PREDICTORS AND CONSEQUENCES OF SEXIST BEHAVIOR

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1. INTRODUCTION

Imagine the following incidents: A female employee discovers that her male coworker got the promotion for the leadership position in the company instead of her, even though she is more qualified to fill the position, considering her experience and job skills in light of the requirements for the position. She goes to the male personnel manager’s office to confront him and asks him for his reasons for not promoting her. Instead of offering her factual reasons, he says: “I don’t understand you ‘working mothers’. You think, you’re being discriminated against? Don’t exaggerate! Only because you lost in a fair competition, you don’t have to complain about being discriminated against. You know, so many women ask for ‘equality’, but in fact they are asking for special favors, such as hiring policies. I don’t get all these feminists making unreasonable demands, while in truth all they want is to have more power than men. Women in general are so easily offended and interpret even the most innocent remark as being sexist. Look Linda, you are a good employee and you have a good position. You should appreciate everything I do for you and look at the bright side: This way you’ll have more time for your kids” (adapted from Glick & Fiske, 1996).

One week later, the same woman is sitting at her desk when her male coworker passes by her office. She is setting up the network server and does not see him right away. He approaches her and when he sees what she is doing, he says to her: “Oh, the network server, that’s so difficult and frustrating for a woman to grapple with. Let me do it for you!” (from Becker, Glick, Ilic & Bohner, 2011, p. 763). He kneels beside her and starts to set up the network server for her. She is very silent, so he tries to cheer her up by saying: “I know that you got pretty upset, because you didn’t get the promotion. If you ask me, our personnel manager shouldn’t have been so hard on you, even though he has a point. Only few men possess qualities like this refined sense of culture and good taste that women have! That’s why women should not bother with pursuing a career, as they have to follow their marital and maternal duties, like cooking, cleaning, and taking care of their husband and the kids. Women are pure and have so much more moral sensibility than any man. A man could never fulfill the challenges of being a housewife. That’s why men should cherish and protect women, put them on a pedestal, and give women the time and space to work at home. In my opinion, men should be willing to sacrifice their own wellbeing in order to help and provide for the women in their lives.” He points to the computer and finishes: “So, if you’ll ever find yourself in a disaster, I’ll be here to rescue you.” (in part adapted from Glick & Fiske, 1996).
1.1. Sexist beliefs

At first glance, these incidents seem very different, as the content of interactions varies. However, both incidents have one thing in common: In both incidents a woman is confronted with beliefs which can be classified as sexist, given that they are prejudicial and “place the object of prejudice at some disadvantage” (Allport, 1954, p. 9). In the following section, sexist beliefs will be defined and conceptualized, the prevalence of sexist beliefs will be detailed, and measures to assess sexist beliefs will be presented.

1.1.1. Defining and conceptualizing sexist beliefs

Over the last decades, a variety of definitions have been developed to conceptualize sexism. In one of the most prominent conceptualizations, sexism is defined as an "individual’s attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors, and organizational, institutional, and cultural practices that either reflect negative evaluations of individuals based on their gender or support unequal status of women and men" (Swim & Hyers, 2009, p. 407; see also Barreto, Ryan, & Schmitt, 2009; Rudman & Glick, 2008). Historically, most empirical researchers have equated prejudice with antipathy and therefore conceptualized sexism mainly through hostility toward women and the endorsement of traditional gender-roles (Glick & Fiske, 2001).

Hostile sexism can be defined through Allport’s definition of prejudice as “an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization” (1954, p. 9). As such, hostile sexism is clearly negative and reflects an antipathy towards non-traditional women (e.g., feminists; for other negative female subtypes, see Sibley & Wilson, 2004). Based on hostile sexism, women are perceived as posing a threat for men by challenging male power and seeking to control men (e.g., through feminist ideologies; Glick & Fiske, 2001). Sexism research took a turn when it began to highlight that the conceptualization of sexism through hostility alone is misleading, because this presumption ignores the fact that beliefs toward women can also be associated with highly positive evaluations of women (Glick & Fiske, 2001). In answer to this, the Ambivalent Sexism Theory has re-conceptualized sexism and expanded the theorization of sexism by adding a fundamental ambivalence to the old-fashioned indicators of sexism (negative attitudes and beliefs about women, and the endorsement of traditional gender-roles and stereotypes). In theory, ambivalence is characterized by a psychologically disconcerting state where a person experiences cognitive dissonance due to conflicted feelings based on an inconsistency between attitudes (e.g., positive and negative attitudes). To minimize the cognitive dissonance, one may repress either the positive or the negative attitudes (Glick & Fiske, 1997). With regard to ambivalence in
sexist beliefs, Glick and Fiske (1996) propose that a repression of one set of beliefs may lead to polarized views of women. As a reaction, men may split “women” into two distinct target groups, a “good” or positive female subtype, and a “bad” or negative female subtype, allowing men to favor “good” women while disliking “bad” women. The favoring of “good” women may be expressed through benevolent treatment directed towards traditional women (e.g., homemakers), while the disliking of “bad” women may be expressed through a hostile treatment of non-traditional women (e.g., career women, Glick & Fiske, 1997). Correspondingly, ambivalent sexism is characterized by two distinct but positively correlated set of beliefs, one reflecting clearly negative and hostile sexist beliefs, and one reflecting subjectively benevolent sexist beliefs toward women (Glick & Fiske, 1996, 1997).

**Benevolent sexism** characterizes women as pure and delicate creatures who ought to be protected by men, while simultaneously suggesting that women are weak (Glick & Fiske, 2001). More precisely, benevolent sexist attitudes are defined as comprising beliefs of protective paternalism (e.g., the belief that women should be protected by men), complementary gender differentiation (e.g., the belief that women have typically domestic qualities that few men possess), and heterosexual intimacy (e.g., the belief that women fulfill men’s romantic needs, cf. Glick & Fiske, 1996). While hostile sexist attitudes justify men’s powerful status through an overt and blatant antipathy toward non-traditional women (e.g., feminists; Sibley & Wilson, 2004), benevolent sexist attitudes subtly legitimize the power difference between men and women by rewarding traditional women with men’s protection, resources, and love, whilst at the same time subtly ascribing attributes that limit women to social roles with less status than those of men (Glick & Fiske, 1997, 2001). This way, both -hostile sexism and benevolent sexism - serve to justify traditional gender-roles and power relations, and contribute to the disadvantaged status of women. The decision about which women to place on a “pedestal”, and which women to place in the “gutter” (Glick & Fiske, 1996) is thought to be determined by stereotypes (e.g., regarding the different female subtypes, Glick & Fiske, 1997), and automatic categories (e.g., cues, such as women’s acceptance or rejection of traditional gender-roles and power relations, Glick & Fiske, 1996). Traditional women, for instance, will likely activate benevolent sexism, as traditional women are stereotypically considered to support traditional gender-roles and power relations. Non-traditional women, on the contrary, will likely activate hostile sexism, as non-traditional women are stereotypically considered to challenge traditional gender-roles and power relations (Glick & Fiske, 1997).
Both hostile and benevolent sexist beliefs comprise stereotypes which can be defined as “cognitive structures that contain the perceiver’s knowledge, beliefs, and expectancies about some human group” (Hamilton & Trolier, 1986, p. 133). Gender stereotypes reflect widely held descriptive beliefs that refer to characteristics, behaviors, and roles ascribed to men and women (Weinraub, Clemens, Sockloff, Ethridge, Gracely, & Myers, 1984), which are merely based on a person’s gender (Best 2009). As any other stereotypical belief, gender stereotypes refer to a socially built and shared ideology (Rollero, Glick, & Tartaglia, 2014), that is thought to originate from traditional gender-roles and power inequalities between men and women (e.g., Eagly, 1987). Their content comprises a set of strengths and weaknesses considered to be typical of females and males. Because gender stereotypes ascribe different qualities to women and to men, gender stereotypes are also defined as complementary (Faniko, Lorenzi-Cioldi, Sarrasin, & Mayor, 2015). While women are stereotypically viewed as being more communal (e.g., warm and caring) than men, men are stereotypically viewed as being more agentic (e.g., strong and ambitious) than women (e.g., Rudman & Glick, 2001; Rudman & Goodwin, 2004). This stereotypical perception of a “typical” woman or man reflects the descriptive component of gender stereotypes and has remained largely unchanged since the 1970s (e.g., Spence & Buckner, 2000). The strengths and weaknesses ascribed to men and women are often congruent with what is socially expected from women (e.g., performing martial and maternal duties) and from men (e.g., compete in the workplace), and reflect the prescriptive component of gender stereotypes (Rudman & Phelan, 2008).

Regarding the incidents described above, the male personnel manager’s hostile sexist remark that, in his view, “[w]omen in general are so easily offended and interpret even the most innocent remark as being sexist”, reflects the descriptive component of gender stereotypes, because it refers to his beliefs about the “typical” characteristics that women actually possess. The male coworker’s benevolent sexist remark that, in his opinion, “women should not bother with pursuing a career, as they have to follow their marital and maternal duties, like cooking, cleaning, and taking care of their husband and the kids”, reflects the prescriptive component of gender stereotypes, because it refers to his belief about the “typical” characteristics that women should possess.

1.1.2. Prevalence of sexist beliefs

Research comparing gender stereotypes in 1983 (Deaux & Lewis, 1983) and in 2014 (Haines, Deaux, & Lofaro, 2016), found gender stereotypes to be stable regarding men’s and women’s gender stereotypical beliefs about “typical” men and women. Thus, for the past 30 years, the differentiation between men and women on the basis of distinctly ascribed agentic
and communal traits, for example, prevails. Regarding sexist beliefs, substantial legislative and normative changes have decreased the social acceptance of sexism in many contexts. For instance, the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 regarding equal employment opportunity speaks against discrimination based on a person’s gender (SEC. 703): “(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-- (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s (...) sex”. According to this law, a personnel manager’s decision not to promote a female employee because of her gender can be considered unlawful. While the establishment of such laws gives rise to the conclusion that the discrimination of women is a thing of the past, the present reality, however, speaks a different language. This can be seen on online platforms, like the “Everyday Sexism Project” (2012), a website founded by Laura Bates, where women and girls upload their everyday experiences of sexism. In one of the website’s entries, a woman wrote on January 30th 2016, “I got my first job when I was 16 my former Boss – who was older than twice my age – always made very inappropriate comments. From the first day on he referred to me as “sweetie” instead of my actual name. (…) Soon he started making comments like “I wonder if you take all your orders so good” or “sweetie I can sure show you how to work with that technical stuff.”

Some nations have demonstrated enormous progress regarding gender equality. However, inequalities between men and women regarding their respective power and status are still prevalent (Athenstaedt & Alfermann, 2011; Neff, Cooper, & Woodruff, 2007). In line with this, a scientific study on women’s experiences with sexism revealed that women face one to two sexist incidents per week (e.g., hearing sexist jokes; Swim, Hyers, Cohen, & Ferguson, 2001). Further, there is strong evidence that so far, virtually no society has reached a state of true gender equality (Hausmann, Tyson, Bekhouche, & Zahidi, 2011). Regular reports still document the gaps between men’s and women’s economic and political participation (United Nations Development Programme, 2011; World Economic Forum, 2012), and yet we live in an era dominated by postfeminism, which assumes the “pastness” of feminism (Genz & Brabon, 2009) and indicates to girls and women that there is no longer a need to fight for gender equality, because the battle for gender equality has already been won (see Hall & Rodriguez, 2003). These assumptions have the potential to make outcries of gender injustice appear unfounded and implausible (Pomerantz, Raby, & Stefanik, 2013), and can result in the unpopularity of the word sexism (Gil & Scharff, 2011).
While it may seem as if sexism has disappeared, sexism research demonstrates that in fact it still prevails in modern societies, albeit expressed through new forms (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995; Glick & Fiske 1996; Jackman, 1994; Swim, Akin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995). To better map the changing expression of sexism, more modern sexism research differentiates between old-fashioned sexism and a more modern sexism (Swim et al., 1995). The main difference between both is that old-fashioned sexism refers to clearly negative beliefs about women (e.g. “Women are generally not as smart as men.”, Swim et al., 1995, p. 212), while modern sexists would be more reluctant to claim that women are inferior to men, and instead respond with denial regarding the prevalence of sexism. This denial is represented by the belief that discrimination of women is no longer a problem (e.g., “Society has reached the point where women and men have equal opportunities for achievement“, Swim et al., 1995, p. 212), an antagonism towards women’s demands, and resentment about special favors for women.

In addition to the traditional and modern forms of sexism, a third form of sexism was proposed, neosexism. Neosexism represents the “manifestation of a conflict between egalitarian values and residual negative feelings towards women“ (Tougas, Brown, Beaton, & Joly, 1995, p. 843). More precisely, the concept of neosexism focuses mainly on political attitudes related to gender discrimination, such as the support for public policies to enhance women’s status (e.g., “Women’s request in terms of equality between the sexes are simply exaggerated“, Tougas et al., 1995). A recent study found that the perception of gender equality in modern society may depend on the point of reference participants use when judging the progress toward gender equality (Sullivan & Sylvia, 2013). In this study, participants read the identical description of a sexist incident, wherein a male and a female co-worker, Mary and Andrew, are described as having the same age, the same education, and working with equal dedication in the same position at the same company. When one day, a fellow co-worker tells Mary that Andrew receives a considerably larger salary than her, she is described as being shocked and outraged. The identical incident was, however, either framed as having happened in the past (1963) or in the present (2008). Results from this study revealed that participants who read the incident as having happened in the past, considered less progress to be needed to achieve gender equality. However, when participants read the incident as having happened in the present, they perceived society to favor men over women and that more progress was needed to achieve gender equality.

As stated by Benokraitis and Feagin (1986), over the years, prejudice and the discrimination against women have become more covert and subtle. In line with this, sexism
can also be differentiated based on the form of its expression: overt, covert, or subtle (Swim & Cohen, 1997). For instance, coming back to the sexist incidents described at the beginning, the male personnel manager’s (hostile) reaction to the female employee’s complaint about being discriminated against, can be classified as an overt form of sexism and is blatant and it reflects an “unequal and harmful treatment of women that is apparent, visible and observable, and can easily be documented” (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1986, p. 30). Due to legislative and normative changes, sexism toward women has become unacceptable in many contexts (Swim et al., 1995; Tougas et al., 1995), which led to a decrease in the overt expression of sexism (Klonis, Plant, & Devine, 2005). Consequently, the personnel manager’s blatant reaction including openly using derogatory comments, may be relatively rare in a woman’s work life, compared to other forms of sexism. The overt form of sexism can be contrasted against a covert form, which also demeans women but may go unnoticed (e.g., ignoring women; Sojo, Wood, & Genat, 2015). Covert sexism can be defined as an “unequal and unfair treatment of women that is recognized but purposefully hidden from view” (Swim, Mallett, & Stangor, 2004, p. 117). Perpetrators, especially in work settings, seem to prefer a more covert form of discrimination, as it allows them to disguise their intentions to harm others, while leaving the victim unsure of whether any harm was intended or not (Kaukiainen et al., 2001). An example for the covert form of sexism could be the personnel manager’s decision not to consider the female employee for the job promotion, a decision which (based on his derogatory comments) seems to be founded on (hostile) sexist beliefs rather than factual reasons. However, the personnel manager’s last remark: “You should appreciate everything I do for you and look at the bright side: This way you’ll have more time for your kids”, could be interpreted as the personnel manager expressing his concern about the female employee’s and her family’s wellbeing. As a consequence, the female employee may be left unsure of whether any harm was intended or not, and the incident may go unnoticed as being sexist. In contrast to such covert sexism, subtle form of sexism represents an “unequal and harmful treatment of women that goes unnoticed because it is perceived to be customary or normal behavior“ (Swim & Cohen, 1997, p. 104). While both the subtle form and the covert form of discrimination are hidden, the subtle form is not intentionally harmful (Swim, et al., 2004). Compared to the overt and the covert forms of discrimination, subtle discrimination is not as easily recognized as being prejudicial, as it is often not perceived as a real discrimination (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1986). This might also be the case in the second incident, where – at least at first glance – one could ask why the male coworker’s offer to help should be considered indicative of sexist beliefs. In fact, subtle sexism might not be perceived as problematic if it goes
unnoticed, and it might remain unnoticed so long as certain subtle discriminations are not considered expressions of sexism (Swim et al., 2004). Subtle discriminations can include a variety of sexist beliefs, such as the one’s described in the second incident. Thus, the male coworker’s statements (e.g., him saying, “that’s so difficult and frustrating for a woman to grapple with. Let me do it for you!”), and “men should cherish and protect women, put them on a pedestal”, see p. 7) tap into subjectively favorable but patronizing beliefs that can be classified as (benevolent) sexist, because they portray women in restricted roles while idealizing them as pure and delicate creatures (Glick & Fiske, 1996, 2001). Also, the male coworker’s agreement with the personnel manager’s decision not to promote his female coworker (e.g., reflected in the male coworker’s statements “Our personnel manager shouldn’t have been so hard on you, even though he has a point” and “Women should not bother with pursuing a career, as they have to follow their marital and maternal duties”) even though she is more qualified to fill the position, reflects benevolent sexist beliefs. Correspondingly, Kilianski and Rudman (1998, p. 348) stated that, “if a man favors such a policy because he believes women are constitutionally incapable of competing for and succeeding in such positions on a “level playing field” (…), then the behavior could be appropriately labeled as benevolent sexism”.

1.1.3. Measuring sexist beliefs

While legislative and normative changes may lead to the impression that gender equality has already been reached and that sexism no longer exists (e.g., Swim et al., 1995), research suggests that sexism still prevails but is expressed through new, less overt, forms (e.g., Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995). Therefore, not only the conceptualization and the prevalence of sexism have occupied the thoughts of researchers for decades, but also the development of scales to assess different forms of sexism (Swim & Hyers, 2008), and specifically subtle sexist beliefs (for an overview, see Swim, Becker, & DeCoste, 2010). The increased endorsement of egalitarian social beliefs led to a shift from the differentiation between sex-role-traditionalism versus sex-role-egalitarianism, as done in the Sex-Role Egalitarianism Scale (e.g., Beere, King, Beere, & King, 1984), to the assessment of current gender-related political issues like the denial and continued discrimination against women, as done in the Modern Sexism Scale (Swim et al., 1995) and in the Neo-Sexism Scale (Tougas et al., 1995). While both the Modern Sexism Scale and the Neo-Sexism Scale assess, at least in part, political attitudes related to gender discrimination (Glick & Fiske, 1996), previous research demonstrated that both scales measure different but related constructs (Campbell, Schellenberg, & Senn, 1997; Swim et al., 2010a).
In contrast to the aforementioned measures, which primarily concentrate on the assessment of current gender-related political issues, the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI) developed by Peter Glick and Susan Fiske (1996), specifically differentiates between the hostile and the benevolent aspects of sexism. Thus, a major strength of the ASI is that, in contrast to other measures of sexism, it allows the investigation of benevolent sexism, which is not considered in any of the measures listed above. The ASI is a self-report inventory that measures, on a 7-point rating scale, strong agreement to form strong disagreement with 22 statements reflecting sexist beliefs. The 22 items are divided into two scales: Eleven of these items are combined to the hostile sexism scale, and the remaining eleven items are combined to the benevolent sexism scale. In contrast to hostile sexism, which (empirically) is a unitary concept (Glick & Fiske, 1996; Glick et al., 2000), benevolent sexism is further divided into three distinct sub-components: Protective Paternalism (e.g., assessed through the belief that “[w]omen should be cherished and protected by men”), Complementary Gender Differentiation (e.g., assessed through the belief that “[m]any women have a quality of purity that few men possess”), and Heterosexual intimacy (e.g., assessed through the belief that “[e]very man ought to have a woman whom he adores”, Glick & Fiske, 1996). With the ASI, Glick and Fiske (1996) developed a measure that has shown high reliability for measuring hostile and benevolent sexism in past research (Glick & Fiske, 2011). The reliability score ranged from $\alpha = .83$ to $\alpha = .90$ across six separate studies throughout the scale development process (Glick & Fiske, 1996). In comparison with other sexism scales, the ASI demonstrated adequate convergent validity for the hostile sexism scale, and acceptable discriminant validity for the benevolent sexism scale (Glick and Fiske, 2001). Because of its broad applicability, the ASI has been used internationally (e.g., Glick et al., 2001) and has been widely applied in the prediction and investigation of several concepts, such as close relationships (e.g., Hammond, Overall, & Cross, 2016), partner preference (e.g., Travaglia, Overall, & Sibley, 2009), tolerance of sexual harassment (e.g., Russel & Oswald, 2015), rape myth acceptance (e.g., Sakalli-Uğurlu, Yalçın, & Glick, 2007), victim blame (e.g., Abrams, Viki, Masser, & Bohner, 2003; Koepke, Eyssel, & Bohner, 2014), and system justification (e.g., Sibley, Overall, & Duckitt, 2007), to name but a few. Because hostile sexism and benevolent sexism are among the most relevant concepts in interpersonal cross-gender interactions (e.g., Barreto, Ellemers, Piebinga, & Moya, 2010; Conelly & Heesacker, 2012; Delacolette et al., 2013; Dumont, Sarlet, & Dardenne, 2010; Good & Rudman, 2010), the present dissertation focuses on the investigation of hostile sexism and benevolent sexism.
To date, sexism research mostly used direct assessment methods like the ASI to assess participants’ (explicit) sexist attitudes. In these studies, participants are instructed to complete a self-report measure containing sentences that explicitly ask about their (sexist) beliefs, to decide for each sentence to which extent they agree with the sentence, and to indicate their agreement on a numerical scale (for an overview, see Becker & Sibley, 2015). Gender attitudes and belief systems in general are assumed to be multifaceted (Ashmore, Del Boca, & Bilder, 1995), and to contain both conscious but also unconscious elements (Rudman & Kilianski, 2000). Based on contemporary dual-process theories in social cognition, “the mental processes underlying social phenomena can be divided into two distinct categories depending on whether they operate in an automatic or nonautomatic fashion” (Sherman, Gawronski, & Trope, 2014, p. 3). The proposed distinction of two categories can be defined as “two different processes that underlie psychological tendencies to evaluate a given entity with some degree of favor or disfavor” (Gawronski, Bodenhausen, & Becker, 2007, p. 222).

Self-report measures afford the assessment of (“explicit”) attitudes that are assumed to be conscious and to operate in a nonautomatic fashion. However, even in scales developed to assess subtle sexism (for an overview, see Swim et al., 2010a), participants may be aware of the topic under consideration, and therefore be able to guess the purpose of the scales, considering that the scales deal exclusively with a specific target group, namely women (Brauer, Wasel, & Niedenthal, 2000). While explicit cognitive processes are assumed to be mostly conscious, intentional, and demanding of resources, implicit cognitive processes are assumed to be unconscious, unintentional, and not demanding of cognitive resources (Bargh, 1994). Because stereotypes “are learned very early in life, before people have the cognitive maturity to reject them” (Rudman & Glick, 2001, p. 110), gender stereotypes can lead people to automatically and quickly associate women with communal traits, and men with agentic traits, even when they explicitly reject these stereotypes (Rudman & Glick, 2001; Rudman & Goodwin, 2004). In line with this, research demonstrated that men, compared to women, are more strongly associated with career and high-status goals, while women, compared to men, are more strongly associated with family and low-status goals (Rudman & Kilianski, 2000). Further, a meta-analysis on the relation between gender and the emergence of leaders, demonstrated that men emerge more frequently as leaders than women (Eagly & Karau, 1991). Considering that gender stereotypes are highly prescriptive (Prentice & Carranza, 2002), it is not surprising that they can affect a person’s perception of others, without this person’s intent to do so. Consequently, gender stereotypes can lead a person to make automatic and involuntary stereotypical judgments of others (Rudman, Greenwald, &
McGhee, 2001). The automatic association between different concepts or social categories (e.g., women) and personality traits (e.g., warm), represents implicit attitudes. Because such implicit attitudes are assumed to be unconscious and to operate in an automatic fashion (e.g., Sherman et al., 2014), their assessment requires less direct measures (e.g., Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). One characteristic of indirect or implicit measures is that, they “provide an estimate of the construct of interest without having to directly ask the participant for a verbal report” (Fazio & Olson, 2003, p. 300). Therefore, implicit measures can overcome the constraints of self-report measures, which are limited to a person’s belief about their attitudes (Rudman, 2011). Further, some theorists even doubt the trustworthiness of self-reports as measures to capture a person’s true attitudes. These theorists also criticize the controllability of responses in self-report measures, and that a person’s response may be influenced by what is deemed a politically correct, discouraging them to overtly express their prejudices (e.g., Latu, Steward, Myers, Lisco, Estes, & Donahue, 2011; Ziegert & Hanges, 2005). Thus, a major appeal of implicit measures is that they are likely free of social desirability concerns (Fazio & Olson, 2003) and assess implicit attitudes while leaving people unaware that their attitudes and stereotypes are being assessed (Fazio & Olson, 2003). Moreover, implicit measures are considered to reveal attitudes that a person may not even be aware of having (Rudman, 2011).

During the last decades, several measures have been developed to assess implicit social cognition (e.g., Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Payne, Jacoby, & Lambert, 2005). Today, approximately two dozen implicit measures exist (Nosek, Hawkins, & Frazier, 2011). In the following, three measures will be presented in ascending order, based on the times they were cited (Nosek et al., 2011). One of these measures is the Affect Misattribution Procedure, which uses primes (e.g., Black and White faces) as stimuli that flash briefly on a computer screen, followed by the presentation of unfamiliar Chinese pictographs. Participants are instructed only to rate the pictographs regarding their pleasantness compared to an average pictograph, while ignoring the primes. Research using this procedure found that, despite the instruction to ignore the primes, participants were reliably influenced by them (Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Steward, 2005). This finding demonstrates that, when participants are asked to make an evaluative judgment in an ambiguous situation, they tend to misattribute their reactions to the attitude object (e.g., the Black and White faces) to the target (pictographs). The Sequential Evaluative Priming Paradigm (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986) is also an implicit measure which uses primes as stimuli. In this paradigm, the prime stimulus (e.g., a series of Black faces and White faces) is briefly displayed on a
computer screen, followed by a semantically unrelated target stimulus (e.g., delightful). The target stimuli have either a positive or a negative connotation (e.g., pleasant versus irritating). Participants are instructed to classify, as quickly as possible, the target’s valence. Research using this paradigm found that participants’ classifications of the target stimuli were easier (i.e., faster, more accurate, or both) when the target’s valence matched the prime’s valence (e.g., Devine, Plant, Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & Vance, 2002). This finding demonstrates that participants automatically evaluate primes, which again influences them when classifying subsequently presented targets (Nosek et al., 2011).

The Implicit Association Test (IAT, developed by Greenwald et al., 1998), is an implicit measure that does not use primes to assess implicit attitudes, but rather assesses implicit attitudes through “the strength of an association between a target concept and an attribute dimension by considering the latency with which participants can employ two response keys when each has been assigned a dual meaning” (Fazio & Olson, 2003, p. 299). The IAT is probably the most well-known and widely used implicit measure (Rudman, 2011), and has been validated cross-culturally (Plessner & Banse, 2001). IATs have been used to implicitly assess, for instance, race attitudes (e.g., Greenwald, Banaji, & Nosek, 2015), age attitudes (e.g., Lueke & Gibson, 2014), and political attitudes (e.g., Friese, Smith, Plischke, Bluemke, & Nosek, 2012), demonstrating the exceptional flexibility of IATs (Gawronski & Conrey, 2004). The choice of an IAT over other implicit measures to assess implicit attitudes, can be advantageous for many reasons: For instance, the predictive validity of IATs is well established with a meta-analysis (Gawronski & Conrey, 2004), and IATs have been found to have a satisfactory internal consistency (coefficients ranging from .70 to .90; Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005; Nosek et al., 2007). Moreover, IATs have robust effect sizes, are easy to use (Gawronski & Conrey, 2004), very resistant to faking (e.g., Banse et al., 2001), and publically available on a website (Plessner & Banse, 2001).

However, there are still many controversies regarding the IAT’s underlying psychological processes (Gawronski & Conrey, 2004), it’s often observed lack of correlation with other implicit measures, including evaluative priming (e.g. Rudman & Kilianski, 2000), and the varying relation of implicit measures with explicit measures in general. In previous research, explicit attitudes were sometimes positively related to implicit attitudes assessed with an IAT (e.g., McConnell & Liebold, 2001), or with priming measures (e.g., Lepore & Brown 1997). However, previous research sometimes also found implicit and explicit measures to be unrelated (e.g., Aidman & Carroll, 2003; Knutson, Mah, Manly, & Grafman, 2007; Latu et al., 2011), or even negatively related (e.g., Karpinski & Hilton, 2001).
Additionally, the occasional reports of significant correlation between implicit and explicit measures mostly refer to correlations that are quite low (e.g., Greenwald et al., 1998; Devine et al., 2002; Rudman & Glick, 2001; Rudman & Kilianski, 2000). Therefore, it may be more appropriate to ask “[w]hen, under what conditions, and for what kind of people, are implicit and explicit measures related?” as suggested by Fazio and Olson (2003, p. 304), rather than examining to what extent implicit and explicit attitudes are related. For instance, in a meta-analysis on the predictive validity of implicit and explicit measures (Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009), explicit measures demonstrated to be strong predictors for some domains, such as consumer behavior and political preferences, while implicit measures demonstrated to be good predictors for other domains, such as interracial and intergroup behavior. It can be assumed that the correlation between implicit and explicit attitudes may vary with the correspondence of the applied implicit and explicit measures (Gawronski, LeBel, & Peters, 2007). In line with this assumption, in a meta-analysis (Hofmann et al., 2005), IAT measures and standard self-report measures were generally more strongly correlated when the two measures corresponded conceptually. Additionally, Ajzen and Fishbein (1977) identified the correspondence between the measures to also moderate the attitude-behavior relation, depending on the correspondence between the attitudinal and behavioral measures. For instance, in their research, Ajzen and Fishbein (1977) found that church attendance was more strongly predicted by measuring a person’s attitude toward the church attended, compared to measuring a person’s attitude toward religion in general.

Summing up the findings regarding the measurement of sexist beliefs, several measures have been developed to assess sexist beliefs explicitly (e.g., Swim et al., 1995; Tougas et al., 1995). Of these measures, however, only the ASI affords the assessment of hostile and benevolent sexism, as defined by Peter Glick and Susan Fiske (1996). Further, it may be of advantage to use different measures when predicting sexist beliefs, considering that in previous research has found implicit measures to have a higher predictive validity in some domains (e.g., consumer behavior), while explicit measures had higher predictive validity in other domains (e.g., intergroup behavior, Greenwald et al., 2009). Thus, it may be advisable to use both implicit and explicit measures to investigate the predictive validity of both implicit and explicit attitudes in the prediction of sexist behavior. Finally, when investigating the attitude-behavior relation of sexism, the potential moderating role of correspondence between the (implicit or explicit) attitudinal and behavioral measures should be taken into account (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977). Translating these conclusions to the sexist incidents described at the beginning of this thesis, a thorough investigation of what may have led the personnel
manager to express hostile sexism, or the male coworker to express benevolent sexism, needs to go beyond the predictive validity of attitudes in general. Instead, a thorough investigation of the predictors of sexist behavior (e.g., hostile sexist remarks, benevolent sexist help-offers) may also require other aspects, such as the differentiation between implicit and explicit sexist attitudes; an investigation of the relation between both, as well as the relation between implicit and explicit sexist attitude and sexist behaviors; and the examination of the predictive validity of implicit versus explicit sexist attitudes in the prediction of sexist behavior. Because the correspondence between the implicit and explicit measures may moderate the attitude-behavior relation of the assessed concepts (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977), implicit and explicit measures should be chosen that correspond with each other, and also with the behavior in question.
1.2. Consequences of Sexist Behavior

Having a closer look at the sexist incidents described at the beginning, one can assume that the female employee will perceive the personnel manager’s remarks (e.g., “I don’t get all these feminists, making unreasonable demands, while in truth all they want is to have more power than men”) as being hostile sexist, as it is clearly negative and reflects an antipathy towards non-traditional women that is “based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization” (Allport, 1954, p. 9). Considering that the female employee is described as seeking a job promotion, while also being a working mother (as highlighted by the personnel manager), it is possible that the personnel manager views her as a non-traditional woman. Translating the theoretical and scientific knowledge about hostile sexism to the personnel manager’s hostile sexist remarks, his reaction may reflect a common perception of non-traditional women as challenging male power while seeking to control men (e.g., through feminist ideologies; Glick & Fiske, 2001). This becomes particularly apparent when he says, “So many women ask for “equality”, but in fact they are asking for special favors, such as hiring policies”. Research on the consequences of hostile sexism for women who challenge traditional (female) gender-roles, for instance by applying for a masculine-typed occupational role, found that men’s and women’s endorsement of hostile, but not benevolent, sexist beliefs were related to the devaluation of female candidates (e.g., considered less friendly), and lower employment recommendation for female candidates compared to male candidates applying for a management position (Masser & Abrams, 2004). However, one may ask: What about the second incident, when the male coworker offers his female colleague to set up the network server for her, so she would not have to “grapple” with it? Or what about him cheering her up, by complimenting her on the qualities he views in women, like a “refined sense of culture and good taste”, being “pure” and having “so much more moral sensibility than any man”, or him explaining her that men should “cherish and protect women”, and “put them on a pedestal”?

