme veel), on 13 April 1988: this was the Popular Front (Rahvarinne). In May 1988 the Green Movement followed and in July 1988 a non-Estonian opposition movement, the International Front (later Interfront). This process of differentiation of the political spectrum continued through 1988 and 1989, resulting in more than 30 groupings of various political persuasions and organisational structures, from popular movement via pressure group to political party. Over the next years, re-arrangements, concentrations of groups into parties and vice-versa would take place, among them the split of the CPE into a more ‘Estonian-minded’ and a ‘Union-minded’ party. This dichotomy is true for all participants in the political process, where forces representing the latter view would prefer to keep the Soviet Union as a state and at best modify the political system. The former ‘Estonian-minded’ forces must be distinguished not in the final aim, for this was far-reaching autonomy at first and complete independence at last; rather, their distinction was in the way and the pace they pursued these goals. The more confrontational were those groups like MRP-AEG, mentioned above, and groups and parties like the Estonian National Independence Party (ENIP) or the Estonian Heritage Society (EHS) which were led by former dissidents and, consequently, political prisoners, like Mart Niklus. These groups clearly advocated an unequivocal return to the Estonian republic of the interwar years; they were usually termed, ‘national radicals’. The far broader church was represented in the Popular Front (Rahvarinne) under the two most prominent leaders, Edgar Savisaar, and Mariu Lauristin; they were usually termed, ‘moderates’, as they did not immediately confront the Centre but still tried to work from inside the system. Indeed, this umbrella group did not form itself as a party, although on the other hand it had many features of a party such as political organisation; however, parties developed from it. Its first aim and the reason for its inception was the support of perestroika. Until the tone from the Centre very much sharpened as a result of the huge popular support of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact demonstration in 1989, the Popular Front was the main political force outside the CPE and the Supreme Soviet. The picture is further complicated by the fact that members of the Popular Front also sat in the Supreme Soviet which the radicals did not recognise, and that the radicals in answer to the Central pressure organised elections to a second, quasi-parliament which for a short period stood in opposition to the Supreme Soviet until the latter recognised it as legitimate expression of the people’s will and both started to co-operate in March 1990. Finally, groups such as the Interfront or the United Council of Work Collectives (UCWC) were mainly based on non-Estonian membership with a strong ‘Union-minded’ approach. Indeed, many of its members were workers of the All-Union factories mentioned in the previous chapters. Note however that even though at first an ethnic cleavage may appear to pit Estonians and non-Estonians against each other as pro- and contra-Estonian interests, i.e., sovereignty and independence from the Centre, this would be much to superficial. Indeed, there were
many Russian supporters of the ‘Estonian’ movements mentioned above; for not only the Estonians differentiated. In this process, the elections that took place between spring 1989 and spring 1991 (if the referendum were counted as election, too) clearly showed increasing support for the ESSR split with, and from, the Centre. The main conclusion with regard to the political scene in the ESSR vis-à-vis the Centre is that in the former a pluralistic party system was emerging as a consequence of glasnost. It led to a democratisation of the republic which formed the basis of the independent state in the 1990s. At the same time, this development pitted the ESSR, and other republics with similar developments, like the Latvian or Lithuanian SSR, against the Central position of one-party state and rule. By 1990, the Centre had to admit defeat and indeed cut Article 6 out of the Soviet Constitution which had enshrined this predominance.  

6.1.2.1 Cutting the Ties to the Centre 1988-1990

On 16 November 1988, the Estonian Supreme Soviet issued a declaration in which it reclaimed the ESSR’s sovereignty. This declaration was issued in conjunction with the claim to the right to self-determination as set down in the UN Pact on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) from 16 Dec. 1966. In some larger part, the declaration was also a consequence of constitutional reforms pursued by the Centre that if anything would strengthen the ties of the union republics which they wanted to free themselves from. The importance and popular support for this momentous declaration can also be demonstrated by noting that this ESSR Supreme Soviet had been ‘elected’ under the Brezhnevian rule in 1985; that 82% of its members...
were CPE members, 66% of whom were ethnic Estonians, 25% Russians, and 9% other nationalities; and that the votes cast by the members of the Soviet showed a huge majority of 254 in favour, 7 against, no abstention.662

The content of this law expressed the uniform and indivisible sovereignty of the ESSR, as represented in its legislative and executive organs of power, its administration and judiciary, over its entire territory. The law also gave the ESSR laws preponderance over Union law, thus clearly establishing a veto right over Union matters and decisions – Art. 74 para 2 of the USSR Constitution had established the reverse order. However, there was no intention on the part of the legislators to leave the Union: the law in fact envisaged a reassessment of the ESSR’s status within the USSR. Although the ESSR had been incorporated in 1940-1944, it never signed the 1922 Union Treaty, hence a redefinition of its status was necessary by means of a new Union Treaty. A resolution to this effect was issued by the ESSR Supreme on the same day as a Law on Changes to the ESSR Constitution and the declaration of sovereignty. The last mentioned piece of legislation was declared null and void by the USSR’s Supreme Soviet on 26 November 1988 and Gorbachev spoke out sharply against those seeking autonomy. As the ESSR insisted and on 7 December 1988 decided by a vote of 200:18:15 to henceforth ignore the USSR Supreme Soviet, this opened the battle of legislatures and laws for power between the Centre and the ESSR, although similar events took place all over the Union. Indeed, the Estonian move was the first of its kind and followed by other republican movements. Most importantly, a chance to reinvent the Soviet Union along different lines that also accommodated the republics’ interests was lost by a certain complacency if not arrogance at the Centre. For at this stage, the republics had demanded only autonomy in deciding those matters directly affecting them, not outright independence.663

The next step was quick to follow. On the day that the ESSR Supreme Soviet decided to ignore the Central Supreme Soviet, the former also voted on 7 December 1988 with 204:49:4 votes in favour of a constitutional amendment making Estonian the official or state language (riigikeel). A draft Language Law had been published at the end of October, and tensions over it reached from the grass roots to the ESSR Supreme Soviet. On 18 Jan 1989 the Language Law664 was finally passed after a period of dithering and softening of the original draft. This not only had an impact on the population as such, which will be discussed in section 6.3. Rather, this section is concerned with a piece of Estonian legislation which represented another measure against the Centre and which the Union-minded Interfront unsurprisingly totally opposed. As will be remembered from the previous chapters, since the ESSR had been incorporated into the Soviet Union, time and again the system of ‘exchange of cadres’ propelled non-Estonian

officials into the republic which had little or no affinity to it, and who usually did not speak Estonian. Also, this law was a reaction to the promotion of the Russian language that had existed throughout the Soviet period and became particularly heavy under Brezhnev. Therefore, this step was directed much more against external influence on matters Estonian than against the non-Estonian population at large, although clearly these two cannot be completely separated. It should be noted, however, that the aim and direction of this law can also be gleaned from its timing, following as it did on the heels of the declaration on independence: crucially, language and sovereignty issues were closely connected to the extend that it would appear to be justified to suggest that in this case, the position of the Estonian language symbolised and represented sovereignty. For in his law, Estonian was made the sole official language of the republic. Non-Estonian officials with limited or no capacity in Estonian and serving the public were required to learn the language within four years. Among them were all forms of executives, all employees of state power and government, public organisations, the judicial system or law enforcement and inspection agencies. Further included were medical personnel, journalists as well as the service sector including commerce and communications. One of the most ridiculous aspects of Brezhnevite language policies was finally rectified, too: doctoral dissertations and habitations (kandidat, doctorat) could now be in Estonian again, for the first time since 1975. Crucially, the implementation of the law not only allowed for a certain period of transition in the use and acquisition of Estonian which in future would be extended several times to accommodate for individual problems – after all, it was clear that in areas such as the North-East of Estonia with its predominantly Russian-speaking population would not find it easy to learn the language, let alone permanently switch over. In addition, professions such as jurisprudence, the police force or transport, which are crucial to a state’s functions, were as a result of the developments under Brezhnev and his predecessors quite purposefully largely Russianophone. The law also established a Language Protection Commission in April 1989 which on 23 November 1989 was made into a full governmental agency, the National Language Board. Its brief not only included the implementation of the law but also further tasks such as language policy development and socio-linguistic research, to name but two. Financial constraints well into the 1990s impeded the policy and the functioning of the law and its institutions.\textsuperscript{665}

On 18 May 1989, the Estonian Supreme Soviet promulgated a ‘Law on the Basis of Economic Accounting’ which mirrored the proposals as set down in the IME programme. Again, it is important to note that the road to political accommodation between the Centre and the republics had not been left yet, as this law still envisaged developments in a Union context. Also, deputies from the ESSR in the USSR Supreme Soviet even initiated a law which on 27 November 1989 was promulgated. This law granted economic autonomy to all three Baltic republics. It would appear that it also indirectly recognised the ESSR declaration of sovereignty at least \textit{de facto}, although not \textit{de jure}.\textsuperscript{666}


\textsuperscript{666} Thiele, \textit{Selbstbestimmungsrecht}, pp. 35-36.
This however was probably the last cooperative effort between the Centre and the republic. Already in August 1989 a veritable crisis had ensued. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in this year was commemorated for the 50th time. The Estonian and Latvian Popular Fronts together with Sajudis in Lithuania organised a human chain between the capitals of all three republics in which more than 1 million people participated. The Centre issued a sharp rebuke, but this had if anything the opposite effect. In the ESSR, this led to a further radicalisation of policies, and it is this stage that the moderate Popular Front had to concede ground to the radicals of the more conservative forces mentioned above, such as ENIP, EHS, and others, whose political power increased. At the same time these political groups gained more political weight in the republic, the gradualist approach previously taken by the Popular Front was increasingly abandoned in favour of direct confrontation with the Centre. It was the conservative forces who had started a highly significant registration process of that part of the ESSR’s population: all those who had lived themselves in the interwar republic and had been Citizens of the Estonian Republic or who were descendants of such citizens were called to register. Around 600,000 signatures were collected from Estonians – as the political groups supporting this process did not recognise the incorporation of Estonia into the USSR, all immigrants residing on ESSR territory since 1940 were declared illegal and would not be given the right to political participation in the unofficial elections to the so-called Congress of Estonia which took place between 24 February and 1 March 1990. The constitutive session of the Congress with 499 delegates took place on 11-12 March 1990; Tunne Keelam became its head. However, those non-Estonians who had not been part of the interwar ethnic minorities but who were interested to become citizens of the Estonian Republic could register still and were made ‘Citizen Candidates’. Their status would be determined as and when a fully independent Estonia could bestow citizenship upon them which in the current circumstances was yet impossible. Around 30,000 non-Estonians, some 2% of the total, did indeed register; for them naturalisation requirements introduced in 1992 were partially waived. More importantly, however, these elections saw the first case of political disenfranchisement in Estonia of a rather sizeable part of the population. The politicians supporting this view held that this part of Soviet era immigrants were illegal from the their viewpoint of the legal continuity of the Estonian Republic. Even though the Congress of Estonia would not qualify as the legal parliament which at this point was still the Supreme Soviet, this was nevertheless a political message that resulted in vicious opposition from the Interfront opposition representing the more Union-minded non-Estonians. Most importantly, it was this political line that would take over the leading role in the Estonian political landscape and determine the first years of the renewed independence period as they would win the parliamentary elections on 20 September 1992.

The elections to the ESSR Supreme Soviet took place only shortly after the above one, on 18 March 1990; as opposed to the former Supreme Soviet, they returned a smaller, 105-seat parliament with a strong Estonian-minded membership that was still less radical than the Estonian Congress. Here the so-called moderates dominated, many of whom were members of the Popular Front. Although this political constellation would threaten a competition between the two parliaments which were popularly legitimised in free and fair elections, despite their different size of electorate, this situation did not continue for very long; on 30 March 1990 the Supreme Soviet invited the Congress to co-
operate. Consequently, the following period may have still been characterised internally by a highly charged political atmosphere; with regard to the bilateral relations with the Centre, however, almost all forces but for a fairly marginal if vociferous minority of ‘Union-minded’ opposition group would now have the same goal: reduce the Centre’s influence down to zero. On 30 March 1990 Estonia declared a ‘period of transition’ at whose end de-facto independence would stand; this followed the Congress of Estonia’s line according to which the country was occupied and de-facto non-independent, but that de jure its independence was never taken away. Shortly before, on 11 March 1990, Lithuania declared its full independence under Article 72 of the Soviet Constitution on 11 March 1990, and on the basis of Articles 70, 72 and 76, thus precluding the anti-secession law discussed below. On 8 May 1990, the ESSR Supreme Soviet issued a law ‘On the reinstatement of the Symbols of the First Republic and the abolition of the ESSR symbols.’ This law reinstated parts of the 1938 Constitution; most importantly, it replaced the republic’s full Soviet title, the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic, by the old name, the Republic of Estonia. This was seen as the ‘formal end’ of the ESSR.

6.1.2.2 Central Retrogression and the Putsch 1990-1991
Rather than stopping the process of dissolution which had started in 1988 and was in full swing in April-May 1990, the measures Gorbachev adopted were not only increasingly desperate. Because of their total inflexibility and insistence on the Centre-republican model of ‘democratic centralism’ with only cosmetic changes, they were also destructive in that they even accelerated the process by hardening the resolve of the titular nationalities in their republics to go it alone if the Centre is unwilling to cooperate. During 1988-1990 there were enough occasion which may have made it possible to keep the Union alive, if in a different form such as, e.g., a confederation. The Centre’s position reflecting the will to keep power at almost all cost, especially from late 1990, made this fully unlikely. In the light of an accumulation of power in the person of Gorbachev who made himself President of the Soviet Union and ruled with a Presidential Council, thus cutting the Party and its CC from power until it was almost completely obliterated; allowing decentralisation or openness on the one hand but not going the whole way in either case led to tensions eventually led to a conservative backlash which tried to save the old Union and even instigated the putsch against Gorbachev.

In April 1990 a Law on Secession was issued which determined the conditions under which a republic could split from the Union; this would appear to be in extension to Art. 72 of the 1977 Soviet Constitution which indeed allowed a secession. In actual fact, this new law was anything but a way to allow actual secession. The clear fighting for power between the Centre and Estonia came to a new high in late December 1990, when on 27 December a Supreme Soviet Resolution called for an All-Union referendum

669 Thiele, Selbshbestimmungsrecht, p. 40.
670 Simon, Desintegration, pp. 6-7.
on the future of the Soviet Union. Only three days before, the new People’s Congress had even issued a resolution in which the necessity of ‘safeguarding the unified federal state’ was called for in true Brezhnevite fashion – a development hardly surprising in the light of one quarter of deputies representing the die-hard conservative faction ‘Soyus’ (Union). At the end of January 1991, the Estonian leadership decided themselves to hold a referendum: on the independence of Estonia. In a clear effort to preclude the All-Union referendum, the Estonian referendum’s date was slated for the 3 March 1991, two weeks before the All-Union one was to be held on 17 March. In the latter referendum Estonia did not participate, and neither did Latvia, Lithuania, Georgia, Armenia, and Moldova.

The Estonian referendum allowed the participation for all individuals above the age of 18 who were in the possession of a valid registration (propiska) and who were not members of the army, border guards, interior ministry or railway troops. Consequently, almost all inhabitants of the ESSR could cast their vote. The question was put in both Estonian and Russian: whether or not the reinstatement of the (interwar) Estonian Republic would be approved. Voter participation was a high 82.9% of an eligible 1,114,000, of whom 77.8% voted ‘yes’. Therefore, a high number of non-Estonians supported Estonian independence, too. The Estonian Supreme Council therefore took the referendum result as full mandate to continue its work and ask internationally for recognition of the government of the Republic of Estonia. A resolution was sent to Gorbachev on 11 March, appealing to accept the results of the referendum. Any further efforts to count Estonia as belonging to the Soviet Union would therefore contradict the will of the people.