1.2.1. Detection of hostile and benevolent sexism

The male coworker’s offer to help, and his attempt to cheer up his female colleague may likely be interpreted as reflecting a nice and kind-hearted behavior. It therefore seems more likely that the female employee will not perceive the male coworker’s offer to help, or his attempt to cheer her up, as being sexist. Instead, she could feel flattered and consider his offer a well-intentioned and chivalrous expression of his care for her. Research on the detection of prejudice indicates, that blatant forms of discrimination like hostile sexism (e.g., an employer refusing to promote a female employee, because in his view she lacks leadership
skills), can be easily recognized as such (see Barreto & Ellemers, 2015, for an overview). As described above, laws like Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 regarding equal employment opportunity, speak against gender-biased discrimination. Based on this law, a personnel manager’s decision not to promote a female employee because of her gender, could be legally sanctioned, and may be socially considered “politically incorrect” and unacceptable. Prior research found men and women to be less likely to identify a person as holding sexist beliefs, when this person was expressing benevolent sexism, compared to when this person was expressing hostile sexism (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005). Two years later, similar findings were found for women, who identified a male recruiter’s hostile sexist comments as representing hostile sexism, while having difficulties to identify his benevolent sexist comments as representing benevolent sexism (Dardenne, Dumont, & Bollier, 2007). Transferring these findings to the sexist incidents described above, the female employee may have more difficulties to identify the male coworker’s remarks as being benevolent sexist, than to identify the personnel manager’s remarks as being hostile sexist. As a possible explanation, the same research (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005) suggests that men and women fail to recognize benevolent sexism as such, because the source of benevolent sexism is relatively positively evaluated. Therefore, a benevolent sexist perpetrator, by deviating from the cognitive prototype of a sexist perpetrator, is more likely to be viewed as likeable, instead of being sexist (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005). However, if the seemingly minor (benevolent) sexist incidents women experience in their everyday (work-) lives are not perceived as harmful, benevolent sexism is likely to remain unchallenged (Becker & Swim, 2012). More recent research focused on developing and testing the effectiveness of interventions to increase awareness about the harms of subtle sexism, or seemingly minor incidents, that occur in everyday interactions in the academic workplace (see Cundiff, Zawadzki, Danube, & Shields, 2014). Findings from previous research indicate that increasing men’s and women’s awareness of the harms caused by benevolent sexism by providing them with information concerning the pervasiveness of benevolent sexism, is insufficient to reduce their benevolent sexist beliefs (Becker & Swim, 2011; Becker & Swim, 2012). In contrast, a more recent study found that providing men and women with information about the harmful nature of benevolent sexism, can lead to a reduced endorsement of benevolent sexist beliefs and an increased rejection of benevolent sexism in general (Becker & Swim, 2012). Considering the difficulties to recognize benevolent sexism as such (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005; Dardenne et al., 2007), the consequences of benevolent sexism, compared to hostile sexism, may be especially detrimental for women.
1.2.2. Consequences of benevolent sexism for women

Much work has addressed the identification and investigation of consequences of benevolent sexism for women. Overall, research largely showed that benevolent sexism leads to many negative effects and bears insidious dangers for women. In the following, a selection of studies demonstrating the consequences of benevolent sexism for women will be presented.

Women’s endorsement of sexist beliefs. The imposition of prescriptive gender-roles on women starts early in childhood, for instance, when a girl is dressed in pink, while a boy is dressed in blue; or when girls receive dolls as presents, while boys receive cars; or when girls are read stories about princesses, while boys are read stories about dragons. The differential treatment of girls and boys may lead girls to believe that it is expected from them to prefer pink over blue, dolls over cars, and princesses over dragons. In line with this, previous research showed that children already express preferences for gender-stereotypical toys in their second year of life (Serbin, Poulin-Dubois, Colburne, & Eichstedt, 2001). Furthermore, the differential treatment of boys and girls serves to define boundaries, which are eventually internalized (Carter, 2014). The internalization of such boundaries can then again be reinforced through external cues, for example, and the socializing influence of significant others, including the family, media, and education system (Albert, 1988; Bandura, 1977). The internalization of gender-roles can lead to the automatic activation of implicit gender stereotypes, and therefore to the automatic association of men and women with different attitudes. For instance, a daughter’s endorsement of implicit gender stereotypes was influenced by the strength of her mother’s implicit gender stereotypes (e.g., Endendijk, Groeneveld, van Berkel, Hallers-Haalboom, Mesman, & Bakermans-Kranenburg, 2013). Also, mothers’ explicit beliefs about traditional gender-roles predicted their daughters’ gender-related beliefs (Croft, Schmader, Block, & Baron, 2014). Furthermore, benevolent sexist beliefs appear not only to be intergenerationally transmitted from mothers to daughters, but also to have an impact on daughter’s academic performance. Correspondingly, in previous research mothers’ benevolent sexist beliefs positively predicted their daughters’ traditional goals, and negatively predicted their daughters’ academic performance (Montañés, de Lemus, Bohner, Megías, Moya, & Garcia-Retamero, 2012). Another approach proposes that the extent to which women identify themselves with the female gender may play a role in their endorsement of benevolent sexist beliefs. For instance, the gender identity model developed by Becker and Wagner (2009) proposes that the endorsement of sexist beliefs may derive from different types of gender identity (Becker & Wagner, 2009). Results from three studies provided empirical evidence for the gender identity model, and showed that especially women...
who are highly identified with their gender, and who prefer traditional gender-roles over progressive gender-roles, endorse benevolent sexist beliefs to a greater extent, and reject collective action to improve women’s social status in society more strongly, compared to weakly identified women (Becker & Wagner, 2009). In addition, research suggests that the salience of traditional female subtypes may also play a crucial role in the endorsement of benevolent sexist beliefs by women (Becker, 2010). In fact, women’s agreement with benevolent sexist statements was higher, when the female respondents thought about the traditional female subtype housewives (instead of a non-traditional female subtype, e.g., feminists), while she was indicating whether these statements reflected how they would describe themselves. The extent to which women believed that the benevolent sexist statements represented an accurate description of themselves, influenced the degree to which women endorsed benevolent sexist beliefs. When they read benevolent sexist statements directed against themselves (as the respondent), or against housewives, women were more likely to endorse these benevolent sexist beliefs, than when the sexist statements were directed against feminists or career women (Becker, 2010). In a diary study, Swim, Eyssell, Murdoch, and Ferguson (2010) found that women’s endorsement of sexist beliefs leads to negative consequences for women: a decreased desire to respond to sexism in everyday life (or wanting to say something but not saying it, Swim, Eyssell, Murdoch, & Ferguson, 2010). The same research showed that a decreased desire to respond to sexist incidents can be driven, for instance, by self-silencing beliefs, such as women’s perception of their responses on a particular matter (e.g., sexist incidents) as socially inappropriate, potentially offensive and cause for conflicts in relationships (Swim et al., 2010b). Results from this study indicate that women’s self-silencing beliefs decreased the likelihood that women responded to sexist incidents.

**Intimate relations.** Women’s endorsement of benevolent sexism can also be influenced by close relationships, or more precisely by a woman’s perception of her intimate partner’s endorsement of benevolent sexism (Hammond et al., 2016). Specifically, women who increasingly perceived their partner to strongly endorse benevolent sexist beliefs, themselves also endorsed more benevolent sexist beliefs, an association which demonstrated to be stable over time (during a time interval of nine months). In contrast, women who perceived a decline in their partner’s endorsement of benevolent sexist beliefs also showed a decline in their own benevolent sexist beliefs over time (Hammond et al., 2016). Benevolent sexism has also been associated with negative relationship outcomes (e.g., less marital satisfaction, Casad, Salazar, & Macina, 2015), and women’s fear of marital violence (Expósito, Herrera, Moya, & Glick,
Further, women’s and men’s endorsement of benevolent sexism are associated with increased rape myth acceptance (e.g., Sakallı-Uğurlu et al., 2007), and blaming of rape victims. For instance, in a study by Abrams, Viki, Masser, and Bohner (2003), individuals with high endorsement of benevolent sexist ideologies attributed more blame to female victims of acquaintance-rape, than individuals with low endorsement of benevolent sexist ideologies. As a possible explanation the researchers proposed that individuals with high endorsement of benevolent sexist ideologies hold particular beliefs about how a respectable woman should behave. These beliefs may result in a perception of women who invite a relationship with a man, as transgressors of traditional gender-role norms and thereby responsible for having been raped. Moreover, previous research showed that women in general are more likely to accept discrimination by a romantic partner following exposure to a benevolent sexist justification (e.g., “I am concerned for your safety”). Benevolently sexist women did not even need a protective justification to react positively to their romantic partner’s prohibition (Moya, Glick, Expósito, de Lemus, & Hart, 2007). These findings demonstrate that women who endorse benevolent sexist ideologies, are particularly prone to trade some degree of their independence to receive male (explicitly sexist) protection.

Women’s career-related choices and ambitions. Regarding women’s career-related choices and ambitions, previous research found a link between women’s implicit (not explicit) romantic ideals of a man, and women’s desire for personal power, providing support for a so-called glass slipper effect. More precisely, women's implicit romantic fantasies, such as the association of a romantic partner with chivalric ideals (e.g., Prince Charming), negatively predicted their interest in personal power (including women’s educational goals, high-status occupational goals, and group leadership appeal, Rudman & Heppen, 2000). Also, the exposure to sexist beliefs held by others can decrease women’s leadership aspirations. Specifically, after being exposed to benevolent sexist beliefs expressed by a benevolent sexist team member, women thought that this team member was a better leader, and were more willing to delegate leadership roles to this team member, especially when they expected that they would have to collaborate with the source of sexism (Barreto et al., 2010). Considering that women are stereotypically more strongly associated with low-status goals, while men are associated with career and high-status goals (Rudman & Kilianski, 2000), it is likely that men and women will be judged based on different standards, making it hard for women to demonstrate their competence. In line with this, recent research found that female trainees are more likely than male trainees to have their performance-related mistakes noted in a performance log (Bienat, Fuergen, Kobrynowicz, 2010) – a finding that provides evidence for
the application of gender-based double standards when judging men’s and women’s competence. In a similar vein, a Catalyst study on US and European business leaders (2007) highlighted the extreme perception of women as being either “too soft” (when acting within their prescribed gender stereotypes) or “too tough” (when acting against their prescribed gender stereotypes), creating a double-bind dilemma for women. In this specific double-bind dilemma, women are confronted with contradictory demands, to which they can only react by choosing between equally unsatisfactory alternatives, both of which will be considered incorrect. This Catalyst study further showed that female leaders tend to be judged based on higher competency standards than men, while receiving lower rewards, and yet constantly having to prove that they are competent by putting in additional effort. Moreover, female leaders are perceived as either competent or likable, but rarely as both (Catalyst, 2007). Consequently, when women act as is traditionally expected for a leader (e.g., “assertively”), these women “tend to be seen as competent, but also not as effective interpersonally as women who adopt a more stereotypically feminine style” (Catalyst, 2007, p. 19).

Exposure to benevolent sexist ideologies has additionally been found to lead to increased state self-objectification among women (e.g., by taking an external observational standpoint on the self, and treating oneself as an objects to be looked at and evaluated), self-surveillance (e.g., monitoring the own body as an outside observer would), body shame, and intentions to engage in a variety of appearance-management behaviors in the immediate future (e.g., Calogero & Jost, 2011).

Furthermore, exposure to benevolent sexism has been found to impair women’s cognitive performance (e.g., Dardenne et al., 2007), demonstrating the deleterious consequences of benevolent sexism for the target. This effect was mediated by mental intrusions that women experienced during the tasks, for instance regarding their sense of competence (e.g., self-doubts). In a more recent study, women were exposed to benevolent sexist statements during the performance of a working memory task. In this study, the exposure to benevolent sexism was associated with a modification in women’s task-related brain networks. Specifically, the exposure to benevolent sexism recruited supplementary brain areas, associated with intrusive thought suppression (e.g., thoughts about performing badly), which are thought to impede women’s optimal cognitive performance (Dardenne et al., 2013).

Maintenance of an unequal status-quo. As mentioned before, benevolent sexism has also been linked to the maintenance of an unequal status-quo, by serving to justify traditional gender-roles and power relations (Glick & Fiske, 1997, 2001). Specifically, benevolent sexist beliefs contribute to the disadvantaged status of women by rewarding traditional women for
supporting the maintenance of traditional gender-roles and power structures, while also limiting traditional women to low-status social roles (Glick & Fiske, 1997, 2001). The exposure to benevolent sexist ideologies (e.g., by reminding men and women of female communal gender stereotypes) has been found to increase women’s support for the status-quo of gender relations and system justification (Jost & Kay, 2005). Additionally, in more recent research, exposure to benevolent sexist beliefs has been shown to undermine women’s support for collective action (Becker & Wright, 2011). Thus, after reading a fictional finding that most men support (benevolent sexist) statements (e.g., “Secretly, most women yearn for a man in whose arms they can find protection and security”; from Schuessler, 2009), women reported decreased motivation to engage in collective action (e.g., decreased willingness to act against sexism in general). This effect was mediated by gender-specific system justification (e.g., the belief that “men and women have a fair shot at wealth and happiness”; adapted from Kay & Jost, 2005), and perceived advantages of being a woman (e.g., being invited to dinners and drinks, men behave charmingly, etc.).

The appeal and the benefits of benevolent sexism for women. Despite the negative consequences of benevolent sexism for women, benevolent sexism appears to be appealing to women. For instance, in a study by Bohner, Ahlborn, and Steiner (2010), women perceived a profile describing a man as a benevolent sexist, to be more likeable and sexually attractive, than a profile describing a nonsexist man. As a possible reason for the appeal of benevolent sexism to women, Connelly and Heesacker (2012) proposed that, while benevolent sexism contributes to the maintenance of gender inequality at a structural level (e.g., through diffuse system justifications), it may benefit women at an individual level (e.g., by increasing their subjective life satisfaction). Correspondingly, the authors found a positive relation between benevolent sexism and diffuse system justifications (e.g., the perception that society as a whole is fair and just), which in turn was positively related to the indirect promotion of women’s subjective life satisfaction (Connelly & Heesacker, 2012). Furthermore, in previous research, men’s endorsement of benevolent sexism produced more positive and caring behaviors towards women, suggesting that benevolent sexism makes men better partners (Overall, Sibley, & Tan, 2011). This is in line with the paternalistic promise of care and protection as proposed in the Ambivalent Sexism Theory (Glick & Fiske, 1996). However, the relationship benefits produced by a partner’s endorsement of benevolent sexism seem to be accessible only to women, not men. More precisely, women’s perception of their male partner’s endorsement of benevolent sexism provided them with more perceived regard (e.g., the feeling to be cared for and loved by their partner) and security (e.g., the feelings that the
relationship is secure, despite potential relationship threats). Conversely, men’s perception of their female partner’s endorsement of benevolent sexism did not have these positive effects (Hammond et al., 2016).

Considering that benevolent sexism seems to primarily (or only) benefit women, one may ask what motivates men to engage in benevolent sexism at all. For instance, in the incidents described before, the man’s offer to install the network server for his female coworker, because he believes it to be “so difficult and frustrating for a woman to grapple with”, seems to only benefit her directly (e.g., by being carded for by the male coworker, and being promised his help and protection, “I’ll be here to rescue you”); additionally, as described above, previous research clearly demonstrated the positive consequences of benevolent sexism for women. However, the implications of the male coworker’s benevolent sexist offer for himself remain unclear. Findings obtained from research on the consequences of prosocial behavior like helping, may help provide better insight into the possible consequences of the male coworker’s offer for himself.

1.2.3. Insights from the helping literature and research on prosocial behavior

_Prosocial behavior_ can been defined as “voluntary intentional behavior that results in benefits for another“ (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987, p. 92). In particular, the term prosocial behavior subsumes several actions that have unique characteristics, but all involve intentional actions that aim at helping others, or to increase other’s welfare (e.g., Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990). Such actions are, for instance, helpful interventions, volunteering, and prosocial spending (e.g., Aknin, Dunn, Whillans, Grant, & Norton, 2013; Aydinli, Bender, & Chasiotis, 2013; Kleinsasser, Jouriles, McDonald, & Rosenfield, 2015), to name but a few. The development of prosocial behaviors starts during the first two years of life (e.g., Dunfield, Kuhlmeier, O’Connell, & Kelley, 2011), and can be expressed in various ways, for example through helping others (e.g., by “recognizing and responding to another individual’s inability to complete a specific goal-directed action”, Dunfield et al., 2011, p. 229).

_Motives for helping_. Early external influences of parents and society may motivate children to engage in prosocial behavior, as proposed by the social role theory (e.g., Eagly, 2006; Eagly & Koenig, 2006). By engaging in prosocial behavior, prosocial values may be “adopted as a component of the self” (Piliavin, Grube, & Callero, 2002, p. 472), and influence future engagement in volunteer behaviors (e.g., Grube & Piliavin, 2000), as well as the satisfaction gained from volunteering (Finkelstein, Penner, & Brannick, 2005; Van Willigen, 2000). In contrast, self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 2000) proposes that a person’s wellbeing is enhanced when engaging in actions that satisfy basic psychological needs (e.g.,
the need for relatedness, Ryan & Deci, 2000). Also, a person’s affective state has been proposed to be a possible motive of helping. Past research showed that positive mood increases engagement in prosocial behavior (e.g., Isen & Levin, 1972). Further, in a study by Manucia, Baumann, and Cialdini (1984), negative or sad mood, compared to neutral mood, led to more engagement in helping behavior, but only when participants believed that their mood could be improved. This finding provides evidence for an instrumental view of benevolence (Manucia, Baumann, & Cialdini, 1984).

The consequences of helping. Research on the consequences of helping has yielded inconsistent findings, sometimes indicating that helping has no positive effect on the helper’s wellbeing, and sometimes stating the contrary: that helping does have a positive effect on the helper’s wellbeing. This lack of clear evidence has been noted by Dovidio and colleagues: “surprisingly, there is little direct evidence that helping others actually makes the helper feel good” (2006, p. 240). In line with this, one of the first studies examining the emotional consequences of prosocial behavior found that, in some cases, helping leads to an increase in happiness (e.g., when helping somebody to search for a missing item), and in other cases it does not (e.g., when giving somebody directions, Harris, 1977). Other studies provide evidence for a positive impact of daily helping experiences on one’s personal happiness (e.g., Wang & Tong, 2015), life satisfaction (e.g., Weinstein & Ryan, 2010), and self-esteem (e.g., Gecas & Burke, 1995). For instance, a diary study on the relation between daily helping and wellbeing suggested that helping others per se does not improve the helper's subjective wellbeing, vitality, or self-esteem, but autonomously occurring helping does (Weinstein & Ryan, 2010). This finding indicates that the impact of helping on the helper’s wellbeing is more likely caused by specific motivational characteristics of the act of helping, rather than the act of helping itself. As an explanation for this inconsistency in findings, a more recent study by Aknin, Dunn, Sandstrom, and Norton (2013a) proposed that the translation of “good deeds” (engaging in helping behavior) into “good feelings” depends on one’s social connection. Correspondingly, they found that helpers only experienced emotional benefits and were happier when they directly and personally delivered funds to a beneficiary. However, when the funds were indirectly delivered through an intermediary and no social connection developed between the helper and the beneficiary, no positive effect of helping on the helper’s wellbeing was found (Aknin et al., 2013a). The authors therefore suggest that, in order to understand the relation between helping and the helper’s wellbeing, it is necessary to investigate how helping is performed. The rewarding effect of helping on the helper’s wellbeing has also been found in 120 out of 136 countries that differ greatly in terms of
wealth (Aknin et al., 2013b). There are also studies showing that prosocial behavior provides an emotional boost, both for the helper and the recipient (e.g., Weinstein & Ryan, 2010). Specifically, a helper’s autonomous prosocial behavior (a self-motivated and volitional action experienced as congruent with one’s self, Ryan & Connell, 1989) led – for both the helper and the recipient – to an increase in positive affect, vitality (feeling energized and fully alive, Weinstein & Ryan, 2009), self-esteem, and perceived relatedness to one another, compared to when prosocial behavior was controlled (actions experienced as originating from, for instance, external controls, Ryan & Connell, 1989), or a no-prosociality control condition (Weinstein & Ryan, 2010).

Gender stereotypes, benevolent sexism, and prosocial behavior. During the socialization of gender-roles, girls are typically socialized to care for others, while boys are typically socialized to compete with others (Eagly & Crowley, 1986). Several researchers have investigated the role of such socialized gender stereotypes, and their roles in the prediction of prosocial behavior. For instance, a meta-analysis on the relation between gender and helping behavior found that women are more likely to elicit help, compared to men, and that men in general help more than women, especially when they have to take the initiative to help (rather than when they help on request, Eagly & Crowley, 1986). Regarding the differences in gender-role socialization, Eagly and Crowley (1986) propose that prosocial behavior represents role behaviors regulated by social norms (e.g., the expectations of others) regarding the prescribed gender-roles of the helper and help-recipient (Eagly & Crowley, 1986). As mentioned before, based on gender stereotypes, men and women are ascribed different qualities (e.g., women are ascribed communality, and men are ascribed agency, Bakan, 1966), which are often the qualities of help required from women and men (Rudman & Phelan, 2008). For instance, based on social-role theory (e.g., Eagly & Koenig, 2006), men are expected to engage in helping behavior that is considered heroic and chivalrous, whereas women are expected to engage in helping behavior that is considered nurturing and caring (Eagly & Crowley, 1986). The beliefs about gender-roles are not only embedded in social norms, but also in a person’s internalization and development of a gender identity that is reflected in an individual’s personal dispositions (Wood & Eagly, 2009). Consequently, expecting men to act chivalrously may lead men to engage in chivalrous behavior. Chivalrous behaviors can be defined as aiming to “protect individuals who are less able and powerful” (Dovidio & Penner, 2001, p. 180), are promoted by male gender-roles (Eagly & Crowley, 1986), and can be “characterized by pure and noble gallantry, honor, courtesy, and disinterested devotion to the cause of the weak or oppressed” (Oxford English Dictionary,
Chivalry has also been associated with benevolent sexism. For instance, in their study Viki, Abrams, and Hutchison (2003) introduce the term *paternalistic chivalry*, which is proposed to subsume benevolent sexist beliefs regarding appropriate behavior for women during courtship or dating relationships. Specifically, paternalistic chivalry refers to the benevolent sexist beliefs that a man is incomplete and unhappy without a woman he adores, and that men ought to protect and provide for the women in their lives (Glick & Fiske, 1996).

Thus, corresponding to the definition of benevolent sexism (Glick & Fiske, 2000), attitudes of paternalistic chivalry are proposed to reflect an “extreme politeness and considerate behavior toward women but also place restrictions on the roles women may play during courtship” (Viki, Abrams, & Hutchison, 2003, p. 534) – a definition highlighting that such attitudes are courteous, but also restrictive to women. In their research, Viki and colleagues (2003) used a new measure of paternalistic chivalry to explore the relation between benevolent sexism and paternalistic chivalry (e.g., the agreement with the statement that, “[i]t is inappropriate for a woman to make sexual advances toward a man.”). Results of this study revealed a positive relation between both concepts, and that benevolent sexist beliefs are positively related to belief systems regarding women’s appropriate behavior. In line with this, Dardenne and colleagues (2007) stated that, “benevolent sexism is a chivalrous attitude toward women that nevertheless is sexist by praising women on characteristics usually associated with subordinates and suggesting their dependence on men” (Dardenne, Bollier, & Dumont, 2007, p. 765). Furthermore, research demonstrated a positive relation between the endorsement of benevolent sexist beliefs and victim blaming and rape proclivity, which was mediated by, for instance, the perceptions of the victim as behaving inappropriately (Abrams et al., 2003). Additionally, research by Kilianski and Rudman (2000) demonstrated that more women were willing to accept benevolent than hostile sexist beliefs, because they perceived these beliefs to be prosocial (e.g., Glick et al., 2000; Kilianski & Rudman, 1998). However, the authors stressed that, “not all prosocial behavior toward women by men constitutes benevolent sexism. It is the belief system underlying the conduct that determines whether or not a man’s actions can be accurately classified as benevolently sexist” (Kilianski & Rudman, 1998, p. 348). Whether men engage in chivalrous helping behavior depends on the help-recipient's gender and the helper’s awareness of sex roles, as theorized in a study by Lamy, Fischer-Lokou, and Guéguen (2009). Specifically, this study found that men were more helpful than women, especially when the help-recipient was female and when the helper was aware of sex roles (Lamy, Fischer-Lokou, & Guéguen, 2009). A more recent study demonstrated the importance of gender-role theory in the exploration of chivalrous helping (Lamy, Fischer-
Lokou, & Guéguen, 2010). In this study, men were primed either with the word *Valentine-Street* or the word *Martin-Street*. Results of this study revealed that men primed with the word *Valentine*, helped a female confederate more frequently, compared to men who were primed with the word *Martin*. Thus, priming of a cognition related to the concept of love led men to become more helpful.

**Chivalrous behavior and the maintenance of gender inequality.** As described before, prosocial behavior, or specifically paternalistic chivalrous behaviors (Viki et al., 2003), seem to be positively related to benevolent sexist beliefs that cast women as pure and delicate creatures (Glick & Fiske, 2001). By ascribing positive traits to women (e.g., kind and nurturing), and expecting women to engage in nurturing and caring behaviors (Eagly & Crowley, 1986) that stereotypically are considered appropriate for women (e.g., Viki et al., 2003), benevolent sexism is appealing to women (Bohner et al., 2010; Connelly & Heesacker, 2012). However, the seemingly positive traits ascribed to women also imply women’s low-status (Rudman & Kilianski, 2000) and inferiority to men, and thereby simultaneously reinforces male dominance and the belief of men’s superiority over women (Glick & Fiske, 1997). In line with this, in more recent research, Altermatt (2010) found that chivalrous men tended to believe that women are more virtuous (both sexually and morally) but less agentic than men, and showed preferential treatment to women whom they perceived as high in virtue and low in agency (i.e., competence and power). As stated above, benevolent sexism has additionally been found to pose insidious danger for women. For instance, benevolent sexism contributes to the maintenance of an unequal status-quo, by justifying traditional gender-roles and power relations (Glick & Fiske, 1997, 2001; Jost & Kay, 2005), and by undermining women’s support for collective action, for instance to “act against sexism in general” (Becker & Wright, 2011, p. 66).

Drawing from the literature on benevolent sexism and prosocial behaviors (as well as their predictors and consequences) presented above, it seems likely that the subjective benefits which the female employee gets from her male coworker’s chivalrous help-offer, may (also) provide benefits for her male coworker (e.g., for his well-being and self-esteem). Consistent with this line of reasoning, findings obtained from research on the consequences of prosocial behavior indicate that engaging in helping behavior benefits both the help-recipient and the helper, in this case, the female employee and the male coworker. However, research on the consequences of benevolent sexism for women largely shows that the endorsement of, and exposure to, benevolent sexism bears insidious dangers for women that may impact, for instance, their intimate relations, career-related choices and ambitions, cognitive performance,
and the maintenance of gender inequality. Regarding the sexist incidents described at the beginning of this thesis, literature and research on benevolent sexism and on helping behavior suggests that the male coworker’s chivalrous help-offer could especially benefit himself by increasing his wellbeing while, on the other hand, also producing negative consequences for the female coworker, and contributing to the maintenance of a status-quo of gender inequality. This raises the question of how the female coworker could respond to sexist incidents like the ones described above. Therefore, the following section provides a review of the literature and research on the confrontation of sexism.
1.3. Individual and Collective Responses to Sexism

In the incidents described before, the female employee experiences sexist incidents, and has to determine how, if at all, she will respond. One possibility would be to confront the male personnel manager and the male coworker, and to express her dissatisfaction with the sexist treatment. Another possibility for the female employee would be to ignore the incidents and to leave the personnel manager and her coworker without noticing her dissatisfaction. Confronting sexism can be viewed as a volitional process that aims at expressing one’s dissatisfaction with discriminatory treatment to the person (or group of people) responsible for it (Becker, Zawadzki, & Shields, 2014; Kaiser & Miller, 2004). A diary study on self-silencing showed that when women experienced a sexist incident, most women remained silent, even when they were generally inclined to confront to sexism. Especially women, who tended to endorse self-silencing beliefs, were less likely they responded to sexist incidents (Swim et al., 2010a). The discrepancy between women’s desire to respond to sexism and decision to remain silent has also been found in other studies. For instance, in a study by Swim and Hyers (1999), 45% of the women responded to sexist remarks by a sexist person (e.g., by questioning the perpetrator, and asking to repeat himself), but only 16% of the women used direct comments to confront the perpetrator. However, 91% of the women who decided not to confront the sexist person publicly reported in a private rating that they had negative thoughts and feelings about the sexist person, and thought that he was prejudiced. Further, in a study comparing immediate behavioral responses to sexual harassment during a realistic job interview, and imagined behavioral responses during an imagined job interview, results indicated that women’s anticipated behaviors (when imagining a job interview) did not mesh with their actual behavior (when actually attending a job interview). Specifically, while 62% of the women anticipated that they would confront a sexist interviewer (e.g., by telling him that his interview question was inappropriate), 52% of the women did not confront the sexist interviewer (Woodzicka & LaFrance, 2001). Correspondingly, in a study by Ayers, Friedman, and Leaper (2009), less than half of the women (46%) reported that they had confronted sexist incidents. In general, women seem to fail to confront the perpetrators of sexism, even when facing blatant discrimination (Swim & Hyers, 1999; Woodzicka & LaFrance, 2001).

1.3.1. Women’s reticence to confront sexism

Research on confronting sexism identified several reasons for women’s reticence to confront sexism. In the sexist incidents described before, the female employee may decide not
to confront the male personnel manager’s or the male coworker’s sexist remarks, because she wants to avoid conflict (Hyers, 2007). Further, she could fear that her attribution of the treatment to discrimination may result in her being labeled a troublemaker (e.g., Kaiser & Miller, 2003) or a complainer (Drury & Kaiser, 2014; Kaiser & Miller, 2001), and be viewed negatively by the male coworkers, but also by her female coworkers (Kaiser, Hagiwara, Malahy, & Wilkins, 2009). Indeed, women who confront sexist remarks are viewed as overreacting or oversensitive (Czopp & Monteith, 2003), as unfriendly (Kaiser et al., 2009), and are often disliked (Dodd, Giuliano, Boutell, & Moran, 2001). Additionally, confronting sexism may lead to organizational minimization (e.g., being encouraged to drop the complaint, the complaint not being taken serious, Bergman, Langhout, Palmieri, Cortina, & Fitzgerald, 2002), and institutional retaliation (e.g., being reassigned against one’s own will, Bergman et al., 2002; losing a job, Fitzgerald, Swan, & Fischer, 1995).