This was the final act in the Centre-republican struggle before the putsch. Neither the new draft Union treaty of November 1990 nor its slightly altered form presented in March would hold any water. Especially the crucially important Russian and Ukrainian republics clearly disagreed with its content and did not support it. While the referenda and counter-referenda were prepared, the Centre had moved in a bloody coup against Lithuania and Latvia on 13 and 20 January, respectively. Even though nowhere near the same happened in Estonia, tension in both the public and the politicians may have reached such a high that the decision on the Estonian referendum had to be influenced by the events only a few hundred kilometres to the south. The huge demonstrations that took place all over the Union, including Moscow, against this brutal assault were surely one reason why the hardliners backed down for the time being. Although rumours of a putsch at the centre were circulating since late December 1990, too, Gorbachev ig-

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671 Simon, Desintegration, pp.13-14. For a public opinion expressed in a Western journal representative of this group’s views, cf. the article by one of its highest leaders, Colonel Viktor Alksnis: ‘Suffering from Self-Determination’, in: Foreign Policy, (84), 1991, pp. 61-71.

672 Thiele, Selbstbestimmung, p. 44.

nored them and went on his customary holiday in the Crimea. During the *putsch*, the Estonian Supreme Soviet declared the restoration of Estonia’s independence from the USSR on 20 August 1991. By the end of the year, Estonia was recognised as an independent state by 63 or so states and was member of the UN and other international bodies. Crucially, both the Russian Federation under Boris Yeltsin and, forced by events, the USSR, too, recognised Estonia, too. One of the main problems of its renewed existence was to become what under Soviet rule was the ‘question of nationalities’ and which was to be come a ‘question of minorities’ in a reversal of order and power. Also, whereas in the Soviet Union external influence on human rights questions had been largely if not totally fended off, Estonia now came into the glare that all ‘new’ states had to endure from the established states of the Western world which they were keen to rejoin. Since the disappearance of the Cold War, meaningful developments especially in human rights questions had become possible since the Paris Conference and the Copenhagen Document in 1990. This included the idea that such questions could not be relegated anymore to the domestic arena only and shielded from external influence – it had been exactly this problem which had prevented any development and dialogue in the time of the superpower competition. Therefore, the following years of independence crucially received a further international dimension that gave the situation of the new minorities under very close attention. In Estonia, these ‘new’ minorities were those who had previously been part of the huge majority in the Soviet Union, and who now, according to some writers, formed a diaspora. Their part and place in the Estonian population came as a result of the migration that took place under Soviet rule.

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674 The events in the Estonian state assembly (Riigikogu) were published in Riigikogu Kantselei / 20. augusti klubi (Eds.): *Kaks otsustavat päeva Toompeal (19.-20. august 1991) [Two Decisive Days on Toompea]*, Tallinn: Eesti Entsüklopeediakirjastus, 1996.

6.2 **Migration and Social Developments in Transition**

This section will deal with the short review of the Gorbachev years first, thus continuing the customary fashion of the previous chapters. It will then sum up the developments and provide the long-term review of the previous chapters, thus going from the chronological micro level to the macro level. A particular aspect of this is the question of urbanisation.

### 6.2.1 Migration and Natural Population Developments, 1985-1991

The demographic picture of the Gorbachev era reflects as before the highs and lows of daily life, being the consequence of the current political, economic and social developments. As a change over the long Brezhnev period, births as well as TFR went up again, although the economic crisis of 1989-1990 again had an impact and caused their drop. During the last years of the ESSR in the Gorbachev era age-old trends reversed: while in-migration markedly slumped, the rates for natural increase jumped up. The ethnic Estonians’ average share in the increase for 1986-1990 is 30.1%, with a continuous rise 1986-1989: 1,171 (19.1%, 1986); 1,654 (24.3%, 1987); 1,949 (29.9%, 1988); 2,578 (44.7%, 1989); 1,079 (38.8%, 1990). The total fertility rate, usually just about replacement level, also went up: from 2.12 in 1985 to 2.17 and 2.26 in the following years, remaining at 2.26 for 1988. After this relative peak, the TFR went down again: 2.21 in 1989 and 2.04 in 1990; in the year 1991 it went down again to 1.79. This change is rather remarkable in the light of an almost continuously low natural increase not surpassing 750 during the years from 1979; in fact, 1979 and 1980 saw negative figures of -247 and -190 respectively. The increase in 1981 and 1982 to 165 and 638, respectively, is negligible in a population of around one million, even if by 1983 a ‘high’ of 727 was reached, only to drop back to ‘increases’ of 157 in 1984 and -152 in 1985.

In migration, an increase in the fluctuation of migrants due to the politically instable circumstances there followed especially in 1988-89, due to which the in-migration balance went down to almost zero with 980 departures in 1000 arrivals. The most important features are that the net balance rapidly fell during 1989-1991, turning negative and thus into effective out-migration by 1990. However, this was the result of a strong decline in in-migration, not of a rise in out-migration, whose numbers did not substantially change between 1981 and 1991: this happened only in 1992 and 1993. Chances are, thus, that potential in-migrants from other parts of the Union became irritated at the situation in the Baltic republics and started to avoid the area as it may have appeared to be too volatile. For the period 1986-90 a figure of 14,076 in-migrants was more or less cancelled out by the 12,574 out-migrants, lowering the migration balance to 1,502 individuals. However, the disaggregated figures for 1986-90 show that already in 1987-88 the migration balance dropped from 4,283 to 965, dropping further to 171 in 1989 and turning negative to -4,021 in 1990. The main reasons for this development seems to be a gradual slowdown in migration into the ESSR until 1990 (by about 2,000 a year), followed by a sudden drop by over 4,000 in 1990, and a further 3,000 in 1991. Compared with the arrivals, the departures had also been declining since the 1970s, yet from the mid-1980s they stabilised at around 12,500 to 13,200 (in 1988). In 1989, depart-
tures almost matched arrivals, after which they increased, reaching 13,237 in 1991 and a balance of -8,034. The peak of out-migration would be reached in 1992, which the following chapter dealing with post-Soviet Estonia will discuss extensively.

The main reasons which may be attributable to the above developments in in-migration, and vice-versa, would appear to be increased economic hardship consequent on the long-standing Union-wide economic problems which had also hit the ESSR, and where the Brezhnevian stagnation period continued until around 1987. The economic reforms introduced by Gorbachev also introduced a measure of uncertainty for the population at large. In addition, ethnic clashes in other republics seemed to caution the population against quick moves for betterment purposes. When the increasing calls for more economic independence (1987); the decision by the ESSR Supreme Soviet to place ESSR laws before Union laws (1988); and the promulgation of the Language Law (1989) filtered through, this may have deterred a large number of potential migrants to move to the ESSR. However, the most compelling reasons for the relatively sudden reduction in migration into the ESSR, would be that from 1 January 1990, the ESSR had power over both her domestic and her economic affairs. This immediately put a stop to further in-migration. In addition, because of the scarcity of goods caused by the economic crisis since 1989, goods were no longer sold to in-migrants from outside the ESSR. This was enforced by checking the inland passport.

In a survey conducted for the 1989-91 period the most important reason for coming to Estonia was family-related, comprising 10,640 or 49.9% of 20,901 arriving migrants over the age of 16. Of these, 5,295 individuals or 25.3% of the total came to join their spouses; 4,430 persons or 21.2% of arrivals came to join their parents; finally, 915 persons or 4.4% came to join their children. The above groups arrived to large degree with further dependants; of the total of 5,180 under-16 year-old children, 2,905 or 56.1% came related to family migration.

The second most important reason appears to be related to military service; 3,312 officers and re-enlistees (üleajateenijad) or 15.3% came to the ESSR for this reason. One might add that another 160 military pensioners or 0.8% of the total came, too – the Baltic republics have always been favourite retiring places for retired service personnel who could usually pick a location where to settle.

Obtaining living quarters throughout the time of the Soviet Union was a serious problem. In the ESSR between 1946 and 1990, roughly 25 million square meters of living quarters were built, 19.3 million or 77.4% of which were state-built. Indeed, obtaining required living space was the third most important reason given to explain the move to the ESSR: 13.9% of all reasons given for migrating to the ESSR were linked to obtaining accommodation (korteri eraldamine, korteri vahetus, elamispinna soetamine või üürimine); 1,046 persons or 5.0% of the total came to directly obtain a flat, in addition to whom another 1,538 or 7.4% came as a result of an arranged exchange of flats. The rest of 142 individuals or 0.7% rented a flat as a subtenant, or bought a dwelling [sic!], which 161 or 0.8% of the total did.

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This shows that at least for the last ten to twenty years, the work-related reasons seemed to have waned even more between the survey on the 1970-75 period and this survey; family-related reasons since then were on the ascendancy. In the 1989-91 survey, work-related reasons have become comparatively unimportant: 795 persons or 3.8% came to work in Estonia, and only another 605 individuals or 2.9% were still sent to a place of work after graduating from a vocational school as a specialist. With regard to the last-mentioned group, one reason may have been linked to the socialist division of labour: for example, for the Tartu Control Instruments Factory, specialists would have to come from either Moscow or Leningrad, as only there the relevant schools would be based. As this factory was a part of the military-industrial complex, it would be controlled from Moscow and young specialists would be transferred to work there on special order.\(^{680}\) Usually the factory would request a certain number of specialists from the relevant ministry which in turn would order the schools to send the relevant number to the firm in question. Compared to the total of 6.7% of respondents for the period 1989-91, in the 1970-75 period some 18.5% of interviewees came to work in the ESSR. In 1975, 45.6% had family-related reasons compared to 49.9% in 1989-91.\(^{681}\)

Short-term in-migration decreased heavily. Conversely, the figure for inhabitants of the ESSR who had permanently lived at their place of residence for 25 years or more had strongly increased, showing a continuation of the trend towards settlement. Indeed, in 1989 more than a third of the entire migrant population, 34.1%, answered this criterion; in 1979, it was only 26.6%. Also, the share of migrants in the population decreased from 62.3% to 57.8% in the 1979-1989 period.\(^{682}\)

6.2.2 Migration and Population Change 1945-1991

To assess the changes that have been dubbed more than once as fundamental both in terms of their actual quality and their impact on post-Soviet developments, this section reviews the long lines of development during the Soviet era. The first will give an overview of external migration with regard to the concepts outlined in chapter 1; the second will deal with the urbanisation that went in tandem with the developments during 1945-1991.

6.2.2.1 External Migration With the ESSR

The census data shows that between 1959 and 1989 the population rose from a total of around 1.197 million to 1.566 million. During this time, the urban population rose by 450,000 and the rural population decreased by 77,000, the total rose by 369,000 only. In this rise, the Estonian population rose by only 70,600 or 7.9% over the 1959 figures, whereas the non-Estonian share doubled by 298,200 or 98.1 over the 1959 figures. This development is only partly the result of natural population increase, but mostly due

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to in-migration from outside the Estonian SSR: in 1989, of the total of 1,566 million inhabitants, 602,400 or so were non-Estonians, 406,600 of whom were born outside the ESSR, some 10% of which were ethnic Estonians (40,271). Conversely, 195,800 were born in the ESSR. Note that the number of migration events, i.e. the combined number of in- and out-migrants for 1945-1991 is approx. 1.7 million, with 1 million arrivals and around 700,000 departures. The developments between the censuses were as follows: 1959-1970, an increase of 159,288, of whom 126,784 were non-Estonians; 1970-1979, an increase of 108,397, of whom 85,742 were non-Estonians; 1979-1989, an increase of 101,186, of whom 85,717 were non-Estonians.

Ethnic Russians represent the largest share of in-migrants in the ESSR’s demographic developments: some 67%. Among the population born outside the ESSR, their share is markedly lower: only 57%. As shown in the chapter on migration during the Stalin era, people migrating into the ESSR were usually in their prime age, i.e., between 20 and 35 years; among them were young specialists with unfinished or vocational secondary education. By consequence, they had a higher reproduction potential and usually surpassed the reproduction rates of their Estonian peers. This too explains why by 1989, there were over 200,000 non-Estonian dependants already born in the ESSR.

The following table disaggregates ethnic groups and their birthplaces for the last Soviet census in 1989. Clearly, most of the non-Estonians were born outside of Estonia, and two thirds of those were ethnic Russians, although, as the table shows, not all had their birthplace in the Russian Federation. However, some 40,300 ethnic Estonians were born outside the post-Soviet republic. In addition note that the descendants of probably 70,000 citizens of the interwar republic now live in the Russian Federation because of the territorial transfer in 1944, discussed above; thus, many ethnic Estonians from the Russian Federation were born on territory such as the old Petserimaa from interwar years which from 1944 belonged to the Pskov district (oblast), or the territory east of the Narva river where three councils of the town of Narva had been situated, or Jaanilinn / Ivangorod, both of which after 1944 belonged to the Leningrad oblast. Another noteworthy fact is the figure for ethnic Russians born in Estonia: they represent 203,800 of 474,800, or 42.9% of the total of ethnic Russians who have regarded the ESSR or Estonia as their home. This makes later calls of hard-line Estonians for ‘the Russians’ to ‘go home’ or ‘return to their native land’ mere xenophobia: Estonia is their home, their heimat, rodina.


684 For Tallinn, see the example provided by Tiit, Akadeemia 5(10), 1993, pp. 2119.

Table 6.1: Ethnic Groups and Birthplaces according to 1989 Census Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group Birthplace in</th>
<th>Total 1,565,662</th>
<th>Estonians 963,281</th>
<th>Russians 474,834</th>
<th>Ukrainians 48,271</th>
<th>Byelorussians 27,711</th>
<th>Finns 16,622</th>
<th>Jews* 4,631</th>
<th>Germans 3,466</th>
<th>Latvians 3,135</th>
<th>other 23,711</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>1,154,585</td>
<td>920,720</td>
<td>203,814</td>
<td>10,179</td>
<td>5,871</td>
<td>5,391</td>
<td>1,558</td>
<td>739</td>
<td>832</td>
<td>5,481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which Tallinn</td>
<td>237,551</td>
<td>144,631</td>
<td>80,739</td>
<td>4,736</td>
<td>2,754</td>
<td>884</td>
<td>1,003</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>2,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>300,430</td>
<td>237,188</td>
<td>4,413</td>
<td>1,573</td>
<td>10,177</td>
<td>925</td>
<td>1,391</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>8,601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total born outside of Estonia</td>
<td>406,628</td>
<td>269,234</td>
<td>37,981</td>
<td>21,766</td>
<td>11,187</td>
<td>3,049</td>
<td>2,715</td>
<td>2,922</td>
<td>18,133</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Population</td>
<td>1,118,825</td>
<td>572,547</td>
<td>436,708</td>
<td>42,325</td>
<td>25,441</td>
<td>4,564</td>
<td>2,527</td>
<td>2,586</td>
<td>20,898</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Population</td>
<td>446,833</td>
<td>390,734</td>
<td>38,126</td>
<td>5,946</td>
<td>2,270</td>
<td>5,389</td>
<td>939</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>2,813</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By comparison with the 1934, the total net effect of the Soviet era, a fundamental change in the population becomes clear. Between the 1934 and 1989 censuses, the most important points and striking differences are:

- The ethnic Estonian population has still not reached its pre-war absolute figures
- The total population in the territory of Soviet and Post-Soviet Estonia has increased by over half a million, that of non-Estonians even more
- Ukrainians, of whom only 89 [sic!] were living in interwar Estonian (again recalculated for the ESSR and present, post-Soviet Estonian territory), reached a figure of 48,271 in 1989 or 3.1% in the population – an increase of 542%;
- Byelorussians have reached almost 28,000 from virtually zero in 1934
- Conversely, the numbers of both Germans and Swedes have dwindled significantly, the former to about a fifth, the latter to almost zero compared with 1934.

Table 6.2: The Population of Estonia, 1934 and 1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>1934</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1989</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1989/1934</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonians</td>
<td>972,750</td>
<td>91.7</td>
<td>963,281</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>-9,469</td>
<td>99.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>50,080</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>474,834</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>424,754</td>
<td>948.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>16,190</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3,466</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-12,728</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swedes</td>
<td>7,616</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-7,319</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvians</td>
<td>4,130</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3,135</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-995</td>
<td>75.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>4,383</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>4,613</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>105.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>6,164</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>116,029</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>109,865</td>
<td>1,882.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,061,313</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1,565,662</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>504,349</td>
<td>147.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Estonians</td>
<td>87,049</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>602,374</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>515,325</td>
<td>62.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes Byelorussians (27,711), Ukrainians (48,271), Finns (16,622), Poles (3,008), Ingrians (306) and unspecified ‘Others’ (20,111).


---

686 ESA: *Rahvastik I*. 1995, Electronic Data. Adapted from Files 101A.XLS - RV199701; 101B.XLS for City, 101C.XLS for Rural data. Errors and gaps occurring are due to unaccountability of individuals.

As the previous chapters have shown, a view à la longue reveals, especially with regard to the Brezhnev era, that the Soviet population was highly mobile. Despite administrative problems, an average of five to six changes in the place of residence was common. Several reasons may be advanced for this, among which labour migration and economic reasons such as better living conditions seem to be of particular interest for studying migration to and from the Baltic. Other reasons, especially pertinent to the immediate post-war period until 1955, include massive administrative population transfers. This means that for the entire Soviet period there would result a high turnover of migrants; indeed, there were over 1 million gross in-migrants and over 700,000 out-migrants. The migrants who did stay in the ESSR, however, tended not to move anymore but remain in the same place. The most important observation in regard to both post-Soviet ethnic questions and to the migration history presented in the preceding chapters and subsumed again below, is the quasi-quintessence stated already at the beginning: that ‘the Russians’ do not exist as a homogeneous group, but that it is on the contrary a very heterogeneous one. In a nutshell, the ‘...so-called ‘Russian-language minority’ living in [post-Soviet] Estonia is very numerous and varied in its origins, ethnic and cultural background, interests and connections.’

Table 6.3: External Migration Dynamics, ESSR with Rest of SU, 1946-1990, 1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Periods</th>
<th>Total Arrivals</th>
<th>Total Departures</th>
<th>Saldo Total</th>
<th>Average / a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-1955</td>
<td>298,894</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>193,802</td>
<td>105,092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-1960</td>
<td>149,364</td>
<td>39,046</td>
<td>118,862</td>
<td>30,502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-1965</td>
<td>111,560</td>
<td>21,814</td>
<td>71,059</td>
<td>40,501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-1970</td>
<td>135,891</td>
<td>28,641</td>
<td>93,398</td>
<td>42,493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-1975</td>
<td>130,389</td>
<td>23,521</td>
<td>98,629</td>
<td>31,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-1980</td>
<td>114,262</td>
<td>18,670</td>
<td>85,864</td>
<td>28,398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-1985</td>
<td>95,225</td>
<td>15,850</td>
<td>67,073</td>
<td>28,152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-1990</td>
<td>70,381</td>
<td>10,820</td>
<td>62,871</td>
<td>28,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-1990</td>
<td>807,072</td>
<td>158,362</td>
<td>648,710</td>
<td>209,316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-1990</td>
<td>1,105,966</td>
<td>15,604</td>
<td>947,604</td>
<td>314,408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>5,203</td>
<td>607</td>
<td>4,596</td>
<td>-8,034</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a For 1946-1955, this data reflects only urban in- and out-migration.

b 153,573 urban, 55,743 rural population increase.


688 Tepp, Eesti Statistika (11), 1994, English summary, pp. 21-22, at p. 22.
Disaggregating the migration balance figures for the entire period 1946-1990, it becomes clear that the largest share of net migration from other Soviet republics to Estonia is represented by the Russian Federation (80.24%), followed by the Ukrainian (7.53%), Byelorussian (5.75%) Kazakh (3.77%), and Latvian (1.46%) Republics. Looking closer at the figures, they can again be disaggregated by republic of origin and of destination, i.e. into in- and out-migration. In terms of the distribution of in-migrants by their former place of residence over the same period 1946-1990, once more the majority stem from the Russian Federation, although here the share is ‘only’ 70.99% compared to the share in net migration; Ukraine’s share is somewhat higher at 11.04%; both Byelorussia’s and Kazakhstan’s shares are lower with 4.52% and 2.41, respectively; conversely, Latvia’s share in in-migration is higher than in the net migration at 3.94%.

Clearly the figures for the Russian Federation and Ukraine need some more analysis. Without being able to give as detailed figures as provided by the statistics, some of the regions with the highest emigration should nevertheless be mentioned. Many if not most of the migrants stem from regions adjacent or close to the Baltic states. One major sending region is the North-West Region, whence 26.25% of in-migrants came; this includes especially the Leningrad Region and the city of Leningrad (now renamed St. Petersburg), as well as Novgorod and Pskov Regions. A further 11.81% came from the Central Region which includes the City and Region of Moscow, also the Yaroslavl, Smolensk and Tver Regions (Oblast). Together these two regions provide over half of all migrants from the Russian Federation. From Ukraine, 4.8% and 4.19% of migrants.

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690 ‘Table 5: Distribution Of In-Migrants By Their Former Place Of Residence’, in: Eesti Statistika, (10), 1994, pp. 45-46, at p. 45, Table 4 (FN 689) and ‘Table 5: Distribution Of In-Migrants By Their Former Place Of Residence’, in: Eesti Statistika, (10), 1994, pp. 45-46, at p. 45.
stem from South-Western and the Don-Dnepr Regions, respectively. The former includes the City and Region of Kiev, also Lvov and Zhitomir Regions.

Table 6.4: Gross Migration into Estonian SSR from the RSFSR, Ukrainian SSR, Byelorussian SSR, 1946-1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ESSR Arrivals</th>
<th>RSFSR</th>
<th>Ukrainian SSR</th>
<th>Byelorussian SSR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Period</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Northern Region</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N. Western Region</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-1955</td>
<td>237,300</td>
<td>16,096</td>
<td>106,543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-1965</td>
<td>81,631</td>
<td>8,184</td>
<td>32,823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-1970</td>
<td>87,577</td>
<td>9,652</td>
<td>31,598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-1975</td>
<td>88,882</td>
<td>9,044</td>
<td>29,642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-1980</td>
<td>75,402</td>
<td>6,369</td>
<td>23,837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-1985</td>
<td>58,420</td>
<td>4,512</td>
<td>17,071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-1990</td>
<td>43,447</td>
<td>3,565</td>
<td>13,411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual average</td>
<td>17,447</td>
<td>1,506</td>
<td>6,451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total</td>
<td>70.99</td>
<td>6.13</td>
<td>26.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(a\) Includes Arkhangelsk and Murmansk Regions (Oblasts) and the Karelian and Komi ASSRs.
\(b\) Includes City and Region of Leningrad, as well as Novgorod and Pskov Regions (Oblasts) et al.
\(c\) Includes City and Region of Moscow, also Bryansk, Ivanovo, Yaroslavl, Smolensk and Tver Regions (Oblasts) et al.
\(d\) Includes City and Region of Kiev, also Lvov and Zhitomir Regions.

Source: 'Table 1. The Number of Immigrants by Place of Origin', in: Eesti Statistika, (10), 1994, pp. 20-26.

Disaggregation by republic and region of origin on a chronological base shows that the period from 1946 to 1965 represents the highest share of in-migration from the Russian Federation, as the figures of each five-year period are above the 70.99% average for 1946-1990: 1946-1955, 79.39%; 1956-60, 75.29%, and 1961-65, 73.17%. In other words, the major share of the population stemming from the Russian Federation and living in Estonia by 1989/90 came to Estonia between 1946 and 1965. This is in fact born out by the data on the duration ethnic Russian in-migrants have lived in the ESSR, many of which have lived in Estonia over 20 years, indeed even 25 to 30 years. Most importantly, the geographic origin of the incoming migrants and the structure of the area next to the north-western region of the RSFSR with its major centre, Leningrad, resulted in the Russian and Russophone population’s consequent orientation towards this area.
Table 6.5: Ethnic Russian Migrants by Duration of Permanent Residence and Age, 1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Length of Permanent Residence (years)</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>under 15 years of age</th>
<th>working age 16-54 / 16-59 (m)</th>
<th>older than working age 54+ / 60+ (m)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>abs.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>abs. %</td>
<td>abs. %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 1</td>
<td>12,863</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>2,627 11.4</td>
<td>9,329 4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>12,663</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>2,415 10.4</td>
<td>9,551 4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>10,954</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2,322 10.0</td>
<td>7,816 3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>10,996</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2,451 10.6</td>
<td>7,786 3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>9,215</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2,055 8.9</td>
<td>6,544 3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>8,464</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1,745 7.5</td>
<td>6,209 3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-9</td>
<td>34,293</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>5,909 25.5</td>
<td>25,796 12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-14</td>
<td>36,080</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>3,448 14.9</td>
<td>29,284 14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-19</td>
<td>31,661</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>176 0.8</td>
<td>27,381 13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>24,339</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>19,963 9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;=25</td>
<td>107,413</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>53,776 26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>298,941</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>23,148 100.0</td>
<td>203,432 100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Figure 6.11: Ethnic Russian Migrants by Duration of Permanent Residence and Age, 1989

Source: as above.

6.2.2.2 Urbanisation and Population Change

Estonia and the Estonian parts of Livonia had been rural provinces of the Tsarist Empire. By the time of Estonian independence urbanisation had taken off in the area inhabited by Estonians, but even during the 1930s it had not been more than a third urbanised. Looking at the developments between 1959 and 1989 and taking the year 1934 for comparison, the ratios between urban and rural populations and especially between Estonians and non-Estonian populations have changed totally, as Table 6.6 shows. Within 25 years, the rural population went down by around 246,000 between 1934 and 1959, whereas the urban population had already almost doubled, despite the destruction in the war.
Immediately after the war started a process which in the following decades resulted in the building of gigantic heavy industry plants in the electricity-generating and chemical fields, which had a huge demand on labour. With the extension of the excavations, industrial and civil building activities were increased, too, as new settlements were established near the production plants and sites; Narva and Sillamäe became towns. Such huge building projects needed corresponding numbers of labour. Indeed, construction activities in Estonia were one of the major reasons for in-migration: ‘The change of the ethnic composition of builders is directly linked with the change in migration intensity.’

A large number of the migrants who came to Estonia for taking part in building projects soon went into other branches of the economy; new migrants followed in their stead. Other major industries where migrants from outside the ESSR came to work in were communications and shipping, as demonstrated in the following tables.

Political developments at the centre always had an impact in the ‘satellites’, not only outside the Soviet Union, but also inside. During those periods where a clear leader had not yet emerged, i.e. 1953-56 after Stalin’s death, and 1964-68 after Khrushchev was ousted, politicians and officials usually took a wait-and-see attitude, anticipating possible changes in direction which may have endangered their positions if they substantially differed from the new order of the day. Kukk questions the necessity of introducing and building so much heavy industry in Estonia in the first place. Clearly there was not: not for Estonia, that is. Implying that Estonian opinion was neither solicited nor taken into account, she states: ‘Whether Estonia needed this heavy industrialisation was deemed a question of no importance.’ In a way, however, this is asking the wrong question: of course Estonia by itself would not need such industrial development; yet like it or not, Estonia had been made part of the Soviet Union and as such was integrated into the Union-wide economic planning. This was the deciding point; as reprehensible and regrettable the political decision-making process may have been, it clearly demonstrated the hierarchy in the Soviet Union and the position of the republics vis-à-vis the central authorities. Consequently, Gerhard Simon and others rightly point to the heavy industrialisation’s design and use as a means to integrate Estonia into the Soviet Union. One might add that by extension, this integration also enlarged control over the republic, as received wisdom by now has accepted that Soviet economic policy was clearly based on political decisions, not on economic.

In this vein, Kulno Kala even refers to unspecified documents which would indicate exactly this goal pursued by the central authorities for the ESSR. By extension, this would allow the conclusion that the ensuing imports of labour from other Union repub-
lics had the same reason, design, and use: to closer link Estonia into the Union context. For while the official reason also suggested that the small post-war population of Estonia could simply not supply the large numbers that were needed, Kukk justifiably points to the fact that without the oversized industrial complexes this question would not have arisen in the first place. Also, there may have been more workers available had there not been a wave of deportations prior, during, and after the war, which next to directly war-related casualties took its additional toll on the population: In late 1944, the industrial workforce ‘...was down to 52% of its pre-war total of 89,000.’

The contention is that there is a strong correlation and connection between the industrialisation that was effected under Stalin and continued until the 1970s, the large number of immigrants that were needed to staff the plants or build them or work in auxiliary functions and urbanisation. Indeed, the non-Estonian in-migrants and the settling immigrants have been urbanites. By 1989, the population at large was 71.5% urbanised, but non-Estonians were 91% urbanised. In the space of a century, a total turnaround in settlement structures, and therefore in the society of the land, were effected. The data clearly show that this happened in the post-war period between 1945 and 1989.

Table 6.6: Urbanisation and Population Change in Estonia from 1881 to 1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>City %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tsarist Empire (1710/21-1918/20)</td>
<td>1881</td>
<td>881,455</td>
<td>114,230</td>
<td>767,225</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1897</td>
<td>958,351</td>
<td>148,778</td>
<td>809,573</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence (1918/20-1940)</td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>1,107,059</td>
<td>298,873</td>
<td>791,934</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>1,126,413</td>
<td>349,826</td>
<td>767,535</td>
<td>31.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESSR (1940/45-1991)</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>1,196,791</td>
<td>675,515</td>
<td>521,276</td>
<td>56.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1,356,079</td>
<td>881,168</td>
<td>474,911</td>
<td>65.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1,464,476</td>
<td>1,016,826</td>
<td>447,650</td>
<td>69.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1,565,662</td>
<td>1,118,829</td>
<td>446,833</td>
<td>71.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

698 Misiunas/Taagepera, p. 110. Kala however writes that the workforce in the largest enterprises was around 40,000 in May 1940; cf. Kala, pp. 512-513.

699 Cf. supra ch. 5.1 and 5.2.
The following Table 6.7 shows that not only was most of the change in the population structure due to immigration from outside the ESSR, but that this change also affected the ethnic composition of urban areas in the republic. Non-Estonian immigrants, chiefly but not exclusively Russians, settled almost exclusively in urban areas. In the 1989 census, Russians were 92%, Ukrainians 87.7%, and Byelorussians 91.8% urban – together they formed 91.4% of the total non-Estonians population. Compared to this, Estonians in 1989 were still only 59.4% urbanised. The ESSR average in this census was 71.5%. Yet even before, non-Estonians were mostly urbanised: in 1959, the ESSR average was 56.4% urban, 43.6% rural population. Although they may have represented only 38.1% of the urban population at large, they were nevertheless in themselves 84.6% urbanised: 257,250 out of a total of 304,138 non-Estonians lived in urban areas. In the following census years, this share increased further, hence in 1970 and 1979 it reached 87.0% and 89.2%, respectively. The non-Estonian share increased to 48.1% in the total urban population by 1989.700

Table 6.7: Urban and Rural Population, Estonian - Others, 1959-1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>675,515</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>881,168</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1,016,82</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1,125,62</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>450,10</td>
<td>66.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian</td>
<td>418,265</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>506,418</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>555,943</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>575,752</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>157,48</td>
<td>37.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>257,250</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>374,750</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>460,883</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>549,871</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>292,62</td>
<td>113.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>521,276</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>474,911</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>447,650</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>444,041</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>-77,235</td>
<td>-14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian</td>
<td>474,388</td>
<td>91.0</td>
<td>418,739</td>
<td>88.2</td>
<td>391,869</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>380,792</td>
<td>85.6</td>
<td>-93,596</td>
<td>-19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>46,888</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>56,172</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>55,781</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>63,249</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>16,361</td>
<td>34.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,196,791</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1,356,079</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1,464,476</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1,565,662</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>368,871</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian</td>
<td>892,653</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>925,157</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>947,812</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>963,281</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>70,628</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>304,138</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>430,922</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>516,664</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>602,381</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>298,243</td>
<td>98.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a There is an unfortunate discrepancy of 4,002 between the added urban-rural population shares and the total in 1989 that cannot at this stage be accounted for.

Source: Own Calculations on the basis of ESSR Census data.

This also continues into towns, where a comparison between 1934 and 1989 may be apposite. As Table 6.8 shows, Estonians made up 85.5% of the capital’s population in 1934, but only 47.4% in 1989 – while Tallinn’s population in total more than trebled. Whereas the towns and cities of the South generally remained largely Estonian, those of the North-East showed a similar picture as Tallinn: Narva in 1934 had a share of 64.8% Estonians in a population of only 23,500, despite its closeness to the Soviet Russian border. By comparison, only 4%, i.e. barely 3,200, Estonians remained by 1989 in a population of over 81,000. In Tartu, however, the near doubling of the population from some 58,900 to 113,400 still resulted only in a loss of under 16%, i.e. from 88.0% Estonians to 72.3% between 1934 and 1989. The town of Paldiski is a special case. From little more than a little village of less than 1,000 population, it rose to a town of 38,700 – a 45-fold increase in the population with little or no Estonians left. The reason for this is its status as a closed town, which it gained because of the naval submarine base with two to four atomic training reactors.