Moreover, in one of the few studies carried out on the likelihood that women will confront sexism in their daily lives, identified women’s cognitive appraisals of a sexist incident (e.g., regarding the expected costs of confronting), feelings of anxiety, as well as the context in which women experience sexism, as important factors in the prediction of confrontation, and an explanation of women’s reticence to confront sexism (Kaiser & Miller, 2004). For instance, women’s perception of the potential costs of confronting has been found to contribute to women’s reticence to confront sexism (Shelton & Stewart, 2004). Specifically, in situations, wherein women perceived the potential costs of confronting sexism to be high (e.g., during a job interview), they were less likely to confront sexism, compared to situations, wherein they perceived the potential costs of confronting sexism to be low (e.g., during a job interview). In general, many women perceive commenting on the inappropriateness of sexist remarks as more risky (regarding the expected reactions of the perpetrator), than not responding to the sexist remarks. Correspondingly, Swim and Hyers (1999) found that women perceived responding to a sexist remark (by addressing its inappropriateness) as equally risky as physically aggressing against the perpetrator, pointing to a confrontation-related anxiety. A confrontation-related anxiety can result in a person withdrawing from a stressful prejudice-tainted environment, because this person is afraid to experience a prejudice-related rejection (Mendoza-Denton, Purdie, Downey, Davis, & Pietrzak, 2002). Further, based on the Backlash Avoidance Model (Rudman & Glick, 1999, 2001), even women occupying high-status positions (e.g., in masculine-stereotyped domains, such as science and engineering), may be unwilling to confront sexism, because they fear backlash. These women may be particularly to confront sexism, and rather hide behaviors that
could be perceived as atypical (e.g., leadership behaviors), while increasing their conformity to (gender) norms, in order to prevent the costs of confronting sexism. On the other hand, other research found that women, who have an optimistic outlook on life, tend to appraise the confrontation of sexism as a less threatening process (Kaiser & Miller, 2004). Whether women decide to confront sexism might also depend on their confidence regarding their ability to effectively confront the perpetrators. In fact, women who lacked confidence in their capacity to effectively respond to prejudice (e.g., the worry not to be able to effectively communicate one’s dissatisfaction with discrimination), compared to more confident women, tended to avoid intergroup situations, (Cohen & Swim, 1995), suggesting that women who lack confidence in their abilities to confront sexism will be more reluctant to confront sexism. These findings illustrate that confronting sexism can carry interpersonal risks for women (Boysen 2013), why deciding whether to confront sexism or not is not an easy decision to make (Ayres et al., 2009).

1.3.2. Factors that might influence the likelihood of confronting sexism

Regarding women’s appraisals about confronting sexism, previous research proposes several factors that may influence the likelihood that women will confront sexism. For instance, the Confronting Prejudiced Responses Model (Goodwin, Ashburh-Nardo, & Morris, 2008) identifies factors that may determine, when and why a person confronts discrimination that they experience or observe. Based on this model, the female employee’s decision to confront the male personnel manager’s or the male coworker’s sexist remarks should depend on five factors that can be translated into steps of confrontation (following no particular sequence). According to the Confronting Prejudiced Responses Model, the confrontation of prejudice would require, first, the detection of discrimination (e.g., whether or not the female employee interprets the incident as discrimination); second, deeming the discriminatory incident an emergency (e.g., by causing harm, or threatening her integrity, and thus considering the incident harmful enough to warrant intervention); third, taking responsibility to confront discrimination (e.g., perceiving herself as responsible for saying or doing something, rather than expecting other observers to respond); fourth, deciding how to confront discrimination; and fifth, taking action to confront discrimination.

The type of discrimination being observed may also be a factor influencing the likelihood of confronting sexism, as well as the perpetrator’s status. For instance, regarding the type of discrimination, Czopp and Monteith (2003) found that people felt more guilt and felt more uncomfortable, when imagining that they were confronted about having engaged in a racist behavior targeting Blacks, than when they imagined that they were confronted about
having engaged in sexist behavior targeting women. Further, regarding the perpetrator’s status, previous research showed that the likelihood that women confront sexism is higher, when the perpetrator has the same or a lower status than her (Fitzgerald et al., 1995). Additionally, sexist humor can lead to a decreased perception of a perpetrator as being sexist, which again can lead to a decreased likelihood that women will confront a sexist incident (Mallett, Ford, & Woodzicka, 2016). Other factors that may increase the likelihood with that women confront sexism are women’s *perception of benefits*, as well as women’s *perceptions of costs* that the confronting sexism could bring. Indeed, in their study, Good, Moss-Racusin, and Sanchez (2012) found that women tended to confront sexism more, when they believed the benefits of confronting to be high (e.g., the belief that confronting sexism would make a difference), and the costs of confronting to be low (e.g., no or few concerns regarding social sanctions). The same research identified women’s identification with their gender as a potential moderator in women’s decision to confront sexism.

For women with low *gender identification*, the study from Good and colleagues (2012) showed that, the decision to confront depended more strongly on the benefits women perceived in confronting, compared to women with high gender identification. Thus, for low-gender-identified women, specifically the perception of confrontation as highly beneficial increased the likelihood that they would engage in confronting behavior. However, when the perceived costs were low, gender identification did not contribute substantially to the prediction of confronting behavior. Women were especially likely to confront, when they perceived, both, the costs to be low, and the benefits to be high. On the contrast, when the costs of confronting were perceived as being high, women’s identification with their gender group played a moderating role in the prediction of confronting by the perceived benefits. When women’s identification with their gender group, and the costs of confronting were high, women’s perception of the benefits of confronting were not particularly predictive for the likelihood of confronting sexism. However, when women’s identification with their gender group was low, and the costs of confronting were high, women’s perception of the benefits of confronting predicted the likelihood of women confronting sexism. While other research also points to the importance of considering group identification when examining confrontation (e.g., Ayres et al., 2009), the study of Good and colleagues (2012) is one of the first that provides evidence for an interaction between gender identification and predictors of confronting sexism. In a study by Kaiser, Hagiwara, Malahy, and Wilkins (2009), gender identification additionally demonstrated to play a role in the perception of women who confront sexism. More precisely, women who were low-identified with their gender group,
tended to view other women more negatively, when this women confronted discrimination, compared to when the women did not confront discrimination. Contrarily, women who were high-identified with their gender group, evaluated other women equally, independent of whether the other women have confronted discrimination or have not confronted discrimination.

1.3.3. Benefits of confronting sexism

Despite the negative consequences that may lead to women’s reticence in confronting sexism, there is also a broad range of benefits women may gain from confronting sexism (e.g., Gervais & Hillard 2014). Confronting can have benefits for targets of sexism, for instance, through an increase in feelings of empowerment, perceived competence, self-esteem, and satisfaction, as well as being perceived as more likable than nonconfronters (e.g., Hyers, 2007; Swim & Thomas, 2005). Further, confronting can have benefits for the perpetrators of sexism, for instance, by educating the perpetrator (e.g., by increasing the ability to recognize sexist language), or through an increase in positive attitudes and reducing subsequent stereotyping (Czopp, Monteith, & Mark, 2006; Hyers, 2007; Mallett & Wagner, 2011). Confronting can also have benefits for the observers of sexism, for instance, through an increased perception of the perpetrator being prejudiced (Blanchard, Crandall, Brigham, & Vaughn, 1994; Rasinski & Czopp, 2010). Furthermore, simply witnessing the confrontation of a sexist stereotype can contribute to the witness or observer reporting less sexism (Boysen, 2013). Moreover, confronting can produce social changes for a larger social group (e.g., by changing social norms; Blanchard, Crandall, Brigham, & Vaughn, 1994). Therefore, confrontation can be viewed as one of the most effective methods to challenge the status-quo, and discrimination (Czopp et al., 2006). Especially confrontation by others demonstrated to be a effective method to reduce discrimination (e.g., Czopp & Monteith, 2003).

1.3.4. Strategies to confront sexism

When facing a sexist incident, there are several options to respond. In order to choose a response or strategy to respond to sexism, a person may try to use one that allows the maximization of the benefits, and minimization of the social costs. The strategies one may choose to respond to sexism can, for instance, be divided into engagement strategies and into disengagement strategies (Compas, Connor, Saltzman, Thomsen, & Wadsworth, 2001). Engagement strategies are oriented toward a stressor, and aim, either, at changing the situation (primary control engagement strategies), or at adapting to the situation (secondary control engagement strategies), while disengagement strategies are oriented away from a
stressor (Compas et al., 2001). In the sexist incidents described before, the female employee could, for instance, directly express her dissatisfaction with the sexist remarks and the discrimination in general to the male personnel manager and the male coworker. This strategy would represent a primary control engagement strategy (Ayres et al., 2009; Compas et al., 2001; Kaiser & Miller 2004).

Strategies to confront sexism can also be divided into *assertive confrontational responses* (e.g., directly labeling the comment as discriminatory), and *non-assertive confrontational responses* (e.g., ignoring a sexist remark, laughing, leaving the situation; Swim et al., 1998). Both, assertive and non-assertive confrontation, compared to no confrontation, demonstrated in previous research to be effective strategies to reduce future stereotypic responses, even though assertive confrontational strategies are often viewed more negatively than non-assertive strategies (Czopp et al., 2006) – at least by men. Thus, previous research found that, a woman who assertively and publicly confronted a man who made a sexist remark, was more respected and liked by the women (compared to a woman who did not confront sexism), while men, on the contrary, reacted less positively to the woman’s assertive behavior and liked her less, compared to a woman who did not confront the perpetrator (Dodd et al., 2001). While ignoring a sexist incident or treatment (e.g., a sexist joke) represents the least assertive response, it is however the most common response to prejudice, compared to assertive responses, and to not responding (Hyers, 2007; Swim & Hyers, 1999). Therefore, the female employee could likely choose a *non-assertive confrontational response*, and leave the personnel manager’s office, and ignore her male coworker’s sexist remarks.

Moreover, one can choose between an *aggressive confrontation* (e.g., slapping the perpetrator) and a *non-aggressive confrontation* (e.g., tactfully addressing the perpetrator). A study by Becker and Barreto (2014) examined men and women’s support for aggressive confrontation, compared to a non-aggressive confrontation, or no confrontation at all. In their study, men and women were more likely to support non-aggressive confrontation, compared to aggressive confrontation, or no confrontation, and preferred confronting (aggressive and non-aggressive) over non-confronting. However, while the high support for confrontation, compared to no confrontation, demonstrated to be linked to women’s high identification with their gender group, for men it was linked to men’s weak identification with their gender group (Becker & Barreto, 2014). Thus, based on the female employee’s identification with the female gender group, she could decide to confront the perpetrators, for instance, by non-
aggressively addressing the sexist incidents and tactfully expressing her dissatisfaction with the discriminatory treatment.

In addition, individuals belonging to a disadvantaged group can respond to sexism by using *individual strategies* (e.g., engaging in individual mobility strategies, by psychologically distancing oneself from the low status group, and psychically moving to the high status group), or *collective strategies* (e.g., engaging in collective action as participating in demonstrations or signing petitions, to improve the position of one’s group). While individual strategies aim at improving a person’s personal situation (e.g., through personal advancement), collective strategies aim at improving the position of the group as a whole, for instance through collectively motivated actions that aim to challenge the status-quo (Branscombe & Ellemers, 1998; Ellemers et al., 1993; Stroebe, Wang, & Wright, 2015; Wright et al., 1990). Individual and collective strategies can be viewed as mutually exclusive, as proposed by the Social Identity Approach (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). According to the Social Identity Approach, a part of every person’s self-concept emanate from the social groups this person belongs to (Tajfel, 1972). Further, most group processes are viewed as deriving from a basic psychological process, categorization. The process of social categorization is viewed as organizing the social stimuli in the world, which aims at providing people, firstly, an understanding of their social environment (Tajfel, 1978), and secondly, a meaningful interpretation of their place in social structures. Based on the Self-Categorization Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), the process of categorization is based on prototypes, for instance about a ‘typical’ group member, and can influence a person’s attributes and behaviors (Oakes, 2004). The Self-Categorization Theory further proposes that a person cannot simultaneously act as a unique individual (in terms of a personal identity) and as a group member (in terms of a social identity), because a person’s personal identity and social identity are mutually exclusive (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). More recent research, however, attempts to overcome the individual–group dichotomy, indicating that a person’s personal identity and social identity are not necessarily exclusive, but can co-occur and be both reinforcing (e.g., Baray, Postmes, & Jetten, 2009; Postmes & Jetten, 2006). Thus, while in the context of social change research, collective actions are often contrasted with individual mobility strategies (e.g., Ellemers et al., 1993), it can be assumed that targets of discrimination may respond to experiences of discrimination by engaging in, both, individual and collective actions simultaneously. For instance, Tausch, Saguy, and Bryson (2015) provide first empirical evidence that for a member of a disadvantaged group, having positive intergroup contact (e.g., friendship) with a member of an advantaged group, can affect social change. Specifically, positive interpersonal
relations with a member of an advantaged group, was for the member of the disadvantaged group, associated with less collective action tendencies (e.g., less intentions to vote for political candidates representing the interests of the ingroup). The negative relation between intergroup contact and collective action intentions can, based on Tausch and colleagues (2015), be explained through a reduced identification with the disadvantaged group and positive attitudes toward the advantaged group, which have led for members of the disadvantaged group to less anger about the relative status of the disadvantaged group. In addition, positive interpersonal relations with a member of an advantaged group, was for the member of the disadvantaged group, associated with increased individual mobility intentions (e.g., the intention to “create connections with people who hold power in society”, Tausch, Saguy, & Bryson, 2015, p. 10). The positive relation between intergroup contact and individual mobility orientation can, based on Tausch and colleagues (2015), be explained through perceived permeability (reflected by the beliefs that upward mobility is possible; Tausch et al., 2015). Transferring these findings to the sexist incidents described before, the female employee could confront the male personnel manager and the male coworker, by emphasizing the inappropriateness of their sexist remarks, firstly, for her personally (individual confrontation), secondly, for women as a whole (collective confrontation), or thirdly, for both (individual and collective confrontation). Because individual but also collective confrontation strategies emphasize the inappropriateness of sexist treatment, both may serve the female employee, as well as her gender group (women in general). Another recent study by Ufkes, Calcagno, Glasford, and Dovidio (2016), found that increasing the salience or perception of a common ingroup identity (compared to the salience of separate identities) between two disadvantaged groups reduced the willingness or intentions of the members to engage in collective action. The inhibiting effect from perceived common identity on the willingness to engage in collective action can, based on Ufkes and colleagues (2016), be explained through lower beliefs about group-based inequality in society (e.g., the belief that inequalities between different social groups still exist), which reduced group-based anger, and through beliefs in the group’s efficacy (e.g., to prevent a policy that would disadvantage their group). These findings add to previous research, by emphasizing that research on the factors that may undermine motivation for social change should pay special attention to the role of an exclusive focus on common ingroup identity in the prediction of collective action (Ufkes, Calcagno, Glasford, & Dovidio, 2016).

Regarding the sexist incidents described before, whether the female employee will act as a group member (of the female gender group) and use collective confrontation, or whether
she will rather act as a unique individual and use individual confrontation, may depend on the
degree to which she identifies herself with women in general. Recent work distinguishes
*group identification* from *disidentification* (Becker & Tausch, 2014). Group identification
reflects the extent to which a particular group membership is integrated in one’s self-concept,
determining the extent to which one internalizes group goals as individual goals (Barreto &
Ellemers, 2000). Because group identification is one of the most significant predictors of
collective action (see Jiménez-Moya, Spears, Rodríguez-Bailón, & de Lemus, 2015), it can be
assumed to positively predict collective responses to confrontation. In contrast to group
identification, disidentification goes beyond the absence of group identification and refers to
individual’s membership to a group they do not wish to belong to (Becker & Tausch, 2014).
Coming back to the female employee’s possible responses, if the female employee
disidentifies herself with the female gender group, she may choose an individual
confrontation that disparages her ingroup. More precisely, an *individual ingroup-disparaging
confrontation* would be reflected in a person differentiating the self from the ingroup. Thus,
when choosing an individual ingroup-disparaging confrontation, the female employee would,
for instance, explicitly differentiate herself from, and derogate other members of, her gender
group (Garcia, Schmitt, Branscombe, & Ellemers, 2010). *Individual ingroup non-disparaging
confrontation*, on the other hand, could be reflected by the female employee’s rejection of the
applicability of ingroup stereotypes to the self.

In sum, sexism literature and research provides a broad range of theories and measures
to investigate sexist beliefs, while research on sexist behavior falls far short. The same holds
true to the identification of benefits and perils of benevolent sexism, which has been largely
examined for women, while the examination of the same for men is mostly limited to general
insights from research on prosocial behaviors. Finally, in contrast to the large body of
research on the confrontation of prejudice in general and specifically sexism, there is a dearth
of research that takes the possible interplay between individual and collective strategies, as
well as the role of women’s group identification, into account, when exploring the
implications of individual and collective strategies for politicized intentions to promote social
change. The present dissertation aims to close these gaps in research.
1.4. Present Research

The present dissertation is predicated on the investigation of predictors and consequences of sexist behavior. It is comprised of three manuscripts, which aim at contributing to the existing literature and research on sexist beliefs, consequences of benevolent sexism for women, and strategies to confront sexism. While the first study investigates predictors of sexist behavior (Manuscript #1), the second study explores the benefits and perils of engaging in benevolent sexist behavior for men (Manuscript #2), and the third study focuses on the examination of individual and collective strategies to confront sexism (Manuscript #3).

1.4.1. MANUSCRIPT #1


In the sexist incidents described at the beginning of the present thesis, a woman experiences two distinct incidents, which have in common that in each, a man expresses his sexist beliefs to her. For instance, in the first incident the male personnel manager’s remarks reflect his hostile sexist beliefs about non-traditional women, while in the second incident the male coworker’s remarks reflect his benevolent sexist beliefs about traditional women. Further, in both incidents behaviors are described that can be viewed as reflecting sexism. For example, the male personnel manager promoting a male employee for a leadership position when this male employee is less qualified than his female coworker, could be described as hostile sexist behavior. On the other hand, the male coworker’s chivalrous help-offer to set up the network server for his female coworker so she would not have to grapple with it, could be described as benevolent sexist behavior. Regarding both incidents, one may ask whether the male personnel manager’s hostile sexist beliefs are connected to his engagement in hostile sexist behavior, and whether the male coworker’s benevolent sexist beliefs are connected to his engagement in benevolent sexist behavior. One of the purposes of the present dissertation is to answer this question, and to identify predictors of sexist behavior by examining the attitude-behavior relationship for sexism. Specifically, the present dissertation aims to assess whether the endorsement of hostile sexist attitudes may lead the male personnel manager to engage in hostile sexist behavior, and whether the endorsement of benevolent sexist attitudes may lead the male coworker to engage in benevolent sexist behavior.
In contrast to the well-advanced research on sexist beliefs, only little is known about sexist behaviors (e.g., Rudman & Glick, 2008; Swim & Hyers, 2009). In line with this, Fiske (1998) has observed that, “documenting discriminatory behavior has not been social psychology’s strong suit” (p. 374), and Baumeister, Vohs, and Funder (2007) called for a renewed commitment to the direct observation of behavior. Responding to the call of research on the investigation of social behaviors, and to expand sexism research to the specific investigation of sexist behaviors, the present dissertation explicitly focuses on sexist behavior, and the examination of the attitude-behavior relation for sexism. On this basis, the present dissertation can be seen as a response to the imbalance between the large body of research on (explicit) sexist beliefs and the rare investigation of sexist behavior. The demand for research on specifically sexist behavior becomes particularly clear in light of the prevalence of sexism reported above. Further, because one of the main aims of psychological research is to predict human behavior, the relatively limited minimal amount of research delineating and predicting different forms of sexist behaviors is surprising. Attempts to classify sexist behaviors, for instance through the three forms proposed by Benokraitis and Feagin (1995), namely blatant sexist behaviors (e.g., the male personnel manager’s decision not to consider the female employee for the job promotion, based on his sexist beliefs rather than factual reasons), covert sexist behaviors (e.g., the personnel manager minimalizing or ignoring the female employee’s complaints about being discriminated against), and subtle sexist behaviors (e.g., the male coworkers chivalry and simultaneously condescending help-offer), does not correspond to hostile and benevolent sexist attitudes, as defined by Glick and Fiske (1996). However, as has been indicated by previous research, the correspondence between the attitudinal and behavioral measures can play a moderating role when examining attitude-behavior relations. Therefore, the present dissertation aims to test the attitude-behavior relation of sexism, while taking the potential moderating role of correspondence between the attitudinal and behavioral measures into account (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977).

Past research on sexism has primarily concentrated on the investigation of explicit sexist beliefs, and their assessment through explicit measures (e.g., Beere et al., 1984; Glick & Fiske, 1996; Swim et al., 1995; Tougas et al., 1995). In particular, the ASI (Glick & Fiske, 1996) has proven to be an outstanding explicit measure that has shown high reliability in the investigation of a broad range of concepts (Hammond et al., 2016; Koepke et al., 2014; Russel & Oswald, 2015; Sibley et al., 2007). In contrast to this well-established explicit measure, however, previous research indicates that it can be advantageous to use different measures to assess attitudes: explicit measures (as the ASI) have been shown to be especially
predictive in some domains, while more indirect measures were especially predictive in other domains (Greenwald et al., 2009). Furthermore, previous research indicated that explicit measures are limited to a person’s belief about their attitudes, and that this limitation can be overcome by using implicit measures (Rudman, 2011). Therefore, in the present dissertation, both explicit and implicit measures will be used to investigate the relation between implicit and explicit sexist attitudes and sexist behaviors. Specifically, the present dissertation will test whether implicit sexist attitudes and explicit sexist attitudes predict sexist behavior differently. Thus, by adding a novel implicit measure to an established explicit measure of sexism (e.g., the ASI), the present dissertation can explore the extent to which the personnel manager’s or the male coworker’s endorsement of implicit sexist attitudes, compared to explicit sexist attitudes, can predict their engagement in sexist behavior.

While to date several measures have been developed to assess implicit social cognition, no indirect measure has been developed that affords assessment of implicit hostile sexist and benevolent sexist attitudes. In contrast to the still outstanding development of implicit sexism measure (e.g., a Sexism IAT), to date several IATs have been developed to assess gender stereotypes (e.g., gender IAT, Knutson, et al., 2007). A gender IAT like the one developed by Knutson, Mah, Manly, and Grafman (2007), assesses implicit gender stereotypes through the implicit association of male names (e.g., John) with strong-meaning words (e.g., dominant), and female names (e.g., Mary) with weak-meaning words (e.g., fragile). Participants who completed this gender IAT (Knutson et al., 2007) displayed an implicit tendency to associate women with weakness and men with strength. In line with this, research using similar gender IATs also showed, for instance, that participants had an implicit tendency to associate women with family and men with career (Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002); women with egalitarianism and men with hierarchy (Mast, 2004). Only isolated studies have investigated the relation between implicit and explicit sexist attitudes (Rudman & Kilianski, 2000; Rudman & Glick, 2001).

In a typical IAT, pictorial or word stimuli appear in the center of the computer screen. Participants are instructed to use two computer keys to categorize the successively presented stimuli as quickly as possible to one of four subordinate categories (Greenwald et al., 1998). The traditional Implicit Association Test consists of seven blocks: In Block 1, the procedure starts with a presentation of the target categories. Participants are instructed to press two keys to sort the target stimuli into the correct category (e.g., sorting a name considered typical of Blacks to the target category Blacks by pressing the “E” key with the left hand, while sorting a name considered typical of Whites to the target category Whites by pressing the “I” key with
the right hand). In Block 2, the attribute dimensions are introduced, and participants are instructed to press the same keys from the first Block to sort the attribute stimuli to the corresponding dimension (e.g., sorting a pleasant-meaning word to the attribute dimension *pleasant* by pressing the “E” key, while sorting an unpleasant-meaning word to the attribute dimension *unpleasant* by pressing the “I” key). In Block 3, the target categories are combined with the attribute dimensions, with one target category (e.g., Blacks) and one attribute dimension (e.g., pleasant) sharing the same response key (e.g., “E”), while the other target category (e.g., Whites) and the other attribute dimension (e.g., unpleasant) share the other response key (e.g., “I”). In Block 4, participants repeat the sorting rules from block three. In Block 5, participants learn a reversal of the response assignments for the target discrimination by repeating the sorting rules from block one, albeit with a reversed key mapping (e.g., the “E” key representing Whites and the “I” key representing Blacks). In Block 6, participants repeat the sorting rules from Block 3, also with a reversed key mapping (e.g., the “E” key representing Whites and *pleasant*, while the “I” key represents Blacks and *unpleasant*). This sorting rule is repeated in the last block, Block 7. If participants press the wrong key, an error message appears at the center of the computer screen (e.g., a large red “X”), and participants need to press the correct key to continue. To calculate a person’s implicit preference for White people compared to Black people, the responses from Block 3, Block 4, Block 6, and Block 7 are analyzed. Half of participants complete Block 3 and 4 representing the incompatible trials (e.g., the evaluatively incompatible combination of Blacks with *pleasant* and Whites with *unpleasant*), and Block 6 and 7 representing the compatible trials (e.g., the evaluatively compatible combination of Blacks with *unpleasant* and Whites with *pleasant*), while the other half completes the same Blocks, however with Block 3 and 4 representing the compatible trials and Block 6 and 7 representing the compatible trials (also named the “reverse order condition”). The data collected in each trial block include response latencies and error rates (Greenwald et al., 1998). The difference in mean latency between the two conditions represents the *IAT effect*, as defined by Greenwald and colleagues (1998). For the calculation of the IAT effect, one can use the D-Statistics, for example, which is an improved scoring algorithm developed by Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003). More precisely, in this improved scoring algorithm, two contrasts are calculated, one by subtracting the mean response latency for the incompatible trials of Block 3 (*Blacks + pleasant, whites + unpleasant*) from the compatible trials of Block 6 (*Whites + pleasant, blacks + unpleasant*), and the second by subtracting the mean response latency for Block 4 from Block 7 (in the reverse order condition, the calculation is the other way around). The scoring algorithm then
divides each contrast score by its associated standard deviation and computes an average of the two resulting scores, forming the \( D \) statistic (Greenwald et al., 2003). Therefore, the \( D \) statistic represents an estimate of the magnitude of the IAT effect (.15 representing a small effect, .35 representing a medium effect, .60 representing a large effect), which can be considered personalized, as it is individually standardized for each subject (Rudman, 2011). As Whites and pleasant are subtracted from Blacks and pleasant, a positive score can be interpreted as reflecting a participant’s implicit association of White people with pleasantness and Black people with unpleasantness. When using this IAT, Greenwald and colleagues (1998) found that participants were overwhelmingly faster in their responses when Blacks were combined with unpleasant, and Whites were combined with pleasant. This finding indicates that the participants had an implicit preference for White people over Black people.

Returning to the investigation of the attitude-behavior relation of sexism, Rudman and Kilianski (2000) used the ASI (Glick & Fiske, 1996) to assess explicit sexist attitudes, while using three different gender IATs to assess implicit sexist attitudes. All three gender IATs used male and female names as target categories, and for the attribute dimension either career-associated words (e.g., promotion) and domestic-associated words (e.g., child care, gender-roles IAT); high-status occupational roles (e.g., leader) and low-status occupational roles (e.g., subordinate, gender authority IAT); or agentic words (e.g., independent) and communal words (e.g., interdependent, gender stereotype IAT). Results from this study showed that explicit benevolent sexist attitudes, but not explicit hostile sexist attitudes, were related to two of the gender IATs (the gender status IAT and the gender stereotype IAT). Thus, benevolent sexists had an implicit tendency to automatically associate women with subordinate or low-authority roles, and men with high-authority roles; and an implicit tendency to automatically associate women with agentic traits, and men with communal traits. Further, a study by Rudman and Glick (2001), using an adapted version of the gender stereotype IAT (Rudman & Kilianski, 2000) to assess implicit gender stereotypes, and the ASI to assess explicit sexist attitudes, found no significant correlation between the implicit and explicit measure. This lack of correlation between gender IATs and the ASI, was also reported in a study by Rudman and Goodwin (2004), and a study by Brauer, Wasel, and Niedenthal (2000). In their study, Brauer and colleagues (2000) reported no significant relation between implicit and explicit measures (measured through the ASI, Glick & Fiske, 1996). In contrast to the aforementioned studies (Rudman & Glick, 2001; Rudman & Kilianski, 2000), in Brauer and colleagues’ study (2000), instead of assessing implicit gender stereotypes through gender IATs, the authors assessed implicit sexist attitudes through an
adaptation of the Adjective Evaluation Task (Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997). This task assesses participants' response times as they indicate, following exposure to either female primes, male primes, or "XXXX", whether or not a given letter combination represents a word.

Regarding the attitude-behavior relation of sexism, Rudman and Glick (2001) state that, “the relationship between IAT-assessed stereotypes and behavior (e.g., discrimination) has been underinvestigated”. As one of the first, Rudman and Glick (2001) examined the relationship between implicit gender stereotypes and sexist behavior. Sexist behavior was assessed through backlash against agentic women, which can be defined as “social and economic penalties for behaving counter stereotypically” (Rudman et al., 2012, p. 168). Results of this study showed that backlash may go back to implicit gender stereotypes that can be assessed through their version of the gender stereotype IAT. More precisely, the implicit tendency to automatically associate men with agency and women with communality, appeared to be negatively related to participants' ratings regarding an agentic female applicant’s social skills. Explicit sexist beliefs, on the other hand, were only weakly related to the behavioral measure. Thus, a person who endorses implicit sexist beliefs rated an agentic woman as less socially skilled when she was applying for a feminized job – a job including stereotypically feminine traits (e.g., communality) in the job description (Rudman & Glick, 2000). However, the use of (adaptations of) the Adjective Evaluation Task or gender IATs, do not afford assessment of implicit hostile and benevolent sexist attitudes. The present dissertation aims to address this shortcoming by developing an implicit measure to assess implicit hostile and benevolent sexist attitudes, and then to test the role of implicit an explicit hostile and benevolent sexist attitudes in the prediction of hostile and benevolent sexist behavior.

Manuscript #1 was designed to explore the predictors of sexist behavior. More precisely, Manuscript #1 aimed to close the gap in research on sexist behavior, by testing how implicit and explicit sexist attitudes correlate with a variety of hostile and benevolent sexist behaviors, and whether hostile and benevolent sexist behavior can be predicted by the corresponding sexist attitudes. The assumption is tested, that hostile sexist behaviors can be predicted by corresponding hostile sexist attitudes, and that benevolent sexist behaviors can be predicted by corresponding benevolent sexist attitudes. However, sexist behavior should be predicted differently, depending on whether sexist attitudes are assessed explicitly or implicitly.
1.4.2. MANUSCRIPT #2


Regarding the sexist incidents described before, previous research suggests that it is likely that the female employee will identify the male personnel manager’s blatant remarks as reflecting hostile sexist behavior, while she may struggle to identify the male coworker’s chivalrous remarks as reflecting benevolent sexism. In fact, benevolent sexism has been shown to be difficult to recognize, whilst also being appealing for women. At the same time, prior research extensively demonstrated that benevolent sexism in particular poses insidious dangers to women, for instance, by influencing women’s intimate relations, career-related choices and ambitions, cognitive performance, and by contributing to the maintenance of an unequal status-quo. Considering the difficulties to recognize benevolent sexism, the appeal, but also the dangers of benevolent sexism for women, it can be assumed that the consequences of benevolent sexism, compared to hostile sexism, may be especially detrimental for women. Therefore, the present dissertation focuses on the examination of benevolent sexist behaviors, when investigating the consequences of sexist behavior for women and for men.