Table 6.8: Urban Settlements in Estonia in Comparison: Estonians and Russians, 1934 and 1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>Total Population 1934</th>
<th>Estonians 1934 %</th>
<th>Total Population 1989</th>
<th>Estonians 1989 %</th>
<th>Population 1989/34 %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tallinn</td>
<td>137,792</td>
<td>85.5</td>
<td>478,974</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>347.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tartu</td>
<td>58,876</td>
<td>88.0</td>
<td>113,420</td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td>192.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narva</td>
<td>23,512</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>81,221</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>345.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valga</td>
<td>10,842</td>
<td>82.3</td>
<td>17,722</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>163.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pärnu</td>
<td>20,334</td>
<td>90.8</td>
<td>52,389</td>
<td>82.4</td>
<td>257.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paldiski</td>
<td>851</td>
<td>94.0</td>
<td>38,700</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>(4,547.6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, there too was some rural-urban migration by Estonians leaving the countryside. Their share of 91% in the rural population decreased to some 86% while the non-Estonians’ share correspondingly increased from 9 to some 14%. If this author’s calculations were correct, Estonians accounted for only 35% of the increase in urban population, with non-Estonians accounted for some 65% of the share between 1959 and 1989. In absolute terms, the increase of some 450,100 in urban population was carried mostly by the 292,600 non-Estonians shown in the table; only some 157,500 Estonians contributed to the net increase. Thus, most of the strong turnaround from a predominantly rural population to a predominantly urban population, effected within some 30 years only, can be attributed to incoming migration (the other factors being the previously discussed natural population increase and rural-urban migration whose overall result shows a net loss of some 77,200 migrants; the Estonian migration from the country of some 93,600 persons was slightly offset by the actual migration of some 16,400 non-Estonians to the country.

The above chapter showed that a large proportion of the increase in Estonian population was due to incoming migration, and that most of the migrants, in fact the overwhelming majority, were ethnic Russians. Also, they settled mostly in the urban areas, thus strongly increasing the non-Estonian share of the population there; already in the countryside surrounding the towns of Narva and Sillamäe, the 1989 relative share of the non-Estonians is considerably lower than in the towns: 96% in Narva and 90% in Sillamäe stand against only 68% or so in the rural areas of Ida-Virumaa.

Due to the strong non-Estonian in-migration into towns, severe housing shortages occurred. This and the widespread opinion among Estonians that the best and modern housing was distributed mostly to non-Estonians, led to increasing bitterness of Estonians towards the latter group. It appears that this point is not without foundation; Estonians who lived in some of the oldest housing in the republic, which may until today be largely wooden houses with facilities outside the house, did not stand much of a chance of receiving new living quarters if they did not have less than at first, 3, later 6 m² living ‘space’ per person in the house. This criticism of better housing given to ‘the Russians’, as well as a general complaint about their preferential treatment which Estonians did not get, was a major complaint in this author’s conversations with Estonians throughout the entire research period, although such complaints were rather stronger during the 1993 and 1995 research visits. Still, they were levied against the non-Estonian population and their complaints of being disadvantaged in post-Soviet Estonia, implying that ‘the Russians’ really have not only no reason to complain, as in Estonian eyes it was they who were the pampered in-migrants who did not mind to even literally occupy flats which Estonians had long been waiting for. Also, for these and many other reasons, e.g. because ‘they’ were occupants and colonisers of the entire Estonian republic, ‘they’ most certainly would not have any moral ground to complain at all.

Such were the developments during the Soviet era that in post-Soviet times, Ida-Virumaa has a virtual if not complete monopoly in the production of a number products, including electricity; building materials from concrete and kukermite via bricks to wood particle and fibre boards; chemical products from fuel via detergents to fertilisers; or cotton and silk textiles. Much of the industrial output again hinges on the major natu-
reral resource of the area, oil-shale, in addition to which came power engineering, and factories of the military complex of the Soviet Union; in light industry textiles predominated.\textsuperscript{701} Thus population as well as industrial production averages are twice as high as the Estonian average.\textsuperscript{702}

Map 6.1: Spatial Distribution of Non-Estonians, 1989

Analyzing the non-Estonians’ spatial distribution, also in terms of the main reasons for in-migrating to Estonia, the industrial centres of Tallinn and the north-east: Narva, Sillamäe, Kohtla-Järve, represent the lion’s share of the ethnic Russians and Russophones in Estonia. Eight areas will be discussed clock-wise; the relevant counties are given in \textit{italics}; the respective city’s, town’s, village’s, hamlet’s number of inhabitants and the initial of its administrative status (c, t, v, h) follow the placename. Administrative centres are underlined.\textsuperscript{703}

\textsuperscript{701} Sillaste/Purga, p. 3, with detailed accounts provided throughout the article with regard to production methods as well as sites for the various industrial branches.
\textsuperscript{702} Sillaste/Purga, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{703} Eesti A & O, pp. 89-91. Data provided is current as of 1 Jan. 1989 for urban and as of 12 Jan. 1989 for rural communities, giving the actual population figures. Note that even if the city status accorded to places like Paldiski or Keila in Harju county (Map: Area 1) is somewhat difficult to believe, the ratio of Paldiski’s number of inhabitants equals 0.55% of the total Estonian population of 1.5 million. Compared to Germany’s 82 million inhabitants in 1999, this ratio equals a city with 447,800 inhabitants; for the UK with a population of some 60 million this would equal a city of 327,700. Tallinn’s share in the Estonian population equals some 1.88 m in Britain and 2.56 m in Germany.
1. **North-West Estonia (Harjumaa):** Tallinn (482,030c), Paldiski (8,192c), Keila (10,082c), Saue (4,372t). Tallinn in 1934 had a Russian population of 5.8% and was 85.5% Estonian. Its main pull factor was the status as the ESSR capital, which also has considerable industry situated in the area. While not very high in absolute numbers, the relative share of the population of the army town of Paldiski in *Harjumaa*, Harju County, was 97% ethnic Russian or Russophone in 1979 and 98.6% of the population in 1989 (in 1934 it was 94% Estonian). The reason for the almost total Russian environment in Paldiski is explained by the fact that the town housed a submarine base and naval training centre, which made it a ‘closed town’ like Sillamäe because of its security status.

2. **North-Central Estonia (Harjumaa, Lääne-Virumaa):** Maardu (16,085c), Kehra (4,032t), Kunda (5,003c), Tapa (10,359c), Rakvere (20,129c). This is part of the huge oil-shale producing region; it has a number of chemical factories; in Kunda is a large cement works. At the same time, the Lahemaa National Park is situated between Maardu and Kunda, including Loksa and Võsu.

3. **Northern North-East Estonia (Ida-Virumaa):** Kiviõli (10,365c), Püssi (2,504t), Kohila-Järve (76,562c), Sillamäe (20,282c), Viivikonna (1,356t), Narva (81,126c), Narva-Jõesuu (4,699t). As previous parts have shown, Estonia’s north-east was developed as the country’s industrial heavy-industry base; it received most in-migrants next to Tallinn; it has the highest share of ethnic Russians and Russophones of any area including Tallinn. Sillamäe was a secret development, a ‘closed town’, which largely excluded any Estonian moving into the area; its All-Union plants in part belonged to the military-industrial complex as far as the uranium treatment works were concerned. In 1970 ethnic Russians and Ukrainians represented probably around 95% of Sillamäe’s population. Kohtla-Järve is an agglomeration of several smaller towns, all of whom are situated in the oil shale mining and treatment area. Narva was home to one of the largest textiles manufacturers in the Soviet Union, Kreenholm, and to other parts of the heavy industry of Ida-Virumaa. Narva-Jõesuu like Toila have both fishing and fish processing predominating in their economy, but in the interwar years, both towns were seaside summer resorts with sea baths, tennis courts and boarding houses. Close to Toila is the famous parkland of Oru; the town gives its name also to the peat production plant, part of the large Oil shale conglomerate.

4. **Along the Lake Peipsi Shore (Ida-Virumaa, Jõgevamaa, Tartumaa):** Alajõe (n.n.), Mustvee (1,923c), Kallaste (1,329c). These are old villages

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705 ESSR ECP Party Archive, C6388, R49, D4, p. 9, quoted in Vseviov, Sillamäe: *A Secret Uranium Town*, p. 10
of trades-, crafts-, and fishermen; also some old believers who fled to the area before Estonian statehood.\textsuperscript{706}

5. **Tartu (Tartu linn, Tartumaa)** (113,907c). Although home to Estonia’s oldest university, Tartu was a partially closed town; spending the night was forbidden. The main reason for this was the barracks of one of the Soviet Army’s airborne divisions, south of Tartu.\textsuperscript{707}

6. **Southern Estonia (Võrumaa, Valgamaa):** Võru (17,406c), Valga (18,053c). The south-eastern corner of Võru County between Obinitsa and Vatsselinna is predominantly Russian. A considerable number of Russians also live on the Estonian-Latvian border in the town of Valga, which is roughly 50% Russian on account of it being a railway centre and one of the main junctions from the Baltic Soviet republics to Moscow and Leningrad; such centres were habitually staffed by Russians and Russophones.\textsuperscript{708}

7. **South-Western Estonia (Pärnumaa):** Pärnu (53,847c), Sindi (4,458c), Lavassaare (533t) and

8. **Western Estonia (Läänemaa):** Haapsalu (15,190) have only little non-Estonian populations. Pärnu Russians are like many Russians in Tartu and on Lake Peipsi usually Estonian Russians, i.e. they have their roots in the old interwar republic. They too are much better integrated into society than the late comers of the 1970s and 1980s.

\textsuperscript{706} Cf. section 2.1.1 on the pre-statehood period c. 1200-1881. Also cf. Dmitri R Mikhailov (=Mihhailov): ‘Loyalty of Russians in Estonia and Problems Of Integration To Autonomous Community’[sic!], Mimeo, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{707} Its commander Dudaev, an ethnic Chechen, would play an important role in 1991 in keeping a cool head and ordering the troops to remain in their barracks; this was answered by the Estonians in their moral and public support, not least by the government, when the first Chechen war broke out 1994-96. Also, a plate was mounted near the entrance to the Barclay Hotel in Tartu town centre (on Ülikooli tn., University Street), which until 1991 had been Dudaev’s command centre.

\textsuperscript{708} This information was provided by Ms. Küllike Tohver of the Estonian Open Foundation, Eesti Avatud Fond; interview with the author, 06 June 1997. Both the material Ms Tohver supplied and her availability as a resource person are gratefully acknowledged.

With the break-up of the Soviet Union two main events happened, one of which was the return of Estonia to the international community of states. The other was that the internal development of the state could now be determined by its own legislative, executive, and judicative powers in conjunction with its people. Membership in the community of citizens is determined by the state and its laws. These in turn are influenced and made by the government of the day. It is at this juncture that a particular part of the Soviet legacy becomes the central problem – the various groups of the population subsumed under ‘non-Estonians’. This outlook will first deal with the domestic issues and provide a broad overview over the main problems with particular reference to the situation of the non-Estonians. The second part will deal with the international level of this question, similarly outlining some of the main problems that have occurred since 1991. The outlook shows that the non-Estonian population, who had grown over fifty years under Soviet rule in Estonia, not only domestically faced direct problems of adaptation and reorientation in a territorial unit that they knew as a constituent part of the Soviet Union whose borders in reality were but administrative. From 1991 these borders were those of a state, part of whose inhabitants they were. Their status changed from *primus inter pares* to *one among many*. Crucially, however, they were not regarded as part of the main people, or nation, within Estonia’s borders to whom however the non-Estonians with interwar ancestry belonged. The period of arrival in the Estonian territory is therefore the decisive factor – pre-Soviet or Soviet era? As was outlined in earlier chapters, the bulk of these non-Estonians arrived during the Soviet era and were consequent upon the doctrine of full restoration of the pre-Soviet state treated as foreigners, or aliens, with applicable laws. The potentially destabilising character of this situation consequently received strong international attention in the international climate of the 1990s.

The question of what status and situation the non-Estonian non-citizens living in post-Soviet Estonia have is strongly dependent on the question of Estonian statehood post-1991. The main difference here is one between a *renewed* state and one that was *newly formed* on erstwhile territory of the Soviet Union that broke apart. The first part must therefore also determine what form of statehood is applicable. Even if this is a more legalistic argument, it is one which determines the applicability of international norms to the question of ‘the Russians’ as new ‘minority’ in the Estonian state post-1991. The moral arguments have as much currency as the historical ones, and both explain the positions taken by Estonians and non-Estonians to a great extent. Yet only the legal argument is the bottom line.

The way to approach this problem is to continue to use the three-level model which has formed the analytical background to all earlier chapters on the domestic level. For the international context a new model is needed. For the non-Estonians, in particular ethnic Russians, have become the central object of relations between three international actors: the Estonian state, on whose level the domestic model still applies; the other two are the international community into which Estonia has been re-integrating since 1991, and the Russian Federation, with whom relations have become rather tense. This constellation suggests a triangular arrangement of the three actors at whose centre ‘the Russians’ or ‘the Russian problem’ is situated. The triangle of actors can be seen as three large black boxes, inside which the (power-) political processes take place which determine the players’ action within the triangle as much as their reactions towards each
others’ policies. In this sense, the players are as interacting in a power game where Estonia and Russia as the main actors in a bilateral arena try to extend that arena to include the international community with the aim of mustering support for their respective position on the one hand, but also to amplify these positions vis-à-vis the other. One of the major determinants of this power game is the Russian foreign policy line which basically aims to re-establish both the Russian Federation as a Great Power and its rightful former dominance over the Soviet territory, as expressed in the doctrine of the Near Abroad. The international community thereby assumes the role of keeping the ring, of using its influence on both sides to mediate between their positions, and to moderate their extremes. The following model shows the interrelations and interdependencies operating around the new minority of non-Estonians. The first part of this triangle of actors refers to the Estonian state.

Figure 6.13: Ethnic Russians in Estonia and the Triangle of Actors
6.3.1 Domestic Affairs

In the transition period from the Soviet era, the inception of the government elected in the re-formed state was preceded by the debates over its form in the Estonian Constitutional Assembly. When this Assembly had presented its draft Constitution to the people and organised a referendum, when parliamentary elections as well as the elections of the Estonian President had taken place, the first post-Soviet government took office. It consisted of the mainly conservative forces that had supported the Estonian Congress and which had united behind the Fatherland Union (Isamaaliit). The first prime minister was Mart Laar.\(^\text{709}\) During the referendum, almost all Soviet-era immigrants were excluded from participation due to the re-enactment by the transitional government of the 1938 Law on Citizenship in November 1991 which foreclosed automatic citizenship to them and stipulated a two-year minimum residency as of 30 March 1990 plus a further year (the so-called 2+1 rule) before any naturalisation could be affected; the same applies to the parliamentary and presidential elections in 1992. Close to a third of the entire population was therefore disenfranchised so that in the final analysis only Estonians and citizens of the interwar republic or their descendants could vote in this most crucial period and determine the state’s makeup. Contrary to Lithuania, the conservative forces that held sway during the transition period in both Estonia and Latvia did not accept to grant citizenship automatically to all inhabitants without qualification. To the leading forces of the day, this would have been tantamount to relinquishing the newly obtained sovereignty.\(^\text{710}\) The background and reasoning of this have to be examined as a precondition for any further examination of the policies towards the new minorities.