In contrast to the large body of research on the consequences of benevolent sexism for women, much less is known about the consequences of benevolent sexism for men, and the reasons why men engage in benevolent sexist behavior at all. Helping literature and research on prosocial behavior provide insights into possible motives for, and consequences of, helping. Motives and consequences can be, for instance, a helper’s (and a help-recipient’s) positive mood, increased well-being, and self-esteem (e.g., Aknin et al., 2013a,b; Gecas & Burke, 1995; Wang & Tong, 2015; Weinstein & Ryan, 2010). Further, helping literature investigated the role of gender stereotypes and chivalry in the maintenance of gender inequality (Altermatt, 2010; Becker & Wright, 2011; Glick & Fiske; Jost & Kay, 2005; Rudman & Kilianski, 2000). Transferring the insights from the helping literature and research on prosocial behavior to the sexist incident described before, it can be assumed that the male coworker’s chivalrous help-offer provides him benefits including increased well-being and self-esteem, while it simultaneously imperils the female employee. However, insights from the helping literature and research on prosocial behavior have not yet been tested as motives for men’s engagement in benevolent sexist behavior. Therefore, questions regarding the effect of the male coworker’s chivalrous help-offer on his emotions, self-esteem and other aspects, including the maintenance of gender inequality, remain unanswered. The present dissertation
aims to respond to this novel research question, by explicitly investigating the benefits and the perils of engaging in benevolent sexist behavior for men.

In Manuscript #2, three experiments are presented, which were designed to investigate the consequences of engaging in sexist behavior. In detail, Manuscript #2 investigated the consequences of engaging in benevolent sexist behavior for women and men. For this purpose, in a controlled field experiment, a controlled laboratory experiment, and a controlled online experiment, benevolent sexist behavior was operationalized through one of the key elements of benevolent sexism; Protective Paternalism, for instance men’s desire to protect, help and cherish a woman (Glick & Fiske, 1997). Thus, male and female participants had the possibility to either engage in a benevolent sexist behavior, a neutral behavior or no behavior. While benevolent sexism is positive in feeling tone, the present dissertation follows the assumption that engaging in benevolent sexist behavior will be subjectively good for men, by leading to positive consequences for men’s self-evaluation, while being bad for women, by contributing to the maintenance of gender inequality.

1.4.3. MANUSCRIPT #3


The first part of the present dissertation was designed to identify predictors of sexist behavior. The second part was designed to investigate the consequences of engaging in sexist behavior for men. While both research questions are important, they leave the question unanswered as to how women can respond to, or confront sexism. Returning to the sexist incidents described before, the knowledge about what may have led the male personnel manager or the male coworker to behave in a sexist way, or the knowledge about possible benefits and perils of engaging in benevolent sexist behavior, provide no indication of how women could respond to such sexist incidents.

As presented before, when being confronted with sexism, one can choose between various responses to confront it. The responses can, for instance, involve engagement or disengagement, be assertive, non-assertive, aggressive, non-aggressive, individual, collective, disparaging, non-disparaging, to name but some variables of responses (e.g., Ayres et al., 2009; Becker & Barreto, 2014; Branscombe & Ellemers, 1998; Compas et al., 2001; Czopp et al., 2006; Ellemers et al., 1993; Garcia et al., 2010; Hyers, 2007; Kaiser & Miller, 2004; Stroebe et al., 2015; Swim & Hyers, 1999; Swim et al., 1998; Wright et al., 1990). While research on confronting sexism proposes different response strategies a woman may choose to
confront sexism, less is known about women’s actual choice of specific strategies or, in other words, whether women prefer some strategies over others. Regarding the sexist incidents described before, based on the knowledge about strategies to confront sexism, one could ask whether in these example scenarios, the female employee would prefer some strategies over other strategies to confront sexism. Would she prefer, for instance, an individual confrontation strategy, a collective confrontation strategy, or choose both strategies?

Confronting sexism can benefit the target of sexism, the perpetrator of sexism, bystanders observing the confronting behavior, and (e.g., by changing social norms) even lead to social changes for a larger social group (Blanchard et al., 1994; Czopp et al., 2006; Gervais & Hillard, 2014; Gervais et al., 2010; Hyers, 2007; Mallett & Wagner, 2011; Rasinski & Czopp, 2010; Swim & Thomas, 2005). Nevertheless, women are often reticent when being confronted with sexism (Swim & Hyers, 1999; Swim et al., 2010a; Woodzicka & LaFrance, 2001). Several factors can influence the likelihood that women will respond to sexism, for instance, whether discrimination is detected, deemed to be an emergency, whether the target of sexism takes responsibility, and decides to actually confront sexism (Ashburh-Nardo et al., 2008). Further, the type of discrimination, the perpetrator’s status, the perception of benefits and costs (Czopp & Monteith, 2003; Good, Moss-Racusin, & Sanchez, 2012), as well as the target’s group identification (Ayres et al., 2009; Good et al., 2012; Kaiser et al., 2009; Major et al., 2003) may determine the likelihood of confrontation. Because previous research indicates that women’s identification with their gender group may play a role in women’s decision to confront sexism (Good et al., 2012), the present research takes the possible influence of gender identification as a potential moderator into account. Thus, the present dissertation aims to consider how the different levels of identification and disidentification with one’s low status group may influence different forms of action. In other words, the present dissertation aims to examine, whether the female employee would choose different strategies to confront the male personnel manager and the male coworker’s sexist remarks, depending on the degree to which she identifies or disidentifies with her gender group.

Further, when examining the different response strategies women can use to confront sexism, the present dissertation takes into account the possible interplay between individual- and collective-level strategies. This challenger Self-Categorization Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), a person’s personal identity and social identity to be mutually exclusive, but is line with recent research, which found that a person and social identity are not necessarily exclusive, but can in fact co-occur (e.g., Baray et al., 2009; Postmes & Jetten, 2006; Postmes et al., 2005; Steffens et al., 2014). Building on these findings, the present dissertation assumes
that targets of discrimination may respond to experiences of discrimination by simultaneously engaging in both individual and collective actions. Accordingly, in the sexist incidents described before, the female employee may choose to confront the male personnel manager and the male coworker through an individual confrontation (e.g., by emphasizing the inappropriateness of their sexist remarks for her personally), or through a collective confrontation (e.g., by emphasizing the inappropriateness of such sexist remarks for women in general), or through both.

Considering that the female employee’s choice of individual confrontation, but also her choice of collective confrontation, emphasize the inappropriateness of sexist treatment by the male personnel manager and the male coworker, both confrontation strategies may serve the female employee personally, as well women in general (her gender group). Therefore, the present dissertation additionally aims to investigate the implications of individual and collective confrontation strategies for action outside the particular sexist incident. Specifically, the present dissertation will test whether (only) the engagement in collective responses, compared to individual responses, in daily encounters with sexism will be associated with increased politicized intentions to promote social change.

Manuscript #3 examines possible ways for women to respond to daily sexism in their everyday life. Both individual and collective strategies to cope with sexism will be investigated, as well as the implications of these strategies for politicized intentions to promote social change. For this purpose, the probability of women to choose collective confrontation, individual non-disparaging confrontation, individual disparaging confrontation, inaction, or expression of agreement with the sexist statement, as response to sexism will be examined. Finally, the influence of group identification and disidentification on women’s choice of strategies is studied.

The present dissertation concludes by summarizing the key findings and with a discussion of the strengths and limitations of the present research, as well as the implications for future research.
1.5. References


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Manuscript #1

*Explicit but not implicit sexist beliefs predict benevolent and hostile sexist behavior.*

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Abstract

Much work has been done on sexist attitudes, but only little on sexist behaviors. The goal of the present research was to close this gap by testing how a variety of benevolent and hostile sexist behaviors correlate with implicit and explicit sexist attitudes. In Study 1 \((N = 126)\), we developed implicit association tests for benevolent sexism and hostile sexism and illustrated that implicit and explicit benevolent sexist beliefs, as well as implicit and explicit hostile sexist beliefs, were positively correlated. In Study 2 \((N = 83\) of Study 1), we tested whether implicit and explicit benevolent and hostile sexist attitudes correlate with benevolent and hostile sexist behaviors. As expected, explicit benevolent (but not hostile) sexist attitudes predicted benevolent sexist behavior, whereas explicit hostile (but not benevolent) sexist attitudes predicted hostile sexist behavior. Implicit sexist attitudes did not predict sexist behavior. The implications of these findings are discussed.

Keywords: implicit attitudes, explicit attitudes, sexist behavior, benevolent sexism, hostile sexism
Explicit but not implicit sexist beliefs predict benevolent and hostile sexist behavior

To date, sexism research has investigated various forms of sexist attitudes. However, in contrast to the well-advanced research on sexist attitudes, much less is known about sexist behaviors (e.g., Rudman & Glick, 2008; Swim & Hyers, 2009). Among few others, Fiske (1993) has criticized that “documenting discriminatory behavior has not been social psychology’s strong suit” (p. 374). In a similar vein, Baumeister, Vohs, and Funder (2007) argued that direct observations of behavior in social psychology have been edged away by “introspective self-reports, hypothetical scenarios, and questionnaire ratings” (p. 396). They further advocated a renewed commitment to include direct observations of behavior whenever it is possible. Moreover, despite the increased use of implicit measures of prejudice in the last decade and the fact that Ambivalent Sexism Theory (Glick & Fiske, 1996) has been developed almost 20 years ago, we are not aware of any published measures assessing benevolent and hostile sexism implicitly. The present research aims to close this gap by focusing on sexist behavior and by investigating whether a variety of sexist behaviors correlate with corresponding implicit and explicit sexist attitudes.

**Studying Sexist Behaviors**

In the following, in line with the behavioral criteria suggested by Ajzen and Fishbein (1977), we define attitudes and beliefs as located “within” a person and thus not directly observable by others, whereas behavior refers to “one or more observable actions performed by the individual” (p. 889). Women face sexist behaviors on a daily basis. This can be seen, for instance, in the “Everyday Sexism Project” (2012), a website founded by Laura Bates, where, to this day, women and girls upload their experiences of sexism, such as sexual harassment, assault, and second-class treatment in education and employment. In only 18 months, the project expanded to 19 countries with about 50,000 entries. Also, on the social network Twitter, many women started publicizing their everyday experiences of sexism under the hashtag #shoutingback (@everydaysexism, 2012). Furthermore, a scientific study of women’s experiences with sexism using daily diaries revealed that women reported that they face one to two sexist incidents per week (e.g., hearing sexist jokes, being sexually harassed, Swim, Hyers, Cohen & Ferguson, 2001). Research also revealed in a computer-harassment paradigm that men are also willing to harass women in a laboratory context by sending them sexist jokes (Mitchell, Hirschman, Angelone & Lilly, 2004; Siebler, Sabelus & Bohner, 2008) and pornographic material (Maass, Cadinu, Guarnieri, & Grasselli, 2003). These behaviors can be classified as *hostile sexist* (Glick & Fiske, 1996). Hostile sexism (HS) is clearly
negative and refers to an antipathy towards non-traditional women who are perceived as challenging male power and as posing a threat for men (e.g., feminists, for other negative female subtypes, see Sibley & Wilson, 2004). However, there is also evidence for sexist behaviors in women’s everyday life that are classified as benevolent sexism. Benevolent sexism (BS) refers to a subjectively positive but patronizing view of women who conform to traditional roles, for instance, housewives (positive female subtypes, Sibley & Wilson, 2004). BS casts women as wonderful but fragile creatures who ought to be protected and provided for by men (Glick & Fiske, 1996). Research using the diary method indicated that women experience one to two benevolent sexist incidents per week (e.g., paternalistic treatment, Becker & Swim, 2011). Further, men also show paternalistic behavior in laboratory contexts. For instance, in role-play situations, benevolent sexist men were less likely to assign challenging developmental opportunities to women compared to less benevolent sexist men (King et al., 2012). Furthermore, Moya, Glick, Expósito, de Lemus and Hart (2007, Study 2) used a task in which female participants had to decide whether or not to accept their male partner’s protectively justified prohibition of an internship opportunity counseling rapists and wife abusers. They showed that most women reacted positively to the partner’s prohibition if it was justified in a benevolently sexist way. Moreover, in two real life studies, Hebl, King, Glick, Singletary and Kazama (2007) demonstrated that participants showed more benevolent reactions (e.g., touching) towards an ostensibly pregnant woman (compared to a non-pregnant woman), when the woman was presented in a traditional role (as a store customer), whereas they showed more hostile reactions (e.g., rudeness), when the woman was presented in a nontraditional role (as a job applicant). Although BS behavior seems harmless, several research findings illustrate that not only HS, but also BS has negative consequences for women. For instance, exposure to BS decreases women’s cognitive performance (Dardenne, Dumont & Bollier, 2007; Dardenne et al., 2013), increases their satisfaction with the unequal status quo (Jost & Kay, 2005), undermines women’s participation in collective action for social change (Becker & Wright, 2011) and leads to an assimilation to the stereotypes implied in BS (Barreto, Ellemers, Piebinga & Moya, 2010).

In conclusion, most research focused on sexist attitudes with a few intriguing and valuable exceptions on sexist behavior (e.g., Hebl et al., 2007; King et al., 2012; Moya et al., 2007). What is still unclear, however, is whether or not sexist behaviors are correlated with sexist attitudes. Do people who endorse BS beliefs also show BS behavior (and HS behavior)? Do people who endorse HS beliefs also show HS behavior (and BS behavior)? Do
implicit as well as explicit attitudes correlate with behaviors? Given that BS and HS attitudes are moderately correlated (Glick & Fiske, 1996), we were also interested in whether HS and BS behaviors are positively correlated.

**The Link Between Explicit and Implicit Attitudes and Behavior**

Most of the research conducted on BS and HS attitudes thus far has used explicit assessment methods in which participants had to complete self-report measures about their stereotypes (for an overview, see Becker & Sibley, in press). This makes sense, because explicit attitudes prove to be relatively good predictors of behavior (Armitage & Conner, 2001). Previous research on the relation of self-reported attitudes and behavior revealed that explicit attitudes and behavioral measures are moderately correlated (average $r = .38$, Kraus, 1995; average $r = .41$, Wallace, Paulson, Lord & Bond, 2005). This suggests that explicit attitudes are useful to predict behavior.

However, explicit measures have been criticized, because individuals can veil their true attitudes for reasons of social desirability and impression management (Duehr & Bono, 2006). People might be particularly reluctant to express HS in a questionnaire because HS is socially undesirable (e.g., Barreto & Ellemers, 2005; Swim, Mallett, Russo-Devosa & Stangor, 2005). Thus, participants may be more likely to control their responses on explicit measures. More recent research proceeded with examining “not self-reported“ attitudes (Rudman & Kilianski, 2000). “Not self-reported attitudes” can be assessed with implicit measures, which are an increasingly common alternative to explicit assessment methods. In contrast to explicit measures, implicit measures demonstrated to be far less susceptible to faking (e.g., Schnabel, Banse, & Asendorpf, 2006). This might give the impression that implicit measures can bypass the limitations of explicit measures, as participants are supposedly unaware that their attitudes are being assessed (Fazio & Olson, 2003). However, more recent studies showed that implicit measures are not entirely immune to faking: the scores in implicit measures can be altered by participants’ deliberate attempts to control their responses (e.g., Degner, 2009). Moreover, previous research has shown that implicit measures generally have lower internally consistencies than explicit measures (Cunningham, Preacher, & Banaji, 2001). Finally, it is not clear whether implicit measures assess well-learned environmental associations rather than prejudice (Karpinski & Hilton, 2001).

Are implicit and explicit attitudes related to each other? Prior work found that implicit and explicit attitudes are sometimes positively related (e.g., Cunningham, Preacher & Banaji, 2001), sometimes unrelated (e.g., Latu et al., 2011), and sometimes even negatively related
(e.g., Karpinski & Hilton, 2001). In a meta-analysis with 126 studies, the correlation between implicit and explicit attitudes ranged from $r = .01$ to $r = .47$ (Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwender, Le & Schmitt, 2005). The mean correlation was small, but positive ($r = .24$). Prior work also found that both implicit and explicit attitudes predict behavior, but that implicit measures worked particularly well for socially sensitive topics and explicit measures worked particularly well in predicting responses which are assumed to be under conscious control (e.g., voting and brand related choices; Greenwald, Poehlmann, Uhland & Banaji, 2009).

The Present Research

The objectives of the present research are two-fold. First, we aim to test whether individuals who have benevolent and hostile sexist attitudes also behave in a benevolent and hostile sexist way. To test this hypothesis, we identify everyday sexist behaviors that correspond to sexist attitudes and examine the attitude-behavior relation in terms of BS and HS. Second, we aim to assess BS and HS attitudes not only at the explicit, but also at the implicit level. Given that, to our knowledge, prior research has not assessed BS and HS at the implicit level, our first goal is to develop two Implicit Association Tests (IATs, Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998) to assess implicit BS and HS attitudes. We further aim to validate the IATs by showing that the IATs correlate with corresponding explicit measures.

Previous research suggests that investigations have to take into account that the implicit-explicit attitudes relationship is subject to conditional factors (c.f. Hofmann et al., 2005; Nosek, 2005). For instance, the implicit-explicit attitudes relationship was only significant when both, the IAT and the explicit scale, assessed attitudes toward corresponding target groups (Gawronski, 2002). Thus, in the present research, we developed and validated implicit measures that correspond to the established explicit scales of the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory.

Although correlations between implicit and explicit measures vary from zero to moderate, moderate correlations represent the typical finding. Consequently, we predict that implicit BS attitudes will be moderately positively related to explicit BS attitudes, whereas implicit HS attitudes will be moderately positively related to explicit HS attitudes.

Furthermore, even though Glick and Fiske (1996) suggest that BS and HS are two sides of a coin that work together to keep women "in their place", sexism research so far has primarily investigated the correlation between BS and HS on an attitudinal level. However, the notion that sexist ambivalence is not limited to the endorsement of ambivalent sexist
attitudes, but translates to the co-occurrence of both sets of sexist behavior (BS and HS) has not been tested so far. The present work aims to fill this gap in research not only by investigating the relationship between BS and HS on an attitudinal but also on a behavioral level. We expect that BS and HS behaviors are positively correlated, because explicit BS and HS attitudes are also positively correlated. Thus, the more men engage in benevolently sexist behavior, the more they should also engage in hostile sexist behavior. Second, similarly to the prediction of implicit and explicit attitudes, we predict that sexist attitudes are more likely to predict sexist behavior when attitudes and behaviors correspond, because prior work illustrated that a strong attitude-behavior relation occurs only when the correspondence between attitudes and behavior is relatively high (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977; Kraus, 1995). That is, BS attitudes should predict BS behavior better than HS behavior, whereas HS attitudes should predict HS behavior better than BS behavior. Furthermore, we expect that the prediction of sexist behavior depends on whether sexist attitudes were assessed implicitly or explicitly. We expect that explicit attitudes are better in predicting sexist behavior than implicit attitudes, because prior work has demonstrated that explicit measures perform overall significantly better as predictors for behavior than IAT measures (Poehlman et al., 2007). This should be particularly true for BS behaviors, because BS behaviors are socially desirable. Thus, neither explicit BS attitudes nor BS behavior should be affected by impression management motives. However, it could be argued that HS behaviors can be better predicted by implicit HS attitudes, because explicit HS attitudes might be affected by participant’s motivation for impression management. However, in the present study, we assessed HS behaviors in a decision-making context. By deciding between showing sexist or non-sexist behavior, participants were able to control their responses. Thus, men’s concern for impression management should affect both explicit HS attitudes and HS behavior. Therefore, we hypothesize that explicit HS attitudes will outperform implicit HS attitudes in predicting HS behaviors.

To test our hypotheses, we conducted two studies. In Study 1 we developed implicit measures to assess BS and HS and examined the intercorrelations between implicit and explicit attitudes. Study 2 aimed at investigating the attitude-behavior relation of BS and HS using newly developed real-life behavioral measures in standardized lab situations.

**Study 1**

Data for Study 1 and Study 2 were collected in two waves. Participants from Study 1 (N = 126) completed the implicit and explicit measures. Two days later, 83 of the 126
participants came back to the laboratory for the assessment of the behavioral measures. These 83 participants agreed to participate in Study 2 at the time of the recruitment of the initial sample. The 43 participants who participated in Study 1 only were debriefed right after completing the implicit and explicit measures, whereas participants who also participated in Study 2 were debriefed two days later after completing the behavioral measures. The Study 1 –sample did not differ from the Study 2 –sample in socio-demographic characteristics.

Method

Participants and Procedure. One-hundred-twenty-six participants were recruited on campus by student research assistants from a German University and received ten euro for participation. All participants identified as male and were between 18 and 36 years of age ($M = 23.85; SD = 3.07$). One-hundred-nineteen (94.4%) participants classified themselves as German and seven (5.6%) as other (All participants were required to have sufficient German language proficiency). Participants were tested in groups of four. Each participant was seated in one of four separate cubicles in front of a PC monitor displaying the instructions. Responses were recorded using the psychological software program Inquisit (Version 3). The present study was introduced as a study on decision-making that supposedly aimed to assess the speed with which people make a decision. Participants first completed the BS-IAT, followed by the HS-IAT. Afterwards, they completed two distractor IATs (Racism-IAT, Religion-IAT) in order to hide that we were particularly interested in sexism. Next, participants completed the explicit measures of BS and HS followed by the Modern Racism Scale (McConahay, 1986) and newly developed items to assess religious prejudice towards Judaism and Islam. Participants of Study 2 completed further items assessing their ability to make decisions, which again served to distract from sexism and some potential moderators (men’s gender identity, internal and external motivation to respond without sexism and social desirability concerns).1

Once participants had completed all parts of the study, participants of the first wave of data collection were fully debriefed and thanked for their participation and participants of the second wave continued with the behavior study two days later (Study 2).

Measures. Implicit Sexist Attitudes. For the present study, two IATs were developed to assess implicit BS and HS attitudes: the Benevolent Sexism IAT (BS-IAT) and the Hostile Sexism IAT (HS-IAT). Each IAT consisted of two attribute and two target concepts.

The BS-IAT assessed a core element of BS: paternalism. Paternalism is expressed in chivalry and presents the belief that women should be cherished and protected by men (Glick & Fiske, 1996). Although BS has three subcomponents, paternalism can be perceived as the
core element of benevolent sexist behavior and is used as a proxy for BS in other studies as well (e.g., Hebl et al., 2007; Moya et al., 2007). In the BS-IAT, the attitude concept “pleasant” was represented by 16 pretested adjectives (e.g., sympathetic, kind) and the attitude concept “unpleasant” by another 16 adjectives (e.g., irritating, annoying). The target concept was represented by 10 self-developed comics that displayed interactions between a man and a woman (see Figure 1). Why did we develop a picture instead of a word IAT? Based on findings that picture stimuli and word stimuli have very little difference in effects (Nosek, Banaji & Greenwald, 2002; Rudman & Ashmore, 2007), Rudman (2011) suggests choosing a stimulus modality that is most feasible for the study design. Foroni & Bel-Bahar (2011) found that the relation between the target category and the stimuli, that is, the level of representation, can explain discrepancies in effects between picture and word IATs. In order to obtain a high level of representation of the target categories “active man” and “active woman” in the BS IAT, we chose pictorial stimuli that we believe are better in displaying activities than words. In our comics, either the man (“active man”) or the woman (“active woman”) played the active role (e.g., protecting) while the other played the passive role (e.g., being protected; example stimuli can be seen in Figure 1). For example, either a man protected a woman with a gun or a woman protected a man with a gun. In order to test the validity of the pictures, we conducted a pretest (see below).

In the HS-IAT, the attitude category was represented by eight pretested nouns with a “non-threatening” meaning (e.g., freedom, love), and eight nouns with a “threatening meaning” (e.g., disease, betrayal). As HS refers to an antipathy towards non-traditional women as feminists (negative female subtype, Glick & Fiske, 1996; Becker, 2010), the target category included words representing a “traditional woman” (e.g., housewife, mother) vs. a “non-traditional woman” (e.g., feminist, women’s rights activist). Counterbalancing techniques were used for the randomized presentation of the target and attitude categories between the left and right side of the screen and the presentation of compatible and incompatible tasks. During the IATs, the target- and attribute words were presented in a mixed order on a computer screen and participants were instructed to sort the stimuli with either a left or a right response key. The basic notion underlying the IAT is that target-attribute pairs will be more quickly and accurately categorized, if they have a strong automatic association. Thus, positive scores on the BS-IAT indicated a stronger association of active men with pleasant words and active women with unpleasant words, whereas a positive score on the HS-IAT represented a stronger association of traditional women with nonthreatening attributes and non-traditional women with threatening attributes. Scores of
automatic associations for the BS-IAT and the HS-IAT were created using the “improved scoring algorithm” proposed by Greenwald, Nosek and Banaji (2003). Internal consistency of the IATs was assessed using the Spearman-Brown corrected split-half correlation between odd and even scores of the implicit measures. The IAT reliability for the BS-IAT was \( r(126) = .66, p<.001 \) and for the HS-IAT was \( r(126) = .86, p<.001 \). Given that IATs are less reliable than explicit measures, results indicate a reasonable level of reliability.

Explicit Sexist Attitudes. Explicit BS and HS attitudes were measured using the German translation of the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI, Glick & Fiske, 1996; Eckes & Six-Materna, 1999). Eleven items assessed BS (e.g., Women should be cherished and protected by men; \( \alpha = .85 \)) and another 11 items assessed HS (e.g., When women lose to men in a fair competition, they typically complain about being discriminated against; \( \alpha = .91 \)), using a seven-point Likert-type scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).

We omitted variables that had more than 5% missing values (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007) and imputed those with less than 5% missing values using multiple imputation (Little & Rubin, 2002; Rubin, 1976).

Results and Discussion

Pretest. In order to test the validity of the BS-IAT pictures, we asked an independent sample of ninety-three participants to describe the BS-IAT pictures. Ninety-three participants were recruited on campus by student research assistants from a German university and received ten euro for participation. All participants identified as male and were between 18 and 36 years of age (\( M = 27.52; SD = 4.37 \)). Eighty-four (90.3%) participants classified themselves as German and nine (9.7%) as other. The descriptions were rated by two independent raters assessing the correctness of the interpretations. The mean inter-rater reliability (Cohen's kappa) was 0.99, indicating that the two raters almost fully agreed on their interpretations of the pictures in terms of the underlying BS belief. Furthermore, participants were instructed to indicate whether they believed that the man or the woman played the active role in the depicted interaction on a seven-point Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Results showed that 97.8% (range from 92-100%) of all participants correctly identified the content of the depicted scenario. Furthermore, the results of the rating scales revealed that when the picture intended to show a man behaving benevolently towards a woman, participants were on average more likely to see the man behaving benevolently towards the woman (\( M = 6.72, SD = .46 \)) than to see the woman behaving benevolently towards the man (\( M = 1.29, SD = .51 \)), all ts > 13.36, ps < .001. When the picture intended to show a woman behaving benevolently towards a man, participants were on average more
likely to see the woman behaving benevolently towards the man ($M = 6.72, SD = 0.48$) than to see the man behaving benevolently towards the woman ($M = 1.27, SD = 0.45$), all $t$s > 14.27, $p$s < .001. Results of this pretest illustrate that the pictures depicted what they were supposed to illustrate and provide strong evidence for the validity of the picture IAT.

The relation between implicit and explicit sexist attitudes. Sample means, standard deviations, and (partial and bivariate) correlations between all scales are presented in Table 1. Both, partial and bivariate correlations indicated that, as expected, implicit BS attitudes were positively related to explicit BS attitudes (bivariate and partial: $r = .19$, $p = .03$), but not to explicit HS attitudes (bivariate: $r = .05$, $p = .56$; partial: $r = -.06$, $p = .50$). Thus, the more participants endorse explicit BS attitudes, the faster they paired men in a protector role with pleasant words and women in a protector role with unpleasant words. Similarly, in line with expectations, implicit HS attitudes correlated positively with explicit HS attitudes (bivariate: $r = .30$, $p < .001$; partial: $r = .24$, $p = .01$) but also with explicit BS attitudes (bivariate: $r = .18$, $p = .04$). However, when partialling out the effects of explicit HS attitudes, implicit HS attitudes were not related to explicit BS attitudes (partial: $r = .03$, $p = .77$). Thus, the more participants endorse explicit HS attitudes, the faster they paired non-traditional women with threatening words and traditional women with nonthreatening words. Additionally, as in line with prior work (Glick & Fiske, 1996), explicit BS and HS attitudes correlated positively ($r = .54$, $p < .001$). Implicit BS and HS attitudes were not correlated ($r = -.12$, $p = .19$).

In sum, results of Study 1 illustrate that we successfully developed measures to assess BS and HS attitudes at the implicit level. The results provide strong support for the validity of both IATs by showing that implicit BS attitudes were related to explicit BS attitudes but not to explicit HS attitudes, whereas implicit HS attitudes were related to explicit HS attitudes but not to explicit BS attitudes. Moreover, results of the pretest provide additional evidence for the validity of the pictures of the BS-IAT.

Study 2

Study 2 was designed to test whether sexist behaviors are related to implicit and explicit sexist attitudes when attitudes and behaviors correspond. Thus, we developed “items” that assess BS and HS behavior that were averaged into behavior scales, one assessing BS behavior and another one assessing HS behavior. We then tested whether implicit or explicit attitudes work better in predicting BS and HS behaviors.
Method

Participants. Eighty-three of the 126 participants that were recruited for Study 1 also participated in Study 2 and received an additional ten euro for their participation. All participants identified as male and were between 18 and 36 years of age ($M = 24.11$, $SD = 3.20$). Eighty-two (98.8%) participants classified themselves as German and one (1.2%) as others. Participants were asked to attend the laboratory one to two days after having participated in Study 1. This time interval was implemented in order to reduce suspicion and to foster the cover story: the present study was introduced as two separate studies which were part of a broader project on decision-making. Whereas Study 1 supposedly assessed the speed with which people make decisions, the alleged second study supposedly examined the influence of group size on the decision process. Once participants had completed all parts of the study, they were fully debriefed and thanked for their participation.

Procedure. In order to assess BS and HS behavior, we selected behaviors used in prior work (e.g., Eyssel & Bohner, 2007; Mitchell et al., 2004; Moya et al., 2007; Ford, Wentzel & Lorion, 2001) and also designed new “items”. Given that it is much more difficult to use rating scales to classify behaviors, we used dichotomous items. The use of dichotomous items is in line with prior work (e.g., to recommend or not to recommend a sexist joke, Mitchell et al., 2004). In order to avoid participants’ suspicion, we decided to include a relatively small number of items measuring BS and HS and to add several filler items.

Three tasks aimed at assessing BS behavior (including a total of six items) and three tasks aimed at assessing HS behavior (including a total of nine items). We intentionally assessed more HS behaviors than BS behaviors, because we were concerned to find floor effects for some HS behaviors, given that HS is socially undesirable (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005; Swim et al., 2005). Thus, we developed more items than necessary in order to be able to drop those HS behavior items that might indicate a floor effect. Data from the implicit and explicit sexist attitudes (Study 1) and sexist behaviors (Study 2) were linked via an anonymous code. For practical reasons, two confederate teams were hired for the study. Each team of confederates consisted of one female and one male confederate who were blind to the research questions.