The question was to Estonians not one of secession from a state which has or had legitimate authority over them. Rather, they appealed for the recognition of the restitution of their state which was incorporated in 1940 into the Soviet Union and a declaration that this incorporation was void \textit{ab initio}, i.e., from 1940.\(^\text{711}\) It was this position that was followed by the majority of the population and which all states of the international community recognised and accepted, as demonstrated by the rapid recognition of Estonia and the other two Baltic states in 1991. The precondition, though, was that both the Russian Federation, and the Soviet Union itself would recognise the Baltic right to independence, which duly came forward on 24 August and 17 September 1991, respectively. On this followed acceptance into the UN and other international bodies which against SU opposition would not have been possible – for despite the putsch and the ensuing problems internally, the Soviet Union as a state and member of the UN Security


Council existed until the end of 1991 and could have vetoed the Baltic states’ accession. The political climate of the mid-1980s to early 1990s was therefore a vital ingredient in the breaking free of the Estonian state – the key words were the recognition of the existence of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact; the end of the Cold War with the consequent release of the Central and Eastern European states from Soviet domination; the consequent change in the international climate as expressed in the Paris Charter and Copenhagen Document, among others; and internally the power struggle between hard-line communists and radicals which the then Soviet President, Gorbachev, was not able to contain and which resulted in a power vacuum towards the republics filled by their steps towards independence. As the USSR did not put in its veto, the Estonian state was resurrected in its prior form based on the principle of the *restitutio ad integrum*. The fact that the Estonian state was accepted on this principle is supported and even expressed by the fact that Germany, for example, only restored diplomatic links with Estonia, not established diplomatic links as happened later with e.g., Kazakhstan or Tadzhikistan. Therefore, the Estonian state doctrine, its refounding myth, as it were, could be applied in both domestic and external terms.

Before some of the important consequences of this doctrine with regard to the people defining the state and the possible illegality of parts of the population in the Estonian territory will be discussed, some basic points with regard to the rightfulness of the Estonian claim to regain independence must be examined. The first problem in terms of international law is that whether or not Estonia is a ‘nation’ as such, which is compounded by the problem that no real definition exists in international law which precisely outlines the criteria for such a definition. However, it may be surmised from the fact that the Baltic states including Estonia had already been recognised states in the 1920s and 1930s that all three states were, and are, based on a ‘nation.’ For from this it follows that based on the principle of self-determination they may split from the USSR for both moral and positive legal norms.\(^7\)

The reasons for this, in review, were as follows. Under positive legal norms of the day, the incorporation of the Baltic states including Estonia was effected under duress and the political process perverted which led to supposedly ‘freely elected’ parliaments which would therefore claim ‘legitimately’ representing their population in their ‘request’ for accession to the USSR.\(^7\) Therefore, the claim to restore Estonian independence was justified under positive international law. In addition, moral legal norms give further weight to the claim to restore independence. For as has been demonstrated in the above chapters, the Estonian state in its form as part of the Soviet Union, i.e. as ESSR, suffered

1. unequal economic costs, indeed exploitation of its ecologic and economic potential in that most produce were exported from the ESSR to other parts of the Soviet Union, including energy; therefore the action of the Soviet Union as such could be regarded as *discriminatory redistribution*.

2. an *assault on their culture*, in particular their language, by the sustained ideologically rationalized efforts to support the Russian language while

\(^7\) In detail cf. the position relayed by Hanneman, pp. 505-506.

\(^7\) Cf. in detail *supra* ch. 2.3.
the Estonian language was partially pushed out of public life – e.g., dissertations on the Estonian language had to be submitted in Russian. As opposed to this, the Estonians already in the 19th Century, but also in the time of their own statehood have proven to be self-aware of their culture and their language as one of the most important parts of their identity.

3. the threat of extinction through genocide and deportations, at least during part of their history in the USSR, as demonstrated in the above chapters; in doing so, the USSR abdicated its right to claim and exercise legitimate sovereignty over the Baltic states including Estonia.\(^{714}\)

While the above is the sharpest version of the Estonian hardliners’ arguments, note that this reflects the mode of the transition period where the moderate forces lost out. Any assessment of the post-Soviet legal acts must be seen in the light of this argument which forms the backbone of post-Estonian state (re-)building and the core of the Soviet ‘nationalities’ question in reverse: it is now the Soviet-era immigrants that find themselves in a minority position.

6.3.1.1 Politics and Economy

In the early years of transition, the political scene in post-Soviet Estonia had to deal with a multitude of aspects going probably beyond the daily routine of Western governments. Rather than tracing party formations and re-formations and daily politics\(^{715}\), which indeed managed to quickly readapt to pre-Soviet times in their frequent changes of government or ministers, added to by a number of scandals, this section will only deal with policies relating more directly to the minority question, or non-Estonians. The focus will therefore be on Estonian citizenship policies and the related matter of language policy.\(^{716}\)

In these as well as in economic question, the allegation of discrimination and even human rights abuse was heard, e.g. in relation to job losses in the non-Estonian population. However, in many cases this was a question of misperception, as the problems of restructuring the economy may not have always been clear to every employee or worker used to the idea of full employment.\(^{717}\)

The OSCE points to the linkage of prosperity, peace and security in a country with its observance of human rights and democratic principles and freedoms, as well as with the existence of a market economy. Economic factors in its view are important to conflict prevention, and especially in relation to conflict prevention to many minority ques-

\(^{714}\) Hanneman, p. 507.
tions: ‘An economic downturn in a country will in all likelihood lead to social tensions, and some people will be looking for a scapegoat, a minority being the likely candidate for that role.’\footnote{Rob Zaagman: The Role of the High Commissioner on National Minorities in OSCE Conflict Prevention, Part I B.} In addition, the reverse may also be true: even if the economy as such suffers, hitting the population at large, this may be misconstrued as affront directed against the minority population, although there may not be a question of ethnic cleavage but of economic necessity, e.g., rationalisation of production, be at the heart. In this case the economic aspects of the Soviet legacy take their toll, especially the question of over-staffing noted in the Brezhnev era.

In the case of Estonia, the transition and restructuring of the economy did indeed lead to unemployment, as former labour intensive heavy industries laid off many workers. Despite official statistics suggesting an unemployment rate of some 2\% in 1993, Estonia had very probably a real unemployment rate that was around 10\% on average, at least if ILO criteria were used.\footnote{Aadne Aasaland: ‘Ethnicity and unemployment in the Baltic states’, in: International Journal, 35(3), pp. 355-370, at p. 358 (official figure) and p. 359 (unemployment according to ILO criteria).} In this regard, the town of Narva and the whole north-eastern region of \textit{Ida-Virumaa} have been hit hard:\footnote{On this region cf. the excellent report by the Stockholm Environment Institute, Tallinn: Kaasik, Tõnis: \textit{Ida-Virumaa: Man, Economy, Nature (A Survey of the Problems Facing Ida-Virumaa in the Context of Sustainable Development)}, Tallinn: Stockholm Environment Institute - Tallinn, 1995. Henceforth as Kaasik, \textit{Ida-Virumaa}.}

All the symptoms of a high industrialization level are apparent: industrial overburden of the natural environment; rapid restructuring of the ethnic, social and cultural environment. The growth that was directed bearing the [Soviet] empire’s interests in mind has turned Ida-Virumaa into a hotbed of tensions affecting the stability of the Estonian society and state and their smooth development.\footnote{Sillaste/Purga (FN ), p. 1.}

This goes some way towards confirming the OSCE’s position mentioned above. Because many ethnic Russians worked in such industries, it appeared to them that they were specially targeted and laid off because of their ethnicity. In conjunction with the laws on citizenship, aliens, language and the like, which were adopted and promulgated while at the same time the economic restructuring took place, this led to accusations of ethnic discrimination which Estonians would perpetrate against ethnic Russians. Quite probably, too, this may have been one of the factors leading to the two 1993 referenda in Narva and Sillamäe. At first sight, looking at the unemployment rates of Estonians and Russians, they indeed diverge: 9\% versus 13\%, respectively. However, the rate of both Estonians and Russians who are employed is both times 61\%, and Aasland points out that the unemployment difference is too small to be based on ethnicity.\footnote{Aasaland (FN 719), p. 360.}

Unfortunately the fact of the matter is that ethnic Russians were largely employed in mostly defence-related or other heavy industry, and these plants were concentrated in the cities of the north-east, especially in the once-closed town of Sillamäe, as well as in Tallinn or the southern town of Valga. Previous chapters have shown that the Soviet economic order and policy led to in-migration and distribution of Slavic migrants, who were indeed predominantly ethnic Russians, into these areas. In this sense, ethnicity does have something to do with the labour market where ethnic Russians were ‘over-
represented’ in some industries. Indeed, in the 1994 NORBALT survey which is the base of Aasland’s analysis, 11% of ethnic Russians worked in heavy industry, and mining; another 11% worked in the construction industry; in both cases, the relative share of Estonians working in these fields were 2% and 8%, respectively. In transport, haulage, post and telecom areas, 12% ethnic Russians and 8% Estonians worked. Therefore ethnic Russians were hit by the transition of the economy fairly hard, yet not because of their ethnicity, but because of their industries having been too old, too inefficient, or both (Kreenholm being a perfect example), and their concentration in these industries.

Comparing the situation in other areas of Estonia, especially in the countryside, it will be remembered from the previous chapter that most people, even in the north-eastern county of Ida-Viru, living and working on the land were Estonians: Agriculture, forestry and fishery were dominated by them, with a ratio of 19% Estonians and only 7% of ethnic Russians. However, fisheries was the domain of non-Estonians. After 1991, the Estonians’ unemployment rates were very high indeed, and oftentimes much higher than the state’s average. One area particularly hard hit was the very weak south-east, Võru County, which may have up to 13% unemployment; another area similarly hit is the West County – neither is very much inhabited by non-Estonians. A visit to the area by this author in 1997 seemed to confirm the overall situation there: compared to the fairly prosperous Tartu, or Tallinn, which the author also saw at least in some part, including outskirts, people in Võru seemed to be generally less well off than in Tallinn or Tartu; the clothing of the population as well as the town’s general outlook, the state of repair, also public transport, appeared to be a shade poorer than in either Tartu or Tallinn.

6.3.1.2 Migration, Society and Inter-Ethnic Relations

Whereas there cannot be any notion of systematic economic discrimination against non-Estonians, other factors may influence inter-ethnic relations and even lead to migration. Crucially, though, a process of inter-group differentiation has been developing since around 1987, for the Estonian Russians, i.e. those who have been citizens or are the descendants of citizens of the interwar republic were rather well integrated. It is now that they could get out from under the commonly applied blanket of ‘the Russians’. Further differentiation takes place along the lines of those non-Estonians who applied for naturalisation, those who decided to remain but not apply immediately, and those who wished to obtain an Estonian passport but could not or would not pass the exams required for naturalisation. A final group is that of the emigrants. Their numbers shot up during 1992-1993, after which out-migration generally decreased, although at the end of the research period in 1998 roughly 100,000 persons have left Estonia and the population figure fell from 1,565 million in 1989 to c. 1.46 million in 1998.

723 Aasaland (FN 719), Table 1, p. 359.
724 Aasaland (FN 719), Table 1, p. 359.
In the Estonian society at large, the main aspects of social life were reorientation and readaptation to the situation of the transforming state. The economic problems have been noted above. The balance of rights and obligations is somewhat more difficult when people reside in a state without being citizens of it, as has been the case at the beginning of the early 1990s. There were heated discussions in the titular population and between Estonians and non-Estonians about the legality and morality of excluding, as had happened, a third of the country’s population from citizenship. The group whose position claimed that a complete restitution of the Estonian state would take place also had the most uncompromising position with regard to the post-war Soviet immigrants. They were regarded across the board as illegal immigrants, who therefore had no right whatsoever to claim Estonian citizenship. If they wished to hold this citizenship, they would have to apply for it and acquire it by naturalisation. This was the position of the representatives of the Congress of Estonia.

The opposite position was that of a zero-sum, clean-slate type provision of citizenship to all people inhabiting the republic before a certain date (June 1990, when Estonia declared its transition period to independence), including above all the ethnic Russians. Those who advocated this would often, if not necessarily in all cases, also argue against a renewed state of Estonia: in their view, the interwar Republic of Estonia ceased its existence on incorporation into the Soviet Union and by extension was newly established, newly erected. This was the position of most of the ethnic Russians themselves, including from 1992 the Russian Federation, which is a most important fact.

A further, third group would occupy the middle ground between these two poles. From a bird’s eye view, they would appear to have had the most advanced, the most flexible position, possibly also the more pragmatic and conciliatory approach. While accepting, at least for the most part, the restitution argument, they also argued for giving citizenship to all people but KGB-officers or former Soviet army personnel. This was the position of the Popular Front (Rahvarinne), whose position unfortunately did not have much of an impact, at least to the effect that it was the more hard-line approach as favoured by the Congress of Estonia which finally held the day on account of its greater support in the population.

On account of the citizenship regulations, there are marked differences between the different groups of the non-Estonian population – ‘non-Estonian’ meaning not possessing an Estonian passport. Indeed, the Estonian foreign ministry in its semi-annual citizenship statistics would repeat its mantra that Estonian Citizenship would not be eth-

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nically based. This statement is born out by the fact that many ethnic Russians belonging
to the so-called historic minorities do regard themselves as Estonian or Baltic Russians,
and usually possess an Estonian passport, in addition to which it is important to remem-
ber that even though the ethnic Russians do represent the largest ethnic minority, they
are by far not the only one.

Also it is worth mentioning that a missing or poor command of the Estonian language
which would never get that person through a language exam does not necessarily have
to exclude an ethnic Russian from having an Estonian passport: again, as part of the his-
toric minorities, all that is needed is proof of having had the citizenship of the interwar
republic, or being a descendent of a former citizenship. By extension, this may well
mean that an absolute non-speaker of Estonian who in the third or fourth generation
lives in Estonia will nevertheless have the opportunity to hold an Estonian passport, if
they do not receive it automatically anyway. According to the Citizenship Law, they may
however be automatically barred from attaining citizenship if they should have been a
member of the KGB or the Soviet armed forces. In addition, the Estonian parliament
decided that ‘...all those who declared their intention to become Estonian citizens before
February 1990...’ would be granted Estonian citizenship ‘without any qualification. That
number is at least 40,000.’

According to the Russian embassy in Estonia, by 1 February 1995, 61,401 Estonian
residents had obtained Russian citizenship; by March, the Russian embassy quoted a

Lehning: ‘Towards a Multicultural Civil Society: The Role of Social Capital and Democratic Cit-
and Sovereignty in Post-Westphalian State’, in: European Journal of International Relations,
EJIR, 2(1), 1996, pp. 77-103; Mark Mitchell / Dave Russell: ‘Immigration, Citizenship and the
Nation-State in the New Europe’, in: Brian Jenkins / Spyros A. Sofos (Eds.): Nation and identity
in contemporary Europe, London: Routledge, 1996, pp. 54-80; Rein Ruutsoo: ‘Instituting of citi-
zenship in the Baltic states 1988-1995’, in: Raimo Blom (Ed.): Regulation and Institutiona-
lization in the Baltic States, Tampere: Department of Sociology and Social Psychology, Univ. of
Tampere, Research Reports A:27/1996, pp. 97-130; Aleksei: Semjonov ‘Citizenship Legislation,
Minority Rights and Integration in Estonia. Paper prepared as part of the Research Project ‘The
Process of Recognition and Incorporation of States in the International Community – The Case
of the Baltic States,’ Oslo, Tallinn and Riga: Norwegian Institute of Human Rights in collabora-
tion with the Legal Information Centre for Human Rights and the Latavian Institute of Human
Rights.’ Ms [April 1998]; Yuri Shevchuk: ‘[Presentation on Dual Citizenship], Transcript of
Session at New School of Social Sciences, New York, Democratic Politics and Policy Workshop,
6 Februr 1995; Graham Smith: ‘The Ethnic Democracy Thesis and the Citizenship Question in
134.

727 Applications shall not be accepted from foreign military personnel in active service; persons
who have been in the employ of the security and intelligence organisations of the USS; persons
who have been convicted of serious criminal offences against persons or who have a criminal
record of repeated convictions for felonies; persons lacking a steady income. Also cf. CE:
European Bulletin on Nationality, Strasbourg: Council of Europe, March 1996, DIR/JUR (96)1,
p. 40.