For the study on sexist behaviors, the participant arrived at the lab alone and was seated in a cubicle. One male and, a minute later, one female participant entered the lab, who were in fact confederates of the experimenter. The inclusion of a male confederate served to simplify the expression of hostile sexist behavior, whereas the female confederate was included as potential target of benevolent sexist behavior. The confederates were seated in
two other cubicles. Participants were told that the aim of this study was to test the influence of group size on decision-making in social situations. Therefore, they would complete tasks in three blocks: first alone, then in a dyad and finally in a triad. Thus, in a first step, participants completed a gender-unrelated rational choice decision task designed by Kahneman and Tversky (1984) in separate cubicles. Afterwards, they were told that they would be randomly assigned into two independent dyads (BS dyad, HS dyad) in order to complete the tasks of the second block together with one of the other participants, while the third person would continue to solve tasks alone. All tasks of the dyads consisted of situations in which participants were given the opportunity to engage in sexist or nonsexist behavior.

In the first dyad (BS dyad), participants were told that they would complete three tasks together with the female confederate. The experimenter chose, supposedly by chance, three tasks from a stack of tasks. She then introduced the tasks as a measure that assesses decision-making in social contexts and involves role-plays. Each task included items assessing BS behavior and neutral items that served as distractors. The first BS behavior task (Anniversary Celebration, BS behavior 1-2) consisted of a scripted role-play read by the experimenter. The script comprised interactions from everyday life in which the participant could show either sexist behaviors, as calling the waitress (BS behavior 1) and paying the check (BS behavior 2) or non-sexist behaviors.

In the second BS behavior task (Dangerous Situations, BS behavior 3-4), the participant and the female confederate were instructed to play siblings discussing the female confederate’s wish to take an internship that involves counseling imprisoned rapists. The task was an adaptation from Moya et al. (2007), using cards that the experimenter handed to the participant and female confederate. The participant’s cards contained two sentences of which either one was benevolent sexist and the other one was neutral or both sentences were neutral. The cards of the female confederate consisted of two identical sentences and were designed to fit with any of the participant’s sentence choice. The participant and the female confederate were instructed to pick the sentence that best reflected what they would say in this situation and to read it out loud. Sexist sentences were: “I think that would be very dangerous for you” (indicating BS behavior 3), “I’m just worried that I wouldn’t be able to protect you” (indicating BS behavior 4). An example for a neutral sentence is “I’m just worried that you will be disappointed by the internship.”

For the third BS behavior task (Bureaucratic Decisions, BS behavior 5-6), the participant and the female confederate were instructed to imagine they were a couple that had recently moved into a new apartment and was assigned bureaucratic and organizational duties
related to its relocation. Together, they were handed a stack of forms one of which was gender-neutral and the other one was gender-related, or both were gender-neutral. The participant and the female confederate were instructed to alternately draw two separate forms from the stack, then to read the label written on the front page of each form and to assign one form to themselves and one form to the other person. Subsequently, they completed this task. Behavior was coded as benevolent sexist when the participant assigned the creation of a shopping list for a toolbox including heavy tools to himself while assigning the creation of a shopping list for baking a cake to the female confederate (indicating BS behavior 5) and assigning the planning of the manual renovation to himself while assigning the planning of the decorative renovation to the female confederate (indicating BS behavior 6). An example for two gender-neutral forms included tasks to unsubscribe from a magazine and the submission of a mail forwarding order. After completion of the BS dyad tasks, the experimenter led the participant and female confederate back into the first room and assigned the male confederate and the participant, seemingly by chance, to a second dyad (HS dyad).

In the second dyad, which assessed HS behavior (HS dyad), the experimenter led the participant and the male confederate into the second lab room and instructed the female confederate to work on an individual decision task in the first room. The first HS behavior task (Joke Recommendation, HS behavior 1-4) was an adaptation of Eyssel and Bohner (2007), Ford, Wentzel and Lorion (2001) and Mitchell et al. (2004), and included the rating and recommendation of sexist jokes. The participant and male confederate were each handed a stack of nine cards. Each card contained either a sexist and a neutral joke or two neutral jokes (as filler items). All jokes were matched based on pre-rated equal levels of humor. The participant and male confederate were told that during the task they would take turns in choosing one of the two jokes and will indicate on a separate sheet whether they want to recommend it as a team to the next group. They were told that the jokes would only be recommended to the next team, if both agreed on recommending it. To assess HS behavior, two of the participant’s cards contained a sexist and a neutral joke. For each card, the participant was instructed to decide between choosing the sexist joke (indicating HS behavior 1 and HS behavior 2) or the neutral joke (indicating non-sexism). An example for a sexist joke is: “Why does a woman have one brain cell more than a horse? So that she doesn’t drink from the bucket while washing the stairs.” An example for a neutral joke is: “Who invented the Triathlon? - The Polish. They walk to the swimming pool, swim one round and return home on a bike.” He then had to read the joke to the male confederate and to indicate on a sheet whether he wanted to recommend it or not. Independent of the participant’s decision,
the male confederate agreed with him. Each time it was the male confederate’s turn, he recommended the sexist jokes (a total of two). The participant then had to decide whether to agree with the male confederate’s decision (indicating HS behavior 3 and HS behavior 4) or to veto to the male confederate’s decision (indicating non-sexism). To reduce participant’s suspicion, some cards contained two distracting neutral jokes. For these two jokes, independent of the participant’s decision, the male confederate disagreed with the participant’s decision. This served to reduce suspicion that could have risen, if the male confederate agreed to all of the participant’s decisions.

In the second HS behavior task, the participant played the male confederate’s best friend who gives him relationship advice (A Friend’s Advice, HS behavior 5-8). The experimenter handed a stack of seven cards each to the participant and to the confederate. The participant’s cards contained two sentences one of which was sexist and the other one was neutral, or both sentences were neutral. The male confederate’s cards contained two identical sentences and were designed to fit with any of the sentences chosen by the participant. The participant and male confederate were instructed to pick the sentence that best reflected what they would say in this situation and to read it out loud. Sexist sentences were: “I think that’s a totally unjustified demand on a man. But how did she come up with the idea to start a career?” (indicating HS behavior 5), “Women like to exaggerate problems they have at work.” (indicating HS behavior 6), “Don’t bother! She was too easily offended and didn’t appreciate everything that you’ve done for her” (indicating HS behavior 7) and “When women lose to men in a fair competition, they typically complain about being discriminated against” (indicating HS behavior 8).

The third task was a distractor game called “Pictionary”. In this game, the participant and the male confederate took turns in choosing a word from a list of words and draw it (e.g., a mobile phone) while the other person had to identify the word by only looking at the sketch. After completion of the tasks from the second dyad, the female confederate was brought into the room for the last block. The experimenter announced that the next participants would arrive in 5 minutes and thus there was not enough time for the triad-tasks. They were therefore instructed to complete the final questionnaire on their decision-making. The female confederate completed her questionnaire quickly and left the room. The male confederate completed his questionnaire and waited until the participant had finished his questionnaire.

In order to assess the last HS behavior, he then introduced an anti-feminism petition “Petition for a men’s rights organization” to the participant and asked him whether he would like to sign it. The participant then decided whether to sign the petition (indicating HS
behavior 9) or not (indicating non-sexism). Afterwards, the participant and the male confederate left the room. Participants were carefully debriefed and rewarded with 20€ for participation.

**Materials**

*The BS behaviors.* The BS behaviors consisted of six items included in the three tasks “Anniversary Celebration” (BS behavior 1-2), “Dangerous Situations” (BS behavior 3-4) and “Bureaucratic Decisions” (BS behavior 5-6). BS behavior items 3 and 6 were excluded (see below).

*The HS behaviors.* The HS behaviors were captured using nine items presented in three tasks: “Joke Recommendation” (HS behavior 1-4), “A Friend’s Advice” (HS behavior 5-8) and “Petition for a men’s rights organization” (HS behavior 9).

Sexist behavior was observed and coded by the experimenter as either sexist or nonsexist.

**Results and Discussion**

*The structure of the sexist behavior scales.* Confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs) were computed using Mplus 7.0 (Muthén & Muthén, 2012). Two BS behavior items were excluded due to low standardized factor loadings (λ < .33; BS behavior 6: planning the decorative renovation and BS behavior 3: Internship is too dangerous). Thus, the final BS behavior scale consisted of four and the HS behavior scale of nine behavior items. Specifically, the BS behavior scale comprised BS behavior 1 (calling the waitress to make an order), BS behavior 2 (paying the check for the female confederate at a restaurant), BS behavior 4 (Concern not to be able to protect a woman) and BS behavior 5 (man selects the task to create a toolbox including heavy tools to himself). The HS Behavior scale comprised all HS behaviors 1 - 9.

The CFA revealed a good fit for the two-factor model (one BS factor and one HS factor; χ² (64) = 74.23, p = .18; comparative fit index (CFI) = .95; root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA) = .04). Given that this was the first time that BS and HS behavior scales have been created, we tested whether a one-factor model (in which all 13 sexist behavior items would load together on one factor) would represent the data better than a two-factor model. Results showed that the two-factor model represented the data significantly better (Δχ² (1) = 5.38, p = .02) than the one-factor model (χ² (65) = 79.78, p = .10; CFI = .93; RMSEA = .05). This result provides strong evidence of the successful development of two behavior scales that represent different aspects of sexism.
**Prediction of sexist behavior.** Table 2 depicts the correlations of all variables. The correlations for the explicit measures reveal that BS attitudes and behaviors as well as HS attitudes and behaviors were positively related. In terms of the implicit measures, implicit BS attitudes were not related to BS behavior, whereas implicit HS attitudes were both related to HS and BS behavior. Because explicit BS and HS attitudes as well as BS and HS behaviors were moderately to highly interrelated, multiple regression analyses are the appropriate test for our hypotheses in order to control for the shared variance between BS and HS attitudes and to test for unique effects of each predictor variable (cf. Glick & Fiske, 1996). In both analyses, implicit and explicit BS and HS attitudes were simultaneously entered as predictors and either BS or HS behavior as criterion. Further, in order to control for differences in the behavioral measures due to variation of the confederate team, the variable team of confederates (0 = Team 1, 1 = Team 2) was examined as possible covariate. Moreover, age was examined as a covariate as well. Results showed that the assignment to one of the two confederate teams did not predict differences in participant’s BS behavior ($B = -0.01, SE = 0.22, p = .98$) and HS behavior ($B = 0.48, SE = 0.43, p = .27$). Age was marginally significant for the prediction of BS behavior ($B = 0.07, SE = 0.04, p = .06$) but not of HS behavior ($B = 0.04, SE = 0.07, p = .58$). Older participants showed more BS behavior than younger participants. In accordance with our main hypothesis, explicit BS attitudes predicted BS behavior positively ($B = 0.45, SE = 0.11, p < .001$), whereas explicit HS attitudes did not predict BS behavior ($B = 0.14, SE = 0.11, p = .19$). Likewise, as hypothesized, explicit HS attitudes predicted HS behavior positively ($B = 1.10, SE = 0.21, p < .001$), whereas explicit BS attitudes did not predict HS behavior ($B = -0.24, SE = 0.21, p = .25$). Supporting the expectation that explicit attitudes would be the better predictors of sexist behavior compared to implicit attitudes, results show that neither implicit BS attitudes ($B = -0.06, SE = .27, p = .82$), nor implicit HS attitudes ($B = 0.38, SE = .27, p = .15$) predicted BS behavior. Similarly, neither implicit HS attitudes ($B = .14, SE = .52, p = .79$) nor implicit BS attitudes ($B = .12, SE = .52, p = .82$) predicted HS behavior. Furthermore, similarly to the explicit BS and HS scales, BS and HS behaviors were also positively correlated ($r = .44, p < .001$).

In sum, the results of Study 2 show that we successfully developed behaviors that assessed BS and HS at the behavioral level. As expected, both behavior scales were positively correlated, indicating that men who behave benevolently sexist are also more likely to behave hostilely sexist. In line with our main hypothesis, explicit BS attitudes, but not explicit HS attitudes, predicted BS behavior positively and explicit HS attitudes, but not explicit BS
attitudes, predicted HS behavior positively. In addition, neither implicit BS nor implicit HS attitudes predicted BS or HS behavior.

**General Discussion**

Much work has been done on sexist attitudes, but only little on sexist behaviors. The main goal of the present research was to close this gap by testing how a variety of BS and HS behaviors correlate with implicit as well as explicit sexist attitudes. For this purpose, two studies were conducted. In Study 1, a BS-IAT and a HS-IAT were developed in order to assess implicit benevolent sexist and hostile sexist attitudes. In Study 2, we developed two behavior scales to assess benevolent sexist and hostile sexist behavior in standardized lab situations. We examined whether implicit and explicit benevolent and hostile sexist attitudes can predict benevolent and hostile sexist behavior.

Our research extends prior work in several ways. First, we successfully developed BS and HS behavior scales and demonstrated that a two scales solution fits the data significantly better than a one scale solution (in which a single sexist behavior factor was assumed). Analogous to previous research, that has shown that BS and HS are positively intercorrelated on an explicit attitudinal level (Glick & Fiske, 1996), we demonstrated that they are also positively intercorrelated on a behavioral level: the more men engage in benevolently sexist behavior, the more they also engage in hostile sexist behavior.

Moreover, we illustrated that explicit benevolent (but not hostile) sexist attitudes predicted benevolent sexist behavior, whereas explicit hostile (but not benevolent) sexist attitudes predicted hostile sexist behavior. This is an important finding, because it provides evidence for convergent validity of the newly developed behavior scales. Finally, we successfully developed IATs to measure BS and HS implicitly. Results show that implicit BS attitudes were positively related to explicit BS attitudes (but not to explicit HS attitudes) and that implicit HS attitudes were positively correlated to explicit HS attitudes (but not explicit BS attitudes). Given that the most reliable indicator of an IAT’s validity is its linkage to other attitudinal or behavioral measures (e.g., Cunningham, Preacher & Banaji, 2001; Perugini, Richetin & Zogmaister, 2010), this is also an important finding, because it provides evidence for the convergent validity of the newly developed IATs. In addition, results of a pretest also confirm the validity of the BS-picture-IAT. However, neither implicit benevolent nor implicit hostile sexist beliefs were related to BS and HS behavior. Thus, explicit attitudes demonstrated to be better in predicting sexist behavior than implicit attitudes. This finding is in line with our expectations for BS. Considering that hostile sexist attitudes are socially
undesirable (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005; Swim et al., 2005) and previous research found that implicit measures work particularly well for socially sensitive topics (Greenwald et al., 2009), our finding may seem contradictory for HS at first glance. However, the same research found that explicit measures work particularly well for responses assumed to be under conscious control (e.g., brand related choices). Since in the present study sexist behavior was assessed using tasks that involved decision-making (e.g., whether to recommend or not to recommend a sexist joke), we expected explicit attitudes to be better in predicting sexist behavior than implicit attitudes. This finding is further in line with prior work, showing that explicit measures perform overall significantly better than IAT measures (Greenwald et al., 2009).

Possible reasons are that implicit measures are not entirely immune to faking (e.g., Degner, 2009), they generally have lower internally consistencies than explicit measures (Cunningham, Preacher, & Banaji, 2001) and it is not clear whether they assess well-learned environmental associations rather than prejudice (Karpinski & Hilton, 2001). Additionally, in the present study, benevolent and hostile sexist behaviors were assessed using role-plays in which the experimenter explicitly instructed participants to decide which behavior they want to show, stimulating conscious consideration of behavioral options.

Limitations and Future Research

In the present research, we created two IATs that assess BS and HS at the implicit level and two behavior scales that assess BS and HS behaviors. This work clearly extends prior work, but it is not without limitations. Although our findings are in line with prior work showing that explicit measures performed better than implicit measures in predicting behavior (Greenwald et al., 2009), one limitation of the present research is that we assessed sexist behaviors in a decision-making context which required intentionally controlled behavior. Thus, it would be interesting to see how implicit measures predict behavior when individuals cannot control their behavioral responses. We think that uncontrolled HS behavior might be also predicted by implicit HS attitudes. We would not expect, however, that implicit BS attitudes would predict uncontrolled BS behavior, because BS behavior is a socially accepted and desired behavior which should not vary depending on its controllability.

Furthermore, given that we used male participants only in our studies, it could be argued that our implicit BS and HS measures are only valid for men. However, we believe that the IATs are similarly applicable to women. Both, the implicit BS and HS measures have been developed based on the sexism literature. In terms of BS, research shows that women are sometimes more likely to endorse BS than men (Glick et al., 2000). In terms of HS, previous research also showed that women can endorse HS as well. For instance, women who endorse
HS direct it against non-traditional women, but not against themselves (Becker, 2010). Thus, we believe that both IATs are valid for women and men. Therefore, we encourage future work to use the BS and HS IAT for women as well and to test whether the IATs can also predict sexist behavior among women.

Moreover, in the present research, a male confederate was included to set a norm of tolerance for HS behavior against women (as proposed by Ford and Ferguson, 2004). Critics could argue that the presence of a male confederate may have influenced participants’ responses. Thus, participants may have demonstrated sexist behavior (e.g., recommended a sexist joke) as a reaction to the male confederate’s engagement in sexist behavior. Further, participants may not have had the courage to contradict the male confederate in order to show their true (and maybe non-sexist) behavior. This alternative explanation, however, can be ruled out: In the present research, hostile sexist attitudes were assessed prior to hostile sexist behavior. Furthermore, explicit HS attitudes and HS behaviors proved to be positively correlated. Thus, participants indicated that they endorsed hostile sexist attitudes before they could engage in hostile sexist behavior. Moreover, we included potential moderators such as social desirability. Social desirability did not moderate the attitude-behavior-relation in terms of HS, showing that participant’s responses were not influenced by their motivation to respond in a socially desirable manner towards the confederate.

Additionally, in the present work, we focused on the paternalism component of BS and neglected the other two subcomponents. We did this for practical and theoretical reasons. First, complementary gender differentiation and heterosexual intimacy are difficult to depict at the behavioral level, because they clearly present views on women, whereas paternalism is the behavioral component of BS. This is mirrored in the decision of other researchers to focus on paternalism only (e.g., Hebl et al., 2007; Moya et al., 2007). Furthermore, we think that the paternalism component captures the essence of BS, because it integrates the other subcomponents to some extent. The belief that women need to be protected implies that women have “special qualities” that are worth protecting (the gender differentiation aspect of BS) and that a man should protect his woman, because men need women to be able to live a fulfilled life (the intimacy aspect of BS). Moreover, when comparing gender relations with relations between other privileged and disadvantaged groups, it is always the paternalism component that received the most attention (for an excellent overview, see Jackman, 1994). Therefore, we believe that it was fruitful to look at the paternalism subcomponent first. However, it is interesting and challenging for future research to develop implicit and behavioral measures for the other two subcomponents of BS as well.
Finally, different types of stimuli were used to conceptualize the target dimension of the implicit measures. In the BS-IAT, we used pictures as targets, while in the HS-IAT, targets were represented by words. It could be argued that the type of stimuli used as a target may have an influence on participant’s task performance. Previous research shows that words sometimes prove to be processed faster than pictures (e.g. Nosek, Greenwald & Banaji, 2005) and sometimes pictures prove to be processed faster than word-IATs (e.g. Dasgupta, McGhee, Greenwald & Banaji, 2000). However, previous research has also found that the stimulus modality (i.e., images vs. text) cannot explain differences in IAT-effect (Foroni & Bel-Bahar, 2010).

Conclusion

In the present research, we successfully developed scales assessing BS and HS behaviors and measures to assess implicit BS and HS attitudes. These developments present crucial steps toward filling the gap of the investigation of sexist behavior in sexism research. We created the implicit and behavior scales in order to investigate whether implicit and explicit sexist attitudes differ in predicting sexist behavior. We demonstrated for BS and HS that explicit, but not implicit, sexist attitudes predict the corresponding sexist behaviors.
References


Table 1

Means, standard deviations and partial correlations of all study variables of Study 1 (N = 126)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. BS-IAT score</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. HS-IAT score</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. ASI-BS</td>
<td>3.96</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>0.19*</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. ASI-HS</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.24**</td>
<td>0.54***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: IAT = Implicit Association Test. ASI = Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (the explicit measures). BS = Benevolent Sexism, HS = Hostile Sexism.

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed).
Table 2
Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations among all study variables of Study 2 (N = 83)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. BS-IAT score</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. HS-IAT score</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. ASI-BS</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.34**</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. ASI-HS</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.34**</td>
<td>.50**</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. BS behavior score</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.33**</td>
<td>.57**</td>
<td>.39**</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. HS behavior score</td>
<td>3.06</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.21*</td>
<td>.22*</td>
<td>.58**</td>
<td>.44**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Pooled correlation coefficients. IAT = Implicit Association Test. ASI = Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (the explicit measure). BS = Benevolent Sexism, HS = Hostile Sexism.

*p < .05; **p < .01 (two-tailed).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Active man</th>
<th>Active woman</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><img src="image1" alt="Active man" /></td>
<td><img src="image2" alt="Active woman" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td><img src="image4" alt="Active woman" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td><img src="image6" alt="Active woman" /></td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image9" alt="Active man" /></td>
<td><img src="image10" alt="Active woman" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1. Picture Stimuli used in the BS IAT
Endnotes

1 None of these moderators were significant and are not discussed any further. Interested readers can obtain the statistics from the first author.

2 A manipulation of time pressure was added to test for a double dissociation (half of the participants were instructed to complete the tasks quickly, the other half was not instructed to complete the tasks quickly). The manipulation had no effect on all dependent variables. Participant’s implicit and explicit HS and BS attitudes were equally strongly correlated (or equally uncorrelated) to HS and BS behavior (there was no significant difference between the correlation coefficients, all $p$s > .44). Therefore, we summarized both conditions for all further analyses.

3 A detailed description of the “Anniversary Celebration” task can be obtained from the additional online materials.

4 The word-for-word script and all materials can be obtained from the first author.

5 Missing values were estimated with full information maximum likelihood (FIML) in order to obtain a test of the hypothesis that the model fits the data for the $\chi^2$ statistic, and to apply DIFFTEST for comparison of the model fits (these options are currently not available for multiple imputation data in Mplus).
Manuscript #2

The benefits and the perils of benevolence:

Consequences of engaging in benevolent sexist behavior for men.

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Abstract

At first glance, benevolent sexist (BS) behaviors seem to advantage women. Thus, we ask why men engage in BS behaviors in first place and tested its positive and negative implications for men. Study 1 (N = 51) illustrated that BS behavior is rewarding for men: After engaging in BS behavior, men experienced more positive emotions, higher self-esteem and perceived themselves as more masculine and attractive. Study 2 (N = 93) replicated these effects and, additionally, highlighted potential burdens of engaging in BS behavior: Men perceived women as being less competent and were less willing to engage in collective action for more gender equality. In Study 3 (N = 293), we examined how women (compared to men) feel after engaging in BS behavior. Results show that while women experienced more positive emotions, the negative effects of BS (viewing women/men in stereotypical terms) did not occur. Implications of these findings are discussed.

Keywords: benevolent sexism, gender stereotypes, collective action, helping, paternalism
The Benefits And The Perils Of Benevolence: Consequences Of Engaging In Benevolent Sexist Behavior for Men

Women are often protected and provided for by men; they are helped when changing a tire or invited into restaurants. All these benevolent behaviors have in common that they seem to directly benefit women – but not necessarily men. In the present research, we ask why men engage in these behaviors at all. Is benevolent sexist (BS) behavior rewarding for men? Will it make men feel better or even more attractive? Will BS behavior affect how men perceive women? In the present work, we examine potential benefits (and perils) of BS behavior for men.

BS is defined as “a set of interrelated attitudes toward women that are sexist in terms of viewing women stereotypically and in restricted roles but that are subjectively positive in feeling tone” (Glick & Fiske, 1996, p. 491). The present research focuses on the core element of benevolent sexism, protective paternalism (for discussions see, e.g., Becker & Sibley, 2015; Jackman, 1994). Protective Paternalism represents “the benevolent aspect of paternalistic ideology, which states that because of their greater authority, power, and physical strength, men should serve as protectors and providers for women” (Glick & Fiske, 1997, pp. 121–122). Protective Paternalism includes a man’s desire to protect, help, and cherish a woman (like a father might feel toward a child) and has been used as a proxy for benevolent sexism in other studies (e.g., Hebl, King, Glick, Singletony, & Kazama, 2007; Moya, Glick, Expósito, de Lemus, & Hart, 2007; Sarlet, Dumont, Delacollette, & Dardenne, 2012). Because benevolent sexism is positive in feeling tone (Glick & Fiske, 1996, 2001), the seemingly chivalrous act of putting a woman on a pedestal can easily be interpreted as cherishing a woman, rather than as behavior that restricts women to a socially prescribed role.

**Negative Consequences of BS Behavior for Women**

Based on the prevailing social acceptability of benevolent sexism (e.g., Glick et al., 2000), one could ask: How can nice and chivalrous behavior ever be considered bad? Indeed, BS does not directly promote blatant discrimination against women – but it works on a subtle level. Recent research has demonstrated that women exposed to BS directly assimilate to this ideology: They emphasize their relational qualities, but de-emphasize their task-related qualities (Barreto, Ellemers, Piebinga, & Moya, 2010), they report less ambitious career goals (Rudman & Heppen, 2000), show decreased cognitive performance (Dardenne, Dumont, & Bollier, 2007; Dumont, Sarlet, & Dardenne, 2010) and increased body shame (Calogero & Jost, 2011). Exposure to BS can also impede social change (Becker & Wright, 2011; Shnabel,
Bar-Anan, Kende, Bareket, & Lazar, 2015), manifest the status-quo (Jost & Kay, 2005) and render discrimination more socially acceptable (Moya et al., 2007). BS behaviors also have important implications for romantic relationships (e.g., Hammond, Overall, & Cross, 2016; Overall, Sibley, & Tan, 2011; Sibley & Overall, 2011). Support for the notion that seemingly positive behaviors can entail negative consequences, comes from the helping literature (e.g., Shnabel & Nadler, 2015; Siem, Lotz-Schmitt, & Stürmer, 2014, Stürmer & Snyder, 2010). Cross-group helping is perceived as a double-edged sword working twofold by assisting the recipient while also signaling his or her inferiority to the helper (Shnabel et al., 2015). This ambivalence is also reflected in the distinction between dependency-oriented and autonomy-oriented helping. Dependency-oriented help leaves the recipient passive, whereas autonomy-oriented help aims at empowering the help-recipient (Shnabel et al., 2015). Bringing together the BS and helping research, Shnabel and colleagues (2015) demonstrated that men endorsing BS were more likely to provide women (but not men) with dependency-oriented help. Thus, a BS help offer, due to its chivalrous tone, can appear prosocial even though it helps to maintain and reinforce the hierarchical relations between helper and recipient.

Positive and Negative Consequences of BS Behavior for Men

As summarized above, the insidious dangers of BS for women are well documented. However, we do not know how men feel and think after expressing BS towards women. Given that many men engage in BS behaviors on a daily basis, it is likely that BS is directly rewarding for men. This assumption is in line with research showing that endorsement of BS is related to happiness among women and men (Hammond & Sibley, 2011), that women expect BS behaviors from men (Becker, 2010; Sarlet et al., 2012) and perceive BS men to be sexy (Bohner, Ahlborn, & Steiner, 2010). Based on these findings, we argue that when men receive positive feedback for their BS behavior from women, they should view themselves in positive terms; for instance, by experiencing positive emotions and greater self-esteem. Furthermore, given that cross-gender interactions often occur in the context of flirting, it is also possible that men feel particularly attractive and masculine when engaging in BS behavior. We therefore assume that BS behavior should not only elicit positive emotions and higher self-esteem (as normal helping behavior might also do, e.g., Messias, De Jong, & McLoughlin, 2005), but that BS behavior specifically affects men’s self-perception as being attractive and masculine.

Thus, although BS behavior may entail several beneficial consequences for men’s self-perception, we also ask how men’s image of women and men’s perception of gender equality
change after engaging in BS. Prior work suggests that BS is strongly linked to the endorsement of traditional gender-roles (e.g., Glick & Fiske, 1996); here, men are perceived as agentic and as possessing the necessary competence for high-status workplace positions, whereas women are perceived as communal and as possessing the necessary warmth to fulfill their marital and parental duties (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007; Good & Sanchez, 2009). Consequently, BS behavior should make traditional gender-roles particularly salient.

According to self-perception theory (Bem, 1972), engaging in behavior can change our attitudes, so that a "behavior may change a person's perception of himself in general, or may alter attitudes specifically related to the behavior, or both" (Scott, 1978, 714-720). Therefore, engaging in BS behavior should strengthen the endorsement of BS beliefs. For instance, when a man offers to install a virus scan on a woman’s computer so women would not have to “grapple with” it (Becker, Glick, Ilic, & Bohner, 2011, p. 762), this might reinforce his perception of women as less competent. Moreover, a reinforced perception of women as being nice but not particularly competent might dispense with the need for changing gender relations. Indeed, prior research demonstrated that exposure to BS contributes to the maintenance of the unequal gender status-quo (Jost & Kay, 2005), and undermines women’s resistance to gender inequality and their support for feminist collective action (Becker & Wright, 2011). Therefore, we expect that engaging in BS behavior reinforces a cycle two-fold: those who endorse BS beliefs engage in BS behavior, which is a) directly rewarding via a positive self-evaluation, and b) in turn, leads to an increased stereotypical perception of women as less competent and further inhibits social change by decreasing men’s willingness to engage in collective action to increase gender equality.

Overview of the Present Research

In three studies, we tested our hypotheses that BS behavior entails positive and negative consequences for men. We conducted our research in the context of helping behavior. Importantly, we predict that BS help is different from “gender-neutral” help (e.g., Shnabel et al., 2015). Therefore, we compared BS help (experimental condition) to neutral (non-sexist) helping behavior (control condition 1), and to a no-help scenario (control condition 2). Note that not all cross-gender helping behaviors necessarily represent BS. In the present work, we selected behaviors that clearly represent Protective Paternalism. However, in order to avoid any misinterpretation, the female experimenter added feedback after the helping behavior in order to make the behavior more obviously BS: In the BS help conditions the experimenter thanked the participant for being a gentleman, in the neutral help condition
she thanked him for being a nice person. Therefore, only the protective helping behavior in the BS help condition could be considered BS behavior as defined by Glick and Fiske (1996).

In Study 1, we focused on the positive aspects of BS behavior for men and conducted a real-life field experiment in a pedestrian zone. In Study 2, we conducted a controlled laboratory experiment, which additionally focused on potential negative consequences of BS behavior. In Study 3, we conducted an online experiment to examine whether the consequences of BS behavior are confined to men, or whether women who engage in cross-gender helping behavior experience similar consequences (i.e., positive self-perception).

**Study 1**

In Study 1, we conducted a real-life field experiment to investigate the effects of BS behavior on men’s self-evaluation. As a pretext to the study, participants were invited to participate in a survey evaluating a new beverage brand, “Splash”.

**Method**

**Participants.** Participants were a convenience sample of \( N = 57 \) men who participated voluntarily and were recruited in a shopping street of a large town in Germany by one of two female research assistants. Four participants questioned the study’s cover story and two participants had more than 20% missings. Thus, the analyses reported below were conducted using data from the remaining 51 participants. Participants identified as male and were between 20 and 66 years of age (\( M = 34.76; SD = 13.63 \)). Forty-seven (92.2%) participants classified themselves as German and four (7.8%) as other (all participants had sufficient German language proficiency).

**Procedure.** For this study, we created a lemonade logo for a new beverage brand called “Splash”. The logo was stuck on bottles of lemonade. Two female experimenters individually recruited male participants. Trained with a pre-written script, the experimenters approached participants following a set procedure. The female experimenter was dressed as a promoter of “Splash” and stood beside two fully filled beverage crates with the label “Splash” in a shopping street. She individually approached passersby whenever she saw a man who appeared to be alone on the shopping street, by saying: “Hello! Would you like to participate in a short survey on the new beverage brand “Splash”? You can taste the new drink. The questionnaire only takes a few minutes!” If the passersby agreed to participate in the study, the experimenter randomly assigned him either to the BS help condition, the neutral help condition, or the no help condition. For this, she discretely and randomly drew one of three bottle tops from her jacket, in which either the number 1, 2 or 3 was written. This way she had
no possibility to deliberately assign participants to one of the three experimental conditions. Then, the experimenter asked the participant to follow her to the barrow but stopped and looked to the two beverage crates at her side. In the BS help condition, she said: “Oh, I can’t leave these crates here. Could you carry them for me? For you as a man this surely is a cinch.” and after arriving at the barrow: “Thank you, you are a true gentleman.” In the neutral help condition, she said: “Oh, I can’t leave these crates here. Could you carry one, too? For us together this surely is a cinch.” and after arriving: “Thank you, you are a nice person.” In the control condition, she did not ask the participant to help her by saying: “These two crates can stay here” and said nothing after arriving at the barrow. At the barrow, the experimenter took one bottle of “Splash”, opened it and gave it to the participant to try it. She waited until the participant tried “Splash” and then instructed him to complete the questionnaire and afterwards to place it in a large envelope (containing several other questionnaires) in order to ensure their anonymity. Participants were then carefully debriefed and thanked for their participation.

**Measures.** All measures were presented on a questionnaire covered as a survey about the new beverage brand “Splash”. The “Splash” logo was printed on the questionnaire, together with the catchphrase “Your opinion is important for us!”. Besides the demographic variables, the first page also contained questions regarding participant’s knowledge about the beverage brand (e.g. “Do you know “Splash”?”). The second page contained the dependent variables. All questions referred to “Splash”, while our variables of interest were subtly interspersed. If not otherwise indicated, all items were assessed on seven-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The items were introduced with the sentence: “How do you feel at the moment, after having tried “Splash”? and thus seemingly referred to participant’s (psychological) state after having tried the lemonade.

Participant’s positive emotions were assessed with three items (e.g., happy; $\alpha = .74$). Self-esteem was assessed with three items (e.g., self-confident; $\alpha = .74$). Self perceived attractiveness was assessed with two items (attractive, appealing; $r = .69$) and self perceived masculinity was assessed with four items (e.g., masculine, dominant; $\alpha = .86$).

**Results and Discussion**

In order to test whether BS help (but not neutral help) leads to an increase in positive emotions, self-esteem, self-perceived attractiveness, and masculinity, we used two planned contrasts. The first compared the BS help condition with the no help condition (control condition 2), the second compared the neutral help condition (control condition 1) with the no help control condition (control condition 2). Correlations of all scales are presented in Table
1. There was no significant main effect of experimenter \((F(1, 46) = 0.48, p = .752, \text{Wilks' } \Lambda = .951)\) on the combined dependent variables. As expected, results indicated that BS help leads to a more positive self-evaluation, compared to neutral help and no help. Men reported more positive emotions, higher levels of self-esteem, and perceived themselves as being more attractive and masculine after engaging in BS help, compared to no help \((F(1, 46) = 7.53, p = .008, \eta^2_p = .143; F(1, 46) = 5.28, p < .026, \eta^2_p = .103; F(1, 46) = 5.26, p = .026, \eta^2_p = .103; F(1, 46) = 5.43, p = .024, \eta^2_p = .106, \) respectively). The difference in all four variables between neutral help and no help was not significant (all \(Fs(1, 46) < 1.14, ps > .29\), see Table 2).

Thus, results of Study 1 provide first evidence that BS behaviors indeed beneficially affect men’s self-evaluation. The field setting and creative cover story lends strong external validity to this finding. However, field studies are less controlled than laboratory experiments and the sample included in Study 1 was rather small. We conducted Study 2 in order to address the limitations of Study 1 and to further investigate potential negative implications of BS behavior.

**Study 2**

In Study 2, we aimed to replicate the Study 1 findings on positive self-evaluation in a new context. We operationalized BS behavior through the **cold-water paradigm** (e.g., von Baeyer, Piira, Chambers, Trapanotto, & Zeltzer, 2005). Study 2 was advertised as a “stress-study”. Going beyond Study 1, we also tested whether engaging in BS help caused men to report stereotypical perceptions of women as less competent, and that following BS help, men are less willing to engage in collective action to increase gender equality.

**Method**

**Participants.** Participants were a convenience sample of \(N = 102\) men recruited on campus at a German University who participated voluntarily and received five Euros for participation. Sample size was determined based on providing sufficient power \((b = .80)\) to detect a medium effect size as significant \((p < .05, \text{Cohen, 1988})\). Four participants questioned the study’s cover story, five participants did not complete full scales. Thus, the analyses reported below were conducted using data from the remaining 93 participants. All participants identified as male and were between 19 and 45 years of age \((M = 24.53, SD = 4.30)\). Ninety-two (95.8%) participants classified themselves as German.
Procedure. Two female experimenters took turn conducting the experiment. As in Study 1, both experimenters were trained with a pre-written script and conducted the experiment identically. The participant arrived alone at the laboratory. He was told to participate in a “stress-study”, supposedly investigating how participants perceive a stressful situation when experiencing it alone or together with another person. First, participants completed some filler questions at the computer assessing how the participant copes with stressors in his everyday life. Meanwhile, the experimenter prepared the “stress-test” by getting a bucket of ice water from the refrigerator. If necessary, she reduced the ice water temperature to a standardized 2-3 degrees Celsius by adding crushed ice. After finishing the first part of the questionnaire, the computer automatically assigned the participant to an experimental condition. If a 01 appeared on the computer screen, the experimenter explained the participant that he would work together with Sarah [BS help condition (1)]. If a 1 appeared, she explained that he would work together with Sven [Neutral help condition (2)]. If a 2 appeared, she explained that he would work alone [No help condition (3)]. In condition 1 and 2, she explained that Sarah/Sven was sitting in another room in the same hallway so they would not distract each other. To increase the credibility, the experimenter had placed a sign stating “Experiment in progress” on the door of the laboratory room and another room in the same hallway. In all three conditions, she explained: “The task is that you [both (1 & 2)] keep your hand in the bucket with ice water for a total of two minutes [together. Therefore, you’ll set the time for Sarah/Sven. When you are done, she/he will try to keep her/his hand in the bucket for the remaining time to complete the two minutes. (1 & 2)]” Then she looked at a message at her mobile phone, typed something, and continued: “[In Sarah’s/Sven’s room, the water doesn’t have the necessary temperature, yet. That’s why you’ll start. (1 & 2)] Let me prepare the stopwatch for you.”. The experimenter placed a stopwatch in front of the participant and said: “I’ll tell you the time every 30 seconds. Keep the hand that you don’t use for writing in the water for as long as you want, and move your hand from time to time. [Remember, Sarah/Sven will be asked to put her/his hand in their bucket for the remaining time. (1 & 2)] Let’s start!” The task was either finished when the participants removed his hand from the bucket or when two minutes were reached. After finishing, the experimenter gave the participant feedback by saying “That was very long.” In the BS help condition she added: “You are a real gentleman! Sarah will be glad, that you saved her from some unpleasantness”. In the neutral help condition she additionally said: “You are very friendly! Sven will be glad, that you saved him from some unpleasantness!” Afterwards, all participants
completed the second part of the questionnaire including the dependent variables. Finally, participants were thanked, fully debriefed and paid 5€ for participating.

**Measures.** All questions were presented as referring to the stress-test. In addition to the dependent variables, the questionnaire contained filler items (e.g., “In a relationship, people should be allowed to tell each other when they are stressed.”). If not otherwise indicated, all items were assessed on seven-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). The scales were somewhat longer than in Study 1, because in Study 1 we had to create a very short questionnaire to stick to the cover story.

*Positive Emotions* were assessed with two items adapted from Janke (1992): “a feeling of joy (e.g., joyful, happy, cheerful)” and “a feeling of pride (e.g., self-confident, self-assured; \( r = .64 \)).” *Self-Esteem* was assessed with two items (self-confident, recognized; \( r = .36 \)). *Attractiveness* was assessed as in Study 1 (\( r = .73 \)). *Masculinity* was assessed with eight items (e.g., masculine, determined, assertive, \( \alpha = .70 \)). *Women’s competence* was assessed with two items (smart, competent; \( r = .55 \)). Participant’s willingness to engage in *collective action* in the future to increase gender equality was assessed with two items (e.g., “Sign a petition, which addresses topics such as gender equality actions.”; \( r = .43 \), Becker & Wright, 2011) on a seven-point Likert scale from 1 (*not likely*) to 7 (*very likely*).

**Results and Discussion**

Correlations of all scales are presented in Table 3. There was no significant main effect of experimenter (\( F(1, 88) = 0.37, p = .934, \) Wilks’ \( \Lambda = .965 \)). The analyses reported below are based on the same contrasts as in Study 1. Replicating findings from Study 1, results revealed that men reported more positive emotions, a tendency for higher self-esteem, and perceived themselves as being more attractive and masculine after engaging in BS help, compared to no help (\( F(1, 88) = 5.46, p = .022, \eta_p^2 = .058; F(1, 88) = 3.15, p = .079, \eta_p^2 = .035; F(1, 88) = 6.00, p = .016, \eta_p^2 = .064; F(1, 88) = 4.68, p = .033, \eta_p^2 = .051 \)). In all four variables, the difference between neutral help and no help was not significant (all \( Fs(1, 88) < 1.28, ps > .262 \), see Table 4).

As expected, results additionally revealed that men perceived women to be less competent after engaging in BS help, compared to no help. The difference between neutral help and no help was not significant (\( F(1, 88) = 3.93, p = .051, \eta_p^2 = .043; F(1, 88) < 0.01, p = .950, \eta_p^2 < .001 \), respectively, see Table 4). Finally, as expected, men were less willing to engage in collective action to increase gender equality after engaging in BS help, compared to
no help. The difference between neutral help and no help was not significant ($F(1, 88) = 4.13$, $p = .045, \eta^2_p = .045$; $F(1, 88) = 0.05, p = .825, \eta^2_p < .001$, respectively, see Table 4).

In sum, results of Study 2 replicate the results from Study 1, illustrating that engaging in BS behavior can boost men’s self-evaluation. Further, going beyond the findings of Study 1, results from Study 2 illustrated that BS behavior is also accompanied by potentially negative effects: Men perceived women as being less competent and were less willing to engage in collective action to increase gender equality after engaging in BS help compared to the control conditions.

Although we found consistent findings across two different contexts (field study and laboratory study) and across two different operationalizations of BS behavior (carrying crates for a woman and putting one’s hand in ice water to protect women from pain), the findings again raise new questions. First, how does engaging in BS behavior affect men’s stereotypical perception of their own gender after a same-gender interaction (Shnabel et al., 2015)? Will they perceive men in general to be less competent when they help a man? It further remains unclear whether the findings from Study 1 and 2 are confined to men or whether similar effects may occur for women engaging in BS behavior. It is not very common for women to behave chivalrously towards men, but it is possible and it could have similar effects on women. To address these research questions, we conducted Study 3 using a male (Study 3a) and a female sample (Study 3b).

**Study 3**

**Study 3a**

In addition to replicating the findings of the prior studies, the novel research question in this study refers to how men perceive other men after a same-gender interaction. In Study 1 and Study 2, we focused on the evaluation of women after a cross-gender interaction, only. Thus, it is possible that when a man helps another man, he perceives men in general to be less competent. We do not think, however, that this possibility is likely, because a man who needs help might be perceived as an exception of the role (Glick & Fiske, 1999). Thus, a generalization to men as a group is rather unlikely. However, it is possible that perceptions of male competency increase after engaging in BS help, because BS behavior reinforces traditional gender stereotypes (e.g., Glick & Fiske, 1996). We do not expect any effects on the stereotypical perception of men as being warm.

**Method. Participants.** Participants were a convenience sample of $N = 127$ men who participated voluntarily in an online experiment. They were recruited via Websites and
through university mailing lists. Sample size was determined based on providing sufficient power ($b = .80$) to detect a medium effect size as significant ($p < .05$, Cohen, 1988). Seventeen participants began the study without completing it. Four participants did not complete full scales and two participants questioned the study’s cover story. Thus, the analyses reported below were conducted using data from the remaining 104 participants (81.9%). A lottery of five 20€ shopping vouchers was offered as compensation. All participants identified as male and were between 18 and 60 years of age ($M = 29.56$, $SD = 8.22$). Ninety-six (88.9%) participants self-classified as German.

**Procedure.** Participants were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions (BS help, neutral help, no help) and instructed to read a scenario while imagining that they were the protagonist in the story. The scenarios in the BS help condition and in the neutral help condition were identical in their description and differed only regarding the help recipient’s gender and the feedback at the end of the scenario. While in the BS help scenario, a woman thanked the participant for being a true gentleman (representing BS behavior), in the neutral help scenario, a man thanked the participant for being a friendly person (representing neutral behavior). In the no help condition, participants read the same text without referring to helping someone else. The text read as follows:

*After a great holiday, you are travelling back home. At the check-in counter of the airport, an employee greets you and explains that your flight is overbooked. He asks you to wait for a moment beside [a woman: BS help condition (1); a man: neutral help condition (2); the counter: no help condition (3)]. He calls [both of (only in 1 & 2)] you to the counter and explains, that there is only one seat left on the 7pm plane. [Therefore, one of you will have to take the next plane at 2am (1 & 2)]. However, the plane leaving at 2am is still quite empty. Thus, passengers in this machine will have lots of space. The check-in employee looks at his computer screen and tells you that your reservation arrived first in the system and that therefore, in principle, you are entitled to the seat on the first plane. He asks which flight you want to take. You [look to the woman/man and you can see in her/his face, how concerned she/he is. You therefore (1 & 2)] start to silently debate the options: On the one hand, you are very tired and just want to get home. On the other hand, [you don't want the woman/man to wait alone until 2am at the airport for the next plane. Besides, (1 & 2)] you have no objection to flying more comfortably. You inform the check-in employee [that you will leave your seat to the woman/man and (1 and 2)] that you will fly with the next plane. The check-in employee apologizes to you for having to wait such a long time and arranges that, as a compensation, you will have 250€ reimbursed from the airfare. Then, he wishes [each of (1 & 2)] you a good*
journey. [The woman/man is grateful to you and does not know what to say. You explain to
her/him that while being tired, you don’t want her/him to have to wait alone until 2am for the
next plane. She/He is very pleased and shakes your hand, saying that you are a true
gentleman/ a very friendly person and that she/he is happy that today there are still
gentlemen/friendly people as nice as you (1 & 2)].

After reading the scenario, participants completed the dependent variables. Finally,
participants were thanked, debriefed and could enter their email address for the lottery.

Measures. In addition to the dependent measures, the questionnaire contained
questions regarding participants' coping mechanisms for stress, as in Study 2. All questions
were presented as referring to the stressful situation described in the scenario. If not otherwise
indicated, all items were assessed on seven-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The same measures were used as in Study 2 to assess positive
emotions (r = .44), self-esteem (r = .42), masculinity (α = .81), and women’s warmth (α =
.76). Attractiveness was assessed with one word (pleasing) in addition to the two-item scale
established in Study 1 (α = .90). In order to avoid socially desirable responding, the items we
used to assess men’s competence and warmth were slightly different from the assessment of
women’s competence and warmth.

Women’s competence was assessed with two words (intelligent, capable) in addition to
the two-item scale established in Study 2 (α = .93). Men’s competence was assessed with four
items (e.g., ambitious, decided; α = .81). Men’s warmth was assessed with three items (e.g.,
sensitive; α = .80). Participant’s willingness to engage in collective action was assessed with
seven items (e.g., “Distribute flyers addressing the discrimination of women.”) in addition to
the two-item scale established in Study 2 (α = .89).

Results and Discussion. Correlations of all scales are presented in Table 5. The
analyses reported below are based on the same contrasts as in Study 1. Replicating findings
from Study 1 and 2, results showed that men reported more positive emotions, higher self-
esteem, and perceived themselves as being more attractive and masculine after engaging in
BS help, compared to no help (F(1, 104) = 12.96, p < .001, η²_p = .111; F(1, 104) = 10.07, p =
.002, η²_p = .088; F(1, 104) = 14.81, p < .001, η²_p = .125; F(1, 104) = 5.99, p = .016, η²_p =
.054, respectively, see Table 6). However, in Study 3a, men also reported more positive
emotions and higher self-esteem after engaging in neutral help, compared to no help (F(1,
104) = 9.26, p = .003, η²_p = .082; F(1, 104) = 7.65, p = .007, η²_p = .069, respectively, see
Table 6). For men’s self-perceived attractiveness and masculinity, the difference between neutral help and no help was not significant (all $F$s$(1, 104) < 2.55$, all $p$s $>.114$, see Table 6).

As in Study 2, men perceived women to be less competent after engaging in BS help, compared to no help. The difference between neutral help and no help was not significant ($F$(1, 104) = 6.46, $p = .013$, $\eta^2_p = .058$; $F$(1, 104) = 1.85, $p = .177$, $\eta^2_p = .017$, respectively, see Table 6). Regarding men’s stereotypical perception of women as being warm, the difference between BS help and neutral help or no help was not significant (all $F$s$(1, 104) < 2.52$, all $p$s $>.116$, see Table 6). Moreover, again, men were less willing to engage in collective action to increase gender equality after engaging in BS help. The difference between neutral help and no help was not significant ($F$(1, 104) = 7.65, $p = .022$, $\eta^2_p = .049$; $F$(1, 104) = 1.77, $p = .187$, $\eta^2_p = .017$, respectively, see Table 6). Finally, men perceived men in general to be somewhat more competent after engaging in BS help, compared to no help. The difference between neutral help and no help was not significant ($F$(1, 104) = 3.19, $p = .077$, $\eta^2_p = .030$; $F$(1, 104) = 1.63, $p = .205$, $\eta^2_p = .015$, respectively, see Table 6). Regarding men’s perception of men in general as being warm, the difference between BS help and no help was not significant. However, results revealed that men perceived men in general to be warmer after engaging in neutral help, compared to no help ($F$(1, 104) = 4.51, $p = .303$, $\eta^2_p = .010$; $F$(1, 104) = 2.52, $p = .036$, $\eta^2_p = .042$, respectively, see Table 6).

In sum, results of Study 3a replicate the findings from Study 1 and 2, illustrating that BS behavior leads to a more positive self-evaluation, but also to stereotypical perceptions of women as less competent and to reduced collective action intentions.

In contrast to Study 1 and 2, in Study 3a, men additionally reported more positive emotions and higher self-esteem after engaging in neutral help. This might be due to the fact that the operationalization of helping was stronger in this study compared to the prior studies (we return to this argument in the general discussion).

In this study, we examined the alternative explanation for our findings that helping another person can generalize to viewing the help-recipient’s group as less competent independent of the helper’s gender. Results suggest, however, that although men perceived women to be less competent when engaging in BS help, they did not perceive men to be less competent when engaging in helping behavior towards men. In contrast, men perceived men in general to be somewhat more competent after engaging in BS behavior, but not after engaging in neutral or no behavior. This finding shows how easily salient gender-role-
consistent behavior can reinforce traditional gender-roles beliefs. In order to investigate whether similar processes occur when women engage in helping behavior, we conducted Study 3b.

**Study 3b**

BS behavior of a woman directed at a man can only rarely be observed, because paternalistic behavior is shown by powerful and dominant groups towards their subordinates, but not by powerless groups towards the dominant group (Jackman, 1994). This can also be seen in the fact that there is no female equivalent of a “gentleman” – a term we have used in the previous studies. Therefore, in this study we do not use the term "BS help", but use “helping a woman” (in a same-gender encounter) vs. “helping a man” (in a cross-gender encounter). However, critical readers could argue that when women help men, the implications should be the same as those found in the previous studies on BS behavior. That is, when helping men, women could feel more positive about themselves and more dominant/masculine, but perceive men as less competent. Prior work illustrated an enhancing effect of volunteering on women’s well-being and self-esteem (Messias et al., 2005). Thus, we expect that women experience more positive emotions and greater self-esteem after engaging in helping behavior towards women and men. However, we do not expect any effect on women’s self-perceived attractiveness and masculinity, because helping behavior is expected from women (e.g., Glick & Fiske, 1996) and helping other people (independent of their gender) should reinforce, but not weaken, traditional gender-roles. For similar reasons, we do not expect that engaging in helping behavior towards a man leads women to view men as less competent, or that their motivation for collective action should be affected.

**Method.** Participants. Participants were a convenience sample of \( N = 227 \) women. The recruitment procedure was the same as in Study 3a. Power analysis indicated the same sample size as in Study 3a. However, we had slightly more participants than calculated, because participation in an online-experiment is more difficult to regulate than a laboratory study. Nine participants began the study without completing it, four participants had more than 20% missings, and one participant questioned the study’s cover story. Thus, the analyses reported below were conducted using data from the remaining 189 participants (92.0%). All participants identified as female and were between 18 and 72 years of age (\( M = 27.68, SD = 7.98 \)). One-hundred-seventy-four (90.6%) participants classified themselves as German and eighteen (9.4%) as other.

**Procedure.** The procedure and the control condition were identical to Study 3a. However, because we could not use the term “gentleman”, we changed the ending of the
scenarios in the condition helping a woman (1) and helping a man (2). We used “kind-hearted” woman as female equivalent to “gentleman”:

[She/He is very pleased and shakes your hand while saying that you are a truly kind-hearted person/ a very friendly person and that she/he is happy that today, there still are kind-hearted people/friendly people who are as nice as you (1 & 2)].

Measures. We used the same measures as in Study 3a (Positive emotions: \( r = .66 \); self-esteem: \( r = .61 \); attractiveness: \( \alpha = .91 \); masculinity: \( \alpha = .83 \); women’s competence: \( \alpha = .94 \); women’s warmth: \( \alpha = .79 \); men’s competence: \( \alpha = .85 \); men’s warmth: \( \alpha = .86 \); collective action intentions: \( \alpha = .94 \)).

Results and Discussion. Correlations of all scales are presented in Table 7. As expected, helping a woman and helping a man led to a more positive self-evaluation regarding women’s emotions, compared to not helping anyone (\( F(2, 185) = 15.36, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .077; F(2, 185) = 17.03, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .084 \)) respectively, see Table 8). There were, however, no differences between the three conditions in terms of women’s self-esteem, self-perceived attractiveness and masculinity (all Fs(1, 185) < 2.31, all ps > .130, see Table 8). Furthermore, there were no differences between the three conditions in terms of perceptions of women’s competence, men’s competence, and men’s warmth (all Fs(1, 185) < 1.05, \( p = .307 \)). However, women perceived women in general as warmer after having helped a woman, than after having helped a man. The difference between helping a man and not helping anyone was not significant (\( F(1, 185) = 4.61, p = .033, \eta^2_p = .024; F(1, 185) < .01, p = .948, \eta^2_p < .001 \), respectively, see Table 8). Further, there was no difference between the three conditions in terms of women’s collective actions tendencies (all \( F(1, 185) < 0.61, p > .437 \), see Table 8).

In sum, results of Study 3b revealed that the findings for women differ considerably from the findings for men (Study 3a). Helping another person did not have any impact on any of our measures except on positive emotions and perceived warmth of women. Helping another person, independent of the help-recipient’s gender, increased positive emotions among women. This is in line with prior work showing that engaging in volunteer community work had a positive effect on women’s well-being (Messias et al., 2005). Furthermore, only helping another woman increased women’s perception that women in general are warm. This indicates that helping a woman increased not only men’s but also women’s stereotypical perception of women in general, but differently: While men’s stereotypical perception of women changed regarding women’s competence, women’s stereotypical perception changed regarding women’s warmth. A possible explanation for women’s increased stereotypical
perception of women’s warmth could be that women’s their perception of women in general was elicited by the help-seeking woman in the scenario. Because the woman in the scenario was seeking help, female participants could have perceived her as acting in line with the stereotypical gender-roles prescribed to women and therefore as being especially warm (Good & Sanchez, 2009). Moreover, this result contrasts the results for men, who perceived women as less competent after engaging in BS behavior, whereas their stereotypical perception of women as being warm remained unaffected by this type of behavior. The findings point to a stability in men’s perception of women’s warmth. This is in line with previous research proposing that positive stereotypes are stable (Czopp, Kay & Cheryan, 2015). Also men’s concurrent increase in their own perceived competency is in line with previous research demonstrating that group interactions can lead to more negative stereotypes of the outgroup, while leading to more positive stereotypes of the ingroup (Stott & Drury, 2004).

In conclusion, results from Studies 3a and 3b demonstrate that the consequences of helping someone from the other sex differ for men and women. Whereas both, men and women, experience more positive emotions after helping another person independent of that person’s gender, only men viewed women as less competent and were less likely to engage in collective action after engaging in BS behavior.

**General Discussion**

At first glance, benevolent sexism provides benefits for women: They are protected and provided for, put on a pedestal, or helped with technical problems. In the present research, we have addressed the question why men engage in BS behaviors even though it benefits women only – at least on the surface. In three studies, we demonstrated that men clearly benefit from BS behavior as well – much more than from engaging in friendly behaviors towards other men. We illustrated that men experience more positive emotions, higher levels of self-esteem, attractiveness, and masculinity when they cared for a woman in a chivalrous manner. Therefore, the first conclusion of the present research is that men might engage in BS behavior because they experience it as directly rewarding. The second conclusion of the present work refers to more negative aspects of BS behavior: the finding that what benefits men may simultaneously burden women. Specifically, we demonstrated that after engaging in BS, men perceived women as less competent and were less willing to engage in collective action to change unequal gender relations. Although this research nicely resonates with prior work on negative effects of BS for women (e.g., Barreto et al., 2010; Becker & Wright, 2011; Dardenne et al., 2007; Hammond et al., 2016; Shnabel et al., 2015),
it is the first study showing the direct consequences of BS behavior on gender stereotypes and action tendencies regarding social change from a *male* perspective. The third conclusion points to the lack of findings for women who engage in helping behavior towards men. Although women experience positive emotions after helping women and men, and perceive women in general as warmer after helping a woman, no other effects occurred. This implies that when women behave “paternalistically” towards men, it changes neither their perceptions of men in general nor their motivation to work for social change. In sum, results demonstrate that BS behavior serves as a “double reinforcer” of traditional gender relations: it is directly rewarding via a positive self-evaluation, and in turn, maintains traditional gender stereotypes.

*Open Questions*

Why did we find an increase in positive self-perception after helping women and men in Study 3, but did not find an effect on positive self-evaluation after engaging in neutral help in Study 1 and 2? We argue that in Study 1, participants did not perceive the act of carrying one of two crates when the female experimenter carried the other as a helping behavior. Similarly, in Study 2, just putting the hand in ice-water did not necessarily imply that the participant wanted to help his male team member. This could explain the absence of a positive effect on participants' self-evaluations in the neutral help condition. However, in the scenario in Study 3, the participant knew that by giving up his seat on an airplane to another person, he helped the other person to great extents. Finally, in contrast to Studies 1 and 2 where participants were somewhat forced to engage in BS behavior, in Study 3, participants imagined that they voluntarily decided to help another person. Thus, participants could have perceived the helping behavior as a prosocial behavior, namely a voluntary behavior intended to fulfill another person’s need for support (Eisenberg, Fabes, & Spinrad, 2006). Voluntary behavior could entail stronger effects than behavior that was not complete voluntary (as in Study 1). Future research is necessary to clarify the influence of voluntariness on the consequences of BS behavior. Additionally, future research could investigate facilitators and inhibitors of BS behavior.

*Strengths, Limitations, and Directions for Future Research*

It is a particular strength of the present work that the results replicated across different situations and different operationalizations of BS behavior. In Study 1, men were asked to carry bottle crates for women; in Study 2 men were asked to put their hand in ice water, ostensibly to prevent that a women had to put her hand in ice water as well; In Study 3, men offered their seat on an airplane to another women in order to protect her from waiting alone
at the airport until late at night. Replication of our findings across these three diverse behaviors points to the robustness of processes elicited by BS behavior.

A further strength is our addition of a female sample in Study 3b. Comparing a male sample with a female sample allowed us to better understand the ambivalent effects of benevolent sexism on men’s and women’s self-evaluation, their stereotypical perceptions of men and women in general, as well as the role of BS behavior for the maintenance of gender inequality and the inhibition of social change. Specifically, we were able to eliminate two possible alternative explanations in Study 3. Critics could firstly argue that men may also perceive men in general as less competent after having helped another man, and secondly that the results obtained for male help-providers in terms of women could also occur for female help-providers in terms of men. Both alternative explanations were, however, not supported by results of Study 3.

Finally, prior research had pointed out that, although there is much research on BS attitudes, BS behaviors have rarely been examined (for exceptions, see de Oliveira Laux, Ksenofontov, & Becker, 2015; Hebl et al., 2007; King et al., 2012; Moya et al., 2007). Thus, the present work also contributes to providing valid operationalizations of BS behavior that can be used in future research.

Some limitations of the present research should also be noted. For our investigation of BS behavior, we used protective paternalism (e.g., Becker & Sibley, 2015) as a proxy for benevolent sexism, as has been done in other studies as well (e.g., Hebl et al., 2007; Moya et al., 2007). Because benevolent sexism could also be operationalized through complementary gender differentiation and heterosexual intimacy as defined by Glick and Fiske (1996), future research could test whether the findings we obtained in our research can also be found when BS behavior is assessed through another proxy for benevolent sexism.

While we devoted significant attention to the development of convincing cover stories across all studies (e.g., by dressing the experimenter as a promoter) and included distractor items (e.g., questions regarding participants' coping mechanisms for stress), in all studies at least one participant questioned the study’s cover story. Future research should pay special attention when creating a cover story and experimental procedure to include more filler questions to distract participants from the research questions.

**Conclusion**

Using three different operationalizations of BS behavior, the present research shows that engaging in BS behavior benefits men: Men feel more positive emotions, higher levels of self-esteem, and perceive themselves to be more attractive and masculine after engaging in
BS compared to two control conditions. However, findings of the present work also confirm the perils of benevolent sexism described in prior research. We demonstrated that BS behavior can reinforce traditional gender stereotypes of women as less competent and undermine men’s motivation to engage in collective action for more gender equality. Thus, BS is a double-edged sword, working twofold by providing men with an overall more positive self-evaluation, while simultaneously contributing to the maintenance of gender inequality.
References


Table 1
Study 1: Correlations of all study variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Positive Emotions Scale</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Masculinity Scale</td>
<td>.62**</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Attractiveness Scale</td>
<td>.52**</td>
<td>.77**</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Self-Esteem Scale</td>
<td>.54**</td>
<td>.76**</td>
<td>.62***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: N = 51.*

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed).
Table 2

Study 1: Descriptive statistics of Emotions, Masculinity, Attractiveness, Self-Esteem by Experimental Condition [means and (SD)].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>Experimental Condition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Benevolent sexist Behavior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Positive Emotions</td>
<td>5.37 (.99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Self-Esteem</td>
<td>4.87 (.83)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Attractiveness</td>
<td>4.60 (1.07)</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Masculinity</td>
<td>4.73 (.97)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

*Note: N = 51. SD = Standard deviation.*
Table 3

Study 2: Correlations of all study variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>1</th>
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<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Positive Emotions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Self-Esteem</td>
<td>.22*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Attractiveness</td>
<td>.25*</td>
<td>.42***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Masculinity</td>
<td>.28**</td>
<td>.51***</td>
<td>.53***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Femininity</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.21*</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Women’s Competence</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.34**</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Women’s Warmth</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.46***</td>
<td>.28**</td>
<td>.43***</td>
<td>.26*</td>
<td>.73***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Collective Action</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N = 93.

† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (two-tailed).
Table 4

Study 2: Descriptive statistics of Emotions, Masculinity, Attractiveness, Self-Esteem by Experimental Condition [means and (SD)].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>Experimental Condition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Benevolent sexist Behavior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Positive Emotions</td>
<td>4.98 (.99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Self-Esteem</td>
<td>5.48 (.81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Attractiveness</td>
<td>4.96 (.78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Masculinity</td>
<td>5.01 (.62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Femininity</td>
<td>5.37 (.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Women’s Competence</td>
<td>4.98 (.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Women’s Warmth</td>
<td>5.32 (.88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Collective Action</td>
<td>3.41 (1.35)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: N = 93. SD = Standard deviation.*
Table 5  
Study 3a: Correlations of all study variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Positive Emotions</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Self-Esteem</td>
<td>.34***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Attractiveness</td>
<td>.25**</td>
<td>.46***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Masculinity</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.60***</td>
<td>.63***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Women’s Competence</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Women’s Warmth</td>
<td>.45***</td>
<td>.20*</td>
<td>.33***</td>
<td>.29**</td>
<td>.36***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Men’s Competence</td>
<td>.30**</td>
<td>.39***</td>
<td>.34***</td>
<td>.25**</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.55***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Collective Action</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N = 104.

†p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed).
Table 6
Study 3a: Descriptive statistics of Emotions, Masculinity, Attractiveness, Self-Esteem by Experimental Condition [means and (SD)].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>Experimental Condition</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Benevolent sexist Behavior</td>
<td>Neutral Behavior</td>
<td>Control (no Behavior)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Positive Emotions Scale</td>
<td>5.19 (1.20)</td>
<td>5.01 (1.29)</td>
<td>4.12 (1.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Self-Esteem Scale</td>
<td>5.41 (.85)</td>
<td>5.32 (.97)</td>
<td>4.72 (.90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Attractiveness Scale</td>
<td>4.97 (.81)</td>
<td>4.44 (.93)</td>
<td>4.05 (1.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Masculinity Scale</td>
<td>5.02 (.71)</td>
<td>4.74 (.79)</td>
<td>4.56 (.83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Women’s Competence</td>
<td>4.49 (1.13)</td>
<td>5.34 (.89)</td>
<td>5.02 (.80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Women’s Warmth</td>
<td>5.32 (.87)</td>
<td>5.44 (.80)</td>
<td>5.11 (.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Men’s Competence</td>
<td>5.11 (.81)</td>
<td>5.02 (.73)</td>
<td>4.78 (.69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Men’s Warmth</td>
<td>4.23 (.89)</td>
<td>4.44 (.96)</td>
<td>4.00 (.72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Collective Action</td>
<td>2.53 (.94)</td>
<td>3.56 (1.28)</td>
<td>3.23 (1.39)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: N = 104. SD = Standard deviation.*
Table 7  
Study 3b: Correlations of all study variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Positive Emotions</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Self-Esteem</td>
<td>.27***</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Attractiveness</td>
<td>.28***</td>
<td>.61***</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Masculinity</td>
<td>.32***</td>
<td>.74***</td>
<td>.63***</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Women’s Competence</td>
<td>.17*</td>
<td>.17*</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.17*</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Women’s Warmth</td>
<td>.23**</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.70***</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Men’s Competence</td>
<td>.19**</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.62***</td>
<td>.55***</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Men’s Warmth</td>
<td>.17*</td>
<td>.18**</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.18*</td>
<td>.58***</td>
<td>.40***</td>
<td>.54***</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Collective Action</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.20**</td>
<td>.14†</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.14*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: N = 189.*

†p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed).
Table 8
Study 3b: Descriptive statistics of Emotions, Masculinity, Attractiveness, Self-Esteem by Experimental Condition [means and (SD)].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>Experimental Condition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Benevolent sexist Behavior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Positive Emotions</td>
<td>5.02 (1.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Self-Esteem</td>
<td>4.83 (1.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Attractiveness</td>
<td>4.35 (1.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Masculinity</td>
<td>4.23 (.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Women’s Competence</td>
<td>5.45 (.97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Women’s Warmth</td>
<td>5.49 (1.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Men’s Competence</td>
<td>5.09 (.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Men’s Warmth</td>
<td>4.57 (1.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Collective Action</td>
<td>3.34 (1.46)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: N = 189. SD = Standard deviation.*
Endnotes

1 Age of participants was included as covariate in all analyses because previous research has found age effects when analyzing benevolent sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996). Therefore, we controlled for age in all analyses. However, results did not change substantially when not controlling for age. Only in Study 3b, there was an effect of participant’s age ($F(1, 104) = 2.355, p = .016; \text{Wilks' } \Lambda = .801$), illustrating at the univariate level that the younger men were, the more likely they perceived themselves as masculine, attractive, self-confident and competent, the more likely they perceived women as warm and competent, but the less willing they were to engage in collective action.

2 In addition to men’s self-perceived masculinity, in Study 2 we also assessed men’s self-perceived femininity (assessed with three items, e.g. sensitive; $\alpha = .80$) and men’s perception of women’s warmth (assessed with three items, e.g. adorable; $\alpha = .71$). As expected, results revealed that neither men’s perception of themselves as being feminine nor men’s perception of women’s warmth differed between the conditions (all $F$s(1, 88) $< 0.49, ps > .486$; $F$s(1, 88) $< 0.33, ps > .569$, respectively, see Table 4).

3 The mean time (in seconds), participants kept their hand in the ice-water was 90.67 ($SD = 27.05$) in the BS help condition, 77.69 ($SD = 28.83$) in the neutral help condition, and 72.57 ($SD = 36.00$) in the no help condition. An analysis of variance revealed that the time in seconds, men kept their hand in the ice water for a woman was somewhat longer, than for another man ($F(1, 59) = 3.61, p = .062, \eta^2_p = .058$).
Manuscript #3

The collective value of “me” (and its limitations): Towards a more nuanced understanding of individual and collective coping with prejudice.

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1 University of Osnabrueck
2 University of Exeter
3 Lisbon University Institute (CIS, ISCTE-IUL)
4 Portland State University

Abstract

Within the social identity tradition, individual and collective responses to social disadvantage are typically seen as mutually exclusive. The current study \(N = 120\) provides a more nuanced understanding of individual and collective responses to social disadvantage by examining the ways in which women anticipate responding to ‘daily sexism’. We test how responses are independently related to ingroup identification, disidentification, and perceived ingroup homogeneity. Results show that women favor confronting sexism over inaction, even if that involves disparaging the ingroup. Specifically, women expect to engage in both individual and collective strategies in response to a sexist statement. Identification with women was positively associated with both collective and individual (non-group disparaging) responses, but only collective responses related to broader intentions to engage in collective action for social change. Finally, perceived group homogeneity uniquely increased agreement with the sexist statement, endorsement of inaction, and group-disparaging responses. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.
The collective value of ‘me’ (and its limitations): Towards a more nuanced understanding of individual and collective coping with prejudice

Prior research has tended to examine individual and collective responses to social disadvantage in separate lines of research. Group-based responses have been primarily studied within work on collective action, where, based on social identity theory, they have been framed as psychologically incompatible with individual responses (for overviews see van Zomeren, Postmes & Spears, 2008; Wright, 2010). In turn, individual responses to prejudice have more often been examined from a stress and coping perspective, focusing primarily on intra-psychic reactions without a clear link to the group on the basis of which prejudiced treatment is received (see Kaiser & Major, 2004 for an overview). In this paper, we build on and integrate these two lines of research with the aim of providing a more nuanced understanding of individual and collective responses to prejudice. Our overall goal is to examine the extent to which both individual and collective strategies play a role in women’s response to sexism. To understand the motivational underpinnings of these strategies, we also examine whether women’s responses to prejudice are related to their levels of ingroup identification, disidentification, and perceived group homogeneity. Finally, we examine how responses to daily encounters with sexism relate to broader intentions to engage in collective action on behalf of women.

**Confronting Prejudice**

Confronting prejudice is a form of protest that involves directly expressing dissatisfaction to the perpetrator. Confronting prejudice is a double-edged sword for the targeted group member. On the one hand, it can lead to positive outcomes for the confronter, such as an increased sense of competence, self-esteem, and empowerment (Gervais et al., 2010; Hyers, 2007; Swim & Thomas, 2005). Moreover, confronting can reduce future stereotype use in perpetrators (Czopp, Monteith, & Mark, 2006) and observers (Rasinski & Czopp, 2010). On the other hand, however, protestors are not always supported by ingroup and outgroup members and can receive social costs for their actions, often being seen as troublemakers and unlikable (e.g., Becker, Glick, Ilic, & Bohner, 2011; Dodd, Giuliano, Boutell, & Moran, 2001; Kaiser & Miller, 2001, 2003).

Reactions to confrontation depend on a range of factors, including the precise way in which confrontation is enacted and group identification (Becker & Barreto, in press; Czopp et al., 2006; Kaiser et al., 2009). For example, women weakly identified and men highly identified with their gender were unsupportive of aggressive confrontation of sexism;
however for women highly identified and men weakly identified with their gender, no confrontation at all was evaluated more negatively than aggressive and non-aggressive confrontation (Becker & Barreto, in press). This suggests that, at least under certain conditions, what is crucial is to ensure that displeasure about prejudicial treatment is expressed and challenged in some way. Moreover, this work underlines the importance of considering gender identification as a predictor of collective responses to prejudice.

The study reported in this paper examined whether this extends to how women anticipate responding when they encounter sexism themselves (rather than witness the reactions of others). Specifically, we examined whether women also favor both individual and collective strategies above inaction when choosing how to respond to sexist events they encounter themselves. To further understand this process, we also examined the extent to which these responses are related to women’s gender identification, disidentification, and perceived ingroup homogeneity.

**Individual and Collective Responses to Prejudice**

Within the social identity theory tradition, individual and collective responses to social disadvantage are generally seen as mutually exclusive (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The basis of this assumption is that individual and collective responses require fundamentally different mindsets and have fundamentally different consequences. Individual responses require an individual mobility belief system in which the social structure is perceived to be stable and legitimate but permeable. Under these conditions, individuals are free to disengage from their group and attempt to improve their individual position. By contrast, collective responses rely on a social change belief system in which the social structure is seen as unstable, illegitimate, and impermeable. Under these conditions, individual mobility cannot take place, so members of disadvantaged groups direct their efforts to improve the conditions of their group through collective attempts.

Research has supported these links between socio-structural conditions, group identification, and behavioral tendencies, showing that social systems that promote one type of individual or collective response tend to inhibit the other (Ellemers, 2001; Wright, 2001). In addition, engaging in an individual or collective strategy tends to shift mindsets in ways that inhibit engagement in the other type of strategy. For example, the pursuit of individual mobility has been shown to reduce group identification and weaken the motivation for collective action (e.g., Derks, van Laar, Ellemers, & Raghoe, in press; Ellemers, 2001; Wright, 2001; but see Tausch, Saguy, & Bryson, in press).
Based on the above research, one might assume that fellow group members would be unsupportive of individual strategies to cope with prejudice, given that this individual action might be perceived to be at the expense of collective coping. However, while this trade-off between individual and collective actions makes sense considering responses to broad scale social disadvantage and wide ranging social action, given the resources it requires, this trade-off may be less self-evident when examining responses to daily forms of prejudice or discrimination (e.g., Swim et al., 2001). Just like other forms of prejudice, sexism is often encountered in the course of one’s daily life, often through routine interpersonal exchanges (Sue, 2010). Although broad scale collective action is an unlikely response to this type of daily micro-aggression, targets may choose to confront the perpetrator by emphasizing the inappropriateness of the comment for women as a whole (collective confrontation), for themselves personally (individual confrontation), or both. In this case, individuals can easily engage in both strategies at the same time. In addition, both individual and collective confrontation strategies emphasize the inappropriateness of sexist treatment, ultimately serving both the individual and the group. It is thus possible that women support both individual and collective responses to sexism, and be more supportive of both types of confrontation than letting the sexist comment pass unchallenged in any way.

Although this idea has as yet to be directly researched, one study suggests that women might indeed see equal benefit in individual and collective responses to sexism (Garcia, Schmitt, Branscombe, & Ellemers, 2010). Garcia and colleagues (2010) compared women’s evaluations of a female lawyer who felt she had been the target of gender discrimination, and who either protested on behalf of women, on behalf of herself, or did not protest the decision. Importantly, mirroring social identity theory’s conceptualization of individual mobility, when protesting individually, the female target explicitly differentiated herself from, and derogated, other women, engaging in *individual group-disparaging confrontation*. While participants recognized that collective protest communicated greater concern for women than did individual protest, participants did not derogate the female who confronted individually, possibly because they perceived that individual protest served women as a group better than no protest at all. As a result, individual protest was as positively evaluated as collective protest on a range of measures, and both were more positively evaluated than no protest at all. In a recent replication of this effect, we additionally found that women’s support for both individual and collective confrontation was not moderated by the extent to which participants identified with their gender group—that is, both strongly and weakly identified women saw
the benefit in both collective and individual confrontation in response to sexist treatment (Barreto, Kahn, & du Toit, 2014).

These results call for a deeper understanding of individual and collective responses to social disadvantage. In the present paper, we extend this initial research in three ways by examining group members’ own choice of strategy to cope with prejudice. First, we show that individual and collective strategy endorsement by women who encounter sexism is also not as incompatible as proposed hitherto and can stem from similar group-based motivations. Second, we demonstrate that these strategies have different implications for action outside the particular event where sexism is encountered, suggesting that only engagement in collective responses in daily encounters with sexism is associated with more politicized intentions to promote social change. Thirdly, we detail how women’s levels of group identification influence the choice of strategies to cope with prejudice.

To test these hypotheses, in the study reported here, we assessed the extent to which participants expressed willingness to engage in a variety of strategies in response to sexism, including individual responses, collective responses, and inaction. Importantly, extending beyond Garcia et al.’s (2010) conceptualization of individual responses, we examined two forms of individual confrontation: ingroup-disparaging (as in Garcia et al., 2010) and ingroup non-disparaging. While ingroup-disparaging confrontation involves self-group differentiation, ingroup non-disparaging confrontation focuses only on rejecting the applicability of the stereotype to the self, without refuting (collective confrontation) or supporting (individual disparaging confrontation) its applicability to the group. Although we expected that all forms of confrontation would be preferred above inaction, since they stress the inappropriateness of sexist treatment, we expected a more similar relationship between collective and non-disparaging individual actions than between these and disparaging actions.

**Identification, Disidentification, and Perceived Homogeneity as Antecedents of Coping Strategies**

To provide a more complete view of the effect of group identification on the choice of strategies to cope with prejudice, we built on recent work distinguishing group identification from disidentification (Becker & Tausch, 2014). Group identification refers to the extent to which a particular group membership has become part of one’s self-concept, and it determines the extent to which group goals are internalized as individual goals (Barreto & Ellemers, 2000). It is, therefore, one of the most significant predictors of collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2008; but see Jiménez-Moya, Spears, Rodríguez-Bailón, & de Lemus, in press). As
such, we expected gender identification to positively predict collective responses to confrontation. We also expected identification to relate positively to individual non-disparaging responses to confrontation, but not to disparaging ones. That is, highly identified women were not expected to disparage their ingroup. In addition, we expected that endorsement of collective, but not individual, strategies in response to encounters with sexism would function as a step towards broader engagement in strategies to promote social change. Indeed, many have argued for the need to develop a politicized identity in order to engage in collective action (e.g., Simon & Klandermans, 2001). Disputing sexism on behalf of women as a whole would appear to constitute one step closer to politicization, and much closer than solely refuting its applicability to the individual self, or letting it pass unchallenged.

Disidentification, on the other hand, constitutes more than the absence of group identification and occurs when individuals are part of groups to which they do not wish to belong (Becker & Tausch, 2014). Akin to categorization threat (Barreto & Ellemers, 2003), disidentification is expressed through feelings of detachment, dissatisfaction with group membership, and the perception of being different from other group members (Becker & Tausch, 2014). As such, individuals who disidentify from their group are likely to respond to prejudice by stressing that they are different from other members of their group (thus by disparaging the group) and/or by avoiding any action that calls further attention to the unwanted group membership. Indeed, disidentification predicts actively harming one’s ingroup and hiding the unwanted group membership (Becker & Tausch, 2014). Thus, in this study, we expected disidentification to predict both individual disparaging confrontation and inaction.

Finally, we examined whether perceived ingroup homogeneity would independently predict how women cope with sexism. Perceived ingroup homogeneity can both be conceptualized as a component of identification (Leach et al., 2008) and as component of prejudice (Becker & Tausch, 2014). Indeed, perceived group homogeneity consists of the perception that group members are very similar to each other, which is both connected to a strong sense of identity and to over-generalized views underlying prejudice. Consistent with this idea, in a prior study, we found that highly identified as well as highly disidentified individuals perceived their ingroup to be more homogenous than non-identified individuals (who have a neutral relation to the group; Becker & Tausch, 2014). This suggests that perceived ingroup homogeneity may reflect a positive relation to the ingroup when it is paired with group identification, but a negative one when it is paired with disidentification.
Perceived ingroup homogeneity might therefore interact with group identification or disidentification to predict responses to prejudice.

**Overview of the Study and Hypotheses**

This study examined the strategies that women envision using to cope with everyday sexism. We included acceptance-motivated (inaction and agreement) and resistance-motivated responses (individual and collective confrontation). Female participants read a scenario in which a man made a sexist statement and indicated to what extent they would be likely to respond with: collective confrontation, individual non-disparaging confrontation, individual disparaging confrontation, inaction, or expression of agreement with the sexist statement. We examined the role of identification, disidentification, and perceived ingroup homogeneity as predictors of these responses. We expected that collective and individual non-disparaging confrontation would be primarily related to identification, and that individual disparaging confrontation, inaction, and agreement with sexism would be primarily related to disidentification. We further examined whether perceived ingroup homogeneity interacts with identification and disidentification to predict these strategies, hypothesizing that the effects of identification and of disidentification would be stronger for individuals who perceived the group to be highly homogeneous.

Finally, we investigated how responses to everyday sexism relate to broader intentions to engage in collective action. Although we expected women to value both collective and individual (non-disparaging) strategies, we expected that only collective (but not individual) confrontation would predict generalized collective action intentions, as only the former focuses on the plight of the group as a whole.

**Method**

*Participants*

A total of 122 women took part in this web-based experiment. Two outliers were excluded (who scored more than three SDs above the midpoint on the disidentification scale). They were recruited via a student email-distribution list at a German university and received credit points for their participation. Participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 31 years (M = 22.18 years, SD = 2.88). Most (96.7%) self-identified as Germans, 3.3% as other.

*Procedure*

Participants first completed measures of gender identification, and disidentification. Next, they read the following text about a man making a sexist comment:
Imagine you are sitting in a group with three other men and two other women. Your group needs to complete several tasks as quickly as possible. One task is to order baby pictures according to their age. Another task is to solve a puzzle. After the tasks are described, Stefan, the man sitting to your right, says “the baby task is obviously for the women: babies are a woman-thing! The men should solve the puzzle, because, of course, men are better at puzzles”.

After this, participants answered the questions that served to assess our dependent variables, were thanked, and fully debriefed.

**Measures**

All items were presented in the form of statements with which participants were asked to agree or disagree on a 7 point Likert-type scale (from 1 = *not at all* to 7 = *very much*).

**Gender Identification.** Leach et al.’s (2008) measure was used to assess identification. Three items measured solidarity (e.g., I feel a bond with this group), four items assessed satisfaction (e.g., I am glad to be in this group), two items measured self-stereotyping (e.g., I am similar to the average person in this group), three items measured centrality (e.g., Being a member of this group is an important part of how I see myself), and two items measured homogeneity (e.g., Members of this group are very similar to each other). The items used to assess solidarity, satisfaction, self-stereotyping, and centrality formed a reliable scale together ($\alpha = .89$). For the reasons explained above, we created a separate scale assessing homogeneity consisting of two items ($\rho = .69$, $p < .001$).

**Gender Disidentification.** Disidentification was assessed with the measure developed by Becker and Tausch (2014). Three items measured detachment (e.g., I feel a distance between myself and women as a group), four items measured dissatisfaction (e.g., I regret that I belong to women as a social category), and four items measured dissimilarity (e.g., I’m dissimilar to the average woman). These items together formed a reliable scale ($\alpha = .89$). Higher scores on this measure indicate higher levels of disidentification.

**Responses to Sexism.** Participants indicated the extent to which they would be likely to respond to the sexist comment by engaging in the following five actions (see appendix; three items were adapted from Rattan & Dweck, 2010): 1) Five items assessed collective confrontation (on behalf of women as a whole, $\alpha = .85$); 2) three items assessed individual non-disparaging confrontation (on behalf of oneself only but without disparaging women as a whole, $\alpha = .76$); 3) three items assessed individual disparaging confrontation (on behalf of
oneself with disparagement of women as a whole, $\alpha = .61$; 4) 12 items assessed three forms of inaction ($\alpha = .90$); 5) two items assessed expression of agreement with the sexist statement ($r = .81$).

**Generalized collective action intentions.** Participants were asked to what extent they would be likely to participate in four actions in favor of women in the future (e.g., I would participate in a demonstration to stop the discrimination of women, $\alpha = .84$).

**Results**

**Preliminary analyses**

Inspection of means reveals that the sample is relatively highly identified with women ($M = 4.43$, $SD = .97$, significantly above the scale mid-point, $p < .001$) and not very disidentified with women ($M = 2.16$, $SD = .88$, significantly below the scale mid-point, $p < .001$) and with perceptions of homogeneity below the scale midpoint ($M = 3.55$, $SD = 1.23$, $p < .001$).

Table 1 illustrates participants’ relative preference for each of the assessed response strategies. Participants indicated that they would be most likely to engage in the individual non-disparaging strategy and least likely to express agreement with the sexist suggestion. Overall, participants indicated that they would be less likely to engage in inaction and expression of agreement than to engage in any form of confrontation, even if confronting involves disparaging group. This preference is also reflected in that, whereas the three forms of confrontation were positively inter-correlated, they were negatively correlated with inaction and agreement.

**Effects of Identification and Disidentification**

Correlations between identification, disidentification, perceived homogeneity, and all response strategies are shown in Table 2. We conducted five regression analyses for each response strategy including identification and disidentification as predictor variables. We also tested whether the interaction between identification and disidentification would explain additional variance. However, none of the interactions was significant and therefore, we do not report these results here.

In line with our hypothesis, collective confrontation was positively related to identification ($B = .44$, $SE = .15$, $t = 2.88$, $p = .01$). Similarly, individual non-disparaging confrontation was also related to identification ($B = .47$, $SE = .15$, $t = 3.09$, $p = .002$): the more female participants identified with women as social category, the higher their preference for engaging in collective and individual non-disparaging confrontation. Inaction was related to disidentification ($B = .36$, $SE = .11$, $t = 3.35$, $p = .001$). Against our expectations, individual
disparaging confrontation was not related to disidentification ($B = -.08, SE = .14, t = -.60, p = .55$; but also not by identification, $B = .13, SE = .14, t = .99, p = .33$).

**Separate and Interactive Effects of Perceived Homogeneity**

In these analyses, we tested whether perceived homogeneity has independent or interactive effects on strategy preference in addition to the effects of identification and disidentification. In the regression analyses, we first included identification, disidentification, and perceived group homogeneity as predictor variables, and then tested for interactions between Identification X Homogeneity and Disidentification X Homogeneity, in the next step. Importantly, all effects reported above for identification and disidentification remained significant and with similar patterns when including homogeneity and the interaction terms.

Perceived homogeneity had independent effects on collective confrontation ($B = .29, SE = .15, t = -1.99, p = .049$), individual disparaging protest ($B = .26, SE = .13, t = 2.05, p = .04$), inaction ($B = .28, SE = .10, t = 2.80, p = .01$) and expression of agreement with the sexist suggestion ($B = .30, SE = .10, t = 2.93, p = .004$). Thus, the more participants perceived all women to be the same, the less likely they were interested in collective confrontation, and the more likely they were to prefer disparaging protest, remaining silent or agreeing with the sexist suggestion. A reliable interaction ($B = -.28, SE = .10, t = -2.84, p = .005$) revealed that a negative effect of identification on inaction was only reliable for women who perceived the group to be homogeneous ($B = .36, SE = .14, t = -2.49, p = .01$), but not for those who did not perceive the group to be homogeneous, $B = .21, SE = .15, t = 1.42, p = .16$.

**Relative Preferences of One Strategy over Others**

As an ancillary research question, we were also interested in whether identification and disidentification predict relative preferences for one response to sexism over another. Specifically, we explored whether identification predicts a relative preference for collective and individual non-disparaging responses over the individual disparaging response and whether disidentification predicts a preference for inaction/agreement with the sexist suggestion over more active responses. We created seven difference scores (following Gollwitzer, Christ, & Lemmer, 2014) by subtracting the individual non-disparaging from the collective response (1) by subtracting the individual disparaging from the collective response (2) and from the individual non-disparaging response (3) and by subtracting inaction (4-5) and agreement with the sexist suggestion (6-7) from the collective and individual non-disparaging response. We conducted seven regression analyses using the seven difference scores as dependent variable and the identification, disidentification, and homogeneity scales as predictor variables. Note, we report individual differences (person-level differences) in
people’s tendencies to respond to sexism, which should not be confused with within-person effects based on varying repeated conditions.

First, we tested whether identification predicts a relative preference for the collective and individual non-disparaging responses over the individual disparaging response. The results showed a consistent pattern in which identification and perceived group homogeneity emerged as significant predictors of a relative preference for collective confrontation over the individual disparaging response ($B = .48$, $SE = .18$, $t = 2.67$, $p = .01$; $B = -.55$, $SE = .16$, $t = -3.39$, $p = .001$, respectively) and of a relative preference for the individual non-disparaging response over the individual disparaging response ($B = .47$, $SE = .18$, $t = 2.66$, $p = .01$; $B = -.46$, $SE = .16$, $t = -2.84$, $p = .001$, respectively). Thus, the more women identified with women as a group and the less they perceived women to be homogeneous, the more they preferred collective and individual non-disparaging responses over individual disparaging responses.

We did not find evidence that identification and homogeneity were related to a relative preference for the collective over the individual non-disparaging response ($B = .006$, $SE = .12$, $t = .05$, $p = .96$; $B = -.07$, $SE = .11$, $t = -.82$, $p = .41$, respectively).

Next, we tested the possibility that disidentification may predict a relative preference for inaction/agreement of the sexist suggestion over collective and individual non-disparaging responses. The effects of disidentification were only significant in terms of the relative preference for the collective response over inaction ($B = -.52$, $SE = .23$, $t = -2.31$, $p = .02$), but not for the other relative preferences ($B = -.33$, $SE = .23$, $t = -1.45$, $p = .15$; $B = -.36$, $SE = .21$, $t = -1.75$, $p = .08$; $B = -.16$, $SE = .22$, $t = -.72$, $p = .48$, respectively). Instead, the results showed again a consistent pattern that identification and homogeneity were related to a relative preference for the collective response over inaction ($B = .63$, $SE = .23$, $t = 2.71$, $p = .01$; $B = -.61$, $SE = .22$, $t = -2.85$, $p = .01$, respectively), for the collective response over agreement with the sexist suggestion ($B = .61$, $SE = .23$, $t = 2.63$, $p = .01$; $B = -.59$, $SE = .21$, $t = -2.75$, $p = .01$, respectively), for the individual non-disparaging response over inaction ($B = .61$, $SE = .21$, $t = 2.85$, $p = .01$; $B = -.48$, $SE = .20$, $t = -2.44$, $p = .02$, respectively) and for the individual non-disparaging response over agreement with the sexist suggestion ($B = .61$, $SE = .23$, $t = 2.61$, $p = .01$; $B = -.50$, $SE = .21$, $t = -2.33$, $p = .02$, respectively). Thus, the more women identified with women as a group, and the less they perceived women to be homogeneous, the more they preferred collective and individual non-disparaging confrontation over inaction and agreement with the sexist suggestion.
Antecedents of Intentions to Engage in Generalized Collective Action

Finally, we tested whether collective confrontation would relate to broader intentions to engage in collective action for social change (i.e., participate in demonstrations against sexism), whereas individual non-disparaging confrontation would not. Moreover, we tested whether collective response mediated the effect of identification on broader collective action intentions. A significant mediation would show that collective confrontation of daily sexism is one of the links between group identification and broader collective action for social change. For these analyses, we controlled for the shared variance between collective and individual non-disparaging confrontation. Given that the collective and the individual non-disparaging confrontation scales were highly correlated, we first tested for multicollinearity. The variance inflation factors (VIF) for the two scales was below 10 (2.089), excluding the possibility of multicollinearity (for a critical discussion see O’Brien, 2007).

We ran a multiple mediation analysis to predict broader intentions to engage in collective action using identification as predictor variable (entered in Step 1) and collective and individual non-disparaging confrontation (entered in Step 2) as possible mediators. In the first step, identification was associated with collective action ($B = .44, SE = .13, t = 3.31, p = .001$). Entering individual non-disparaging and collective confrontation in the second step revealed that, as expected, only collective confrontation ($B = .33, SE = .11, t = 3.01, p = .003$) but not individual non-disparaging confrontation ($B = .12, SE = .11, t = 1.08, p = .28$) was related to general collective action intentions. The effect of identification on collective action was reduced when including the mediators ($B = .19, SE = .12, t = 1.56, p = .12$). Bootstrapping analyses confirmed a significant indirect effect of intentions to engage in collective confrontation (lower CI: .04 upper CI: .35) mediating the relationship between identification and intentions to engage in generalized collective action.

Discussion

This research provides a more nuanced understanding of individual versus collective responses to sexism in several ways. First, we build on and integrate two lines of research that have been examined separately in the past: work on collective action (that has focused exclusively on collective responses) with research on individual responses to prejudice (that has mainly looked at individual coping). We did so by examining a range of responses to prejudice including acceptance-motivated (inaction and agreement) and resistance-motivated responses (individual and collective confrontation), the latter at the individual and at the collective level. Our research shows that when faced with sexism, women preferred action-
related responses over inaction, even when that action involved disparaging the group. Second, our research provides new insights into the role of group identification, disidentification, and perceived group homogeneity as antecedents of responses to sexism. Third, we show that when the shared variance of individual and collective confrontation is controlled for, only collective confrontation uniquely predicts broader collective action intentions for social change.

**Individual versus Collective Strategies to Cope with Prejudice**

So far, individual and collective responses to prejudice were seen as mutually exclusive. Numerous studies indicated the detrimental effects of individual mobility on collective action for social change (see Kulich, Lorenzi-Cioldi & Iacovello, in press for a discussion). The present paper shows that women endorse individual and collective confrontation (even if individual confrontation disparages women as a group) compared to inaction, potentially because both serve to clarify displeasure with prejudicial treatment. Thus, individual and collective strategies are not necessarily incompatible as proposed hitherto, but were positively correlated and more likely to be endorsed compared to inaction. Comparing individual and collective responses, though, women favored the individual non-disparaging and the collective responses (over the disparaging response) and only individual non-disparaging and collective responses were related to gender identification.

The value of considering individual and collective strategies separately was, however, underlined by additional findings. That is, when controlling for their shared variance, only women who envisioned responding to a sexist encounter with collective confrontation also reported greater intentions to engage in broader actions in favor of women. This finding supports the notion that the “private is political”, in the sense that it illustrates that confronting a sexist incident in a private situation might function as a crucial step towards politicization and as a link between gender identification and a general motivation to engage in collective action. This also further underlines the need to regard daily incidents as both important and consequential in ways that surpass the particular incident.