728 Speech by Tunne Keelam at the 35. session of the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly
on 13 May 1993, in: CEPA: Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Forty-fourth Or-

figure of some 71,000 people.\textsuperscript{730} The choice of an Estonian alien passport vs. a Russian Federation passport is at times one of necessity, at times one of convenience; in most cases it is the choice made when naturalisation seems too big a problem to surmount in the face of having a passport or non at all. This last problem would come with the expiration of the former USSR passport. By early October 1996, the Estonian Citizenship and Migration Department (\textit{Kodakondsuse- ja Migratsiooniamet, KMA}) had received 112,443 applications for aliens passports; this is some 65,000 applications less than the expected 177,000. This shortfall was explained in terms of residents opting for a Russian passport.\textsuperscript{731} On 12 May 1997, the former Soviet passport, which until then was still recognised as an internal document, finally became invalid. By mid-August 1997, the KMA had given out 136,311 passports; 158,860 applications were received and 155,137 passports were printed and handed out. By the same date, 16 states recognised the Estonian aliens’ passport.\textsuperscript{732} The statistics issued by the Estonian foreign ministry gives the following data on citizenship: of a total population of 1,453,200 (1,462,130) as of 1 January 1998 (1 January 1997), 1,046,197 (1,015797) individuals have an Estonian citizen’s passport as of 28 February 1998 (30 November 1997); 97,380 (94,432) non-ethnic and ethnic Estonians have been naturalised as of 2 March 1998 (30 November 1997); 168,294 (164,732) individuals have applied for an aliens’ passport, 166,246 (154,119) of which had been printed by 02 March 1998 (01 December 1997); finally, some 100,000 individuals have chosen other citizenships, mainly Russian. Estimates put the number of non-ethnic Estonian residents who are Estonians by birth at some 80,000.\textsuperscript{733}

The main reasons given in applying for Russian citizenship were a dislike of the aliens’ passport which made many feel like second-class inhabitants. Indeed, the question of universal suffrage and the disenfranchisement that many observers made rather great play of may be problematic from an international law perspective and rather strong democratic views – yet for only 12\% of interviewees in a survey the right to vote in a state election was of any concern; political interest has cooled quickly anyway in the entire population. Rather, the question was the vague notion of \textit{a sense of belonging}. Many of those who have worked in the ESSR had no notion of possibly being utilised for ulterior motifs, their argument centres of having worked for the Union and also for this republic. In consequence, not being accepted and even treated as a complete foreigner, an alien, despite maybe twenty-five if not thirty years of living and working in the republic causes a feeling of utter rejection. As around three-quarters of this part of the population have a residence permit, and a half have a work permit, they are in their view constantly made feel less welcome. Consequently, a much more important reason given for a passport are a desire ‘to feel part of the country’. In the 1997 survey by the IOM, only 28\% said they had a Russian passport, but 52\% owned an aliens’ passport; 16\% still possessed the old Soviet passport. Excluding the Russian citizens, 63\% of the rest wish to obtain Estonian citizenship, and over 67\% of the 18-29 age group do likewise.

\textsuperscript{730} OMRI DD 5 May 1995.
\textsuperscript{731} OMRI DD 4 Oct. 1996.
Indeed, the young have a much more open attitude and generally feel they may well have a future in Estonia. Almost all respondents, which may well be extrapolated to the entire non-Estonian population, feel that the citizenship laws and regulations should be made easier. In terms of age groups, Russian citizens are much older, generally over 50, while the younger generations have obtained an aliens’ passport. Feeling alienated without proper reason, many of the older generation have usually not seen much of a point in making any effort to integrate; conversely, the younger generation, both stateless and Estonian citizens, have much more in common and are willing to integrate and make do with circumstances. Also, Russian citizens tend to think that they will have it easier to cross the Russian border as and when they should travel to the Russian Federation. According to CSCE figures, a sharp rise occurred between July 1995 and August 1996, from around 76,000 to some 113,000.\(^{734}\) This happened after the new citizenship and language laws of 1995 which appeared to make naturalisation much harder.

No group has expressed a particularly strong desire to emigrate; if there is any lesson clear from the mid-1990s at the latest, it is that ‘the Russians’ are in Estonia, and they are there to stay. Conversely, however, very many have expressed their intentions to work abroad for a few months; indeed, it is the non-Estonians who are even more looking forward to the country’s joining the EU than Estonians themselves, for they expect much better travel and work conditions. Also, if there is any group which could imagine to move permanently abroad, generally to the West, it is the Russian. Reasons given are generally economic; it is particularly noteworthy that only 6% have rated tension as a reason to emigrate.\(^{735}\)

In very rough terms, the non-Estonian population can be also split according to their citizenship status, i.e. Estonian, Russian, or non-citizens / stateless; each of the three groups would then hold about a third of the population, apart from an unknown residue of non-Estonians who have neither registered nor obtained any form of passport. Contrary to impressions created internationally by the Russian Federation, the mere fact that a third of Estonian inhabitants is stateless does not give any cause to suggest that they would be lacking any rights. Indeed, they are entitled to almost all rights except for active voting rights in state parliamentary elections – local elections are open to active participation to any one resident in the area, concomitantly with recently introduced European laws. Passive voting rights are accorded only to Estonian citizens, though that, too, is fairly common in Europe. Also, note the importance of participation in the political process note above; the New Baltic Barometer confirms that political rights are valued least, \textit{social and economic rights come first}. Besides, the question of citizenship does not play any role in terms of fair treatment by administrative institutions, which is evaluated badly across the board in all ethnic and age groups. Particularly the police, housing or social security offices have a bad reputation with Estonians and Russians alike; hence


\(^{735}\) IOM-Survey, p. 3.
it is a question of what service the respondent expects, not his ethnic background, which appears decisive in these matters.\textsuperscript{736}

In terms of their evaluations of the past, no-one of the Russophones wanted a return to the days of the Soviet Union, even though they resided in a state whose lingua franca was Russian. The surprising fact is that over 80\% of them do agree that one should learn the Estonian language; many of them feel however daunted by the complexity of the language. By now, however, they are all fairly clear that their social and economic well-being is much better guaranteed than in the Russian Federation; most do not feel a deprived minority. Indeed, a large majority of the Russian populations both sides of the border reject the Russian foreign policy and its claim to supremacy over the old Soviet territory (‘Near Abroad’) just as much as the sabre-rattling and threats which does not improve their lot at all. Nevertheless, ‘the Russians’ have become part of the international arena and especially a bone of contention between Estonia and the Russian Federation. This problem will be examined in the following section.\textsuperscript{737}

6.3.2 International Bilateral and Multilateral Affairs

In international, or more precisely, inter-state, relations Estonia operated into two main directions: dealing with matters relating to the break-up of the Soviet Union in bilateral relations with the Russian Federation, and integrating into the international community of states by acceding to its various organisations and instruments.\textsuperscript{738} In diplomacy and under international law, instruments are e.g., treaties or declarations to which states are party. The Charter of the United Nations or the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are such instruments.\textsuperscript{739} The following scheme gives an overview over Estonian international relations with regard to its position in the Baltic area, cooperation with international organisations and certain states. It becomes clear that Estonian bilateral relations are not limited to the Russian Federation; however, because of the special and tense relationship that developed from 1993 at the latest, the examination of bilateral questions must be limited to the relations between these two states. Bilateral relations with other states, especially the Scandinavian states, will be dealt with under the heading of multilateral questions.


Although the international community looked benignly on those newly entering states ‘coming in from the cold’, as it were, they also expected these states to adhere to the rules governing the international system. At the same time that the international climate was free from the Cold War effects and progress in international laws, treaties and obligations became possible, the newcomers had to accede to all major instruments. In particular, questions of migration, minorities, and human rights were quite high on the agenda, which were especially pertinent in the states of Central and Eastern Europe.

Major documents were signed in 1990 and afterwards that basically lifted the question of absolute sovereignty in internal matters touching these question. The Paris Summit of the OSCE Heads of States in 1990 and the Copenhagen Document of the same year...
opened a new chapter in this field which was no more the sole prerogative of the government of a state but may in certain circumstances be placed under international scrutiny.\footnote{On this development cf. in more detail, Sebastian Bartsch: \textit{Minderheitenschutz in der internationalen Politik. Völkerbund und KSZE / OSZE in neuer Perspektive}, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1995.}

The main organisations in Europe dealing with the question of human and minority rights are the CSCE/OSCE and the Council of Europe, as well as the more recently founded institution of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. In Estonian domestic affairs, as noted above, a number of problems occurred with regard to the non-Estonian population in the realm of citizenship questions, to which the laws outlined above apply. In particular, the 1992 and 1995 Laws on Citizenship, the 1993 Law on Aliens, and the 1989 Law on Language and further documents came under close inspection by both the international community and the Russian Federation.\footnote{On the judicial aspects and the conformity of these laws with international law, cf. supra Thiele, \textit{Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker}, passim, including full texts of the above laws; for the Law on Aliens also cf. the appendix in \textit{Nationalities Papers} 23(2), 1995, pp. 441-450.} From 1993, Estonian relations to the Russian Federation cooled and became increasingly tense as the latter started to accuse Estonia of human rights abuses and discrimination of its non-Estonian population. The people at the heart of the matter, whom the Russian Federation claimed to defend, found themselves in a rather problematic position between three fronts: domestically within Estonia, where they had enough problems as such; in Estonian bilateral relations with the Russian Federation which domestically if anything increased tensions and lowered possibilities for compromise; and in Estonian relations with the international community which had the double function of nudging Estonia towards the European standards it aspired and keeping the ring in terms of the Estonian-Russian relations with an corrective influence on spurious claims made by the Russian Federation. In short, they found themselves in a triangle of actors that on an inter-state level led to massive tensions, but which they could not very much influence.

This is especially true for the Estonian – Russian bilateral relations which very much revolve around the issue of the ethnic Russians living in Estonia, and which the Russian Federation linked to other, unrelated issues.\footnote{Zurjari-Ossipova (FN 710); Mark A. Cichock: \textquote{Interdependence and Manipulation in the Russian-Baltic Relationship: 1993-1997}, in: \textit{JBS}, 30(2), 1999, pp. 89-116.} Two of these issues will be examined briefly – the questions of troop withdrawal and border negotiations. The first problem relates to the withdrawal of formerly Soviet troops which were now the troops of the Soviet Union’s successor, the Russian Federation and dragged on from 1992 to 1994. The second problem pertains to the question of the demarcation of the Estonian-Russian state border and has been a highly charged issue during the entire research period. For in conjunction with the restoration of its pre-Soviet republic, successive Estonian governments have pointed to the 1920 Tartu Treaty which delineated the Estonian-Russian state border and is therefore constitutional part of the Estonian state. As noted in chapters 2 and 3 of this study, Soviet Russia had agreed to these borders ‘once and for all’. On occupying Estonia in 1940 and after the German troops withdrew in 1944, territorial changes and re-arrangements of the border were made, the outcome of which had represented the status quo until 1991, after which the 1944 revisions became topical again, since they formed part of the Estonian-Russian bilateral negotiations. Several times an
initial agreement was reached, but for the one or the other reason, the Russian Federation’s representative had a reason to withdraw behind further demands, even though Estonia after years of wrangling gave up the territorial demand. Both questions were linked to and accompanied by vociferous claims of Estonian human rights abuse by the Russian Federation. Contrary to the Russian Federation, other states with sizeable minorities in Estonia, such as Ukraine or Byelorussia, have not yet registered any complaint, although they might make entirely the same claim were it to be founded on the same reasons, i.e., systematic discrimination against non-Estonians, of which Ukrainians and Byelorussians are a part in their entirety. Therefore, Estonia’s internal and external politics are inextricably intertwined due to its historical legacy and special geographic position as a small state with a huge neighbour with whom it once had lived in a rather unhappy, and not exactly voluntary, Union. Its interest to normalise its foreign relations with the rest of the world has only been superseded by an intense interest in securing the state so its recently regained existence would be guaranteed.

6.3.2.1 Bilateral Relations: The Troop Withdrawal
Over the 1990s, the background to the Estonian-Russian bilateral relations would appear to be less determined by the existence of the Russian minorities or their perceived or real human rights problems. Rather, it would be more determined by general foreign policy interests. After a short period of ‘Atlanticists’ favouring good relations with the USA and the West and concentration on internal matters, a hardline faction started to determine policies in the Russian Duma and influenced President Yeltsin. In mid-1993, the Russian Federation adopted a new foreign policy doctrine, which was followed by a new military security doctrine in October 1993.743 In line with this new foreign policy, the Russian Federation began to reassert its position in the global and European arenas. In particular, it began to reassert a Great Power status demanding equal recognition with the USA on the one hand, and a sphere of interest and influence on the entire territory of the former Soviet Union. The fiercely independent stance of the Baltic states and Estonia in particular had enough opponents in the Centre to warrant efforts to preclude its further incorporation and inclusion into the international community, for the more this process would advance, the less the influence on Estonia would be. This section will deal with the Troop Withdrawal as a case study of this policy.

Foreign troops in a sovereign country are potentially destabilising for the region. If they are the troops of a neighbouring state, the problem arises all the more, as short of military domination there usually is no reason beyond common military exercises to have troops on this territory, let alone in barracks. The international community voiced considerable concern over this problem and the destabilising effects on the Baltic region. In consequence, as long as such a situation would exist, any incorporation of Estonia into organisations where it would form part of the organisation’s external borders, such as EU or NATO, was more or less precluded, as these organisations do not incorporate states which are either unstable or have a border problem. For the best part of the

1990s, however, Estonia had both problems and the large majority of ethnic Russians who had felt repulsed by Estonian citizenship and naturalisation rules and unaccepted were a welcome tool in this game. Hence Russian memoranda could suggest that there would be ‘persons deprived of the possibility to obtain citizenship’ when talk should be of ‘persons without citizenship’; that there would be ‘pensioners, to whom the residence permits are given only temporarily, including those who are granted it for 6 months’ when talk should be of ‘retired military’ who for constitutional reasons could not receive the same treatment as ordinary pensioners; or the memoranda would use vague terms such as ‘great number’, ‘lots’, ‘much less volume’ without a necessary corollary such as the definite figures pertaining to applications for aliens’ passports vis-à-vis those numbers of passes actually handed out.744

Indeed, the international obligation to withdraw the troops was generally fulfilled in that more than 100,000 troops left the Baltic area during 1992-1993. Whereas Lithuania managed to have the troops withdrawn by 31 August 1993, Latvia managed on 30 April 1994 to secure an arrangement and sign a contract to similar effect with a target date of August 1994. However, some 3,000 troops still remained in Estonia until its President, Lennart Meri, could sign an agreement on 26 July 1994 with President Yeltsin that both contained the troop withdrawal and provided the demanded social guarantees for retired Russian military personnel. A further document, signed on 31 July 1994, referred to the former naval training centre at Paldiski, whose nuclear reactors were to be dismantled by 30 September 1995. The agreements also covered the very sore point of residence permits for the retired military personnel and their families: obviously, to Estonians the very idea of allowing the troops to stay that for fifty years were seen as occupiers was anathema, especially since quite a number of the retirees were very young indeed. Politically, this was an incredibly great problem to overcome, as most Estonians already had a problem with ‘ordinary’ Russians, but military personnel, active or retired, was too much of a reminder of the past to accept calmly. Therefore, and unsurprisingly, the Estonians included a condition that if any person is deemed a security risk to Estonia, he may be refused such residency permit.

This was the actual problem, viz. to get as much mileage out of the withdrawal. Since 1989, the Russian Federation had to accommodate tens of thousands of returning troops for whom neither living quarters nor barracks existed.745 Already in 1991 had massive problems with the rehousing of then up to some 15-20% or some 250,000 of the career officers only, who by the end of 1994 had to be withdrawn from Germany; in addition, there were troops withdrawn from Poland and other states in Central and Eastern Europe.746 There had been much too little housing built; those withdrawn from Germany would probably arrive in the Russian Federation with nowhere to go and create existential problems for the officers and their families. Troops just could not be withdrawn without anywhere to go. In consequence, this created a rather tense situation within the entire army, and by extension, domestically. Parts of the Russian military establishment wanted a delay of the withdrawal. In fact, even the Russian troops that did

744 Zurjari-Ossipova (FN 710), pp. 16-17.
return were played with and dealt a heavy blow. Promises of housing turned out to be either half-built, empty blocks of flats whose building was abandoned for lack of funds, or even worse.\textsuperscript{747} Only slowly did there emerge a compromise deal between the two conflicting parties.\textsuperscript{748} It in effect gave the Russian Federation more time to build the housing, and in effect made the Estonian government agree to provide some funding for it, in effect paying for the withdrawal of foreign troops that by international standards would have had to be withdrawn unconditionally.

This process was consequently accompanied by several jolts and halts which were publicly justified by Estonian human rights abuses. On 24 June 1993 President Yeltsin uttered that Russia had the ‘possibilities to remind [Estonia of] some geopolitical and demographic realities...’, adding that it must be understood ‘...that Russia cannot remain a disinterested observer if the ethnic Russian population were to show a natural desire to defend itself against crude discrimination.’\textsuperscript{749} Half a year later, Foreign Minister Kozyrev was quoted as saying that the Russian Federation should not withdraw from regions which had been in the sphere of Russian interests for centuries, although military domination of the Baltic states would not be part of these. It would merely be dangerous to create a vacuum which might be filled by unfriendly forces. On the other hand, the protection of ethnic Russians in the former Soviet states would very much be one of Moscow’s strategic interests. These comments came one day after Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton had signed an agreement which committed the Russian Federation to continue the withdrawal.\textsuperscript{750} When the troops were finally withdrawn at the end of August 1994, the UN General Assembly issued a statement according to which ‘...withdrawal of foreign armed forces from the territory of the Baltic states would contribute to enhancing stability in Europe and developing better relations between the Baltic states and the Russian Federation. The General Assembly thus concluded its consideration of this item.’\textsuperscript{751}

For the population of both states, the situation was beyond their reach, especially for those ethnic Russians at the heart of the Russian Federation’s ‘concerns’ in Estonia. To have some leeway in influencing the Baltic states scot-free, ethnic Russians in the Baltics were made the Russian Federation’s chess pawns by either exacerbating or playing up problems that undeniably did exist. Yet such problems did also exist and resulted in even moderate Estonians hardening their stance because of the severe pressure the Russian Federation exerted on Estonia, which on account of widespread reporting in the press and audiovisual media was known to probably every Estonian down to the last village. Because of the Estonian viewpoint of long-standing association, if not equation, of ethnic Russians with the centre of the Soviet Union (‘Moscow’) which has been dis-

cussed in earlier chapters, it is not particular surprising that the Russian Federation’s policy contributed to a deterioration of the political climate in Estonia on the one hand, and consequently, at least probably, to a reluctance to soften the somewhat stringent stance towards the ethnic Russians residing in Estonia. Therefore, the ethnic Russians were left in a position between a rock and a hard place, which added considerably to the problems existing on account of the new situation in a ‘new’ state. In this regard it matters little that the Russian foreign policy rhetoric may have been for internal consumption to pacify the neo-nationalist and ultra-conservative groups in Russia, such as Zhirinovsky and his ‘Liberal’ Democratic Party, who were seen by most groups outside Russia as a threat. Still, for the simple reason that the ethnic Russians in Estonia were in danger of being seen as a fifth column of the Russian Federation – witness the age of the Russian military pensioners, some of whom were as young as 35 – the Russian Federation’s foreign policy had a severe impact on their situation.

[...] At the very least, the existence of these [neo-imperialist] groups [in Russia], regardless of their actual power, would create suspicions among already paranoid non-Russian peoples that Moscow seeks to manipulate them and is behind the local ethnic or other troubles.\(^{752}\)

As a further heavy cost on the population which affects any one regardless of ethnicity or other traits, it may be interesting to refer to an Estonian-Finnish study of environmental pollution released in November 1998. As noted above, the 1987 phosphorite saga started public protests against the environmental recklessness of the planning authorities. The above report brought out some gruesome details on the former Soviet army’s destruction of the environment whose cleaning-up Estonia additionally had to cover: 4,000 hectares of land were polluted by oil products and fuel – e.g. at Tapa Air Base: some air crews simply pumped the fuel into the ground to falsify their flying records; 158,000 tons of heave metals were found in the soil; over 2,600 hectares were polluted with heaps of rusty iron. Where garrisons had been stationed, ‘...some 5,000 tons of spilled oil and 170 tons of battery waste were found, ...along with 3,000 tons of chemical waste and 3,000 tons of plastic and resin. The area around the capital Tallinn is the most damaged.’ According to the report, the clean-up would take decades and some $5m (equivalent to roughly DM 8.5 million or EKK 68m) to complete.\(^{753}\) Here, too, the international community had to stand in to help Estonia with the predicament it inherited.

6.3.2.2 Multilateral Relations

The most problematic consequence of the Russian Federation’s policy of linking the minority question to the withdrawal of troops or the finalising of border arrangements is


that a largely internal issue became a question of state security. As the Russian Foreign Policy and Military Doctrines of 1993 together with the military, political, and economic threats made to Estonia posed a question mark over Estonia’s external security, strenuous efforts were made to gain maximum security in the West. Since direct security guarantees from Western states would have been tantamount to confronting the Russian Federation just as directly, other ways and means had to be found. Further integration into the institution of Europe equals coming back to where Estonia anyway belonged in the metaphysical sense and was therefore the general policy line. Yet on a different plane, it meant economic integration to help rebuild the economy, and political integration to help secure the internal, but mostly the external stability and sovereignty of the country. Membership in both EU and NATO became shorthand versions for passive and active security for Estonia.

However, the international community does play a role in Estonia besides the security aspect. In several aspects of its statehood it is no different from the other states in Central and Eastern Europe and experienced similar problems of transition. Consequently, both international governmental and non-governmental organisations (IGOs and NGOs, respectively) play a role as well as direct bilateral relations with other states, notably the Scandinavian states. Since 1991 they have provided cooperation and assistance in reshaping the state bodies or erecting additionally necessary structures along European standards – e.g., the reform of the judicial system; the training of border guards in conjunction with a European-style border regime; or the reform of the administrative system would be cases in point. The EU has helped with the PHARE, or TACIS assistance programmes, to name but two; however, the conditions for acceptance into the EU do also contain strict conditions on human rights and related matters and were indeed a part of the Acquis communautaire that Estonia had to fulfil. On 4 December 1995 Estonia formally announced its intention to apply for membership in the European Union; it was invited to join the first round of candidates at the Luxembourg Summit in December 1997. UNDP involved itself by providing think-pieces on the Estonian society and helps in a co-ordinating role, e.g. together with Finland, in creating a passport regis-


ter and machine-readable passport system (with bar-coded identity documents) which is a precondition for integration with the EU and, prior to this, visa-free travel with Finland and Sweden.\(^758\)

While not being restricted exclusively to these tasks, the Council of Europe or the OSCE, on the other hand, very much examine the human rights situation in the country, and make recommendations according to their assessments, working both on the intergovernmental and local levels. In doing so, they have an important role in being a neutral observer, who by giving informed advice and statements on the situation of the ethnic Russian’s situation counteract some of the Russian Federation’s more exaggerated and rather less helpful allegations of Estonian human rights abuse, and thus indeed keep the ring. A further notable institution dealing with human rights matters is the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), whose post was established following resolution no. 48/141 of 20 Dec. 1993 by the General Assembly. The first person to fill this post is the former Irish President, Mary Robinson.\(^759\) Although there are also a number of especially non-governmental international organisations, such as Human Rights Watch, the roles of the CSCE/OSCE and the Council of Europe were of crucial importance in achieving substantial improvements in the language and citizenship laws and their combined requirements for applicants for naturalisation.

The most important principles of the Council of Europe are: 1., to safeguard individual freedom; 2., to safeguard human rights; 3., to fortify democratic institutions; 4., cultural cooperation; and 5., the search for solutions for the large social problems (minorities, xenophobia, intolerance, environmental protection, et al.) of Europe. On 14 April 1993, the Political Affairs Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly issued the Report on the application of the Republic of Estonia for membership in the Council of Europe.\(^760\) Its Parliamentary Assembly (CEPA) held a debate\(^761\) on the Estonian application on 13 May 1993, which the Speaker of the Estonian Parliament, Ülo Nugis and Tunne Keelam as special guest attended. On 14 May 1993,\(^762\) Estonia was accepted

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into the Council of Europe (CE), against the protestations of the Russian Federation which cited Estonian human rights violations. Before any admission could happen, however, the rigorous process of admission determined the obligations to hold democratic elections and meet the organisation’s strict standards on human rights. In addition, the newcomers had to accept the monitoring of their adherence to the CE standards which included several visits of CEPA subcommittee members on the Human Rights who decided on recommendations whether or not to end this monitoring status. Whereas the 1992 elections in Estonia were the crucial political condition for attaining membership because a democratic government was \textit{sine qua non}, this must not be misconstrued as giving a clean bill of health in all aspects of its political and socio-economic spheres, but that the basic preconditions for entry and further development of these areas were regarded as given. In 1992 alone, fifteen delegations came to Estonia to study the human rights situation. The 1993 Bratinka-Report clearly stated that the invitation to join extended to Estonia was linked to the Council of Europe’s aim to ‘help consolidate the democratic institutions and rule of law in that country.’ At the same time, he was convinced that both Estonian MPs and civil servants would have done ‘...their utmost to follow our advice and suggestions.’

The debate in the Parliamentary Assembly on 13 May 1993 makes it quite clear that Estonia’s progress in political, social, and economic spheres, including the human rights sphere, was deemed highly satisfactory, even if much remained to be done. However, a letter by the Russian Federation’s foreign minister seemed to have all but advised the Council of Europe not to invite Estonia – and clearly caused a strong reaction in the Parliamentary Assembly. This seemed to have followed a Russian delegation’s wish, referred to by a German speaker in the CEPA debate, expressed at the sitting of the CEPA Political Affairs Committee on Malta that ‘...Estonian should only be admitted as a full member when the Russian Government has concluded a treaty with the Estonian Government on the rights of the Russians living in Estonia.’ In this debate on 13 May 1993, the same speaker uttered a certain disbelief when declining the Russian delegation’s wish again: ‘[...] This is not, I believe, the right way to go about things and we cannot accept it here.’ In 1997 Estonia became only the second country in Central and Eastern Europe whose monitoring status was cancelled following a CEPA vote on the recommendation by the Political Affairs Committee on 30 Jan. 1997, and against the Russian delegation’s appeal to extend the monitoring period. The assembly recommended that in four areas more improvements be made, only one of which affects this work directly: it was recommended that the granting of citizenship to non-ethnic Estonians be improved. This recommendation was made despite the now almost customary criticism from the Russian Federation, stating that ‘...Estonia was failing to keep its promise to end discrimination against ethnic Russians.’

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[766] OMRI DD 31 Jan 1997. The other three areas were abolishing the death penalty; improvements of threatment of refugees and asylum-seekers; and improving conditons in prison.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
The final part of this section will concentrate on the role of the OSCE and its High Commissioner on National Minorities. On 5 Sep. 1991, the Baltic states had requested admission to the CSCE on three equally worded letters to the Chairman of the CSCE Council, which at that time was the then German foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher. In a meeting barely three weeks after the August coup, the CSCE held its third meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension from 10 Sep. through 4 Oct. 1991 in Moscow. An additional, fifteen-minute meeting (!) was called on 10 Sep. 1991, from 9:20 to 9:35, in which the Republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were admitted as participating States of the CSCE process, in virtue of §54 of the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations. With this further recognition, the Baltic states were now committed to the international principles, norms, instruments and laws they undertook to adopt. In their letter of application to the CSCE, these were especially the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, and all other CSCE documents. The Letter by the Estonian Foreign Minister, at that time Lennart Meri, read: ‘The Government of the Republic of Estonia accepts in their entirety all commitments and responsibilities contained in those documents, and declares its determination to act in accordance with their provisions.’ This was further enhanced by the fact that Estonia has included a passage in its constitution that international law supersedes Estonian state law.

The most important institution within the framework of the OSCE was its High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM); his ‘eyes and ears’, as he liked to point out, were the long-term missions in countries with a ‘minority situation’. For the period of

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14. Universally recognized principles and norms of international law shall be an inseparable part of the Estonian legal system (EC, art. 3). If Estonian law or other acts contradict foreign treaties ratified by the Riigikogu (including international human rights conventions), the provisions of the foreign treaty shall be applied (EC, art. 123).

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770 Letter of application by Lennart Meri, then Foreign Minister of Estonia, dated 5 Sep. 1991, as reprinted in the annex to the Journal of the Moscow Conference.

this study, Mr. Max van der Stoel has been the HCNM who defined his role largely in
terms of early warning and conflict prevention measures.\textsuperscript{772} Both the mission and the
HCNM have consequently had an important share in advising the respective govern-
ments and recording the grievances of the respective minority communities and working
towards mutual understanding. This also applies to Estonia. The main reasons to co-
operate with the OSCE and the background to accept a long-term mission on the part
of Estonia, in spite of the consequential public admission that there was a minority prob-
lem, is probably five-fold: 1., Safeguarding against further claims and demands by pow-
erful neighbours, i.e. the Russian Federation; 2., Compliance with claims of well-
meaning and friendly states; 3., Incapability of conflicting parties to continue or start a
dialogue; 4., Hope to gain some advantages \textit{vis-à-vis} non-governmental conflict parties;
and 5., Hope to receive different help in return for accepting the mission.\textsuperscript{773} The OSCE
documents are only politically binding, and thus do not directly create international ju-
dicial commitments. In the first place, they are fairly powerful moral institutions. On the
other hand, they do have judicial relevance, for they confirm norms of foundations of
international customary law and influence the design and practice of inner-state laws of
the participating states.\textsuperscript{774}

The main work by the OSCE’s High Commissioner on Nationalities (HCNM)
can be likened to that of an arbiter between both Estonians and non-Estonians on the
one hand, and as an indirect corrective on both antagonistic states in this power game,
i.e. Estonia and the Russian Federation. While he repeatedly stressed his desire for Es-
tonia to flourish as a free and independent state and yet for Estonians to further
strengthen their identity, he also cautioned them about having to find a workable solution
with the Russophone population that would be less confrontational and also provide
more information pertaining to this groups’ status, rights, and obligations. In his first re-
port to the OSCE leadership in April 1993 he categorically stated that he found no evi-
dence of persecution of the national minorities in Estonia, although a dialogue between
an all parties was advised and resulted in the Round Table established under the aus-
pices of the Estonian President. In particular, recommendations on the citizenship and
language laws and the wider issues regarding their influence in the socio-economic
sphere focussed on the actual implementation of these laws. While the actual require-
ment of a certain knowledge of Estonian as a precondition for naturalisation was not
questioned and the position supported that non-Estonians would have to make a certain
effort at integrating into the society, the HCNM also recommended that elderly should

\textsuperscript{772} Cf. e.g. Max van der Stoel, CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities: ‘Early Response to
Ethnic Conflicts: Focusing on Prevention. Address to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Con-
ference on Security and Cooperation in Europe’, 8 July 1993, Helsinki, Finland, Ms. Also cf. G.
E. Edwards: ‘Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy. The Role of the OSCE High Commissio-
Inter-Ethnic Relations: \textit{The Role of the High Commissioner on National Minorities in Conflict


\textsuperscript{774} Excerpts from the 1992 Helsinki Document, ‘The Challenge of Change’, are reprinted in SIPRI:
des Wandels’, in: Auswärtiges Amt, Referat Öffentlichkeitsarbeit (Ed.): \textit{Von der KSZE zur
OSZE. Grundlagen, Dokumente und Texte zum deutschen Beitrag 1993-1997}, Bonn: Auswärt-
be exempted from these rules and that especially the required knowledge of Estonian to obtain citizenship should not exceed the capabilities needed for simple conversation. The language requirement also specifically governs the question of work permits necessary for non-citizens. On his prompting, the establishment of language training facilities were supported by a number of OSCE and EU member states, so that over the 1990s this issue was largely solved, even if bones of contention still remained. The further problems in regard to aliens laws, work permits and travel documents were of a technical nature, pertaining mainly to equipment question and procedural matters, such as the requirement for the non-citizen population to register as aliens which took place during the period 1994-1997 after a rather slow start. Here, too, foreign governments have helped overcome these matters.