**Identification, Disidentification, and Perceived Homogeneity as Antecedents of Coping**

This research also demonstrates the value of distinguishing between ingroup identification, disidentification, and perceived homogeneity as independent predictors of resistance- versus acceptance-oriented strategies to deal with prejudice. Whereas gender identification was related to individual non-disparaging and collective confrontation and also
to a relative preference for non-disparaging confrontation over disparaging confrontation and agreement, disidentification was not associated with the expression of agreement with a sexist suggestion. Thus, identification was related to ingroup-supporting behaviors (but not ingroup-harming behaviors), whereas disidentification was related to ingroup-harming behaviors (but not ingroup-supporting behaviors). This is in line with findings of Becker and Tausch (2014) and further illustrates the usefulness of considering identification and disidentification separately. Furthermore, perceived homogeneity played an important role in addition to identification and disidentification. The more individuals perceived women to be a homogenous group the less likely they opted for collective confrontation, but the more they opted for individual disparaging confrontation, inaction and agreement with the sexist suggestion. Moreover, the combination of low identification with high perceived group homogeneity was strongly related to inaction. As outlined in the introduction, perceived ingroup homogeneity can both be conceptualized as a component of identification (Leach et al., 2008) and as component of prejudice (Becker & Tausch, 2014). Our findings primarily relate to the prejudicial aspect of perceived ingroup homogeneity. Specifically, in our study, perceived group homogeneity appears to have contributed to motivate individual confrontation that disparaged the group. Thus, although prior work illustrated that perceived homogeneity might be a component of identification, our findings suggest that it could be as well be a component, or at least a correlate, of ingroup disidentification (see also Becker & Tausch, 2014). Future work is needed to examine in more detail how perceived group homogeneity interacts with identification and disidentification. Moreover, it is also possible that the specific scenario used in the present study, in which the sexist perpetrator referred to homogeneity in his suggestion “women are like this”, elicited these more negative effects of homogeneity. Thus, it is possible that homogeneity might play a different role when women are asked to respond to a sexist incident in which women are not explicitly described as similar by the perpetrator.

Limitations of the Present Work and Directions for Future Research

This research employed scenarios and behavioral intention measures as responses to sexism. This is a clear limitation of the present work. Prior findings indicate that although women intend to confront sexism, in reality, they do not confront for various reasons (Swim & Hyers, 1999). Thus, it is possible that although women imagine that they would adopt collective and individual confrontation to a greater extent than no confrontation, in actuality most women may remain silent when they are faced with sexism in their everyday lives. An important avenue for future research, therefore, is to examine women’s actual responses to
daily experiences of sexism. Furthermore, the order in which the dependent measures were presented could have affected the results of this study. Future research might examine whether or not this is the case. Furthermore, it would be important to examine similar processes as a function of politicized identification (i.e., identification with feminists) instead of identification with the gender group, since prior work indicates that politicized identification is a particularly important predictor of collective action (e.g., Stürmer & Simon, 2004). More interestingly, future research might also wish to examine whether confrontation of particular incidents increases politicized identification.

**Implications for Social Change**

These findings have practical and political implications related to social change. First, although past research demonstrates that women hesitate in confronting due to expected social costs, our results clearly show that women find confrontation very important. Second, our results demonstrate that how women respond to sexist incidents can have consequences that are noticeable outside of those incidents, e.g., by participating in further actions to facilitate social change. Taken together, it would appear important to raise awareness about the possibility and importance of confronting daily sexist events, including the various ways in which sexism can be displayed, and the consequences it may have. Schools and work organizations may wish to include this type of information in their training, along with role playing sessions in which confrontation is practiced, thereby preparing women to overcome barriers to this form of action. Ultimately, the goal would be to encourage women and men to confront sexism more frequently and in less costly ways. In these role-playing sessions, women and men could be faced with different forms of sexism and encouraged to practice diverse possible responses, some of which are individual and some of which are collective. By testing different responses to sexism, women and men may learn that an appropriate response in one situation might be not appropriate at all in other situations. This exposure to (simulated) sexist incidents might also inform on how it feels to encounter sexism and remain inactive. Prior work indicated that women who did not confront worried and ruminated about how they could have responded in this situation (Swim & Hyers, 1999). Experiencing these negative consequences of remaining silent when faced with sexism might motivate even the less identified to confront in similar future situations, albeit perhaps in different ways. Ultimately, a core message of this work is that it does not matter as much how confrontation is expressed—as an inaccurate depiction of a specific individual, or of a group as a whole—as long as it is made clear that sexism does not pass unnoticed and unchallenged.
References


Table 1: Means (and standard deviations) for the likelihood with which participants imagine engaging in each response to the sexist statement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response strategy</th>
<th>M (SD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collective confrontation</td>
<td>3.76 (1.57)\textsubscript{b}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual non-disparaging confrontation</td>
<td>4.66 (1.52)\textsubscript{a}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual disparaging confrontation</td>
<td>2.91 (1.32)\textsubscript{c}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inaction</td>
<td>2.49 (1.09)\textsubscript{d}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expression of agreement with sexist suggestion</td>
<td>1.58 (1.07)\textsubscript{e}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Means with different subscripts differ at $p < .05$. 
Table 2: Correlations between identification, disidentification, and responses to sexism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Identification</td>
<td></td>
<td>.46**</td>
<td></td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td>.29**</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Disidentification</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.25**</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.20*</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Ingroup homogeneity</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.22*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Collective confrontation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.73**</td>
<td>.28**</td>
<td>-.39**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Individual non-disparaging confrontation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.28**</td>
<td>-.29**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Individual disparaging confrontation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Inaction</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Agreement with sexist suggestion</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Correlations with ** are significant with $p < .01$, correlations with * are significant with $p < .05$. 
Appendix: Responses to sexism

Collective confrontation
- I would disagree with him and would make clear that women are not like this.
- I would disagree and start a discussion about sexism.
- I would try to get the other women involved in order to respond together against Stefan’s statement.
- I would disagree and clearly say that he is discriminating against women.
- I would disagree and communicate that this was sexist.

Individual non-disparaging confrontation
- I would disagree because personally, I do not want that people behave to me in this way.
- I would disagree with him and make clear that, personally, I want to do the puzzle.
- I would disagree because personally, I do not want to experience discrimination.

Individual disparaging confrontation
- I would disagree with him and would make clear that, even though the statement may apply to women more generally, it does not apply to me personally.
- I would disagree with him and make clear that I do not like being categorized as a woman.
- I would disagree with him and make clear that I am totally different from the average woman.

Inaction
a) Inaction to avoid conflict
- I would do nothing, because I want to avoid conflict.
- I would do nothing, because I would not want to risk getting into a fight.
- I would do nothing, because I would not want to cause a negative atmosphere

b) Inaction to downplay importance of sexist statement
- I would do nothing, because I would think that it is not worth getting excited about this.
- I would not respond, because I would not find this matter worth my time and energy.
- I wouldn’t dignify it with a response (Rattan & Dweck, 2010).
- I would do nothing, because I don’t care which task I am supposed to do.
- I would do nothing, because the tasks are not important for me.
- I would do my best to pretend it didn’t happen (Rattan & Dweck, 2010).
- I would ignore Stefan’s comment.

c) Avoidance
- I would do nothing at that moment, and I would avoid Stefan in the future.
- I would leave as soon as possible (Rattan & Dweck, 2010).

Expression of agreement with the sexist statement
- I would agree with Stefan.
- I would support Stefan’s idea.
2. GENERAL DISCUSSION

The present dissertation set out to investigate the predictors and consequences of sexist behavior. Specifically, this dissertation aimed at contributing to the existing sexism literature and research, by expanding the scope of research on sexist beliefs to the investigation of the relation between implicit and explicit hostile and benevolent sexist attitudes, and hostile and benevolent sexist behaviors (Manuscript #1). A second goal was to deliver novel insight into the consequences of benevolent sexism for men, or in other words, to identify possible costs and perils that engaging in benevolent sexist behavior has for men (Manuscript #2). Finally, the present dissertation focused on the examination of individual and collective strategies to respond when being confronted with sexism (Manuscript #3).

2.1. Summary of results

2.1.1. Predictors of sexist behavior

Past research on sexism has primarily focused on the investigation of explicit sexist attitudes, and their assessment through explicit measures (e.g., self-report measures; e.g., Beere et al., 1984; Glick & Fiske, 1996; Swim et al., 1995; Tougas et al., 1995)). In contrast to the well-advanced research on sexist beliefs, much less is known about sexist behaviors (e.g., Rudman & Glick, 2008; Swim & Hyers, 2009). Responding to the call of research on the investigation of social behaviors (e.g., Fiske, 1998; Baumeister et al., 2007), and to expand the scope of sexism research to the investigation of the attitude-behavior relation of hostile and benevolent sexist attitudes, and hostile and benevolent sexist behaviors, the first purpose of the present dissertation was to fill this gap in research on sexist behavior. For this purpose, the first Manuscript of the present dissertation (Manuscript #1) tested how implicit and explicit (benevolent and hostile) sexist attitudes correlate with sexist behaviors. Considering that in previous research benevolent sexism and hostile sexism demonstrated to be positively intercorrelated on an explicit attitudinal level (Glick & Fiske, 1996), we expected them to be also positively intercorrelated on a behavioral level. Further, because previous research identified the correspondence between measures as a potential moderator of attitude-behavior relations (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977), we predicted that hostile sexist behaviors can be predicted by corresponding hostile sexist attitudes, and that benevolent sexist behaviors can be predicted by corresponding benevolent sexist attitudes.

While in previous research, the self-report measures ASI proved to be an appropriate measure to assess sexist attitudes explicitly (e.g., Rudman & Glick, 2001), recent sexism research and literature suggests that it may be of advantage to use implicit measures, which
allow assessing sexist attitudes implicitly: As described before, one advantage of implicit measures is that they “provide an estimate of the construct of interest without having to directly ask the participant for a verbal report” (Fazio & Olson, 2003, p. 300). By this, they can overcome the constraints of self-report measures, which are limited to a person’s belief about their attitudes (Rudman, 2011). With the ASI, Glick and Fiske (1996) developed a well-established measure to assess explicit hostile and benevolent sexist attitudes. However, to date, no measure has been developed that assesses hostile and benevolent sexism implicitly. Thus far, implicit sexist attitudes, or gender stereotypes in general, were generally assessed through gender IATs or (an adaptation of) the Adjective Evaluation Task (e.g., Brauer et al., 2000; Knutson, et al., 2007; Mast, 2004; Nosek et al., 2002; Rudman and Glick, 2001; Rudman & Kilianski, 2000). However, these implicit measures assess implicit gender stereotypes, rather than hostile and benevolent sexist attitudes as defined by Glick and Fiske (1996). Therefore, a further aim of the present dissertation was to develop an implicit measure to assess implicit hostile sexist attitudes to test the role of implicit an explicit hostile and benevolent sexist attitudes in the prediction of hostile and benevolent sexist behavior. The assumption was tested that implicit sexist attitudes and explicit sexist attitudes would predict sexist behavior differently. Specifically, we predicted that explicit attitudes would be more predictive of sexist behavior than implicit attitudes, because in previous research, explicit measures tended to be overall better predictors for behavior, compared to IAT measures (Greenwald et al., 2009). Further, regarding the relation between implicit and explicit sexist attitudes, we predicted that implicit hostile sexist attitudes and benevolent sexist attitudes would be positively related to the corresponding explicit attitudes.

Two studies provided clear evidence for our assumptions. Specifically, results of both studies indicated that hostile sexist attitudes and benevolent sexist attitudes were positively intercorrelated on an explicit attitudinal level, and on a behavioral level. In contrast, hostile and benevolent sexist attitudes were not intercorrelated on an implicit attitudinal level. In line with our assumptions, results revealed that explicit benevolent (but not hostile) sexist attitudes predicted benevolent sexist behavior, whereas explicit hostile (but not benevolent) sexist attitudes predicted hostile sexist behavior. Implicit sexist attitudes on the other hand did not predict sexist behavior, confirming our assumption that explicit sexist attitudes would be better predictors for sexist behavior, compared to implicit sexist attitudes. Finally, as expected, results showed that implicit sexist attitudes were positively related to the corresponding explicit sexist attitudes. Specifically, benevolent sexist attitudes were positively related to explicit benevolent sexist attitudes (but not to explicit HS attitudes) and
implicit HS attitudes were positively correlated to explicit HS attitudes (but not explicit BS attitudes), providing evidence for the convergent validity of the newly developed hostile sexism IAT and the benevolent sexism IAT.

2.1.2. Consequences of sexist behavior

Although a large body of research addressed the consequences of benevolent sexism for women, there is still a lack of studies, which have explicitly investigated the consequences of benevolent sexism for men and the reasons why men engage in benevolent sexist behavior at all. Therefore, Manuscript #2 builds on helping literature and findings from research on prosocial behavior, which showed, for instance, that engaging in prosocial behavior increases the helper’s positive emotions and self-esteem (Aknin et al., 2013a,b; Gecas & Burke, 1995; Ryan & Connell, 1989; Wang & Tong, 2015; Weinstein & Ryan, 2010). However, previous research on the negative consequences of benevolent sexism for women demonstrated that benevolent sexism contributes to the maintenance of an unequal status-quo, for instance, by justifying traditional gender-roles and power relations (Glick & Fiske, 1997, 2001; Jost & Kay, 2005), as well as by undermining women’s support for collective action to challenge the status-quo (Becker & Wright, 2011).

The insights from helping literature and research on prosocial behavior have not yet been transferred to sexism research. Therefore, questions regarding the motives that might explain why men engage in benevolent sexist behavior at all remain unanswered. Also the consequences of engaging in benevolent sexist behavior for men remain unclear. The present dissertation aims to respond to this novel research questions, by explicitly investigating the benefits and costs of engaging in benevolent sexist behavior for men. Transferring the insights from helping literature and research on prosocial behavior to the investigation of sexist behavior, we predicted that engaging in benevolent sexist behavior would benefit men (e.g., regarding men’s emotions and self-esteem), while it simultaneously imperils women. Thus, we proposed that a benevolent sexist behavior would on the one hand lead for men, for instance, to increased positive emotions and a higher self-esteem, while it simultaneously undermines men’s willingness to engage in collective actions to change unequal gender relations.

In a field experiment, a controlled laboratory experiment, and a controlled online experiment, we found strong support for these assumptions. The findings of the latter manuscript suggest that men benefit from engaging in benevolent sexist behavior. Specifically, after engaging in benevolent sexist behavior, men experienced more positive emotions, higher self-esteem and perceived themselves as more masculine and attractive, than
after engaging in a neutral behavior or no behavior. However, as expected, men additionally perceived women as being less competent, and were less willing to engage in collective action for more gender equality. Additionally, we demonstrated that the overall benefits of engaging in benevolent sexist behavior seem to be primarily reserved for men. Thus, while women reported more positive emotions, no increase in women’s self-esteem and self-perception, stereotypical perception of women and men in general, or willingness to engage in collective action to change unequal gender relations was found.

2.1.3. Individual and collective responses to sexism

The third part of the present dissertation aimed at examining possible ways for women to respond to “daily” sexism or sexist incidents in their everyday life. As described before, a wide range of strategies exist to confront sexism, for instance, individual or collective strategies (Branscombe & Ellemers, 1998; Ellemers et al., 1993; Stroebe, Wang, & Wright, 2015). The present dissertation challenges the assumption from Self-Categorization Theory, which assumes that individual and collective strategies are mutually exclusive (Self-Categorization Theory, Tajfel & Turner, 1979). More recent research proposes that a person’s personal identity and social identity are not necessarily exclusive, but can in fact co-occur (e.g., Baray, Postmes, & Jetten, 2009). Therefore, when examining the different response strategies women can use to confront sexism, the present dissertation takes the possible interplay between individual- and collective-level strategies into account.

Because previous research showed that women’s identification with their gender group can influence women’s decision to confront sexism (e.g., Good et al., 2012), the present dissertation takes the possible influence of gender identification as a potential moderator into account. In other words, the present dissertation aimed to explore how the different levels of identification and disidentification with one’s low status group may influence different forms of action. It was posited that women’s collective confrontation (e.g., a woman’s disagreement with a sexist statement, and communication that the statement was sexist) and individual non-disparaging confrontation (e.g., a woman’s disagreement with a sexist statement, because she personally does not want to experience discrimination) would be primarily associated with women’s identification with their gender group, while individual disparaging confrontation (e.g., a woman’s disagreement with a sexist statement, and making clear that she is dissimilar to the average woman), inaction (e.g., a woman doing nothing, or not responding to sexism, because she wants to avoid conflict), as well as agreement with sexism (e.g., a woman’s agreement with a sexist statement), would be primarily associated with women’s
disidentification with their gender group (e.g., expressed through women’s self-reported regret to belong to women as a social category).

Additionally, the present dissertation aimed at investigating the implications of individual and collective confrontation strategies for action outside the particular sexist incident. Specifically, the present dissertation aimed at testing whether (only) engagement in collective responses, compared to individual responses, in daily encounters with sexism, would be associated with increased politicized intentions to promote social change. Regarding possible implications of individual and collective strategies for politicized intentions to promote social change, we expected that women would value, both, collective and individual (non-disparaging) strategies. However, we additionally predicted that only collective (but not individual) confrontation would predict generalized collective action intentions, because collective confrontation has implications for the (female gender) group as a whole (Becker, 2012).

A web-based experimental study provided evidence for our assumptions. One key finding of Manuscript #3 was that women favor confronting sexism over inaction, and even prefer confrontation over inaction when confrontation involves disparaging the (female gender) ingroup. Moreover, women expected to respond to a sexist statement by using, both, individual and collective strategies to confront. Results moreover revealed that women’s choice to use collective and individual (nongroup disparaging) responses to confront “daily” sexism was positively related to women’s identification with their gender group. However, only collective responses were furthermore related to broader intentions to engage in collective action for social change.

2.2. Contributions of the research to the scientific field

While the three manuscripts presented in the present dissertation diverge in their particular focus, all three manuscripts can be integrated into a general investigation of factors that might contribute to and factors that might challenge the maintenance of unequal gender relations.

Our research presented in Manuscript #1 fills the gap in previous research by offering measures to assess sexist behaviors that correspond to hostile sexist attitudes and benevolent sexist attitudes, as defined by Glick and Fiske (1996). Therefore, one of the main methodological contributions of Manuscript #1 is the development of a behavioral measure to assess hostile sexism and benevolent sexism on a behavioral level. The development of a
behavioral measure of hostile and benevolent sexism allowed us to investigate sexist incidents as encountered by women in their everyday lives (e.g., Swim et al., 2001). Our research highlights that the positive relation between hostile and benevolent sexist attitudes, as assessed with the ASI (Glick & Fiske, 1996), can also be found for hostile and benevolent sexist behaviors. Thus, the more men endorse hostile sexist attitudes, the more they also endorse benevolent sexist attitudes, and the more men engage in hostile sexist behavior, the more they also engage in benevolent sexist behavior. Moreover, we demonstrated that the level, on which sexist attitudes are assessed, plays a role in the predictability of sexist attitudes when predicting sexist behavior. Because thus far no implicit measure was developed to assess implicit sexist attitude, another main methodological contribution of Manuscript #1 is the development of implicit measures that allow assessing hostile sexist attitudes and benevolent sexist attitudes on an implicit level. The development of measures to assess sexism on a behavioral level and on an implicit attitudinal level is an important step in the investigation of sexist behaviors, as it contributes to the identification of sexist behaviors, and to the revelation of the underlying sexist attitudes.

Transferring the findings reported in Manuscript #1 to the sexist incidents described at the beginning of this dissertation, the male personnel manager’s hostile sexist decision to promote a male employee instead of a more qualified female employee (e.g., regarding her experience and job skills) may in fact reflect his endorsement of (underlying) hostile sexist beliefs about non-traditional, such as “working mothers” and “feminists”. Correspondingly, the male coworker’s benevolent sexist help offer may reflect his endorsement of benevolent sexist beliefs about, and how men should behave towards, traditional women, such as “housewives” and “mothers”. Moreover, the operationalization of benevolent sexism into a corresponding behavioral measure forms the foundation of Manuscript #1, which investigated the consequences of engaging in benevolent sexist behavior.

With Manuscript #2, the present dissertation extended previous research on the consequences of benevolent sexism for women, by specifically investigating the consequences of benevolent sexist behaviors for men, after having engaged in benevolent sexist behavior. Further, Manuscript #2 contributes to a better understanding of factors that can lead to the maintenance of an unequal status-quo, by examining, for instance, men’s self-perception, but also men’s perception of women (e.g., regarding their competence), as well as men’s willingness to engage in collective actions to challenge unequal gender relations, after having behaved benevolently sexist. Specifically, the findings reported in Manuscript #2 highlight that benevolent sexism can indeed benefit men, while it, despite it’s subjectively
positive tone (Glick & Fiske, 1996) and appeal for women (e.g., Bohner et al., 2010), can increase the perception of women’s inferiority to men (e.g., regarding men’s and women’s competence, see also Glick & Fiske, 1997; Shnabel et al., 2015), and thereby imperil women. Moreover, we demonstrated that benevolent sexism undermines men’s support for collective actions to challenge unequal gender relations.

Thus, transferring the findings reported in Manuscript #2 to the benevolent sexist incidents described at the beginning of this dissertation, the male coworkers benevolent sexist offer to help his female coworker might benefit him (e.g., by increasing his positive emotions and self-esteem, making him feel more attractive and masculine), while on it might imperil his female coworker personally (e.g., by being perceived as less competent), but also imperil women in general (e.g., by decreasing his support for social change and thereby), contributing to the maintenance of the status-quo. These findings led us to the question, how women could respond to the sexist incidents they encounter in their everyday lives. This question was addressed in Manuscript #3.

Manuscript #3 extends previous research on the confrontation of sexism, firstly, by stressing the importance of taking the possible interplay between individual- and collective-level strategies to confront sexism into account, secondly, by highlighting the role of group identification and disidentification with one’s status group as antecedents for different responses to sexism, and thirdly, by showing that collective strategies to confront sexism have political implications, as they uniquely predicted broader collective action intentions for social change. In other words, in Manuscript #3, we addressed different strategies to confront sexism, while considering the role of women’s identification with their gender group, when examining the implications of the different confrontation strategies for the willingness to engage in actions that provide social change.

Transferring the findings reported in Manuscript #3 to the sexist incidents described above, the female employee might favor the idea of confronting the male personnel manager’s and the male coworker’s sexist remarks by disagreeing with the sexist remarks, compared to the idea of not confronting and rather to ignore the sexist remarks. Further, she might prefer confronting over inaction even if her response would involve her differentiating herself from her gender group, for instance by stating that while the sexist remarks may apply to women more generally, they are not applicable to her personally. In general, she might be willing to engage in both, individual and collective strategies to confront sexism. Thus, she might confront the personnel manager and the male coworker by disagreeing with their sexist remarks, and adding that she personally does not want to experience discrimination (choosing
an individual strategy), or by adding that the sexist remarks discriminate women in general (choosing a collective strategy) or both, especially when she highly identifies with her gender. Moreover, it is likely that only when the female employee can imagine herself responding to the sexist incident with a collective confrontation strategy, she may also be willing to engage in broader actions for social change. This points to the importance of confronting daily incidents, for instance in work settings, because on a broader level, the female employee’s expression of her dissatisfaction with discriminatory treatment of women in general to the people responsible for it (Becker & Barreto, 2014) is related to women’s support of collective action. Therefore, on a more general level, the results presented in Manuscript #3 can be considered a contribution to a more nuanced understanding of responses to sexism, and the understanding of maintaining factors that can contribute to the maintenance of unequal gender relations.

2.3. Open questions and implications for research and practice

Although I believe that this thesis renders new insights into the investigation of the predictors and consequences of sexist behavior, and response strategies to confront sexism, certain open questions remain to be disclosed by future research to reach a comprehensive understanding of sexist behaviors, regarding their predictors and consequences. Because each manuscript comprises a thorough discussion of its research findings and limitations, in the following section only issues will be addressed that not have been discussed before.

Results of the first Manuscript (Manuscript #1) of the present dissertation indicated that explicit sexist attitudes are better predictors for sexist behavior, compared to implicit sexist attitudes. While this finding is in line with prior work, showing that explicit measures perform overall significantly better than IAT measures (Greenwald et al., 2009), the question remains open, as to whether the lack of findings for the prediction of sexist behavior by implicit measures could not be alternatively explained by, for instance, the operationalization of sexist behaviors. As stressed in the discussion of Manuscript #1, we operationalized sexist behaviors though tasks that involved conscious decision-making. For instance, men were given the opportunity to express their preference for sexist statements over non-sexist statements. However, findings from a meta-analysis on the predictive validity of implicit and explicit measures suggests, for instance, that explicit measures are better predictors for the prediction of political preferences, while implicit measures are better predictors for the prediction of intergroup behavior (Greenwald et al., 2009). Correspondingly, the main finding reported in Manuscript #1, that explicit but not implicit sexist attitudes predict sexist
behaviors, may not be transferrable to intergroup behavior, as it reflects the participant’s rational indication of his preferences for sexist statements over neutral statements.

In addition, as mentioned before, also the choice of implicit measure could have played a role in the low predictive validity of implicit measures for the prediction of sexist behavior. For instance, previous research that used an Adjective Evaluation Task and gender IATs to assess implicit gender stereotypes about “agentic” women versus “communal” women, showed that implicit gender stereotypes, but not explicit sexist beliefs (e.g., assessed with the ASI, Glick & Fiske, 1996) were more strongly related to backlash towards an agentic woman (e.g., viewing agentic women as socially deficient; Rudman & Glick, 2001). Because the research only examined correlations, no conclusion can be drawn regarding the predictive validity of the implicit, compared to the explicit measure. Further, neither the implicit, nor the measure of backlash effects, allow assessing hostile and benevolent sexism on an implicit attitudinal and a behavioral level. Nevertheless, the findings of this research highlight that the choice of implicit measure, as well as the correspondence between the measures (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977), can play a role in the predictability of sexist behaviors by implicit measures.

Another open question that refers to our implicit measure is the question of whether the use of negations for our target category “non-traditional women”, and for our attribute dimension “non-threatening”, may have slowed down participant’s cognition, as suggested in previous research (e.g., Wason, 1959; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). However, more recent research relativizes this assumption by demonstrating that negations can be processed quickly, but that under some circumstances negations can influence participant’s working memory (Deutsch, Kordts-Freudinger, Gawronski; & Strack, 2009).

Based on these findings, more research is needed to illuminate the relation between benevolent and hostile sexism on an attitudinal, and on a behavioral level. Specifically, future research may examine whether the predictive validity of our Sexism IATs increases when the aim is to predict sexist behaviors that reflect intergroup behaviors, rather than decision-making. This research may also help in answering the question of whether implicit sexist attitudes are indeed not predictive for sexist behaviors, or whether implicit sexist attitudes can predict sexist behaviors, depending on the sexist behaviors that are being assessed. Future research should also take the possible influence of the negations used in our Sexism IAT in account, when memory load is manipulated before conducting our Sexism IAT. Further, the use of self-activation IATs that prime participants through prime words, for instance “I”, “me”, “myself”, may increase participant’s accessibility of self-relevant thoughts and thereby the predictive validity of implicit attitudes (Perugini, O’Gorman, & Prestwich, 2007). Future
research should also take into account that high conceptual correspondence between implicit measures (e.g., an IAT) and explicit measures is linked to a higher correlation between the measures (Hofmann et al., 2005). In general, we encourage future research that uses our Sexism IAT to assess implicit sexist attitudes.

In Manuscript #2, we demonstrated that after engaging in benevolent sexist helping behavior men were less willing to engage in collective actions for social change, compared to men who engaged in neutral helping behavior or no helping behavior. Because we assessed the willingness to engage in collective actions, rather than an actual engagement in collective actions, critiques could argue that our findings are limited to men’s self-reported willingness to engage in collective actions. However, we decided to assess collective action tendencies, because it is very difficult to assess actual collective actions, especially in a laboratory setting. Further, previous research showed that behavioral intentions (as collective action tendencies) can indeed be used as a proxy for actual (collective action) behaviors (Webb & Sheeran, 2006). Moreover, intentions to engage in collective action demonstrated to be good predictors of a person’s actual participation in collective actions (e.g., Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009). However, in line with Tausch and colleagues (2011), we encourage future studies to investigate the effect of benevolent sexist behaviors on the actual participation in collective actions. The necessity of a direct assessment of collective action becomes particularly clear in Manuscript #3, when we compared women’s tendencies to engage in collective actions to their tendencies to engage in individual actions. Considering the discrepancy between women’s desire to respond to sexism and decision to remain silent, reported in several studies (e.g., Ayers, Friedman & Leaper, 2009; Swim & Hyers, 1999), it is possible that while in our studies women reported that they would engage in collective action for social change, that their actual behavior would be to remain silent. Therefore, future research is needed that builds on the findings reported in the present dissertation and explores the effects of benevolent sexist behaviors on the actual engagement in collective actions for social change.

Coming back to a more general level, the present research adds to previous research on sexism, by explicitly focusing on the investigation of sexist behaviors. While the three Manuscripts presented in this dissertation shed light into the role of implicit and explicit sexist attitudes in the prediction of hostile and benevolent sexist behaviors, the identification of benefits and perils of engaging in benevolent sexist, and how women can respond to sexism, clearly, much additional research is needed to gain a fully understanding of sexist behaviors and their implications for gender inequality. I hope that the results of the present dissertation studies encourage additional research that examines sexist behaviors on the micro and on the
macro level, when examining the effects of sexist behaviors for women personally, and women in general.

2.4. Conclusion

The present dissertation fills the gap in research on sexist behaviors, and on implicit sexist attitudes, by providing measures to assess implicit hostile and benevolent sexist attitudes, and hostile and benevolent sexist behaviors. Additionally, the present dissertation expands previous research that demonstrated the insidious dangers of benevolent sexism for women, by showing that men’s benevolent sexist behaviors benefit men, while they imperil women. Despite the negative effects of sexism for women personally, and women in general, women seem to fail to confront sexism, as has been reported in previous research (e.g., Woodzicka & LaFrance, 2001). Therefore, the present dissertation paves the way for additional research on sexist behaviors, firstly, by helping to identify sexist behaviors and how sexist behaviors can be predicted by sexist attitudes, secondly, by showing that men’s engagement in benevolent sexist behaviors benefits men personally, while it imperils women, and inhibits social change, and thirdly, by providing response strategies that allow women to confront sexism on an individual level and on a collective level. Overall, we hope that our novel implicit and behavioral measures to assess hostile and benevolent sexism serve researchers and practitioners, who also follow the call for research on the investigation of social behaviors (e.g., Fiske, 1998; Baumeister et al., 2007), and thus contribute to an increased research of sexist behavior.
2.5. References


Albert, 1988


Zusammenfassung

Prädiktoren und Konsequenzen von sexistischem Verhalten


Abschließend zielte die vorliegende Doktorarbeit darauf ab, die Bedeutung von individuellen und kollektiven Konfrontationsstrategien für Aktionen außerhalb eines spezifischen sexistischen Vorfalls zu untersuchen.


Zusammenfassend bieten die Ergebnisse aus allen drei Teilen der vorliegenden Doktorarbeit neue Erkenntnisse zu den Prädiktoren und Konsequenzen von sexistischem Verhalten, und die Konfrontation von Sexismus. Somit füllt die vorliegende Doktorarbeit die Forschungslücke zu sexistischem Verhalten, sie trägt zu einem besseren Verständnis der Rolle von sexistischem Verhalten für die Aufrechterhaltung des Status-Quo bei, und erweitert die Erkenntnisse zu den Prädiktoren und Konsequenzen von Sexismus durch die zusätzliche Betrachtung verschiedener Strategien, die zur Konfrontation von Sexismus eingesetzt werden können.
References


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