There can be no doubt that the above outline of the triangle of actors is revolving around the almost pivotal position of the non-Estonian, and largely ethnic Russian, minority population in the development of post-Soviet Estonia. Although the developments of the 1990s have only been outlined and need much further elaboration, this study has shown that the historical component is vital to an understanding of the post-Soviet society and especially the politics pursued in this period which at the outset were clearly aimed at turning the clock backwards and almost starting afresh in 1939-1940 but with a democratic regime. Due note must be taken that the political forces who governed during the transitional period managed to eclipse the more moderate forces, which however have since reappeared and managed to take at least a period lead: the 1998 governmental programme is a consequence of this (but also of the need to adapt to European requirements in the light of a possible assent to the EU). The politics of Estonia being what they are, the tendency to start various policy matters with the somewhat harder, conservative line preceding liberalisations which react to international concerns follows with as much regularity as the change of centre-right and centre-left coalitions. The general international context also has a somewhat softening effect à la longue, for the more secure the Estonians feel in their external affairs, the calmer the international scene becomes. The fact remains that the Soviet legacy in politics and economics is largely overcome following the transition of the system governing the country. In society, the cleavages built up over fifty years of Soviet rule will take somewhat longer to overcome; a mixing of populations Estonian-style is not very likely in the sense that settlement areas will remain the same for some time to come and conform largely, if decreasingly so, to language areas. Still, here, too, there is scope for a multi-layered approach which allows for a slow growth of communality among the various population groups which in politics has started. A civic society and democracy as opposed to an ethnic democracy with a preponderance of Estonians may well develop. Barring unforeseen circumstances, history will tell in 2018.

775 Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations (FN 772), pp. 52-56. In more detail, cf. the literature supra FN 718 and FN 772 in this section.
### 7 Appendix

#### 7.1 APPENDIX 1: POPULATION CENSUSES IN TSARIST, INDEPENDENT AND SOVIET ESTONIA, 1881-1989

#### Table 7.9: Population in Rural Districts (Counties) and Towns, 1881

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rural District, Town</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>M, %</th>
<th>F, %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Total Population*</td>
<td>881,455</td>
<td>425,342</td>
<td>456,113</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Urban</td>
<td>114,230</td>
<td>56,304</td>
<td>57,726</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Rural</td>
<td>767,225</td>
<td>368,838</td>
<td>398,387</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. HARJU</td>
<td>138,260</td>
<td>68,867</td>
<td>69,393</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tallinn</td>
<td>50,488</td>
<td>26,482</td>
<td>24,006</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paldiski</td>
<td>933</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. JARVA</td>
<td>49,760</td>
<td>24,177</td>
<td>25,583</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paldiski</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>937</td>
<td>1,063</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. LÄÄNE</td>
<td>78,380</td>
<td>37,421</td>
<td>40,959</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haapsalu</td>
<td>2,884</td>
<td>1,366</td>
<td>1,518</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. PÄRNU</td>
<td>102,034</td>
<td>50,093</td>
<td>51,941</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pärnu</td>
<td>12,966</td>
<td>6,111</td>
<td>6,855</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. SAARE</td>
<td>56,573</td>
<td>26,400</td>
<td>30,173</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuressaare</td>
<td>3,454</td>
<td>1,513</td>
<td>1,941</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. TARTU</td>
<td>177,163</td>
<td>84,710</td>
<td>92,453</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>51.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tartu</td>
<td>29,974</td>
<td>13,972</td>
<td>16,002</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. VIRU</td>
<td>102,034</td>
<td>50,093</td>
<td>51,941</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rakvere</td>
<td>3,509</td>
<td>1,747</td>
<td>1,762</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. VÕRU</td>
<td>90,479</td>
<td>43,307</td>
<td>47,172</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Võru</td>
<td>2,697</td>
<td>1,286</td>
<td>1,411</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Without the towns of Narva and Valga, the Kreenholm settleMalest and Petseri district.


#### Table 7.10: Population in Counties and Towns, 1897

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County, town</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>M, %</th>
<th>F, %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Total population*</td>
<td>958,351</td>
<td>463,145</td>
<td>495,206</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>51.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Urban</td>
<td>148,778</td>
<td>73,273</td>
<td>75,505</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>50.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Rural population</td>
<td>809,573</td>
<td>389,872</td>
<td>419,701</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>51.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. HARJU</td>
<td>157,736</td>
<td>84,710</td>
<td>73,026</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tallinn</td>
<td>64,572</td>
<td>33,462</td>
<td>31,110</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>48.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paldiski</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. JARVA</td>
<td>64,572</td>
<td>33,462</td>
<td>31,110</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>48.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paldiski</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. LAANE</td>
<td>52,673</td>
<td>25,730</td>
<td>26,943</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paide</td>
<td>2,507</td>
<td>1,117</td>
<td>1,390</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>55.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. PÄRNU</td>
<td>98,123</td>
<td>47,278</td>
<td>50,845</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>51.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pärnu</td>
<td>12,898</td>
<td>6,058</td>
<td>6,840</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. SAARE</td>
<td>60,263</td>
<td>27,713</td>
<td>32,550</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuressaare</td>
<td>4,603</td>
<td>2,122</td>
<td>2,481</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>53.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. TARTU</td>
<td>190,317</td>
<td>91,324</td>
<td>98,993</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tartu</td>
<td>42,308</td>
<td>20,234</td>
<td>22,074</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>52.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. VILJANDI</td>
<td>98,123</td>
<td>47,278</td>
<td>50,845</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>51.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viljandi</td>
<td>12,898</td>
<td>6,058</td>
<td>6,840</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. VIRU</td>
<td>120,230</td>
<td>59,042</td>
<td>61,188</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rakvere</td>
<td>5,890</td>
<td>2,833</td>
<td>3,057</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>51.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. VÕRU</td>
<td>97,185</td>
<td>46,871</td>
<td>50,314</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Võru</td>
<td>4,152</td>
<td>1,952</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Without the towns of Narva, Valga and the county of Petseri.

## Table 7.11: Population in Rural Districts and Towns, 1922

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District, Town</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>M %</th>
<th>F %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Total Population</td>
<td>1,107,059</td>
<td>520,239</td>
<td>586,820</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Urban</td>
<td>298,873</td>
<td>133,640</td>
<td>165,233</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Rural</td>
<td>791,934</td>
<td>372,850</td>
<td>419,084</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. HARJU</td>
<td>219,654</td>
<td>101,739</td>
<td>117,915</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tallinn</td>
<td>122,419</td>
<td>55,680</td>
<td>66,739</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paldiski</td>
<td>1,053</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. JÄRVA</td>
<td>58,211</td>
<td>27,826</td>
<td>30,385</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pärds</td>
<td>2,980</td>
<td>1,322</td>
<td>1,658</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. LAANE</td>
<td>75,991</td>
<td>35,275</td>
<td>40,716</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haapsalu</td>
<td>4,251</td>
<td>1,780</td>
<td>2,471</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. PETSERI</td>
<td>60,848</td>
<td>28,756</td>
<td>32,092</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petseri</td>
<td>2,013</td>
<td>967</td>
<td>1,046</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. PARNU</td>
<td>94,014</td>
<td>43,587</td>
<td>50,427</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pärnu</td>
<td>18,499</td>
<td>8,156</td>
<td>10,343</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. SAARE</td>
<td>57,157</td>
<td>25,024</td>
<td>32,133</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
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*Source: Estonian Statistical Office (ESA), URL: [www.stat.ee/wwwstat/content/I_B_AJ_922/1.html](http://www.stat.ee/wwwstat/content/I_B_AJ_922/1.html), 12 Jan 2000.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District, town</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
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<th>F %</th>
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Table 7.13: Population in Districts and Towns, 1970

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<th>District, Town</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>M %</th>
<th>F %</th>
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**Towns**

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<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Tallinn</td>
<td>369,583</td>
<td>168,228</td>
<td>201,355</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Kohila-Järve</td>
<td>82,558</td>
<td>38,817</td>
<td>43,741</td>
<td>47</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Narva</td>
<td>61,346</td>
<td>28,170</td>
<td>33,176</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>54</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Pärnu</td>
<td>50,224</td>
<td>22,639</td>
<td>27,585</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Sindi</td>
<td>13,505</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Sindi</td>
<td>13,505</td>
<td>6,150</td>
<td>7,355</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Districts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District, Town</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>M %</th>
<th>F %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. HAAPSA LU</td>
<td>32,030</td>
<td>14,913</td>
<td>17,117</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. HARJU</td>
<td>82,838</td>
<td>38,929</td>
<td>43,909</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. HIIUMAA</td>
<td>9,967</td>
<td>4,442</td>
<td>5,525</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. JÕGEVA</td>
<td>42,028</td>
<td>19,127</td>
<td>22,901</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. MUSTVEE</td>
<td>3,644</td>
<td>1,651</td>
<td>1,993</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>55</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. POI TSAMAA</td>
<td>4,523</td>
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<td>2,479</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>55</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. KINGSISPEA</td>
<td>38,894</td>
<td>17,755</td>
<td>21,139</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. TÜR I</td>
<td>6,275</td>
<td>2,833</td>
<td>3,442</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. PÅRN U</td>
<td>43,686</td>
<td>20,265</td>
<td>23,421</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. RAKVERE</td>
<td>78,055</td>
<td>35,896</td>
<td>42,159</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. VALGA</td>
<td>45,443</td>
<td>20,629</td>
<td>24,814</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>55</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. TÕRVA</td>
<td>2,755</td>
<td>1,244</td>
<td>1,511</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. VÕRU</td>
<td>49,797</td>
<td>22,945</td>
<td>26,852</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>54</td>
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<tr>
<td>14. VILJANDI</td>
<td>68,143</td>
<td>30,812</td>
<td>37,331</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>55</td>
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<tr>
<td>15. VÕRU</td>
<td>49,797</td>
<td>22,945</td>
<td>26,852</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 7.14: Population in Districts and Towns, 1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District, town</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>M %</th>
<th>F %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Total population</td>
<td>1,464,476</td>
<td>677,274</td>
<td>787,202</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>53.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Urban population</td>
<td>1,016,826</td>
<td>467,890</td>
<td>548,936</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>54.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Rural population</td>
<td>447,650</td>
<td>209,384</td>
<td>238,266</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>53.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Republican town administrations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District, town</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>M %</th>
<th>F %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Tallinn</td>
<td>441,800</td>
<td>202,790</td>
<td>239,010</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>54.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Kohtla-Järve</td>
<td>87,472</td>
<td>38,419</td>
<td>48,053</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>54.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Districts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District, town</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>M %</th>
<th>F %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. HAAPSALU</td>
<td>32,408</td>
<td>15,271</td>
<td>17,137</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>52.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. HARJU</td>
<td>38,970</td>
<td>14,784</td>
<td>24,186</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>53.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. HIIUMAA</td>
<td>10,180</td>
<td>4,387</td>
<td>5,793</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>52.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. JõGEVA</td>
<td>42,426</td>
<td>19,435</td>
<td>22,991</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>53.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. POŁVA</td>
<td>36,303</td>
<td>16,734</td>
<td>19,569</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>53.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. PARNU</td>
<td>42,589</td>
<td>20,334</td>
<td>22,255</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>52.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. RAKVERE</td>
<td>78,553</td>
<td>36,310</td>
<td>42,243</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>53.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. VALGA</td>
<td>44,015</td>
<td>20,284</td>
<td>23,731</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>53.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. PARNU</td>
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<td>20,334</td>
<td>22,255</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>52.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Source:
Table 7.15: ESSR Population in Districts and Towns, 1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District, town</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>M %</th>
<th>F %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Total population</td>
<td>1,565,662</td>
<td>731,392</td>
<td>834,270</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>53.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Urban population</td>
<td>1,118,829</td>
<td>517,400</td>
<td>601,429</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>53.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Rural population</td>
<td>446,833</td>
<td>213,992</td>
<td>232,841</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>52.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican town administrations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Tallinn</td>
<td>499,421</td>
<td>232,530</td>
<td>266,891</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>53.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maardu</td>
<td>16,052</td>
<td>7,926</td>
<td>8,126</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>50.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Kohila-Järve</td>
<td>91,444</td>
<td>42,594</td>
<td>49,050</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>53.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiviõli</td>
<td>10,390</td>
<td>4,688</td>
<td>5,702</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>54.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Narva</td>
<td>84,975</td>
<td>38,759</td>
<td>46,216</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>54.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pärnu</td>
<td>56,937</td>
<td>25,777</td>
<td>31,160</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>54.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindi</td>
<td>4,548</td>
<td>1,950</td>
<td>2,598</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Sillamäe</td>
<td>20,561</td>
<td>9,587</td>
<td>10,974</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>53.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tallinn</td>
<td>113,420</td>
<td>51,618</td>
<td>61,802</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>54.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindi</td>
<td>4,548</td>
<td>1,950</td>
<td>2,598</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>57.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Tartu</td>
<td>113,420</td>
<td>51,618</td>
<td>61,802</td>
<td>45.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Republican town administrations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Tallinn</td>
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<td>232,530</td>
<td>266,891</td>
<td>46.6</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maardu</td>
<td>16,052</td>
<td>7,926</td>
<td>8,126</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>50.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Kohila-Järve</td>
<td>91,444</td>
<td>42,594</td>
<td>49,050</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>53.5</td>
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<td>Kiviõli</td>
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<td>4,688</td>
<td>5,702</td>
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<td>54.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Narva</td>
<td>84,975</td>
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<td>46,216</td>
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<td>53.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pärnu</td>
<td>56,937</td>
<td>25,777</td>
<td>31,160</td>
<td>45.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sindi</td>
<td>4,548</td>
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<td>2,598</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Sillamäe</td>
<td>20,561</td>
<td>9,587</td>
<td>10,974</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>53.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tallinn</td>
<td>113,420</td>
<td>51,618</td>
<td>61,802</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>54.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindi</td>
<td>4,548</td>
<td>1,950</td>
<td>2,598</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Tartu</td>
<td>113,420</td>
<td>51,618</td>
<td>61,802</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>54.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.2 APPENDIX 2: BIBLIOGRAPHY

7.2.1 Official Documents, Treaties, Reports, Speeches


Bratinka, Józef: Report on the application of the Republic of Estonia for membership in the Council of Europe, Doc. 6810, 14 April 1993, ADOC6810, 1403-84/93-1-E.


CEPA Committee on Relations with European Non-Member Countries: ‘Draft Minutes of the meeting held in Paris on 4 December 1992’, AS/NM (44) PV 6, 8 Dec. 1992 AANPV6.44, 1406-10/12/92-1-E, p. 3.


EV Government: *Declaration by the Government of the Republic of Estonia on the Occasion [sic!] of Accession to the Council of Europe*, mimeographed fax dated 06/05 [1993], provided by the Council of Europe library in Tallinn.


UN: UN-Document CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5.


7.2.2 The Press

[BNS:] ‘Vene eksperdid esitasid oma soovitusid’, in: EPL, 18 Dec 1996 URL:


Clark, Bruce: ‘Estonia protests at ‘invasion threat’’, in: FT, 10 May 1994, p. 3.


Sildam, Toomas: ‘Minister Veidemann: meie pelgame muulasi ja nemad meid’, in: PM, 15 Nov. 1997, p. 2. (We fear the others, and the others [fear] us (?)]


7.2.3 Monographs and Journals


Grobel, O. / Lejinis, Atis (Eds.): The Baltic Dimension of European Integration, Riga: LIIA, IEWS, Royal Danish Embassy, 1996.


Hobsbawm, Eric: ‘Qu’est-ce qu’un conflit ethnique?’, in: Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales (100), Décembre 1993, pp. 51-57.


Maier, Sylvia: ‘Are the Baltic States Living Up to their International Legal Obligations? An analysis of Russian Cultural Minority Rights in Estonia and Latvia in the context of recent domestic leg-


held on February 3-5, 1992 in Maribor, Slovenia, München: Slavica Verlag Dr. Anton Kovac, 1993, pp. 92-98.


Shevchuk, Yuri: ‘[Presentation on Dual Citizenship]’, Transcript of Session at New School of Social Sciences, New York, Democratic Politics and Policy Workshop, 6 Februar 1995.


Andreas Demuth


ANDREAS DEMUTH


7.3 Appendix 3: Declaration

In accordance with §6, para 2, section a, sentence 2 of the Rules and Procedures of the University of Osnabrück of 24 August 1984 as issued in MBl. no. 33/1984, p. 714, with regard to the bestowal of the Degree of Dr. phil., I herewith declare that I have composed this work alone and without help disallowed under the aforementioned Rules and Procedures and that I have mentioned all means employed in the composition of this dissertation.